Since nobody really thinks this war will be avoided, what do you think will the Iraq Armed Forces do?
I suggest their will be already large minefileds both south and north at the borders to Turkey and Kuwait, but what else?
How about a inicial strike against Kuwait? I think it would be hard since the US will pretty sure know what units are nearby so they would loose the element of surprise.
Will the Iraqies leave the desert to the US and withdraw to their cities to defend them in risky house to house fighting?
Will Saddam launch NBC weapons (if he has any left)? Will he try to fire on Israel again? A massive initial strike with Scuds on Israel with B and/or C weapons would pretty sure force them to declare war against Iraq. What will the other Islamic nations do then?
Iraqs first moves
Moderator: Commissar D, the Evil
Iraqs first moves
Wenn man nichts zu sagen hat, einfach mal die Fresse halten.
-
Tom Houlihan
- Patron
- Posts: 4301
- Joined: Mon Sep 30, 2002 12:05 pm
- Location: MI, USA
- Contact:
Iraq
Well, the had lotsa practice in that technique during the first "Persian Excursion!"
Serious post:
There was an article in The Vancouver Sun today about Saddam opening a school for suicide bombers. I think that most of Iraq will fall easily enough, but Baghdad will be a different story. Especially if the US tries the Richtofen tactic and bombs the hell out of the city first. A lot of parallels can be drawn between Stalingrad and the potential fight in Baghdad.
--Mike
There was an article in The Vancouver Sun today about Saddam opening a school for suicide bombers. I think that most of Iraq will fall easily enough, but Baghdad will be a different story. Especially if the US tries the Richtofen tactic and bombs the hell out of the city first. A lot of parallels can be drawn between Stalingrad and the potential fight in Baghdad.
--Mike
Don't you read the news man???? Why are you talking about weapons of mass destruction? Iraq has no such weapons anymore.
The Iraqis will fight with conventional weapons and the US will answer with nuclear and chemical weapons, killing millions of Iraqis. The casualties will be mostly civilians too.
Isn't that what guys like you already predicted weeks ago?
Christian
The Iraqis will fight with conventional weapons and the US will answer with nuclear and chemical weapons, killing millions of Iraqis. The casualties will be mostly civilians too.
Isn't that what guys like you already predicted weeks ago?
Christian
Christian
As far as I remember, I never anticipated that the US will or would strike first with NBC weapons, because thats complete bullshit. I however assume that Saddam will not hesitate to do so, especially when he sees a chance to inflict high casualties to the US or Israel.
I wanted to know if anyone has any idea what the iraqi military will do when the combat starts or what operations were already done.
As far as I remember, I never anticipated that the US will or would strike first with NBC weapons, because thats complete bullshit. I however assume that Saddam will not hesitate to do so, especially when he sees a chance to inflict high casualties to the US or Israel.
I wanted to know if anyone has any idea what the iraqi military will do when the combat starts or what operations were already done.
Wenn man nichts zu sagen hat, einfach mal die Fresse halten.
Great line Baltasar!I however assume that Saddam will not hesitate to do so, especially when he sees a chance to inflict high casualties to the US or Israel.
How can Hussein use weapons that Iraq does not have anymore? Blix and Elbaradei just confirmed last week how wonderful the cooperation had been and how many things they had destroyed.
After all, isn't the US just interested in the oil, like you guys keep claiming? Oh, and I forgot, of course the evil US is going to kill as many civilians as possible in the process.
Christian
-
Piet Duits
- Associate
- Posts: 726
- Joined: Sat Sep 28, 2002 1:51 pm
- Location: Oudenbosch, Nederland
Christian wrote:Oh, and I forgot, of course the evil US is going to kill as many civilians as possible in the process.
I don't think they will do that on purpose. What I do wonder is how many US and Allied victims of the socalled Friendly Fire the US Armed forces will inflict this time. (deed of agression part 1)
From the very important Murphy's Laws of Combat: there is no such thing as friendly fire.
As we all know (and those who ignore that are plain stupid in my opinion) the US has a long time reputation of bombarding their own troops together with their enemies.
Back to the issue again. First of all, I am very happy the thinking part of the world made the US realise they do need support for their cowboy actions (deed of agression part 2), and have given Iraq more time to hide.... any forbidden weapons... Away with the Chili con Carne!-- I mean, to disembarm.
However, when the US does think the time is right to attack Iraq, it will be an easy war. OK, some casualties will occur, being it from hostile fire or friendly fire (no kidding this time). The majority of Iraqi soldiers are just like all of us. I like to relax, as do you guys. Heck, maybe some of them are collectors of german wartime books! :)
The Iraqi Republican Guard, and some Gung-Ho commanders will however retreat for Urban Combat, which the US will try to end by bombarding a hole in the earth. This will not kill all of them, resulting in a frontal attack by the Infantry, supported by the Queen of Battle: the Arty.
