Raid towards Breda 1940.

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Preparations up to May 10, 1940 for the raid of the 7th French Army towards Breda.

"The worst mental disorder is to mistake one's desires for reality" (*).

The engagement of the French armies in 1940 is the subject of abundant and passionate literature. There are many clichés. Shortcuts are common to describe the land action. Details are forgotten. Memories focus on simple but false ideas. Because the Maginot Line would have been useless, because the French units would have been poorly equipped, France could only lose against a German enemy adorned with all the military virtues. It was inevitable, and moreover, that is what happened. The consequence becomes an explanation of the cause.

This is a matter of taking a reasoned step, by making a well-founded judgment on the planning of operations, to deepen the understanding of the defeat of 1940. The conduct of operations can only exceptionally compensate for the inadequacies of the operation plan. The study of the preparation of the 7th Army for combat is thus a textbook case. General Giraud's staff, in fact, planned an original action over several months, an army raid towards Holland, in a framework that was no less original, the subordination to General Gamelin, then to General Georges.

The army was thus directly confronted with two of the major problems posed to French strategists before the start of the German attack, namely the attitude of the Belgians and the Dutch, and the harmful influence of political-military considerations on the preparation of the battle

The conclusions are paradoxical, given the goal initially pursued. It appears that the French defeat was predictable on the morning of May 10. The reasons commonly cited are not, however, sufficient. More than means, it was a question of strategy.

So, why and how did General Gamelin deprive himself of his strategic reserves? It is necessary to go back to 1935 to understand it.

The preliminary procrastination.

At that time, the French high command was torn between two temptations. The first was that of the defensive to save lives and "have a few years to modernize an army that was beginning its transformation". The second, imposed by politicians, was the temptation to come to the aid of Belgium in the event of a German aggression, whatever the circumstances. A middle, pragmatic path envisaged the defense of the front, in Belgium, this double crossroads, land which links the plains of the North to Paris, riverine between the Rhine and the seaports.

It would make it possible not to abandon Antwerp and the Belgian coast to the Kriegsmarine, which is in line with British wishes, expressed from the beginning of the planning of the engagement of a BEF (British Expeditionary Force), in March 1936. Napoleon had already said it: Antwerp is "a pistol aimed at the heart of England". The protection of the populations of the large cities of the North of France would be better ensured, the front would be shortened by 250 km in France, 400 in fact with the salients, to 100 km in Belgium between Wavre and Givet. Finally, and perhaps above all, it would be possible to create a continuous front and the Belgian army would be kept in line on its territory.

In the French Plan D of 1933, the 7th Army was already in reserve at Reims, able to act in the South of the Ardennes. The future Breda maneuver appeared at the conference of November 22, 1934. General Gamelin promised the chief of staff of the Belgian army, General Cumont, a study "to improve the situation", because plan D bis ignored a German attack through Holland.
General Gamelin already had intentions, which would be constant over the period. His curious decisions during the Phoney War would have their origins in his dream of a continuous allied front, and his inability to give orders. The causes of his attitude, whether they relate to medicine or any other discipline, are beyond the scope of this article.

Quote from Bossuet written on the file containing the intelligence summaries of the 7th Army (*).

Source: La préparation jusqu'au 10 mai 1940 du raid de la 7e Armée francaise vers Breda. Didier Tanguy. RIHM n° 81Commission Française d'Histoire Militaire.

Cheers. Raúl M .

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Preparations up to May 10, 1940 for the raid of the 7th French Army towards Breda.

The preliminary procrastination.

In fact, the bulk of French plans were finalized as early as 1935. On April 6, after Germany reoccupied the demilitarized zone in the Rhineland, General Gamelin wrote to the Minister of War: "On the military level, a defensive attitude is initially required, supported by our permanent organizations and the major obstacles on the ground. It is only once our mobilization is complete that we can consider changing our attitude. As for our offensive action, it must be understood that it can only be considered after assembly and executed with our active forces, especially the best of them." The Commander-in-Chief was already in a position that would make him agree to easily part with his strategic reserve in 1940 in favor of action among neutrals. It remained to determine the starting point for the counterattack.

