...I've read of these attacks all my life, but a couple of things I've never found out are how they were done, and about how many times on average a German fighter pilot in, say, an Fw-190, could make head-on attacks against a US bomber formation. I would imagine only three or four times, based on fuel, ammunition, and performance of his machine (plus battle damage, if any), but if anyone could explain this in depth, I'd greatly appreciate the information. Thanks.
Yours,
Paul
Head-on attacks against US four-engined day bombers...
Paul it was the common attack done at the stage of 3-4 a/c in 1943 developing in whole staffels by spring of 44 till the tactic was to come from behind and attack level with the heavy 4 engine bombers.
Only one attack was usually committed unless there were no Allied escort fighters to break up the German a/c as they formed up for another attack.
there was scant time to set up the attack and then proceed with the bomber image filling the revi gunsight for almost under 5 seconds duration of fire, trying to hit the inboard engines or cockpit. It is surprising to me how cool headed the Luftwaffe pilots were to be making them successful under these stressful type of attacks including the US bomber crews having to endure this only armed with a single.50 and later a controlled twin .50.
another problem facing the German pilots was by attacking a formation from a lead position was that they would have to fly through the rest of the bomber box thus subjecting themselvese to the enormous firepower of the other bombers .50's
hth a little ?
E ~
Only one attack was usually committed unless there were no Allied escort fighters to break up the German a/c as they formed up for another attack.
there was scant time to set up the attack and then proceed with the bomber image filling the revi gunsight for almost under 5 seconds duration of fire, trying to hit the inboard engines or cockpit. It is surprising to me how cool headed the Luftwaffe pilots were to be making them successful under these stressful type of attacks including the US bomber crews having to endure this only armed with a single.50 and later a controlled twin .50.
another problem facing the German pilots was by attacking a formation from a lead position was that they would have to fly through the rest of the bomber box thus subjecting themselvese to the enormous firepower of the other bombers .50's
hth a little ?
E ~
Re: Head-on attacks against US four-engined day bombers...
Depending upon numbers (of available attacking fighters) and whether dealing with fighter escort, the following is applicable for the bomber attack by typical squadron strength after escort fighters have left or been attended to by defending ancillary fighters.Paul_9686 wrote:...I've read of these attacks all my life, but a couple of things I've never found out are how they were done, and about how many times on average a German fighter pilot in, say, an Fw-190, could make head-on attacks against a US bomber formation. I would imagine only three or four times, based on fuel, ammunition, and performance of his machine (plus battle damage, if any), but if anyone could explain this in depth, I'd greatly appreciate the information.
Good guys (defending fighters) given a vector and height to IP bomber stream. Climb to height above and abeam the formation. Turn to fly parallel and abeam the formation slightly higher and out of range. Continue until in a position ahead of and abeam of the lead box. (10-11 o'clock high) or (1-2 o'clock high). 180 sweeping turn and attack head on, ideally attacking the lead ship of the lead box and create havoc separating the formation.
Aiming points varied depending upon experience of attackers and bomber type. Centre of mass, fuel tanks and pilot station were preferred, though easier said than done when you realise rate of closure was in the vicinity of 600kts if they went to boost, or to give it some perspective, 12 statue miles per minute.
At appropriate range, let fly with everything available, then split dispersing protective fire of box over multiple diverging targets. Typical split might be lead half-rolls and pulls through with advantage of high speed departure and shielded from fire other than bottom of box. Right does similar but to low right, similiarly left. Mid-centre might fly through the formation trying to executing break at max rate of departure speed.
Escort fighters where present, had to be contended with first unless ancillery attacking forces were available to be deployed for this purpose.
In the case of just an attacking flight and no excort fighters, another favourite tactic was to feint with an obvious beam attack by two fighters flyng lead and wing to attract attention and fire from the box, turning away just before defensive fire effective range was reached. Concurrently, an the unseen third fighter of the flight would position undetected (up-sun where this was tactically possible) and attack from another beam, with increased effectiveness and probability of survival.
Ehehe..nasty NAZIS!
To quote someone I know who flew in this conflict when once I naively and immaturely as a young man remarked how much I'd have loved to have attacked those bomber formations, "If you've ever witnessed first hand the combined firepower of a box in action, no - you wouldn't!". The air war over the Reich was no replica of the Battle of Britain "Tally-ho old boy" club 'Heinkel hunt' for the Me or Fw driving defenders.
