German Armor in France

[tigre]

Hi to all

I think this could be intresting.

German Armor In France

Translated and digested by the MILITARY REVIEW from an article by
Major Rogé in “Revue Historiquede l’Armee” (France) No. 1, ,March 1947.

HOW many tanks did the Germans use against France in May 1940?
To answer this much discussed question, the author interviewed General Guderian the American prisoner of war camp at Allendorff in November 1946.
General Guderian’s efforts had occupied prominent place in the evolution of the modern German Army. He conceived the armored division, formulated the rules. for employment, and codified its tactics in the 1940 regulations. His book, AchtungPanzer, established him as a leader in armor.
He put his doctrine of employment of armor into practice in the Polish campaign. As commander of the 19th Armored Army Corps under. General von Kleist in the offensive against France, he was charged with the decisive operation of the campaign. He forced the passage of the Meuse at Sedan on 13 May, and in the last half of June, 1940, he encircled the group of French Armies of the East at Epinal and Gerardmer.

The interview follows:

Question: How many armored and motorized divisions did the German Army possees on 10 May 1940?

Answer: The German Army on 10 May 1940, had ten armored and six motorized divisions. All were engaged against France on 10 May.

Question: Did the German Army possess any separate armored units in addition to the armored divisions?

Answer: The German Army possessed no separate armored formations.
Question: How many tanks were there in each armored division?

Answer: The ten armored divisions were not made up in the same manner and did not possess the same number of tanks. Divisions 1, 2 and 10 each had 276 combat vehicles. Divisions 3, 4 and 5 each had 324 combat vehicles. Divisions 6, 7 and 8 each had 218 combat vehicles. The 9th Division had 229 combat vehicles. This gives a total of 2,683 combat vehicles of categories 1, 2, 3 and 4, to which should be added the commander’s tanks and armored cars.

Question: Would you be able, on the basis of the document you possess, to indicate the number of commander’s tanks and armored care in the armored divisions?

Answer: Each armored division had three commander’s tanks, which makes a total of thirty. Each armored brigade had four commander’s tanks, which makes a total of forty tanks. Each armored regiment had three commander’s tanks, which makes a total of sixty tanks. Each armored battalion had three commander’s tanks, which makes a total of 120 tanks. Each artillery regiment of the armored divisions had seven commander’s tanks, which makes a total of seventy tanks.
This gives a grand total of 320 commander’s tanks.

Question: The total number of tanks of the ten armored divisions was, therefore, 2,683 plus 320, or 3,003 tanks?

Answer: That is correct. But it is a theoretical figure. It was not reached, and we did not employ more than 2,800 battle worthy combat vehicles.

Question: We should also count the armored cars. How many of these did you possees?

Answer: Fifty-six for each armored division or a total of 560; twenty-four for each motorized division or a total of 144; and three for each division of infantry on the active list, or a total of 108. This makes grand total of about 800. But this theoretical figure was not reached and the number of armored cars should be estimated at about 700.

Question: Were all infantry divisions supplied with three armored cars on 10 May 1940?

Answer: Only the thirty-six divisions of the active army were provided with three armored cars.

Question: According to your figure, the total number of armored combat vehicles employed against France in 1940 did not exceed 3,500?

Answer: That is correct. However, we did have at our disposal some one hundred tanks, armored cars and self-propelled guns in Norway and the schools of Germany.

Question: Were there tanks and armored cars in process of construction in the armament factories at that time?

Answer: Certainly, but I do not recall how many such there were on 10 May 1940.

Question: Did armored divisions 12, 13, 14, 15, 17 and 24 participate in the campaign of France in 1940?

Answer: No, these divisions did not exist at that time, but studies were in progress for their organization and formation.

Question: What was the figure for the armored and motorized divisions in condition for combat on 1 September 1939?

Answer: Germany engaged against Poland all the armored and motorized divisions at her disposal, ‘namely, four armored and five motorized divisions.

Question: How was Germany able to put ten armored and six motorized divisions into the line by May 1940?

Answer: The cadres and troops existed and were already trained in the use of tanks. The equipment was constructed during the period between September 1939 and April 1940.

Question: Did the captured tanks of Czechoslovakia and Poland permit the formation, of armored divisions?

Answer: The doctrines of employment of tanks in Poland and Czechoslovakia were not the same as in Germany. Hence the foreign equipment would not answer the purposes of the German General Staff. The equipment was not interchangeable.