On May 15, 1936, General Gamelin described the Hollande hypothesis as "the most likely hypothesis." The constraints were already known. The Commander-in-Chief declared in 1936: "Intervention in Belgium is only interesting if the Belgians call on us before the aggression (…). If they wait to be attacked, we will arrive too late". These conclusions are confirmed by the map exercises of the High Council of War from October 1936 to April 1937, and during the winter of 1937.

After these test exercises, which today would be called wargaming, General Gamelin will specify his idea of ​​decisive flank counter-attacks against the Germans, which he now intends to launch from the favorable positions of Ghent-Antwerp held by the Belgians. He is omnipresent. "Whether in the organization of the armed forces or in the development of pacts and policy towards the powers of Central Europe, England or the Neutrals, his role is crucial".

In January 1938, taking up the key ideas of Plan D bis, the Echo Plan kept the 7th Army in reserve between Arras and Reims. The first of the three forms of intervention in Belgium, the northern variant of the plan, was a simple advance of the national resistance position towards the Escaut to the east of Lille, covered by the cavalry. This maneuver would later be called the "Escaut Plan". This French plan had a major flaw. It was a reaction plan. The initiative was German. The big question that the Allied High Command was asking itself was therefore: how to ward off the surprise of the German attack?

The design of this maneuver would also be made difficult by the mediocrity of Franco-Belgian relations. Initially, the Treaty of Locarno obliged France to help Belgium. However, King Leopold's decision to implement a policy of independence, a policy explained in his declaration of October 14, 1936, cast doubt on Belgian loyalty to its allies. For French strategists, relations with Belgium can be summed up in one expression: "the puzzle of Belgian neutrality". These relations are the key to planning the engagement of the Allied forces in Belgium.

The uncertainty about Belgian consent will push the Allied command to think about planning that adds Belgian hypotheses to hypotheses about the German enemy. The work of the general staff will then often appear as a series of contradictions between the desirable and the possible, particularly with regard to deadlines, the defensive position that is actually prepared on the border and the one on which it is planned to fight. Thus, why fortify the North when Allied Belgium offers us a protective glacis?

Source: La préparation jusqu'au 10 mai 1940 du raid de la 7e Armée francaise vers Breda. Didier Tanguy. RIHM n° 81Commission Française d'Histoire Militaire.

Cheers. Raúl M .

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Preparations up to May 10, 1940 for the raid of the 7th French Army towards Breda.

The strength of the 7th Army.

General Giraud will be in command of the 7th Army throughout the fake war, from the mobilization. He is described as a man more confident than pessimistic, more a trainer of men than a calculator. He claims to have baraka (in Islam, it is a kind of blessing), that is, luck in combat. Wounded, taken prisoner and escaped during the First World War, he then participated in the conquest of Morocco, before becoming a student and then a teacher at the Higher War School.

On September 2, 1939, the advanced echelons of the 7th Army Headquarters arrived at the small town of Pargny-les-Reims. The high command chose this deployment in the Reims region, between the northern border and Paris, because the railway and road communication routes would allow the army to intervene quickly towards the less fortified areas of the north-eastern front.

The last formations of organic elements installed in the territory of the 17th Military Region of Toulouse, under the orders of Colonel Damidoux, landed in the Reims region on 27 September, putting an end to the army's concentration phase.

Lieutenant Colonel Devinck, head of the 4th Office of the 7th Army from 3 September 1939 to 30 June 1940, detailed the concentration of the army southwest of Reims. The organic elements came, for the most part, from the southwest and the south of France. The head of the 4th Office confirms the dissimilar appearance of the units, the difficulties of installation, the lack of military training of part of the personnel, the shortages of equipment and weapons. He also notes the variety and sometimes wear and tear of motor vehicles.