The biggest problem with conducting a second pass/attack was the need to conduct a rapid egress in the interest of survival, which course encumbered repositioning for a second attack viable in the same terms. This is the disadvantage of the piston engined fighter. It takes time to climb even with boost and water meth, both of which are limited (time/ volume).
Where possible a second attack came from a supporting formation whilst the former reformed for another attack where perceived possible prior to the enemy formation approaching the target and defensive flak shield, but more usually returned for a landing to rearm and refuel with the intention of attacking the formation again on its egress from the target.
Last edited by sigrun on Tue Oct 26, 2004 2:30 pm, edited 1 time in total.
Thanks for your reply, Erich. It also astounds me to think of the incredible courage required to make such an attack. One other thing--when breaking off the attack and diving away, would a pilot roll over on his back and dive away with his plane's belly to the guns of the ball turret gunners? I'm thinking this would be the best move in an FW-190, which had (if I recall correctly) exceptionally tough belly armor in most of its variants.
Yours,
Paul
Yours,
Paul
in 1943 and early 1944 none of the attacking Fw 190's had high escorts. Not till April of 44 when I./JG 3 was doing prtective work in all blue 109's, but the unit went back to it's origianl bomber killing or defensive efforts agasint Allied fighters during Normandie. The high escort came into reality on 7-7-44 by Gerhard Stamp's I./JG 300 during the Blitzschlacht über Oschelrsleben which was covered on my web-pages a few years ago.
The Fw 190's during 1943 and the first part of 1944 were not heavily armored except for the nose ring and in some cases the bottom of the engine mount, and yes you are correct through cine film fottage it is plainly seen that the Fw's would do a half roll through the formation but this was also the case of the Bf 109 attackers which would also barrel through and then split-S down and out away from any escort fighters, or so they thought.
During the rear attacks during the summer of 44 which became standard practice the SturmFw's would attack in a wedge then fan out into a straight line, pilots picking out individual bombers almost upon the last moment. As the German fighters went up through the formation either right or left they would try and reform if the US escorts were not there. Coming together under the orders of Stafflen kommandeurs the reamining undamaged Sturm Fw's would form up for another rear attack some 1000 feet higher than the bomber formations and possibly up to a 1/2 mile behind. this is of course unders so called perfect conditions with no allied fighters present. All the while when US fighters were about the 109's would try their best to keep the Mustangs at bay
The Fw 190's during 1943 and the first part of 1944 were not heavily armored except for the nose ring and in some cases the bottom of the engine mount, and yes you are correct through cine film fottage it is plainly seen that the Fw's would do a half roll through the formation but this was also the case of the Bf 109 attackers which would also barrel through and then split-S down and out away from any escort fighters, or so they thought.
During the rear attacks during the summer of 44 which became standard practice the SturmFw's would attack in a wedge then fan out into a straight line, pilots picking out individual bombers almost upon the last moment. As the German fighters went up through the formation either right or left they would try and reform if the US escorts were not there. Coming together under the orders of Stafflen kommandeurs the reamining undamaged Sturm Fw's would form up for another rear attack some 1000 feet higher than the bomber formations and possibly up to a 1/2 mile behind. this is of course unders so called perfect conditions with no allied fighters present. All the while when US fighters were about the 109's would try their best to keep the Mustangs at bay
Hi Paul, though not Erich, I can perhaps give you an accurate answer.Paul_9686 wrote:Thanks for your reply, Erich. It also astounds me to think of the incredible courage required to make such an attack. One other thing--when breaking off the attack and diving away, would a pilot roll over on his back and dive away with his plane's belly to the guns of the ball turret gunners? I'm thinking this would be the best move in an FW-190, which had (if I recall correctly) exceptionally tough belly armor in most of its variants.
Yours,
Paul
The hypothetical "armor" and "belly" exposure thinking and hypotheses are an academic nonsense argued rhetorically by those book experts who have no concept of the salient issues in air combat. The pragmatic reality is you want to achieve minimum defensive crossfire, causing them maximum deflection by maximum rate of departure from the formation all of which make you a fast moving, smaller target (hard to track & hit) exposed to the minimum number of guns possible, ie: only ventral and and stopping the high flight from firing a you less they hit their own formation, (yes please) whilst very quickly becoming an impossibly small and rapidly diminishing target before being out of effective range.
