; a point of view about it...............................Influence of technical communication on leadership and combat events.
In 1909, Schlieffen called the commander a "modern Alexander" who was further back in a house with spacious offices where there were wire and radio telegraphs, telephones and signaling devices. As a result, the connection schemes always presented the same picture: wire lines that ran radially forward from a command post in the rear to the subordinate units. The commanders at their command posts were also connected to their command posts by wire and were therefore restricted in their movements to a certain axis.
When radio was introduced into battle formations as a new means of communication, little changed for a long time. The radio links doubled the wire connection and thus acted as a safety measure in case the wire broke; they were often used alone temporarily until the wire came along.
The main means of connection was the wire, the radio the auxiliary means. At that time, this rating corresponded entirely to the operational safety of these means. These means of communication had little influence on the way of leading, except for the fact that orders could be transmitted more quickly.
Later both means, wire and radio, would receive a different role. The change came from the tank weapon and from there was transferred to the infantry. The armored troops had consistently developed and exploited the peculiarities of radio, thereby achieving something completely new.
In 1935, Oberst Guderian *, as commander of a tank division, demanded for the first time an uninterrupted connection within the movement for his leadership and between all of his weapons. Radio thus became the main means of leadership in the movement, a type of leadership that had not existed before. A radio station was assigned to each tactically important connection. When moving, these radio stations followed the staff vehicles and maintained the connection via their roof antennas while driving. The messages received were transmitted to the relevant staff vehicles by motorcyclists.
Through continued training of the transmission personnel and through constant improvement of equipment and methods, it was finally possible to move an entire armored division around the terrain, to drive under cover, to have deployments made, etc., without the orders being transmitted other than via radio. The conclusion of this development phase was the Wehrmacht maneuvers in 1937, in which, in the final phase, Generalmajor Guderian demonstrated the attack of several hundred tanks in battle, together with infantry, artillery and air force, exclusively with the help of tank radio.
Guderian's leadership ideas proved their validity through success in 1940. As general of the armored troops at the head of Group v. Kleist quickly forced the Meuse crossing at Sedan and the breakthrough of the extending Maginot Line, then fought his way through the enemy's rear to the Aisne and crossed it, finally appearing in front of the Swiss border. It was Guderian's habit to leave the command post early every day to go to the front, accompanied only by his general echelon, and not to return until evening.
The general's radio unit traveled directly in his vehicle, an armored personnel carrier, which ensured him constant communication with his chief of staff. Through his chief of staff he was in contact with the air forces, neighboring troops, the superior command and the rear services. He was able to get in touch with his subordinate units via his other radio squads. In this way it was possible for him to always be at the focal point of the battle and to observe the enemy as well as his own troops, which was probably the only way to recognize and exploit the chances of success early enough given the incredibly rapid course of combat operations. Through his own observation and with the help of radio communications, he continually brought the combat orders to his units and their movements in harmony with the overall situation.
* Guderian was clear about the concept since during the IWW he had served as a communications officer in various echelons of command. Leutnant Guderian joined Telegraphen-Bataillon Nr. 3 and commanded a “heavy radio station” of the 5. Cavalry Division, according to the mobilization order. There he lived through the eventful beginning of the war. In October he was transferred to the 4th Army Command with the same task. The radio industry was in its infancy back then. Here Guderian became acquainted with wireless transmission, by means of which twenty years later he made his armored weapon tactically mobile and superior to all others. Incoming and outgoing radio messages also brought him into close contact with the work of the General Staff. (Walde K. Guderian. Eine Biographie).
Source: Einfluss der technischen Nachrichtenübermittlung auf die Führung und das Kampfgeschehen: Beispiele aus dem Zweiten Weltkrieg. Brun, E. ASMZ: Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift. Band (Jahr): 119 (1953). Heft 4
Cheers. Raúl M
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