Ambrose vs Zitterling ?

[Dan Behr]

Having read a bit of Stephen Ambrose I have now read Normandy 1944 by Nikolas Zitterling in which he states that far from having parity of troops in the battle, as suggested by Stephen Ambrose, that they had in fact a better advantage than was normal for the Russians on the Eastern Front.

Presuming these guys are reading from the same sources when they did their research what is a bloke supposed to believe ?

Dan

[Darrin]

Having read a bit of Stephen Ambrose I have now read Normandy 1944 by Nikolas Zitterling in which he states that far from having parity of troops in the battle, as suggested by Stephen Ambrose, that they had in fact a better advantage than was normal for the Russians on the Eastern Front.

Presuming these guys are reading from the same sources when they did their research what is a bloke supposed to believe ?

Dan

Actually many writers as zetterling says in the beging of chapter 7 on p77 use numbers such as those that were apparently taken from Montgomerys book. The numbers inside it are apparently wrong when compared to actual ger archive info because allied wartime est were an unreliable source for ger losses and str. For example while the number of pows and mias are relativly close the the killed and wounded est is off by over 3 times. So the sources different authors use are not always the same.

To get back to the more imprtant parts of the discussion the ger routinally used large number of non gers in thier supply line. Although they may have been outnumberd by this much just counting troops in fact you could prob add 50% to the ger forces at normandy. Then the ratio would drop closer to 2.5 and the allies at least at normandy had no way to do this. There are a few other minor quibbles I don´t know the answer to in terms of his sources for the allied str used in this cal.

In reality the number of western allied soilders on the front lile in div or inf bat was prob less than double what the ger had. The real big adv came in other areas. Such as arty not that the allied had much more then the gers but they used MANY more times maybe 5 times. All this leads to larger supply lines and troops but not to huge adv in combat troops on the frontline. They did have large numbers of tanks though that were almost as large as rus by the end of the year maybe. More trucks and needed more fuel to keep all this going which goes back to the larger supply lines and troops. Not to mention hauling things over beachs repairing transport net etc...

[Qvist]

That's easy to answer - you can safely believe Zetterling. Just look at the sources - they are most definitely not the same ones for both authors, and this is the whole difference.

Ambrose's figure is taken from an obscure 1950s historical work that again probably relied on nothing solid. He might as well have thought up the figure he wanted to have. Essentially, his assumption about German strength is entirely unsupported by any credible source.

Zetterling's figure on the other hand is derived from wide-ranging and systematic investigation of the German records - which is of course the only place where you can find really viable information about the strength of the German units in Normandy.

It is somewhat debatable whether Zetterling's force count for US troops is really viable, and his German figures can also be discussed on the level of detail - to an extent, the sources may allow several alternative figures. But what is completely clear beyond any doubt whatsoever is that Ambrose's assumptions about German strength has no basis in reality, and that force levels in NW Europe, whether in Normandy or later, were not remotely close to "parity".

cheers

[Qvist]

Darrin, that is more than a little lacking in precision IMO.

To get back to the more imprtant parts of the discussion the ger routinally used large number of non gers in thier supply line. Although they may have been outnumberd by this much just counting troops in fact you could prob add 50% to the ger forces at normandy.

Add 50%?! How do you make that work?

If you look here:http://www.feldgrau.net/phpBB2/viewtopi ... highlight=

incorporating this overview:

Summary of the possible total strength of Heer, Waffen-SS, Luftwaffe, Kriegesmarine, Organization Todt (including RAD and NSKK) and Osttruppen personnel in OB.West as of 1 June and reinforcements and replacements to 23 July 1944

Heer ~ 728,000
SS ~ 75,563 plus reinforcements of 36,479 for a total of 112,042 committed
Luftwaffe Fallschirm-Armee ~ 39,476 plus reinforcements of 12,031 for a total of 51,507 committed
Luftwaffe Flak, including III Flak-Korps and other battalions attached to OB-West and Marine Flak ~ 114,444
Luftwaffe Flieger-Einheiten ~ 120,000
Kriegesmarine ~ 88,000
OT/RAD/NSKK ~ 73,965+
HiWi and Ostruppen ~ 67,000
Total: ~ 1,306,448 plus 48,510 reinforcements and 10,078 replacements by 23 July = 1,365,036

You will find detailed info on various categories of personnel in the West. To increase German forces by 50%, you would need about 450,000 non-Germans. As you can see, sources indicate there were 67,000 such troops. You might want to add all RAD/OT/NSKK personnel as well if what you really meant was not "non-Germans in the supply lines" but "supply personnel not carriedon WH strength", but you still have only about 140,000. Not to mention the fact that many of the Osttruppen were not in fact supply troops, but combat troops.