The headquarters and organic elements of the army represent 1,000 officers, 21,000 soldiers, 3,300 animals, 1,200 horse-drawn vehicles and 2,300 motor vehicles. Lieutenant Colonel Devinck points out several problems that will influence operations. In particular, the responsibilities of the generals commanding the artillery and the army engineers are poorly defined. They combine a tactical function and a department head function, two activities that will come into conflict during operations. "A commander of weapons, at the "army" level, cannot be simultaneously absorbed by the front, which runs the game, and by the rear, which provides him with the means, given their quantities, their importance and their multiple origins.

It is still planned that the transport of certain ammunition will be drawn by horses, although this supply has priority in all armies. Medical resources are not sufficiently autonomous. The service does not have its own means of transport, the volume of supplies is important. As for the horse-drawn train, the requisition only foresees "a waste of the resources of the Gascon and Pyrenean countryside."

From the beginning, during the mobilization and concentration of the army, the General Staff methodically addressed the problem of increasing power. First of all, it is a question of regulating the operation of the teams that will design future actions. The 3rd Office of the 7th Army distributed a memorandum on September 4 to explain the organization of the army to its subordinates. This note is complemented by an instruction on the internal functioning of the General Headquarters.

This General Headquarters is composed of two groups. The first group covers the territorial zone of the front occupied by the army. The second group covers the rear area, also called the "stage zone".

Source: La préparation jusqu'au 10 mai 1940 du raid de la 7e Armée francaise vers Breda. Didier Tanguy. RIHM n° 81Commission Française d'Histoire Militaire.

Cheers. Raúl M .

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Preparations up to May 10, 1940 for the raid of the 7th French Army towards Breda.

The strength of the 7th Army.

The 1st group includes a general staff, troop and service commands, and the troops of the headquarters. It represents 249 officers and 840 men. The general staff is divided into four offices:

- 1st Office: personnel;

- 2nd Office: intelligence;

- 3rd Office: operations;

- 4th Office: transport, supplies.

The internal notes specify that the service operates in accordance with the requirements of the instruction of May 28, 1924 on the organization and operation of general staffs in the field. In particular, the general staff directly regulates, according to the orders of the general commanding the army, all questions relating to operations. The arms and services directly order the technical arrangements. The questions must be dealt with quickly, after agreement between the offices, arms or services concerned. It is specified that often, and in any case for simple questions, personal contacts of officers will suffice.

The chief of staff personally and directly directs the 2nd and 3rd offices, as well as the transmission service. The deputy chief of staff also directs, according to the instructions of the chief of staff, the 1st and 4th offices, as well as the commands of the general headquarters. He particularly monitors the coordination of supplies, evacuations and traffic issues with current or planned operations.

Studies to adapt the army headquarters to the new requirements will continue until the engagement in May 1940. A press service composed of two officers is created in October17.

These provisions will prove their effectiveness until May 10, 1940. It is even permissible to think that the strong responsiveness of the general staff of the 7th Army to the requests of its superiors will push them to ask for more and more studies. This version partly explains why the plans and hypotheses accumulated. Intellectually, the 7th Army staff never lost its footing.

The 3rd Bureau quickly clarified the division of the 1st group of the headquarters. It recalled that, normally, all the elements of the 1st group would be distributed in an area allowing close collaboration between its constituent elements. However, during certain active operations, a command post as small as possible would be detached forward. At the end of its movement, the headquarters would deploy in an area that would include seven to eight medium-sized villages.

During this period, the 4th Bureau planned the removal of the organic elements. The automobile units would reach their future operational deployment zones by road. The other units would have to move over 12 days, using 60 trains. The movement plan would, however, come into play without incident to move the 7th Army from the Reims region to Flanders in November 1939.

The 7th Army, concentrated to the South-West of Reims, was only a command body, without divisions or mission. It was kept at the disposal of the general commanding in chief. However, as a member of the High Council of War, General Giraud had knowledge of various plans and eventualities falling within the framework of cover operations.

The command took advantage of the calm period following the arrival of the army formations in the concentration zone to ensure their preparation by organizing specialized training courses.