Question: Did you capture many French tanks in France in 1940?

Answer: The number of tanks seized in parks in France was not very great.

Question: How many armored and motorized divisions were engaged against Russia in June 1941?

Answer: Twenty-four armored and ten motorized divisions including S.S. units.

Question: How many armored and motorized divisions were created between the month of July 1940 and June 1941?

Answer: Fourteen armored and four motorized divisions.

Question: Were these divisions of the same type and composition as those which fought in France in May 1940?

Answer: No, they were less powerful. Each of the twenty-four armored divisions possessed only three battalions of tanks instead of the four in the armored divisions of 10 May 1940. Armored divisions Nos. 1 to 10 each lost one battalion of tanks. Thirty-two battalions of tanks had been created. The armored divisions which were engaged against Russia in June 1941 each had a strength of some 180 tanks while their minimum strength in the campaign of France was 280 tanks.

Question: Did not the German General Staff attempt to reorganize the armored divisions during the course of the war, providing each with four armored battalions as in 1940 during the French campaign ?

Answer: To our great regret, we were unable to increase the numerical strengh, in the matter of tanks, of our armored divisions. We did not have enough tanks for the operations we had undertaken in Russia and Africa.

Question: Nevertheless, was not the tank production of German industry very high, considering the means at its disposal?

Answer: Our monthly tank production passed from 250 per month at the beginning of 1940 to 500 at the beginning of 1942, reached 800 at the beginning of 1943 and 1,000 at the end of 1943. From the summer of 1944 on, production fell off and continued to do so until April 1945. Then too, the multiplicity of the types constructed often slowed down production.

Question: This being the ease, why was it not possible to reinforce the armored divisions?

Answer: Our losses, on the Russian front particularly, were so great that the tanks coming out of our factories served simply to replace those that had been destroyed or worn out. We did, however, increase the number of our armored units, raising to thirty-four the number of our armored divisions. But in each division, the number of tank battalions decreased and the number of tanks in each armored division did not exceed 100 or 120 by the end of the war.

Question: How did Germany handle the fuel problem so as to supply her armored and motorized divisions, her air and naval forces, during the war?

Answer: Germany’s production of synthetic gasoline was insufficient, even with the help of Austrian oil. The Rumanian oil was indispensible for continuing the war.

Question: Were Germany’s war industries able to aid her allies, Italy, Finland, Hungary and Rumania in weapons and other equipment?

Answer: In spite of the production attained .bv the armament industries, our losses were such that it was not possible to arm Germany and her allies in a uniform manner. Hence, the armies allied with Germany were less well armed, especially as regarded tanks, armored cars and antiaircraft guns, than the German Army. Leaving, for the moment, these matters of a technical nature, the subject of the French campaign was broached. The information thus gathered, will perhaps permit, to a certain extent, the completion of the French records and give an idea of the significance of the maneuvers carried otit on the two sides. “The original plan of the invasion of France” said General Guderian, “consisted in the unreserved execution of the Schlieffen plan, characterized by a powerful attack by the German right wing across Holland and Belgium, reaching the French Channel coast. But in November 1939, a German courier carrying confidential orders on the plan of invasion, unfortunately landed at Brussels instead of Cologne, and Hitler decided to change the plan for the Invasion of France. The main maneuver then consisted in making the decisive effort in the center, through Luxembourg and southern Belgium, reaching the Meuse at Sedan and piercing the Mag-inot line at this point. If the maneuver succeeded, it would permit a rapid march toward the mouth of the Somme and would insure the separation into two parts of the France-English forces, one in Belgium and northern France, the other in the east, inside the fortifications of the Maginot line. This military operation was to be of decisive importance and the outcome of the western campaign depended on. it. The offensive of the Central Group of Armies was prolonged by the attack uf the Northern Group of Armies across Holland and Belgium with the aim:

“l. Of causing the Allied High Conimand to believe, and continue to believe, that the Schlieffen plan was being followed;

“2. Of encircling the France-Belgian Armies in northern France, in conjunction with the Central Group of. Armies.”

Question: What role, General, were you personally to play in the execution of the new plan, and what did you think of this plan?

Answer: In November 1939 I was at Coblenz. I was called by Hitler to give my opinion of the new plan. In case I approved it, I was to have ‘charge of its preparation and direction as far as the armored arm was concerned. But I had already studied it and had even already proposed to General von Manstein, von Rundstedt’s chief of staff, before being by called Hitler.