Such as arty not that the allied had much more then the gers but they used MANY more times maybe 5 times. All this leads to larger supply lines and troops but not to huge adv in combat troops on the frontline.

the AMERICANS did not have many more guns than the Germans, but the ALLIES certainly did - and of course, not all German artillery was deployed against the Americans. The greater ammunition expenditure comes in addition to this. And while you are right that allied support forces were proportionally larger than German, this does not mean that there was no big numerical advantage in combat troops.

cheers

[Darrin]

Darrin, that is more than a little lacking in precision IMO.

To get back to the more imprtant parts of the discussion the ger routinally used large number of non gers in thier supply line. Although they may have been outnumberd by this much just counting troops in fact you could prob add 50% to the ger forces at normandy.

Add 50%?! How do you make that work?

If you look here:http://www.feldgrau.net/phpBB2/viewtopi ... highlight=

incorporating this overview:

Summary of the possible total strength of Heer, Waffen-SS, Luftwaffe, Kriegesmarine, Organization Todt (including RAD and NSKK) and Osttruppen personnel in OB.West as of 1 June and reinforcements and replacements to 23 July 1944

Heer ~ 728,000
SS ~ 75,563 plus reinforcements of 36,479 for a total of 112,042 committed
Luftwaffe Fallschirm-Armee ~ 39,476 plus reinforcements of 12,031 for a total of 51,507 committed
Luftwaffe Flak, including III Flak-Korps and other battalions attached to OB-West and Marine Flak ~ 114,444
Luftwaffe Flieger-Einheiten ~ 120,000
Kriegesmarine ~ 88,000
OT/RAD/NSKK ~ 73,965+
HiWi and Ostruppen ~ 67,000
Total: ~ 1,306,448 plus 48,510 reinforcements and 10,078 replacements by 23 July = 1,365,036

You will find detailed info on various categories of personnel in the West. To increase German forces by 50%, you would need about 450,000 non-Germans. As you can see, sources indicate there were 67,000 such troops. You might want to add all RAD/OT/NSKK personnel as well if what you really meant was not "non-Germans in the supply lines" but "supply personnel not carriedon WH strength", but you still have only about 140,000. Not to mention the fact that many of the Osttruppen were not in fact supply troops, but combat troops.

The ratio str of the 7th army was over 310,000 but on the 1st of june it had almost 170,000 soilders, 40,000 luft and 5000 navy in the same report see p 113 note 1. Rich has on an earlier now defunct buliten posted several cat of non ger army combat troops that were present either intiallly to help with building concs. Or to help with supply then and after the battle started this added almost 50% to the ger actual str numbers if memory does not fail me. Maybe you could ask rich for the details again.

Its entrily possible that although the ration strs don´t actually show true ger combat str it did help contribute to it by rear area supply. Which was something the ger used by the end of the war mainly non gers. But something the allies in normandy certainly couldn´t. Maybe after normandy in the newly lib areas they did but I don´t know.

[Darrin]

Such as arty not that the allied had much more then the gers but they used MANY more times maybe 5 times. All this leads to larger supply lines and troops but not to huge adv in combat troops on the frontline.

the AMERICANS did not have many more guns than the Germans, but the ALLIES certainly did - and of course, not all German artillery was deployed against the Americans. The greater ammunition expenditure comes in addition to this. And while you are right that allied support forces were proportionally larger than German, this does not mean that there was no big numerical advantage in combat troops.

cheers

The western allied arty commpared to all ger arty certainly was larger but probably less than double. The biggest adv was not those front combat troops but the rear area supply shell tonage or numbers.