Finally, on October 20, 1939, the general commanding in chief on the North-Eastern front entrusted the general commanding the 7th Army with the permanent mission of inspecting the large units and training battalions stationed in the staging area of ​​the Grand Quartier Général. He thus accumulates territorial and operational responsibilities, which can only disperse his efforts. This general role is short-lived. It will be shortened by the alert measures of November 1939.

Source: La préparation jusqu'au 10 mai 1940 du raid de la 7e Armée francaise vers Breda. Didier Tanguy. RIHM n° 81Commission Française d'Histoire Militaire.

Cheers. Raúl M .

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Preparations up to May 10, 1940 for the raid of the 7th French Army towards Breda.

The Escaut Plan.

Following the operations conducted by Army Group No 2 in Lorraine, the general commanding in chief on the North-Eastern front, by instruction 264 3/NE of September 26, 1939 and at the request of General Gamelin, approached the provisions of Plan E regarding the initial missions of the Northern armies. The Escaut Plan is one of the possible maneuvers.

As a reserve of the Grand Headquarters General, the 7th Army must be ready, on order, to integrate Army Group No 1, whose mission is as follows: "In all cases and at a minimum, ensure the integrity of the national territory by defending without any thought of retreat the organized resistance position at the border or its immediate surroundings".

While waiting to take charge of the defense of the border position to the West of Maulde, its main mission, and possibly, in the event of entry into Belgium, to form the marching wing of the Allied armies, the 7th Army continued to report directly to General Georges and the North-East General Headquarters. In the event that the Escaut maneuver were to be carried out, it was planned to assign the following units to it:

- 2 defensive sector divisions (series B): the 51st Infantry Division, deployed around Lille, and the 53rd Infantry Division, deployed in the Dunkirk region;

- A first batch of intervention units comprising:

* 2 organic elements of army corps;

* the 2nd Light Mechanized Division, then stationed between Péronne and St-Quentin;

* the 2nd Brigade of mounted dragoons;

* 3 motorized infantry divisions;

- A second batch composed of 3 infantry divisions.

The last six divisions were not named at that time.

The army staff proceeded methodically, but still as quickly. As early as 5 October 1939, General Giraud submitted to General Georges the questions that he considered essential to resolve for the success of the planned manoeuvre. A simple study of the terrain made it possible to deduce from the outset that an operation such as the one that would be attempted required an allied or at least unanimously consenting Belgium. The 7th Army would cross strips oriented southwest/northeast, that is to say successively Flanders, the Waess country and the Campine. This area was characterised by great ease of movement, if the road network was not destroyed, and if no flooding was carried out. The ease of carrying out destruction was proven, because the routes included many bridges and the area included a relatively small number of high-volume roads to allow the continuous passage of heavy loads.

Noting that "there is every reason to believe that our adversaries, in the event of action in Holland, would use tanks en masse", General Giraud requested that all units of the 7th Army be equipped with at least their organic allocation of anti-tank means. One request concerns new DCA means, cannons and machine guns, especially for the benefit of the light mechanical division, which will maneuver during the day. General Giraud recommends that the 2nd echelon formations also be equipped with these additional means, because the 2nd echelon must be able to stop tanks and aircraft, like the leading units, in the context of successive barrages of a defense in depth based on cuts. Finally, General Giraud requested that an intervention unit be attached to it for the staging area. With motorized, mechanized and anti-tank means, which would allow it to take vigorous action after a rapid movement, this unit, of the value of a battalion, would fight against infiltrated armored vehicles or entrenched paratroopers.

Source: La préparation jusqu'au 10 mai 1940 du raid de la 7e Armée francaise vers Breda. Didier Tanguy. RIHM n° 81Commission Française d'Histoire Militaire.

Cheers. Raúl M .

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Preparations up to May 10, 1940 for the raid of the 7th French Army towards Breda.

The Escaut Plan.