A, comparison of the two plans showed the following advantages in the new one:

I. According to the information supplied by the German intelligence depark
ment, the France-British High Command was looking for Germany to make use of the Schlieffen plan. The French High Command had concentrated most of its armored and motorized forces on the Belgian frontier and, in the event this plan was followed, these appeared to be ready to penetrate into Belgium as soon as the German invasion began.

II. The field defenses both in Belgium and Holland confirmed the fact that the enemy was getting ready to block the execution of the Schlieffen plan. On the other hand, the Belgian defenses on the Luxembourg frontier were weak.

III. In the Sedan sector, in the center the France-British positions, the Maginot Line. was unfinished and did not possess the strength of the Lorraine and Rhine fortifications.

IV. The concentration of enemy forces the Sedan area brought out the weakness of the German divisions when spread over large fronts with a part of them be longing to the second reserves.

V. The surprise factor could be decisive.

A profound study of the plan proved that it would be necessary to make use of
more than the three divisions called for by Schlieffen plan. It was not hard to persuade
the High Command of the need to use all available armored and motorized
divisions.

Question: What command did you posess in the execution of the plan of the campaign against France ?

Answer: In the Central Group of Armies commanded by General von Rundstedt there had been organized an armored formation under General von Kleist which was made up of the XIV, XLI and XIX Armored Corps. I was given the command of the XIX Armored Corps.

Question: How did you handle the, instruction and training of the cadres and men during the war?

Answer: For the first time I had the opportunity to organize the detailed preparation of an operation, orientating the divisional generals and training the troops in maneuvers. For several months I trained the forces, first in war games, then in the terrain of the Eifel area, which is similar to that of the Ardennes, in the detailed execution of the maneuvers which were, to be conducted in Luxembourg, in Belgium and on the Meuse in France from J-day to J-day plus 5.

The staffs and men of the 19th Armored Corps had reached so high a degree of perfection in their training that the orders for the corps, divisions and regiments were made out as far along as J-day plus 5.

From 10 to 15 May, I did not have many changes to make in these orders which were issued when the time for them arrived, like the different acts in a play.

Question: How were the generals and corps commanders of the XIX Armored Corps designated?

Answer: I myself chose my subordinates from those with whom I was well acquainted. My chief of staff, General Nehring, who the folIowing year was to command the Afrika Korps, understood me by looking at me? My method of command, however, was very simple and very rapid. It consisted in giving my orders solely by radio, and coded. I always had with me a radio. officer and a code officer. From my tank ,I transmitted orders directly to my subordinates, whom I visited on the front line. Written orders were edited by my Chief of Staff and did not exceed one or two pages in length.

Question: What was the composition of the XIX Armored Corps on 10 May 1940?

Answer: The XIX Armored Corps was made up of three armored divisions, the 2d, 1st and 10th, from right to left. The 1st, in the center, was followed by the staff of the XIX Corps and the separate elements, that is to say:, one regiment of armored artillery (two groups of 105s and one group of 150s), one regiment of Flak (antiaircraft artillery), one observation squadron, one signal corps battalion, one engineer battalion and the Gross Deutschland regiment. Each armored division comprised one regiment of armored artillery of three groups (two of 105s and one of 150s), two regiments of tanks, two regiments of motorized infantry, one motorized reconnaissance group, one motorcycle battalion, one engineer battalion, one signal corps battalion, one arititank battalion, one flak
company, one reconnaissance squadron and motorized services. With its 900 tanks and its twelve groups of artillery, four of which were 150s, the XIX Armored Corps had concentrated within it both power and speed. Both men and cadres were certain of victory.

Question: How did you cross the Meuse on 13 May and break through the fortified French position at Sedan?

Answer: Routes had been reconnoitered and the choice of the attack sector, between Sedan and Saint-Menges, had been made in advance. The main problem was speed of execution: the most rapid possible crossing of the Meuse. By 12 May, the 1st Armored Division had taken Sedan while the 10th was entering Bazeilles and Balari. The 2d had been stopped before la Semoy.
General von Kleist ordered the attack at 1600 on 13 May for the purpose of crowing the Meuse. I would have preferred to wait till the 14th in order to have the use of my three armored divisions. The attack planned for 13 May was to develop on a narrow front (2 ½ km.) between Sedan and Saint-Menges, after a concentrated fire preparation by artillery and aviation.
General von Kleist desired a very short but brutal preparation. I, on the contrary, desired a preparation of two hours duration in order to obtain a demoralizing effect by the prolonged action of the flaks.