That would not be an easy walkover.
Let's hope the US and their Disciples' Soldiers have not time to go to urban combat, because they are too busy registrering all the POW's, ending the battle before it becomes a real battle.
So, i'sn't this a nice answer? :)
Piet, proud to be an European
-
Henrik Krog
- Contributor
- Posts: 363
- Joined: Sun Sep 29, 2002 12:50 pm
- Contact:
I thought this might be of interest.
Henrik
> STRATFOR'S GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT
> http://www.stratfor.com
> 14 March 2003
>
> =================================================================
>
> Featured On Stratfor Today, For Members Only:
>
> * War Plan: Scenarios
> http://www.stratfor.biz/Story.neo?storyId=211472
>
>
> Today's Featured Analysis
>
> War Plan: Scenarios
> ==============
>
> Both the U.S.-led military coalition and Iraq have their war
> plans, which have been described in some detail in this series.
> The Iraqi war plan is more traditional, because Iraq must fix its
> deployments prior to war. Mobility is not likely to be an option.
> The Americans, highly mobile and, they believe, much clearer on
> events on the battlefield, go into the war with a framework for
> operations and the belief that the battle will evolve along some
> general lines, with numerous surprises and opportunities during
> the course of the war. They have less a war plan than a library
> of war options.
>
> That said, wars are not fought by plans. They are fought by
> military forces guided by plans; the intersection of those plans
> with each other, and the natural friction, unintended
> consequences and failures that constitute the battlefield,
> ultimately constitute the war. What would have happened at the
> Battle of Midway had U.S. aircraft not accidentally stumbled onto
> the Japanese fleet? This is not to say that wars are wholly
> unpredictable, particularly in the broadest sense. But wars are
> surprising processes, and it is essential to remember the number
> of wars in which the outcome surprised everybody, including the
> winners.
>
> Somewhere between randomness and fortune-telling, there are a
> range of reasonable scenarios that describe what might happen in
> a war. Some are more probable then others, and many overlap or
> complement each other. The usefulness of scenarios is not so much
> their predictive as their instructional value. They identify
> variables that might influence a war's outcome. They identify the
> significant and insignificant variables. After the war, these are
> "what ifs" -- before a war, these are guideposts.
>
> We will present, simply as models, nine possible outcomes of the
> war. These are in no particular order and, to emphasize, they are
> not mutually exclusive -- in terms of either outcome or
> implementation.
>
> 1991 Redux
>
> The essence of the 1991 experience was that the Iraqis, attacked
> on multiple levels by U.S. airpower, collapsed completely on the
> Kuwaiti battlefield, posing very little effective resistance at
> that time. There were several causes: The troops deployed in
> Kuwait were generally of poor quality and unmotivated; Iraq had
> no effective plan for the devolution of command; there was an
> extended, counter-force air campaign; Iraqi troops had no
> intelligence on U.S. force movements once the war was under way.
>
> In the 2003 scenario, the planned counterforce bombardment will
> be more limited; the terrain will be much larger, more varied and
> will contain Baghdad; the quality of troops is uncertain; the
> Iraqis have a plan for devolution and a war plan that minimizes
> the need for intelligence by minimizing maneuver and counter-
> attack options.
>
> In this scenario, the key elements are:
>
> 1. Iraqi troop capabilities must be universally and appallingly
> low.
> 2. Iraqi plans for devolving command must fail, and troops must
> be effectively leaderless.
>
> If these two things -- which really amount to one thing, a very
> bad army - hold true, then we might see a repeat of 1991.
> However, if there is any substantial improvement in one or both
> of these variables, that is not going to happen.
>
> We regard this outcome as moderately high, but far from certain.
>
> The Italian Campaign
>
> What made the Italian campaign of 1943-45 interesting was that it
> was without successful, decisive breakouts -- Anzio proving the
> point. It was a campaign of yards, not miles, and it dragged out
> for an extensive period of time. German resistance in Italy was
> made possible by the terrain, the superb quality of the German
> troops on the defensive and the quality of German command under
> Mannstein.
>
> The Iraqi terrain is only suitable for this sort of war in the
> northeastern quadrant; it would be a long reach to compare the
> best Iraqi troops with ordinary Wehrmacht soldiers, and there are
> probably no Mannsteins in the Iraqi army. However, between the
> urban areas and river lines south of Baghdad, to Baghdad itself
> and the mountains in the northeast, the willingness of Iraqi
> forces to take casualties over an extended period of time
> potentially could extend the war dramatically. Iraq does not have
> the internal industrial base to sustain a multi-year war effort,
> but it can sustain a war for months. We regard this as a low-
> probability outcome -- and it must be remembered that, in the
> end, the Germans lost in Italy.
