I've heard that the Soviets had developed a modern warfighting doctrine by 1939. But, I keep hearing that the Soviet Army basically used massive numbers to overcome German qualitative advantages. Was this due to a tendency to use " human wave " style tactics?
I've also heard that a good way to describe Soviet offensive tactics was that of a bulldozer approach, throw massive amounts of men, materiel and firepower all along the line. Once the weak point was found, the Soviets would concentrate on that point and bulldoze further. I read in Von Mellenthin's book, " Panzer Battles ", that the Soviets also used to infiltrate German lines and these infiltrators would attck the main German line from the rear. Is this correct?
Soviet Tactics
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Freiritter
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You must see Soviet tactics a little bit different from other armies. Remember that to 1942 real commanders of each soviet unit was a "Komisar", a party member to supervising the "military" commander. So even if officer (the officers ranks entered to red army in 1942) gives order, "Komisar" could aprove this order or not. So in 1942 Stalins makes all "Komisars" assistans to officers, so after that thay can't disaprove their orthers. And of course You must remember that in second line was NKVD. NKVD shoots to all soldiers who retreats
tactics
Did the Red Army have tactics? Of course they did and here they are:
1. order thousands of illiterate peasants to run at the german positions (if they retreat shoot them).
2. Repeat 1.
3. Repeat 2.
4. Once this has been done, attack small german villages with a whole shock army.
5. Repeat 1.
6. When invading Berlin bomb the already completly flattened city centre with 3000 thousand howitzers for 2 days and then, repeat 1.
1. order thousands of illiterate peasants to run at the german positions (if they retreat shoot them).
2. Repeat 1.
3. Repeat 2.
4. Once this has been done, attack small german villages with a whole shock army.
5. Repeat 1.
6. When invading Berlin bomb the already completly flattened city centre with 3000 thousand howitzers for 2 days and then, repeat 1.
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laszlo.nemedi
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Re: tactics
Can I ask for your references for that?km1789 wrote:Did the Red Army have tactics? Of course they did and here they are:
1. order thousands of illiterate peasants to run at the german positions (if they retreat shoot them).
2. Repeat 1.
3. Repeat 2.
4. Once this has been done, attack small german villages with a whole shock army.
5. Repeat 1.
6. When invading Berlin bomb the already completly flattened city centre with 3000 thousand howitzers for 2 days and then, repeat 1.
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laszlo.nemedi
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Re: Soviet Tactics
First I would separate the first half of the war and the second half.Freiritter wrote:I've heard that the Soviets had developed a modern warfighting doctrine by 1939. But, I keep hearing that the Soviet Army basically used massive numbers to overcome German qualitative advantages. Was this due to a tendency to use " human wave " style tactics?
I've also heard that a good way to describe Soviet offensive tactics was that of a bulldozer approach, throw massive amounts of men, materiel and firepower all along the line. Once the weak point was found, the Soviets would concentrate on that point and bulldoze further. I read in Von Mellenthin's book, " Panzer Battles ", that the Soviets also used to infiltrate German lines and these infiltrators would attck the main German line from the rear. Is this correct?
The first half was a tactical disaster as most of the commanders proved their incompetencies, and many times ordered frontal attacks.
I saw many improvement in the second half (of course incompetent commanders still existed).
The infiltrator groups existed (significantly in the second half of the war).
As for the the bulldoze:
the soviets learned to attack the enemy weak point with overwhelming power (as learned the Western Allied, too). In the beginning of the war that tactics helped the German to achive their victories (keyword: Schwerpunkt).
So nothing special in that tactic. If you think they just bombard all along the whole frontline to find weak points, the artillery expension shows it wasnot the case...
Tactics, of course, is not the same as operational art. It is absolutely true that by the late 1930s the Soviets, or more specifically Tukhachevskii, had developed very advanced ideas about war at the operational level. However, he was executed during the purges and his ideas lapsed although they were again picked up in part in 1942.
It's interesting that the West didn't even start to understand the concept of the operational level in any meaningful way until the late 1970s (although some able commanders had intuitively grasped elements and some military historians suggest that the Japanese had some understanding). The Germans were no better, some argue that Blitzkrieg was operatinal level but there is a reasonably convincing case that it was no more that tactical opportunism. The fact is that if you've mastered operational art then tactics don't particularly matter (unless your're concerned about casualties). This is one reason why the Soviets relied on battle drills to a far higher level that the Germans.
