Earlier, in one of the previous posts I already mentioned, that two motorised air-defence divisions of Germans participated in Korsun-Shevchenkovsky battle: Flak Div. 17. (mot.) on III. Pz. Korp. and Flak Div. 10. (mot.) on a site XLVII Pz. Korp. (gen v. Vormann).
Before Flak Div. 10. (mot.) was in gen. Schörner’s Korp-Abteilung also it was thrown to Korsun-Shevchenkovsky together with Pz. Div. 24.
However, Pz. Div. 24. unlike Flak Div. 10. (mot.) participation in Korsun-Shevchenkovsky battle did not accept, as at once on arrival in the Vormann’s Korp. it has been returned back to Nikopol as Russian have made there a breakthrough of the defences of bridgehead .
In structure Flak Div. 10. (mot.) was Flak Regt.12 (mot.) to which light 735th Railway Air-Defence Abteilung- /leichte Flak Abt. 735 (Eisb.)/ submitted in the office relation.. Thus concerning use this railway Air-Defence Abteilung submitted to the German commander of transport traffics of the South of Russia.
More low I give transfer of the battle report of one of commanders of batteries leichte Flak Abt. 735 (Eisb.).
The report is interesting in several directions.
First, comparison of the data received from the report of commanders of batteries, and that that informs us the German post-war source about same of
leichte Flak-Abteilung 735 (v), leichte Flak-Abteilung 735 (Eisb.) once again shows low reliability of the last.
Secondly, this report shows basic differences between the Railway Air-Defence Abteilungs, operating in an army group "South" (as others army groups in Russia - "A", "Center" and "North".), and heavy Air-Defence Abteilungs on the railway platforms, operating on the expanded territory of Reich.
These are differences both in a chain of command, and in type of solved problems.
The truth here is one but. As assures us, ours dear Jan-Hendrik, all German commanders of air-defence units and formations are in combination agents of the Soviet propagation. Thereupon I wish to tell, that I about it do not know, the such information I do not arrange and consequently I leave them on exclusive on conscience of ours dear Jan-Hendrik.
As to quality of my transfers that here, ours dear Jan-Hendrik, is absolutely right. In my opinion, it is necessary to award at least the Iron Cross II of everyone whom to suffice patience to read till the end of my literary trash. But unfortunately, anything in here (поменьшей to a measure at present) help I can nothing. In such case Russian speak - you a welcome to all we have!
So, follows more low, the report of lieutenant Ernst (it is possible Erist) - the commander 2nd battery of leichte Flak Abt. 735th (Eisb.). This report is made together with corporal /unter-offizier/ Meier (is commander of 1st platoon) and contains some typewritten pages. Therefore I give from it only that is of interest for us.
About it Abteilung I will give some additional data in a following post.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lieutenant Ernst ............................................on October, 19th, 1943
2nd battery of light 735th Air-Defence Abteilung
To: 17th (mot.) Air-Defence Division.
The report on approach of an infantry and tanks of the opponent
on railway station Pyatkihatka - on October, 18th, 1943.
2nd battery carried out air-defence defence of railway station Pyatkihatka. The battery deployed as follows:
1st platoon as a part of four guns with one the searchlight on railway platforms was in deadlock on an East side of station at a road exit on Verhovtsevo.
2nd platoon as a part of three guns and a transport railway platforms were in deadlock on the southwest side of station in a direction to Krivoi Rog.
4th platoon was on positions for land defence to the north of station, the platoon should replace positions and pass to air-defence towers nearby from a battery transport:
Two searchlights stood at deadlock behind empty echelons.
In a direction on Znamenka 3rd platoon.
......
In 15.00 October, 18 1st platoon has told by phone, that tanks and an infantry of the opponent attack distance of 3,500 m. I slowly has sent this report to an aide-de-camp of 12th air-defence Regiment /Flak Regt.12 (mot) - Yuri/ and has obtained the order to get the locomotive and to transport the battery in Aleksandriha. Therefore I have immediately commanded to platoons to be prepared for movement, to move together all cars and to expect the locomotive.