The maneuver designed by the 7th Army is expressed as follows:

"Covered by the Light Mechanized Division pushed to the Dendre from D-1 afternoon, the 1st echelon of forces (2 organic elements of army corps, including 1 motorized, and 3 infantry divisions) moves to the Escaut during the following two nights, able to:

- Either set up defensively while waiting for the entry into the line of the large units of the 2nd echelon (3 DI),

- Or move towards Louvain, from D-2 evening, with reconnaissance and covered by the Light Mechanized Division operating during the day,

and in any case, prepare destructions on the Escaut and the Dendre".

The mission terms used by General Giraud are eloquent: to move, to defend. It is never a question of destruction, as if the general staff wanted to ignore the enemy.

On 24 October, the general commanding the North-East theatre of operations, through his personal and secret instruction no. 7 specifying the "general conditions in which the manoeuvre of the Franco-British forces heading into Belgium would take place, to accept the battle on the Escaut", also sets "the possible conditions for a deeper penetration into Belgium".

This instruction is in fact an overall clarification of the detailed orders already given. It replaces the defensive battle initially planned with a penetration into Belgium to confront the enemy.

Still deployed in the Reims region, Giraud's army still only has a secondary role in this plan.

Source: La préparation jusqu'au 10 mai 1940 du raid de la 7e Armée francaise vers Breda. Didier Tanguy. RIHM n° 81Commission Française d'Histoire Militaire.

Cheers. Raúl M .

Feliz Navidad - Feliz Natal - Frohe Weihnachten - Joyeux Noël - Merry Christmas - Wesołych Świąt!.

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Preparations up to May 10, 1940 for the raid of the 7th French Army towards Breda.

The "Hollande" hypothesis and the deployment of the 7th Army in Flanders.

The "Hollande" hypothesis appears in a note from the North-East General Headquarters dated November 8. It requires an intervention in Belgium. However, General Gamelin does not believe in this hypothesis, which he nevertheless raised. This plan is a step for him, in the logic of his command in small steps towards the creation of a common front with the Neutrals. General Georges is opposed to the plan, as to any excessive advance in Belgium.

Due to the German threat, the provisions for a rapid implementation of the "Hollande" plan are taken by the high command on the evening of November 9, 1939. The general commander-in-chief places the 7th Army at the disposal of Army Group No. 1. By personal and secret instruction No. 8 of Army Group No. 1 of 10 November, the staff of the 7th Army received the order to set up on the same day in St Omer. The new mission incumbent on the army was practically that of the Army Group: … "Establishing itself on the Scheldt between Oudenaarde (inclusive) and the bridgehead of Ghent and covering itself on the Belgian coast (…) push into the region West and North of Antwerp the large units necessary to:

- Occupy the South bank of the Maritime Scheldt and the bottleneck of Woensdrecht by which the island of Beveland is attached to the continent;

- Take possession of the port of Vlissingen and the island of Walcheren".

The 7th Army was reinforced for this purpose and now included:

- The organic elements of the 1st and 16th Army Corps;

- The 9th and 25th motorized infantry divisions;

- The 21st, 53rd and 60th infantry divisions;

- The troops of the Flanders defensive sector, under the orders of General Barthélémy.

Among these resources, some are in the sector and constitute the 16th Army Corps, the others are in reserve at the Grand Quartier Général. Also, on 11 November, General Giraud requested that these large units be made available to him and set up near the border. The necessary authorisations were received during the day at 12:30.

Moreover, during the days of 11 and 12 November, the army's manoeuvre was developed and its essential provisions were decided. General Giraud had little room for manoeuvre since General Billotte had already established the articulation of the army and the missions of the divisions. The doctrine in force meant that the command was excessively centralised. The influence of 1914-1918 can be seen here. Since all units were interdependent on a continuous front, the movement of one influencing the wing of the other, centralized coordination was necessary. However, what had prevailed twenty years earlier was outdated in the face of technical progress, particularly in communications. These gave the leader of 1939 opportunities for initiative, which were denied to him by his superiors.

Source: La préparation jusqu'au 10 mai 1940 du raid de la 7e Armée francaise vers Breda. Didier Tanguy. RIHM n° 81Commission Française d'Histoire Militaire.

Cheers. Raúl M .