It's interesting that the West didn't even start to understand the concept of the operational level in any meaningful way until the late 1970s (although some able commanders had intuitively grasped elements and some military historians suggest that the Japanese had some understanding). The Germans were no better, some argue that Blitzkrieg was operatinal level but there is a reasonably convincing case that it was no more that tactical opportunism. The fact is that if you've mastered operational art then tactics don't particularly matter (unless your're concerned about casualties). This is one reason why the Soviets relied on battle drills to a far higher level that the Germans.
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Freiritter
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Good points, everyone. Yes, I had forgotten that modern mechanized warfare doctrine calls for the rapid collection of combat power on weak points in the enemy's lines. But, I'm trying to determine: What were the salient points on which Soviet warfighting rested. it seems to me that the Soviets relied on large numbers and huge industrial production to offset an enemy's qualitative advantages. Essentially, it seems to me that the Soviet Army was a huge bear that wrestled and bled the Germans to death.
P.S. What is operational art? Is it the use of assets at the operational level, like brigades and divisions?
P.S. What is operational art? Is it the use of assets at the operational level, like brigades and divisions?
1. Laszlo is right. We must separate poor soviet tactics from 1941/42 and better and better tactics from 1943/1945.
2. Tukhachevski was not great tactician! it's propaganda! Believe me. Did anybody read Tukhachevskis books? There is nothing about tactics!
"Comunist party gives Soviet soldier a good example how to work and fight.", "Komsomol create a best way to achieve Lenins ideas to Red Army", "Our leader, commarade Stalin, is the greatest headmaster ever born!", and so on. Nothing like in Guderians book. In 1928 Tukhachevsky wrote:" Soviet Union must built in 1930-1931, 25 to 50 thousends tanks. They will needed in tens of thousends kilometers of frontlines over the world." Maybe i didn't translate this very well, but this stupid words and ideas cames from Tukhachevski books. And remember that he lost war against Poland in 1920.
and most important. Tukhachevski become Marshall of Soviet Union in 1937, during peace, for "colectivisation" of Ukrainian peasants, that mean for hunger in which died few milions of Ukrainians.
2. Tukhachevski was not great tactician! it's propaganda! Believe me. Did anybody read Tukhachevskis books? There is nothing about tactics!
"Comunist party gives Soviet soldier a good example how to work and fight.", "Komsomol create a best way to achieve Lenins ideas to Red Army", "Our leader, commarade Stalin, is the greatest headmaster ever born!", and so on. Nothing like in Guderians book. In 1928 Tukhachevsky wrote:" Soviet Union must built in 1930-1931, 25 to 50 thousends tanks. They will needed in tens of thousends kilometers of frontlines over the world." Maybe i didn't translate this very well, but this stupid words and ideas cames from Tukhachevski books. And remember that he lost war against Poland in 1920.
and most important. Tukhachevski become Marshall of Soviet Union in 1937, during peace, for "colectivisation" of Ukrainian peasants, that mean for hunger in which died few milions of Ukrainians.
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laszlo.nemedi
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Well, the second front (the western allied) was relied on large numbers and industrial production (that was the weakness of the German strategy). The difference was the SU had to fight from the beginning alone, while the US and Brits could start the war (in reality, forget now the other smaller theater) in second half of 1944, and not alone.Freiritter wrote:Good points, everyone. Yes, I had forgotten that modern mechanized warfare doctrine calls for the rapid collection of combat power on weak points in the enemy's lines. But, I'm trying to determine: What were the salient points on which Soviet warfighting rested. it seems to me that the Soviets relied on large numbers and huge industrial production to offset an enemy's qualitative advantages. Essentially, it seems to me that the Soviet Army was a huge bear that wrestled and bled the Germans to death.
P.S. What is operational art? Is it the use of assets at the operational level, like brigades and divisions?
Anyway the Germans was tactically much better than any other allied along the whole war, but their resources was limited. When the allied (SU, US, Brit) could learn the basics of the new kind of war, they slowly but surely started to win battles...