I have commanded to 4th platoon to remove three guns from gun carriages and to ship in empty cars of the battery. Then I have called in management of transportable park and have tried to receive the mobile locomotive to connect all platforms and battery cars in one structure. However to me have answered, that free locomotives are not present, and in the next two-three hours will not be. Therefore I have sent ober-wachmeistr Herndkind to the chief of station with the task - by all means immediately to get the locomotive for battery formation in one structure.
In the meantime 1st platoon has reported, that shells are torn already nearby from a platoon, apparently, it the tanks of the opponent pushed forward delivered fire.
......
I could not leave without the consent of the battle commandant Pyatikhatka - therefore I have tried to contact it by phone and to report on battery departure, that and it was possible to me after long efforts. Then I together with wachmeist Velvig have gone to two searchlights which were at deadlock behind empties, whether to find out they are deduced from this deadlock.
Firing was distributed absolutely close from station. On searchlight plants machine-gun fire from the north was already conducted. In the meantime has darkened. I was convinced that both searchlight plants it is impossible to take out at once as ahead of them at deadlock there is a considerable quantity of empty cars. Then in darkness I have gone on station and have found for cars of 1st platoon. The platoon commander corporal Meier has reported on me, that the locomotive together with corporal Wielde has left behind other platoons.
Now tanks of the opponent have appeared on a North side of station and have opened fire on ways, structures and locomotives. Apparently, the infantry of the opponent has got on station as from a station building machine-gun fire was conducted. We could not shoot, as were in the middle of other structures. All German railwaymen in panic ran. From time to time there passed the German soldiers who have lost the subdivisions, they informed, that ahead of German troops already there are no also Soviet tanks encircle Pyatikhatka.
I have got through some cars and have gone on locomotive searches under steams which could generate battery structure, however on all recarts there were only Russian brigades. All German railwaymen ran from station. To entrust formation of structure to Russian brigade it was impossible. We did not know neither ways, nor an arrangement of arrows as it was absolutely dark.
....
Both departures on Verhovtsevo and Znamenka had tanks of the opponent. To me have informed, that the first locomotive forming for us structure, has received a direct hit of a shell of a tank gun and has failed. It has convinced me, that the battery cannot be deduced from station. I could not find in darkness of the commander of 1st platoon and have given to the commander of 3rd gun of a platoon the order to undermine guns. Whether this order is executed, I could not establish till now yet as did not meet those soldiers of this platoon it was entrusted to them to undermine guns. I have commanded to a platoon to collect at a transport arrangement.
I also have run to 2nd platoon and a transport to give the order to undermine guns as I saw, that the opponent delivers fire on a platoon arrangement.
.....
Having come to 2 platoon, I have found ober-wachmeistr Hernkind with the platoon commander and several soldiers in shelter. Platoon cars were already fired by the tanks of the opponent which are nearby. The Platoon commander has sent the majority of people in a direction on the south as since October, 3rd at them was not neither small arms and nor an ammunition.
....
After that we under strong fire of tank guns and machine guns have set fire to some cars, including the car-office. Classified documents still before took with itself ober-wachmeist Herndkind.
....
I with small group of people left from station in a direction on the south. The village through which we passed, also was under fire of the opponent. Tanks of the opponent already encircled Pyatikhatka - from the south.
Having made a night march, having passed about 20 km, we have been picked up by a column of cargo motor vehicles of an antiaircraft artillery of land forces and are delivered to Krivoi Rog. Immediately after the arrival to Krivoi Rog I was in a headquarters of 17th (motorised) air-defence division.
I do not know losses in personnel as to define these losses at first it is necessary to collect all remained soldiers of the battery. Losses in an equipment:
12 guns of calibre of 2.0 sm, the sample «30»;
4 searchlights of 60 sm;
4 /electro-/ units;
12 special trailers «51»;
1 cargo motor vehicle;
1 automobile motor vehicle;
2 motorcycles.
the lieutenant /
signature – Yuri/
---------------------------------------------
![:[]](./images/smilies/icon_study.gif "Study"){kind=icon}