Feliz Navidad - Feliz Natal - Frohe Weihnachten - Joyeux Noël - Merry Christmas - Wesołych Świąt!.

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Preparations up to May 10, 1940 for the raid of the 7th French Army towards Breda.

The "Hollande" hypothesis and the deployment of the 7th Army in Flanders.

In the Hollande hypothesis, the 1st Army Corps, with the 21st and 25th Infantry Divisions, must occupy the islands and the western region of Antwerp. The 16th Army Corps, with the 9th Motorized Infantry Division, is responsible for ensuring the security of the army's right flank on the Middle Scheldt and the subsequent defense of this section. The reconnaissance groupings are created. The Northern grouping of reconnaissance groups, placed under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Lestoquoi, is responsible for covering the movement of the 1st Army Corps.

The transport of infantry by sea to Vlissingen, and by air to Walcheren, is planned.

The mission of the 7th Army is complex. In particular, it is not unidirectional. The principle of concentration of efforts is not respected. Action on the islands is delicate. Access is difficult and the island terrain is unfavorable. This is why General Giraud plans to quickly send light elements that he will reinforce. The deployment of the army will be done under significant air threat. The Belgian uncertainty prevents a definitive plan for a coherent system on the Escaut.

The effectiveness of the plan is very largely dependent on the implementation times. This is why the definition of four implementation routes in Holland is meticulously studied at the 7th Army. From North to South, they connect le Boulonnais to the South bank of the Escaut estuary (route I), Antwerp (II), Ghent (III) and Oudenaarde (IV).

Once these studies have been carried out, General Giraud reports to General Billotte on 15 November on the conditions for the possible execution of the Hollande plan, and the need to take advantage of the improvement in relations with the Belgians since the recent alert.

General Billotte approves the conditions under which General Giraud envisages the maneuver of his army in the event of an invasion of Holland. He clarified, however, that the defence of the Scheldt remained the responsibility of the Belgian army, with the 7th Army acting only in support. He also asked him to task the 16th Army Corps, with the 9th Motorised Infantry Division, with ensuring the security of the army's right flank, even if "it was clearly understood that the 16th Army Corps was part of a Franco-British group that would eventually deliver a perfectly united battle on the Scheldt". The meaning of this sentence was rather that nothing had been agreed.

The relaxation that followed the alert led to the consideration of a reduction in the force from 17 November, compatible with the execution of movement orders, which facilitated the work of organising the national position and the training of units disrupted by the movements entering the sector, while providing the troops with a certain comfort.

Source: La préparation jusqu'au 10 mai 1940 du raid de la 7e Armée francaise vers Breda. Didier Tanguy. RIHM n° 81Commission Française d'Histoire Militaire.

Cheers. Raúl M .

Feliz Año Nuevo - Happy New Year - feliz Ano Novo - gluckliches Neues Jahr - Bonne Année - Felice Anno Nuovo - Szczęśliwego nowego roku!

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Preparations up to May 10, 1940 for the raid of the 7th French Army towards Breda.

The design of the Dyle maneuver.

The Escaut maneuver gave rise to the Hollande hypothesis, and studies to compensate for the weaknesses of the latter, which appeared during the alert in mid-November, revealed the need for a further movement towards the Dyle to cover itself facing the East.

As early as November 15, by his personal and secret instruction No. 8, General Gamelin reformulated the mission of the 7th Army, which would no longer be able to report to Army Group No. 1 and which, carried behind and to the left of the Belgians of Antwerp, would be ready "in particular to ensure the cover of their flank by linking them if possible to the Dutch". On November 8, the Hollande hypothesis in fact provided for a French advance, but only up to the North of Antwerp.