I think the keywords of the Germans tactical superiority was their training based on initiative, which was supported with the Aufstragtactic (sp?).
The Blitzkrieg was not official theory in Germany but was practiced well, but with their tactical superiority they could do anything in the battlefield, even the Blitzkrieg...
I don't think anyone has ever claimed that Tukhachevskii's greatest strength was tactics, although he was no slouch. I repeat, it was his grasp of war at the operational level that was his contribution. He'd been the 'chief fire fighter' for the red forces in the civil war, when things were turning pearshaped somewhere Tukhachevskii was dispatched to sort it out. He was very successful - the revolution won. Triandafillov is another important influence.
Tukhachevskii was little understood (or even heard of) in the west until the 1970s, when the work of Richard Simkin brought him to a wider audience and provided a raft of insights into Soviet military thinking. You really need to start with Simkin's 'Race to the Swift' and then move on to 'Deep Battle'. I know its fashionable to attempt to denigrate Tukhachevskii, usually this is underinformed 'NIH'. He's not easy to come to grips with for people with a background in traditional military thinking, this is why he wasn't understood in the west until the the late '70s. Simkin also correlates this with the retirement of the last of the Wehrmarcht trained officers from the Bundeswehr, in other words that NATO had relied too heavily on their understanding of Sov warfighting from their Great Patriotic War experience, where, of course, they didn't just loose the plot they'd never found it.
Of course while the Sovs had the theory they didn't always have the means of practicing it in the Great Patriotic War. Operational art really means the manouvre not the attrition approach to war, unless attrition is unavoidable, which it sometimes is particularly if you have to fight a 'break-in' battle. (Don't get confused by matters of 'minor tactics' involving 'fire and manouvre', that's a different matter altogether.) The real essence are things like tempo, simultaneity, interchangeability.
Of course even in the earlier part of the 20th century manouvre war had been practiced, albeit it not in name. Allenby's campaign in Palestine is a good example.
The operational level is best defined as 'the level that possesses assets capable of achieving an objective lying at one and only one remove from an objective that can be stated in politico-economic terms'.
I'll wrap up with a quote from Simkin 'Tukhachevskii was the founder of modern Soviet 'military science'. Whatever one may think of the Soviet political system, and however one may rate the actual capabilities of the Soviet Army in the field, one cannot rationally deny that, in the Marshal's day and again from 1942 onwards, Soviet military thought and writing has remained streets ahead of anything that had been done elsewhere. Even Moshe Dayan's disciples seem to acknowledge this.'
Tukhachevskii was little understood (or even heard of) in the west until the 1970s, when the work of Richard Simkin brought him to a wider audience and provided a raft of insights into Soviet military thinking. You really need to start with Simkin's 'Race to the Swift' and then move on to 'Deep Battle'. I know its fashionable to attempt to denigrate Tukhachevskii, usually this is underinformed 'NIH'. He's not easy to come to grips with for people with a background in traditional military thinking, this is why he wasn't understood in the west until the the late '70s. Simkin also correlates this with the retirement of the last of the Wehrmarcht trained officers from the Bundeswehr, in other words that NATO had relied too heavily on their understanding of Sov warfighting from their Great Patriotic War experience, where, of course, they didn't just loose the plot they'd never found it.
Of course while the Sovs had the theory they didn't always have the means of practicing it in the Great Patriotic War. Operational art really means the manouvre not the attrition approach to war, unless attrition is unavoidable, which it sometimes is particularly if you have to fight a 'break-in' battle. (Don't get confused by matters of 'minor tactics' involving 'fire and manouvre', that's a different matter altogether.) The real essence are things like tempo, simultaneity, interchangeability.
Of course even in the earlier part of the 20th century manouvre war had been practiced, albeit it not in name. Allenby's campaign in Palestine is a good example.
The operational level is best defined as 'the level that possesses assets capable of achieving an objective lying at one and only one remove from an objective that can be stated in politico-economic terms'.
I'll wrap up with a quote from Simkin 'Tukhachevskii was the founder of modern Soviet 'military science'. Whatever one may think of the Soviet political system, and however one may rate the actual capabilities of the Soviet Army in the field, one cannot rationally deny that, in the Marshal's day and again from 1942 onwards, Soviet military thought and writing has remained streets ahead of anything that had been done elsewhere. Even Moshe Dayan's disciples seem to acknowledge this.'