While zetterling says the numbers were very high at cobra 3.8:1 the numbers were more usually somewhere between 2:1 and 3:1. This still doesn´t account for non german combat troops working suplly lines leaving the real ratio somewhere lower than zetterlings.

[Qvist]

The ratio str of the 7th army was over 310,000 but on the 1st of june it had almost 170,000 soilders, 40,000 luft and 5000 navy in the same report see p 113 note 1. Rich has on an earlier now defunct buliten posted several cat of non ger army combat troops that were present either intiallly to help with building concs. Or to help with supply then and after the battle started this added almost 50% to the ger actual str numbers if memory does not fail me. Maybe you could ask rich for the details again

Darrin, the figures quoted above are from Rich. It is roughly accurate that total number of German military personnel in all of Western Europe, including Osttruppen and RAD/OT/NSKK personnel is about 50% higher than just the Feldheer, FJ and W-SS numbers, but that is something entirely different than "non-German troops helping with supplies" or "supply troops" for that matter.

The western allied arty commpared to all ger arty certainly was larger but probably less than double.

What Zetterling actually writes is that on 25 July, the US forces had 1720 artillery pieces and the CW forces 1520, for a total of 3240. The Germans by contrast had 1672 pieces. He also concludes that American shell consumption may have been as high as four times that of ALL the German artillery. Considering that CW artillery presumably fired more than the occasional stray round, this is somewhat hard to reconcile with your judgment that allied shell consumption was five times as high as German.

While zetterling says the numbers were very high at cobra 3.8:1 the numbers were more usually somewhere between 2:1 and 3:1.

What do you mean "usually"? What are you talking about here?

This still doesn´t account for non german combat troops working suplly lines leaving the real ratio somewhere lower than zetterlings.

"Non-German combat troops working supply lines"! What ARE you talking about!?

[Darrin]

The ratio str of the 7th army was over 310,000 but on the 1st of june it had almost 170,000 soilders, 40,000 luft and 5000 navy in the same report see p 113 note 1. Rich has on an earlier now defunct buliten posted several cat of non ger army combat troops that were present either intiallly to help with building concs. Or to help with supply then and after the battle started this added almost 50% to the ger actual str numbers if memory does not fail me. Maybe you could ask rich for the details again

Darrin, the figures quoted above are from Rich. It is roughly accurate that total number of German military personnel in all of Western Europe, including Osttruppen and RAD/OT/NSKK personnel is about 50% higher than just the Feldheer, FJ and W-SS numbers, but that is something entirely different than "non-German troops helping with supplies" or "supply troops" for that matter.

While zetterling says the numbers were very high at cobra 3.8:1 the numbers were more usually somewhere between 2:1 and 3:1.

What do you mean "usually"? What are you talking about here?

This still doesn´t account for non german combat troops working suplly lines leaving the real ratio somewhere lower than zetterlings.

"Non-German combat troops working supply lines"! What ARE you talking about!?

The figures above are at least 95 % ger total troop numbers in normandy. They don´t account for large numbers of pows from various nationalities as well as even french civ helping the ger rear area supply line and connstruction. The figures rich posted that were relevent to to the 7th army on the 1st of jun only and included a total breakdown of the 310,000 ration str. But as I said it was posted on a forum that moved actually but didn´t carry any of its old messages with it.

Zetterling in discussing the manpower adv says uses the div slice. A battle with roughly equal number of divs and the allies really didn´t have many more then the ger. The allies would have about a 2 or 3 adv in actual troop str 40,000 to 15,000 div slices. Since the allied troop str includes all rear area supply personnal the ger relied much more on non ger troop str this would be a bit misleading.

PS. About the # of arty do the guns include the large number of ger rockets which the allies did not use?

[Qvist]

Zetterling in discussing the manpower adv says uses the div slice. A battle with roughly equal number of divs and the allies really didn´t have many more then the ger. The allies would have about a 2 or 3 adv in actual troop str 40,000 to 15,000 div slices. Since the allied troop str includes all rear area supply personnal the ger relied much more on non ger troop str this would be a bit misleading.

Darrin, you are talking about POW and civilian forced construction labour, not non-German troops. If through some logic impenetrable to me you want to include this in German forces, be my guest.