On November 17, General Georges declined the Dyle maneuver by his personal and secret instruction No. 8. He resumes the mission of the 15th, omitting its aspect of covering the Belgians and liaising with the Dutch. General Gamelin obviously criticises the planned manoeuvre for not ensuring sufficient liaison between the Belgian and Dutch armies. Also, during the meeting quickly scheduled for November 23 in Arras, in the presence of Generals Billotte, Giraud, Blanchard, who commands the 1st Army, and Prioux, who commands the Cavalry Corps, but in the absence of General Georges, General Gamelin specifies that there is a certain lightening of the German system in the face of Holland and Belgium, and that he envisages "the possibility of possibly granting some aid to the Dutch troops in the Breda region". He invites General Billotte to carry out studies in this direction. The approach is characteristic of General Gamelin's suggestive method.

On November 26, a personal and secret instruction from Army Group No. 1 specified the two manoeuvres now planned in the event of intervention, namely the Escaut manoeuvre and the Dyle manoeuvre, both of which included the possible intervention on the Maritime Escaut and in the islands envisaged in the Hollande hypothesis. The instruction gave a mission to the 7th Army, but it did not set out its execution, as did Instruction No. 8 in the context of the Hollande hypothesis on November 8. This ambiguity was undoubtedly due to General Gamelin's wish to dissociate the action of the 7th Army from that of the other forces of the Front, in order to keep the means of carrying out an action in Holland at all costs. As a precaution, the 7th Army, placed in reserve at the Grand Headquarters to the west of Antwerp, would still have to, like the other armies, maintain garrisons on the position in national territory. These will consist of a B-series division.

The high command remains in line with its "all-out, otherwise, if things went badly, there was no way to catch up". The center of the North-Eastern front, so poorly provided with fortification works, will find itself stripped of intervention reserves. General Gamelin was unable to impose a reduction in his forces on General Prételat, who commanded the Army Group No 2. However, even after the emergency deployment of the 7th Army in November, a sectoral relief of the latter by units stationed on the Maginot Line made it possible to reconstitute a strategic reserve.

Source: La préparation jusqu'au 10 mai 1940 du raid de la 7e Armée francaise vers Breda. Didier Tanguy. RIHM n° 81Commission Française d'Histoire Militaire.

Cheers. Raúl M .

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Preparations up to May 10, 1940 for the raid of the 7th French Army towards Breda.

The Breda Maneuver.

In General Gamelin's mind, even if this idea is not clearly expressed in his orders, the future Breda Maneuver is inseparable from the Dyle Plan. It is probably necessary to understand that General Gamelin has had an idea in mind for several years. This idea is that of the front. He is waiting for the opportunity to put it into practice, an opportunity provided by the November alert. Opportunity or pretext, because General Gamelin has the questionable habit of establishing maneuver plans without worrying about the means necessary to conduct them.

The taste he showed for cartography at the beginning of his career most certainly pushes him not to see an insurmountable constraint in the absence of reconnaissance among neutrals. The period lends itself to such an attempt. The threat becomes clearer, due to the German system. The Belgian attitude becomes more conciliatory and the Belgians begin major fortification work. Furthermore, it was a question of granting aid requested by Holland and having land communication with it.

So why not entrust this mission to the BEF? Perhaps to avoid placing it in front of a possibility of re-embarkation. Or else, General Gamelin already had at that time the idea of ​​implementing the Breda plan, whatever the circumstances, and he already wanted to ensure a French army under orders to play this maneuver, to limit the intermediaries. Moreover, in February during the studies linked to the definition of the BEF zone, General Georges would try to have the 7th Army relieved by the British to avoid extending the Dyle maneuver to Holland, which General Gamelin would refuse.

On November 29, in Dunkirk, he directly asked General Giraud to study the engagement of his army in contact with the Dutch. During this meeting, all the essential aspects of the maneuver were reviewed. The 7th Army would have five divisions to ensure the defense of the Breda position, marked by Riokevorsel, Breda and Geertruidenberg, a development of 40 kilometers. As for the threats weighing on the Belgian coast, Admiral Darlan does not believe in the possibility of a massive German landing. On the other hand, raids aimed at occupying or blocking important points on the coast seem possible. A covering system is developed.