Maybe i'm wrong, but Tukhachevski never wrote nothing about modern war. In his book or other works we don't find nothing about strategy. He's words are full of slogans: we need tanks, we need planes, army must do rapid strike far in enemy territory, soldier must be well trained. But for sure it's not a sciene work how this tanks, planes and well trained soldiers will be used in battlefield. He never mention about logistic side. Never wrote about needed ammo, communication, movement of whole armies.
Mikhail Tukhachevski probably was good general, but the story about his dreams about modern army and blitzkrieg was not a sciene work , but propaganda. If anybody could read his book will know what i mean.
Bolshaja Otiechiestwiennaja Wajna - it's Great Fatherland War.
Otiechiestwo means Homeland, Fatherland not Patriotism.
Mikhail Tukhachevski probably was good general, but the story about his dreams about modern army and blitzkrieg was not a sciene work , but propaganda. If anybody could read his book will know what i mean.
Bolshaja Otiechiestwiennaja Wajna - it's Great Fatherland War.
Otiechiestwo means Homeland, Fatherland not Patriotism.
"Sobranyje diela" - Michail Tukhachevskij
"Woprosy strategii i operatiwnogo iskustwa w sowietskich wojennych trudach" - Michail Tukhachevskij
" Klassovaja i narodnaja strategia" - Michail Tukhachevskij
"Charakter granicznych operacji" - Michail Tuchaczevskij
Some of this books were translatet to other languages (usually printed in west in years 1966-1968), all were written by Tukhachevskij. I recommend it but if somebody want find a military strategy will be disapointed.
About commanders. Yona Yakir was a commander of Kievs Military District, in 1937, he was also Commander of Army 1st degree (four stars general in US Army), but he was never in military school, even never drafted to army during I WW. But he was good revolutionist and he was awarded by Trotski to Komandarm 1st degree. He was shooted in the same day with Tukhachevskij as he's protegee.
Anyway try to get Tukhachevski's book and You will see what i mean.
"Woprosy strategii i operatiwnogo iskustwa w sowietskich wojennych trudach" - Michail Tukhachevskij
" Klassovaja i narodnaja strategia" - Michail Tukhachevskij
"Charakter granicznych operacji" - Michail Tuchaczevskij
Some of this books were translatet to other languages (usually printed in west in years 1966-1968), all were written by Tukhachevskij. I recommend it but if somebody want find a military strategy will be disapointed.
About commanders. Yona Yakir was a commander of Kievs Military District, in 1937, he was also Commander of Army 1st degree (four stars general in US Army), but he was never in military school, even never drafted to army during I WW. But he was good revolutionist and he was awarded by Trotski to Komandarm 1st degree. He was shooted in the same day with Tukhachevskij as he's protegee.
Anyway try to get Tukhachevski's book and You will see what i mean.
My understanding is that Tukhacheviskii wrote a lot. For example his paper on 'Manouvre and Artillery' presented at the Red Army's All-Union Artillery Conference in 1924. Then there's his writings in the 1930s on guided rockets and the like, very advanced thinking. And these are just artillery matters.
It is the totality of his writings that are important. No doubt some of them are overladen with political propaganda, which always makes for a difficult read. However, Simkin is the place to start, at least in English.
It is the totality of his writings that are important. No doubt some of them are overladen with political propaganda, which always makes for a difficult read. However, Simkin is the place to start, at least in English.
No doubt that Tukhachevskij wrote a lot about modern warfare: tanks, mechanised infantry, paratroopers. But usually he didn't wrote how to use them, for example if the thank crew it was four men, he didnt care how many soldiers must be used in service as mechanics, how many must be cooks, medics etc. so sometimes he sent 1 000 tanks 300 miles inside enemy territory, but did'nt mention how to provide to this tanks fuel, how many of them could broke up, how to secure captured territory etc. Hi's ideas looks like this: Let's strike with 1 000 tanks on 10 miles wide front, we break the enemy lines and with rapid move we capture city X. What will be reaction of enemy, what about landscape, wheather? The books by Tukhachevskij are usually in this spirit, when he is not writing about propaganda.