[Christian]

Dan,

I recently read the reviews of Normandy 1944 (Zetterling) and there is one in particular that caught my attention (Dr. Robert A. Forczyk). Here is a link:
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/de ... ce&s=books

Cheers,

Christian

[militaryhistorywriter]

Dear Sir,
The best book that I have found in regards to D-Day is The Longest Day by Cornelius Ryan. His writing and knowledge is unsurpassed even in this day and age. May God Bless-Major Robert A. Lynn, USMCR

[Qvist]

Actually, I thought Mr. Forczyk's review was a bit weird.

It is obvious early on that the author has revisionist inclinations and the data that is presented is used to support revisionist conclusions, such as stating that the Anglo-Americans enjoyed a larger numerical superiority over the Germans did than the Soviets had on the Eastern Front. By and large, the author's revisionist positions appear sound, at least with the facts presented.

Uh, establishing a force ratio on the basis of solid data makes you a revisionist now?

The author also affects an attitude of moral superiority based upon his research efforts and tends to swing data with all the dexterity of a meat cleaver. For example, the author makes a major effort to prove that Allied airpower inflicted only modest battlefield damage on German units and he uses partial facts and extrapolation to estimate losses; "Allied air power caused great destruction to the French rail net. The destruction of the bridges over the Loire and the Seine was also a great hindrance to road movements. Otherwise it seems that the destruction caused by air power was modest." Curiously, there is no mention of Field Marshal Rommel being badly wounded by Allied fighter-bombers on 17 July 1944; was this just a fluke? The major increases in German unit-level anti-aircraft protection and fear of the dreaded "jabos" do not seem likely reactions to a modest threat. While airpower advocates have frequently exaggerated their ability to win or shape campaigns, there is little doubt that the Allied efforts in Normandy hinged on air supremacy. Indeed, there would have been no Second Front with Allied air superiority in Normandy, so it was decisive. On German losses however, the author does make valid points that many divisions were not as "destroyed" as other accounts would suggest.[/quote]

I does not appear to me that Forczyk has really understood the argument in the book, which is that air power DID play a very important role in the campaign, but that its contribution consisted more in exactly the sort of indirect effects Forczyk mentions himself and not so much in actual ground casualties inflicted on the Germans. Similar conclusions have, I believe, been reached also by other works, notably Williamson Murray. It may be true that there would have been no second front without allied air supremacy, but that is not an issue in the book, which is concerned with the effects of allied air power during the campaign in Normandy.

The chapter on German combat efficiency is weird and worthless, beginning by using chunks of Stephen Ambrose' s D-Day as a whipping boy. The author then shifts to Trevor Dupuy's quantitative models of combat efficiency and then shifts back to idiotic generalizations: "..it could be concluded that 100 Germans would make an even fight against about 150 Allied soldiers." However, as Napoleon said, "in war, the moral to the material as three is to one."

Here it is plainly evident that Forczyk has completely failed to understand the nature of the argument. Firstly, the tentative conclusion that he deems an "idiotic generalisation" is not a generalisation at all, but the result of applying a simplified quantitative model to the casualty figures. The result is of course nothing more than tentative, but this is duly noted by the author. Secondly, factors like "The moral" is exactly what is contained in such a judgment on efficiency, and not something that stands outside it - so if anything his Napoleon quote (talk about idiotic generalisations BTW....), to the extent it is valid, supports exactly the sort of argument Zetterling is making.

Combat effectiveness is based upon intangibles such as morale, leadership, training, doctrine and experience far more than mere numbers. Most German combat units in June 1944 had a core of combat-experienced officers and sergeants, whereas few British or US units had prior combat experience. The Germans also benefited from a proven tactical doctrine, tough realistic training and dependable weapons, while the US units were to learn through the school of hard knocks. Yet both sides had elite units and not-so-elite units; the US Rangers and 82nd Airborne were certainly better than most of the battered, ill-equipped German infantry divisions in Normandy. While the US 29th Division might have lacked combat experience it was fully equipped and certainly superior to a thread-bare "static" division like the German 709th Infantry Division, which in addition to lacking combat experience, was equipped with a mix of Czech, French and Russian weapons.

Yes - but what in the above that stands in opposition to anything found or concluded in the book I fail to see.