The attack was to be led by the 1st Armored Division reinforced by the Gross Deutschland regiment on a front of 2 ½ kilometers between Sedan and Saint- Menges. Its engineer battalion was to be reinforced by the corps engineer battalion. The artillery of the 1st Armored Division was to be reinforced by the corps artillery and was to be aided by the fire of the groups of 150s belonging to the 2d and 10th Armored Divisions which, from their positions, were able to fire into the sector of the lst. Armored, Division. The fire concentration of the 1st Armored Division on a front of 2500 meters was to comprise:

The two groups of 105s of the Ist Armored Division.
The two groups of 105s of the Corps Artillery Regiment.
The group of 150s of the 1st Armored Division.
The group of 150s of the corps artillery.
The group of 150s of the 10th Armored Division.
The. group of 150s of the 2d Armored Division.
The AA fire in the attack sector was to he provided by the flak regiment of the XIX Corps.

Question: When did the artillery preparation take place; how long did it last; what was the rate of fire?

Answer: The artillery preparation was to last from 1400 to 1600 on 13 May. Normal rate of fire from 1400 to 1540; rapid rate of fire from 1540 to 1600.

Question: What was the mission of the artillery?

Answer: The mission of the artillery was to destroy the French positions south the Meuse, and, particularly the artillery positions, command posts, supply columns and casemates.

Question: What wasthe mission of the aviation?

Answer: The aviation was to insure air supremacy during the 13th and particularly from noontime on. Before the attack, I had dealt with the Luftwafe concerning the employment of its forces. I had asked the dive-bombing forces to destroy the French artillery and to spread action over the period between 1400 and 1600 with maximum intensity from 1530 1600. Liaison between the XIX Corps and the ,air force had been worked out in great detail. In addition to the organic reconnaissance aviation of the XIX Armored Corps and the fighter squadrons which insured us air supremacy, twelve squadrons of dive bombers took part in the attack.

Question: What was your impression on 13 May of the French defense on the banks the Meuse?

Answer: I noted that the southern bank the Meuse was but little defended and that the enemy forces appeared weak. Hence, I decided to destroy the casemates that had resisted the artillery preparation by bringing our 88s to the north bank of the Meuse and firing directly into the ernbrasures of the casemates.

Question: What was the situation at 1600 atthe moment of the attack?

Answer: At 1600 the attack succeeded and the armored infantry easily crossed the Meuse in pneumatic boats. The construction of the bridge was immediately begun. The surprise had been complete, Anglo-French aviation was gone. The French artillery, overwhelmed by the artillery fire and Stuka attacks was falling back. The casemates had either been destroyed or taken without defenders.

Question: How did the attack develop south of the Meuse?

Answer: At this time, the 2d Armored Division was still halted before la Semoy and the 10th had not yst succeeded in crossing the Meuse. It was the 1st Armored Division that was to play the decisive role. On the afternoon of the 13th, the tanks and artillery of the 1st Armored Division crossed the bridge to the south side of the Meuse to attack the principal position of enemy resistance in the direction of Chehery, in order to support the action of the brigade of armored infantry the Gross Deustchland regiment. It was 1800 when the attack began on the principal position of enemy resistance, south of the Meuse. By the end of the afternoon, this position had been broken through over a front of five kilometers and the Gross Deutschland regiment had progressed a distance of six kilometers south of the Meuse.

Question: What would the situation have been at 1400 if the French had begun their counterattack at dawn?

Answer: It would have surprised the 1st Armored Division in a difficult situation, and the more so since at this hour I was not yet able to count on the 2d Armored Division. But a few hours later, the 2nd Armored Division, which had succeeded in taking la Semoy, crossed the Meuse and supported the 1st Armored Division in its repulse of the counterattack of the French tanks.

Question: Is it not true that the Franco-English and Belgian aviation attempted destroy the bridge over which all the communications of the XIX Corps passed during the day of 14 May?

Answer: This day was critical, for the Franco-Englisha viation was mistress of the skies at Sedan as a.result of the departure of the German aviation for another sector.

Question: How did the XIX Corps resist these attacks and by what means was the bridge protected?

