Hello Richard !
Only after reading your reply I realized, that you are most probably the person
who runs the sturmpanzer website ! Please let me first express my gratitude for the efforts
of you and your co-workers and for the huge amount of fascinating data you are willing to share !
Really appreciated
!
According to your questions (and btw, all informations I have, only refer to Inf./Gren. units),
my understanding is the following :
1.) Yes, the main-purpose of a Div.-Kampfschule (DKS) was the training of
Gruppenführer- und Zugführer-Anwärtern (= squad- and platoon leader candidates),
to qualify them for their coming tasks.
A secondary purpose could be the training of specialists.
2.) The following is my interpretation on the differences of KStN 125a (1.4.1944) and KStN 125b (1.8.1944) :
The Ausbildungsstaffel of KStN 125a comprises the complete training personnel of a FEB.
The personnel of the Versorgungskompanie has only supply and maintenance duties,
while the Ersatz-Staffel consists of the incoming replacements, that were to receive additional training.
From this personnel of the Ausbildungsstaffel, there would be formed a Div.-Kampfschule (as described in 1.),
and some other companies, with the task of training the enlisted men.
I understand the KStN 125b from 1.8.44 as a scaled down version of a FEB, adapted to its special task,
and especially the heavy weapons omitted (e.g. le.FH. 18 and Pak 7,5cm).
I think the reason for implementing this KStN for the divsions of 29th, 30th and 32nd wave, was that the
formation of these divisions was ordered in July/August under emergency conditions (the breakdown
in the east and the west) and therefore the divisions were only authorized the most important components,
to have them ready as soon as possible.
3.) I think this view is underlined by some excerpts of "Grundlegender Befehl Nr. 15",
titled : How to improve the fighting power of the infantry (see last post), which orders :
>> ... 4. Einrichtung und Etatisierung der Div.-Kampfschulen zur Ausbildung von Zug- und Gruppenführern. <<
[Formation and authorization of Div.-Kampfschulen to train platoon and squad leader-candidates ]
>> 5. Einrichtung und Etatisierung von Feld-Ersatzbataillonen zur weiteren Ausbildung des eintreffenden
Ersatzes zu vollwertigen Ostkämpfern und zum Schaffen einer hochstehenden Personal-Reserve, ... <<
[Formation and authorization of FEBs to further train the incoming replacements to capable fighters
on the eastern-front(?!)(sorry, my bad translation) and to build up a fully trained reserve ..]
This order was issued on June, 22nd, 1943, but neither the KStN 1191 (1.11.1943) nor KStN 125a (1.4.1944)
explicitly contain a Sub-unit Div.-Kampfschule. On the other hand, a number of Gliederungen around
1943/44 (as listed e.g. by Scherzer) explicitly do refer to a Div.-Kampfschule as 1. company of the FEB.
The description under 2.) is my only explanation of this fact.
4.) Regarding the training and qualification of NCOs, from 1942 onward the NCO-schools had in no way the capacities
to produce sufficient numbers of NCO-replacements. To improve this situation, additional courses were organized :
Wehrkreis-NCO-courses, Kampfschullehrgänge at the HQ of the field-armies, and finally the Div.-Kampfschulen.
From several sources I read, one point comes out very clear :
The german army put a very strong focus on continous training, whenever possible. Not only of the new recruits,
but to the same degree of the forces already deployed on the front. The importance and benefit of having a FEB
was never under question. It was only, that very often the combat situation didn't allow for training,
when every man was desperately needed at the front.
Therefore, on your last question, if a Kampfschule could also take up the duty of training of enlisted men,
I can only speculate : If there was the need of additional training for a lot of this men, I assume the
division would try to make it possible, by commanding a number of supplementary teachers to this unit, so that
it would be able to perform its task. But that would of course depend on the actual situation at the front.
5.) This is underlined by the fact, that a considerable number of VGDs set up a FEB on their own.
The following infos from Veit Scherzer, Bd. Ia, with regard to DKS / FEBs might be of interest:
>> The 17 Gren.Div.s of the 29th wave (most of which became VGDs) were ordered to form a
Divisions-Kampfschule (DKS) on Aug, 10th, 1944. At least eight of these ( 45., 78., 544., 547., 551.,
558., 559., 562.) expanded that DKS to an FEB by their own decision (auf dem Kommandowege) in September.
(and the 6. Gren.Div. as well).<<
The situation for the 25 VGDs of the 32nd wave was very similar :
>> While at the beginning of their formation they were authorized to have only a Div.-Kampfschule,
for the 62., 271. and 326. VGD the formation of a FEB was ordered. Eight more VGDs (18., 26., 183.,
212., 246., 272., 352., 708.) formed such a FEB "auf dem Kommandowege", and had it authorized until
November 1944. <<
Similar applies to the 12. ID, 16. VGD of the 30th wave, while the 19th had only a Div.-Kampfschule,
which was expanded to a FEB only in Jan. 45 (no info on the other divisions of that wave).
If this is correct, approximately half of the divisions already had a FEB shortly after their formation.
In Dec., 1944, all VGDs of both waves were ordered to reorganize according to Inf.Div. 45, including a FEB.
6.) I still would like to learn more on the actual set-up of DKS and FEBs and the exchange of personal.
But I hope this gives some base for further discussions !
Sorry it took me so long to reply,
Best regards
,
hero(
.)
?
!