The Dunkirk meeting made it possible to present to the high command the imbalance of the deployment already studied. In the most unfavorable hypothesis, the 7th Army leaving from the French border while there is no serious resistance to the German action in Holland, the Germans would be in Breda from D2 with 3 divisions of the 1st echelon. The two leading divisions of the 7th Army, one of cavalry and one of motorized infantry, would not be there until D5. Starting from the Dutch-Belgian border, these two divisions would reach Breda on D2. Due to the lack of an agreement with Belgium, the study of movements is thwarted.

No safe rail transport will be planned for non-motorized units. The lack of contact between the French army and the Belgian railways, the SNCB, is not compensated for by the discreet contacts between French and Belgian engineers. They would be supplemented by the dispatch to Belgium of Commander Zeller, from GQG, as soon as Belgium calls for help, to obtain the trains necessary for the movement of the French armies from the first day.

Support is also discussed at this meeting on 29 November. It can rely on the railway from Antwerp or be carried by sea. However, the port of Dordrecht is connected to Breda by a railway line that is very vulnerable to the crossing of the Meuse at Moerjdijk on a 1,500-metre-long bridge.

Source: La préparation jusqu'au 10 mai 1940 du raid de la 7e Armée francaise vers Breda. Didier Tanguy. RIHM n° 81Commission Française d'Histoire Militaire.

Cheers. Raúl M .

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Preparations up to May 10, 1940 for the raid of the 7th French Army towards Breda.

The Breda Maneuver.

The update of the orders given since November 12 by General Giraud's personal and secret instruction No. 1 was ensured on November 30 by a personal and secret instruction No. 2.

Concerning the means implemented, according to Pierre Rocolle, "without doubt, the means granted to the 7th Army, which would penetrate Holland, had been calculated as precisely as possible, but there was no imbalance between the mission of this army and the forces at its disposal"44. This was not necessarily the opinion of the staff of the 7th Army, which conducted studies to justify the reinforcement of the army by a light mechanical division45, if only to arrive on time and safely. "The Light Mechanical Division is all the more essential since we cannot count, in the region in question, on Belgian or Dutch mechanized vehicles capable of fighting against German tanks".

General Georges described the Breda maneuver as "an adventure". On December 5, he explained to General Gamelin that we should not commit the majority of our reserves in Belgium and Holland, in the face of a German attack that could be nothing more than a diversion. He recommended first placing a coherent system on the Dyle before moving further north. General Gamelin seemed apparently convinced, but the Breda hypothesis was only deferred in his mind. Unable to impose his views by expressing them in the form of orders, General Gamelin only backed down temporarily in the face of General Georges' determination. "Moderation quickly becomes mediocrity. In these high positions, should one not demand a lot to obtain a little, and is it not preferable to be excessive rather than balanced? (…) The philosopher has taken precedence over the man of action"46.

The alert triggered on 3 December has the effect of activating the development of the planned maneuver and of emphasizing the need for a memento of alert measures to allow a rapid transition from the state of rest to the execution of one or other of the planned operations, without making any mistakes in assumptions. Three alert stages are to be defined, from alert 1, which requires the on-site alert of elements that would have to cross the border as soon as the orders to execute the Dyle maneuver are sent, to alert 3, which requires any additional arrangements to be made with a view to playing the Escaut or Dyle maneuvers.

The alert memento will be signed on 25 December. The precautionary measures are supplemented by studies by the 7th Army staff on its own operation in operations47.

On 23 December 1939, the command having noted that a Dutch infantry brigade was occupying the islands of Walcheren and South Beveland, the transport of a company by plane to Flushing and the initial occupation of Walcheren and the Woensdrecht isthmus by reconnaissance groups were cancelled48. At this same meeting, the vulnerability of the 7th Army's movement was again highlighted, with the movement taking place "parallel to the North Sea coast, from where air attacks could come that were difficult to detect".

These elements were taken into account in the 7th Army's Operation Order No. 3, dated 8 January 1940.

Source: La préparation jusqu'au 10 mai 1940 du raid de la 7e Armée francaise vers Breda. Didier Tanguy. RIHM n° 81Commission Française d'Histoire Militaire.

Cheers. Raúl M .