The best way to to this on both the ingress and egress is rate of closure (head on) and using a gravity assisted departure in conjunction with divergent targets and confusion on the way out.
Defensive gunners don't get time to aim at anything other than in the general direction and at best, centre of mass at those sorts of speeds. So nonsense about ball turrets aiming for the fuel tanks, offensive tactics determined by belly armor etc is an academically esoteric 1 v 1 fighter discussion at its most plausible, and even then a rather "sounds good on paper" argument of concern perhaps for those sufficiently cool and experienced enough to maintain sufficient cogence under combat duress.
Not your average thrown into battle with a minimum of training and zip experience circa 1944 fighter pilot or bomber gunner - on any front.
Everything happens very quickly in the air.
.
Hi PaulPaul_9686 wrote:Thanks, friends.
Sigrun, I don't doubt everything happens in a bloomin' hurry in the air, even at WWII-era speeds of the 300-450 mph range.
I hope this topic will remain active for a while; the more I learn, the happier I am.
Yours,
Paul
When I stress the point, it's because it is generally unappreciated in favour of more trivial though academically appealing through being easily comprehended, recognised and measureable for the sake of "I win" argument.
I don't doubt your capability to comprehend, interest in the subject or your intelligence. It's just that it the sort of thing glossed over with scant regard by academics, who seldom having any real comprehensive appreciation of that factor of their own, de-emphasise it, or even where not, fail to provide any appreciation of its imposing relevance.
As an example, your sentence "evenat WWII-era speeds of the 300-450 mph" is all revealing that your imagination yet fails to truly grasp just how quickly things happen in the air. Time. "If only I'd" or "If I'd had more time" means you end up the kill icon, not painting it. You aren't alone by a long shot. Probably something best analogised with it's a lot like riding a high performance motorbike. You can imagine what it's like all you like from your car seat, but you don't know until you've felt the manoeuverability, acceleration and unrestricted freedom knee to the bitumen. Then there's the appreciation of the difference between riding a street 600 of 100bhp and a liquid cooled racing two stroke of half its weight also of 100bhp. Though they sound the equal on paper, that is where any similarity or equality ends. It's an understanding of which reading can only take you so far without some appreciation derived of relative experience thing. Appreciate that this is difficult if not impossible for most relative to air ops.
That's what I get for being a non-aviator, Sigrun. Though I've liked WWII aircraft all my life. The Focke-Wulf 190 is my favorite, which leads me to this query:
What would be a good mix of weapons for a head-on attack? I'm thinking of something like the Fw-190 A-6/R1--two fuselage-mounted 7.9mm machine guns, two wing-root 20mm cannon, and under the wings, two gondolas (one under each wing) each holding two 20mm cannon, for a grand total of six cannon and two machine guns.
The time period I'm thinking of is the autumn of 1943. I think the Fw-190 A-8 had not yet arrived at the squadrons, so that's why I'm envisioning the A-6/R1.
Yours,
Paul
What would be a good mix of weapons for a head-on attack? I'm thinking of something like the Fw-190 A-6/R1--two fuselage-mounted 7.9mm machine guns, two wing-root 20mm cannon, and under the wings, two gondolas (one under each wing) each holding two 20mm cannon, for a grand total of six cannon and two machine guns.
The time period I'm thinking of is the autumn of 1943. I think the Fw-190 A-8 had not yet arrived at the squadrons, so that's why I'm envisioning the A-6/R1.
Yours,
Paul
Hi Paul
The problem with head on atttack is the rate of closure which equates to target size and time within guns range. But of course, that's also a primary reason for choosing head on attack. ie: maximising survival through minimising exposure as a targetable unit to enemy fire on the ingress and egress. Vulnerability of the B17F in this regard, which was the mainstay of the 8th Air Force assault in autumn '43, comes to mind as the optimum target for this technique. At this juncture, and feel free to jump in and correct me if I'm wrong, the escort fighters still didn't have the range to stay to the targets in the Reich, leaving bombers vulnerable in this target ingress and egress phase.