Answer: It was the flak regiment of the XIX Corps which, owing to the skill with which its position had been chosen and the accuracy of its fire, was more than a match for the French aviation. In spite of their courage, the enemy aviators were not able to destroy the Saint-Menges bridge (between Sedan and Saint-Menges). More than 150 enemy planes were destroyed.

Question: What decision didyou takeat the end of the afternoon of the 14th in view of the failure of the French counterattacks both on the ground and in the air?

Answer: In spite of tbe spearhead position of the XIX Armored Corps, I decided to push the 1st and 2d Armored Divisions westward for the purpose of disorganizing the rear of the Ninth Army and profit from my success by exploiting it as rapidly as possible. I insured the security of the movement of the 1st and 2d Armored Divisions by assigning to the 10th Armored Division, rein forced by the Gross Deutschland regiment, the task of protecting our left flank in the direction of Paris until the infantry units of Marshal von Rundetedt could arrive and relieve the 10th Armored Division south of the Meuse at Sedan.

Question: In your opinion, what action could the French have taken to stop you maneuver ?

Answer: From 15 to 17 May, the only means available to the French for avoiding the catastrophe that awaited them, if the thing were possible, would haw been a combined counterattack by eight divisions of the army of General Frere and the armored division of General De Gaulle, on the flank of the XIX Corps which was moving westward. Even if this counterattack had not succeeded it would have resuIted in an arrest of two or three days duration of the advance of the XIX Armored Corps. General de Gaulle’s counterattack seems to me to have failed owing to lack of sufficient gasoline, and that of General Frere was not put into execution.

Question: Did the German General Staff believe in your victory on 10 May 1940?

Answer: Many were skeptical of the resuits of my maneuver. I was obliged to do a great amount of fighting in Germany to obtain the triumph of my tactics in the employment of armored divisions. But in my corps, everyone, officers, noncommissioned officers and men, were sure of victory.

[Reb]

Good post Tigre - thanks. Always glad to hear from Hurryin' Heinz!

Cheers
Reb

[Nibelung]

Tigre, thank you, indeed Guderian is allways plesant to read and study!!

best,
Nibelung

[Qvist]

There are some interesting inaccuracies in Guderians interview (or transcript errors, or misunderstandings, who knows?):

Question: How many armored and motorized divisions were engaged against Russia in June 1941?

Twenty-four armored and ten motorized divisions including S.S. units.

I wonder how he arrives at 24 armored divisions? There were only 21 German armored divisions in existence at the time (including 21.PzD), and of these, only 19 were in the East or in OKH reserve. It seems that he is counting the four SS divisions as Panzer Divisions, which is odd, given that they were not either in name or in practice at this point. And even then he is one short, perhaps he is including the romanians too? The mot. division figure is correct if the SS divisions are not included.

Question: Were these divisions of the same type and composition as those which fought in France in May 1940?

Answer: No, they were less powerful. Each of the twenty-four armored divisions possessed only three battalions of tanks instead of the four in the armored divisions of 10 May 1940. Armored divisions Nos. 1 to 10 each lost one battalion of tanks. Thirty-two battalions of tanks had been created. The armored divisions which were engaged against Russia in June 1941 each had a strength of some 180 tanks while their minimum strength in the campaign of France was 280 tanks.

This is equally odd, because almost all of the Panzer divisions had two rather than three batallions of tanks (with just two exceptions, if my memory serves me).

cheers

[Pirx]

Some commander's medium tanks had no gun. How much of them where used in France?

[tigre]

Hi Qvist, nice to meet you.

Who knows , perhaps because he has not documents at all at that time, and was answering from memory. Please, note that he answered that Fourteen armored and four motorized divisions were created from July 1940 to June 1941. Nevertheless the discussion is open.

Best Regards. Hasta la vista.

[Domen123]

Answer: Germany engaged against Poland all the armored and motorized divisions at her disposal, ‘namely, four armored and five motorized divisions.

Question: How was Germany able to put ten armored and six motorized divisions into the line by May 1940?

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, Kempf Panzerdivisionen = 7 armoured divisions
1, 2, 3, 4 Leichtedivisionen = 4 light [armoured] divisions
1, 2, 3, 4 = 4 motorized divisions

And that's the answer how Germany managed to put ten armoured divisions into the line by May 1940 (they already had them in 1939, just small reorganization of three light into three armoured was needed).