The heart of this book lies in the second section, which covers each German division and separate unit in great detail. However, the detail is more impressive at first glance than after carefully reading through the entries. There are odd omissions, such as a failure to list who the unit commander was in most cases or to provide a detailed organization chart for the German 7th Armee and its subordinate corps. There is not even a section on German commanders in Normandy or on defensive doctrine which shaped organization. Yet one of the greatest omissions is the lack of any maps, which makes it difficult to determine where units were actually located in Normandy. Although the author consulted the German daily situation maps, his failure to present any graphic depictions is a serious flaw. If a researcher tries to utilize this volume, as I did, you will quickly run into the realization that this volume is not optimized for research (there is not even an index). For example, when I tried to assess probable German losses in Operation Jupiter on 10-11 July 1944 it quickly became apparent that only the roughest guess would be possible using this source. The book is particularly vague about German units and losses in the first few days of the campaign, which frustrates any attempt to assess the effectiveness of Allied airborne operations.

Well, if you expect the total definitive encyclopedia including everything anybody might want to know about the German army in Normandy, this book will not meet your expectations. But there are few books which will give you more. The author also notes that the amount of information on each unit has been determined above all simply by what information could be found. Forczyk may have failed to note that this is in many cases sadly not too much, as numerous records from the campaign, especially on the unit level, were lost. If he thinks he can do better, I suggest he gets started.

This could have been a superb book, because the author was clearly willing to spend the time to gather a huge amount of data. Unfortunately, Zetterling has too many axes to grind against other authors and it has blinded him to his task at hand, which is to make this data available without distortion. This book belongs in any serious Normandy collection but it is far from definitive and not user-friendly.

This is not a factbook, and I do not think Zetterling would agree with Forczyk that his task is just to make data available. Rather, he makes analysis on the basis of data. To take issue with other works when these put forward conclusions that in his opinion are untenable is from my perspective not a drawback of the book. In fact, I think it is among the most useful aspects of it.

cheers

[sid guttridge]

Hi Guys,

Simply discussing the number of artillery barrels possessed by each side's army tells us comparitively little about the weight of fire support available to each side in Normandy.

For a start, it tells us nothing about range, weight of shell, ammunition availability, etc..

Nor does it seem to include the massive naval artillery support only available to the Allies, or their virtual monopoly of air support.

And what about rocket projectiles on each side? Or heavy mortars? Where do they fit in?

This said, it is immediately obvious that almost all these factors overwhelmingly favour the Allies. Therefore, to restrict the argument purely to army artillery barrels distorts the true situation and under estimates the Allied advantage in fire support.

Cheers,

Sid.

[Rich]

Hi Guys,

Nor does it seem to include the massive naval artillery support only available to the Allies, or their virtual monopoly of air support.

To quibble, I am unsure that the Allied naval support was "massive" either in terms of numbers throughout, or in terms of effectiveness, except on the first few days of the campaign and on the flanks of the lodgement. For one thing, for a five-division assault the support was pretty paltry in terms of numbers, weight and duration, especially when compared to those found in the Pacific. And for another, since the gunfire support stations of the cruisers and battleships of neccessity were 6-8,000 meters off shore, their effective range inland was limited. Even the DDs, which proved capable of standing as close as 1,000 meters from shore, had limited effect inland. Worse, ammunition limitations meant that, although a light cruiser had about the same firepower as 3 or 4 4-gun batteries, they could only sustain short bursts of fire before having to re-ammunition.

And the Germans had air support and apparently managed an average of 3-400 sorties a day against the beachhead through most of June, but they were simply ineffective due to the Allied air superiority, so I wouldn't call it a monopoly.

[Rich]

Actually, I thought Mr. Forczyk's review was a bit weird.

You got there before I did this time. Although to weird I would add "ill-informed." I rather hope he's a medical doctor, since if he's a professor of history I pity his students.

BTW, regarding the ongoing German strength dispute, I have tried to refine the data some more, to include just AOK 7, and will try to post it later. (BTW, why is it that darrin so enjoys selectively misquoting the data I post, but can never bring himself to acknowledge the source, nor evidently can he avoid rubbishing my comments, even when I agree with him? )