Given that the time available for the shot is exceptionally short and less than optimum in terms of aimed fire, though less in terms of ROF than the 7.92mm, maximum explosive impact of cannon is ideal. The more the better. Remember just one of these striking the fuel tanks, lines or the flight deck is going to make a beaut bonfire or break up the party leaving one hell of a mess. Self-sealing ain't gonna' help with 20mm. Even if it isn't an almighty explosive WOOMPAH! upon initial contact, aluminium spars won't take long to burn through at all from the resultant fire.
Admittedly without being researched to the same degree as you about 190A variants, I'd agree with you in terms of preferred armament for engaging enemy bomber formations, 6x 20mm of the A6/R1 sound mighty tasty. Just getting the target CoM zeroed in the sight, assuming you can select/fire all six 20mm guns together, you've got to hit something with all that firepower, and with a 20mm strike, it increases probability of any/every strike being decisive.
The problem with head on atttack is the rate of closure which equates to target size and time within guns range. But of course, that's also a primary reason for choosing head on attack. ie: maximising survival through minimising exposure as a targetable unit to enemy fire on the ingress and egress. Vulnerability of the B17F in this regard, which was the mainstay of the 8th Air Force assault in autumn '43, comes to mind as the optimum target for this technique. At this juncture, and feel free to jump in and correct me if I'm wrong, the escort fighters still didn't have the range to stay to the targets in the Reich, leaving bombers vulnerable in this target ingress and egress phase.
Given that the time available for the shot is exceptionally short and less than optimum in terms of aimed fire, though less in terms of ROF than the 7.92mm, maximum explosive impact of cannon is ideal. The more the better. Remember just one of these striking the fuel tanks, lines or the flight deck is going to make a beaut bonfire or break up the party leaving one hell of a mess. Self-sealing ain't gonna' help with 20mm. Even if it isn't an almighty explosive WOOMPAH! upon initial contact, aluminium spars won't take long to burn through at all from the resultant fire.
Admittedly without being researched to the same degree as you about 190A variants, I'd agree with you in terms of preferred armament for engaging enemy bomber formations, 6x 20mm of the A6/R1 sound mighty tasty. Just getting the target CoM zeroed in the sight, assuming you can select/fire all six 20mm guns together, you've got to hit something with all that firepower, and with a 20mm strike, it increases probability of any/every strike being decisive.
So, the underwing double cannon gondolas were originally a factory conversion (Umrust-Bausatz) and not a field conversion (Rustsatz), Erich? (Sorry my German lacks umlauts and is probably ungrammatical, to boot.) But William Greene says that the A-5/U12 was only built as two prototypes, not as a regular part of the A-5 series. He mentions the A-6/R1 going to the Eastern Front, but this has to be a mistake on his part--why load down an Fw-190 like that for combat in the East? IMHO, it's in the West--against those Yankee bombers--that the A-6/R1's weaponry will be most appreciated.
Oh, and I found a photo of ace Sepp Wurmheller at this webpage (http://www.luftwaffe.cz/wurmheller.html) which shows him beside the rudder of his Fw-190 about August or September 1943 (scroll down, you can't miss it), and the subtype of Werk Nr. 530314 is identified as an A-6. So the A-6 would've been available to the fighter wings in autumn 1943.
Thanks for your additional comments, Sigrun. I was thinking that an A-6/R1 would be an especially good bomber-killer, due to weight of fire--as long as the Yankees are still using the P-47, which lacked range and had to break off at the German border. Otherwise, those cannon gondolas are so much weight and drag, and could mean the difference between life and death in fighter-vs.-fighter combat.
Naturally, once the Mustang became available in numbers after the turn of '43/'44, it was a whole new ballgame.
Yours,
Paul
Oh, and I found a photo of ace Sepp Wurmheller at this webpage (http://www.luftwaffe.cz/wurmheller.html) which shows him beside the rudder of his Fw-190 about August or September 1943 (scroll down, you can't miss it), and the subtype of Werk Nr. 530314 is identified as an A-6. So the A-6 would've been available to the fighter wings in autumn 1943.
Thanks for your additional comments, Sigrun. I was thinking that an A-6/R1 would be an especially good bomber-killer, due to weight of fire--as long as the Yankees are still using the P-47, which lacked range and had to break off at the German border. Otherwise, those cannon gondolas are so much weight and drag, and could mean the difference between life and death in fighter-vs.-fighter combat.
Naturally, once the Mustang became available in numbers after the turn of '43/'44, it was a whole new ballgame.
Yours,
Paul