>
> Cease-Fire
>
> There are multiple cases of partial victories in which the
> attacking force could not complete the mission for a variety of
> reasons -- military and political -- wound up taking territory
> and then being forced to accept a cease-fire in place, with the
> new frontier being the point where the forward line of troops
> ended. Israel in 1967 is a case where the best that could be
> achieved was a redefinition of borders without regime change or
> armistice. The Korean War was a case in which both sides had to
> concede that their war aims were unattainable, accepting a cease-
> fire that became a border.
>
> The dependency in this scenario is troop quality and devolution
> of command. It also requires Iraq to be able to inflict
> substantial casualties on U.S. and coalition forces, while being
> able to sustain high intensity operations. The latter is the
> greatest bottleneck to the ability to sustain high intensity
> conflict from the Iraqi point of view. It is not clear that Iraqi
> forces have the logistical basis for conducting the kind of
> extended war of attrition that would be required to impose a
> cease-fire. The key variable is political. If the U.S. threshold
> for casualties is low, then the ability to use, for example,
> chemical weapons coupled with urban warfare to attrit U.S. troops
> could create a situation where the United States might have
> limited appetite for continuing the campaign in the northeast.
> Under those circumstances, the United States might accept a
> cease-fire.
>
> In another scenario, the ability of Iraqi special forces to
> penetrate the United States and allied countries to carry out a
> range of high-intensity operations against civilian populations
> potentially could create a domestic political situation in which
> the United States is forced to accept a cease-fire in place.
> However, if the Iraqis were in a position to create this
> situation, it is not clear that they would accept a cease-fire.
>
> The key for this scenario is that Iraqi resistance be
> sufficiently capable and sustained to create a situation in which
> the lines have become relatively stable and casualties are
> acceptable on the Iraqi side but unacceptable on the American.
> The center of gravity of this plan is Baghdad. If the United
> States finds that the battle for Baghdad has drained U.S.
> resources, Washington might accept a cease-fire, rather than
> victory, as its conclusion.
>
> We regard the probability of this outcome as moderately low.
>
> Stalingrad
>
> The Battle of Stalingrad was a massive confluence of forces in an
> urban environment. Neither side expected this to be a decisive
> battle, but it evolved into one. Stalingrad had two phases: One
> was the German offensive, the other was the Soviet counter-
> offensive. The German offensive's was characterized by a highly
> mobile force of inferior size that was drawn into an urban
> environment in which mobility declined and in which numbers were
> critical. The Germans were drained by the battle, opening the
> opportunity for counter-attack. The key variable is a massive
> urban environment in which all variables except numbers and urban
> fortifications became irrelevant.
>
> At Stalingrad, the key was the ability of the Soviets to feed
> forces into the battle faster than the Germans could. The Iraqis
> do not have this ability -- probably not from a morale level and
> certainly not from a numeric standpoint. Nor will the United
> States commit the German error of feeding mobile, trained forces
> into a meat grinder. The United States will decline combat in
> this environment, while the Iraqis will not be able to sustain
> it.
>
> The more likely outcome to a Stalingrad would be an American
> probe into the city, possibly by airmobile or airborne forces.
> These forces become surrounded and defeated; the United States
> attempts to break through to these forces and either makes the
> linkup and withdraws or fails to link up and withdraws. The
> United States is much more likely to shift attention elsewhere,
> or even accept a cease-fire, than go into a well-defended
> Baghdad. The Iraqis' ability to pose such a defense is also
> doubtful.
>
> However, the unexpected happens -- and the search for incremental
> solutions to problems that are not recognized for what they are
> is a trap for all commanders. There we will regard the odds of
> this scenario as moderately low, rather than simply low, because
> in war, accidents do happen.
>
> WMD
>
> There is no precedent for this scenario. Assume for the moment
> that Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein actually had operational weapons
> of mass destruction -- including not only chemical weapons, which
> Iraq certainly has, but nuclear and biological weapons as well,
> including battlefield nuclear weapons. In other words, assume
> that the worst fears of the United States already have been
> realized.
>
> The most rational usage of these weapons is preemptive, simply
> because the moment prior to war is the time of highest
> concentration of forces and because the damage is being inflicted
> in another country. Deploying biological weapons in Kuwait prior
> several days before a U.S. attack is launched will allow the
> toxins to take effect. This could delay or even prevent a war. If
> it were possible to deliver nuclear weapons into northern Iraq,
> this would be the second blow. Any attack that materialized at
> this point would result in chemical and tactical nuclear attack.
>
> The United States at this point would face a dilemma. If it
> called off its own attack, it would leave Hussein in command of
> the region. If it pressed the attack, it would have to destroy
> all WMD. Now, since this originated in an intelligence failure,
> there would be no reason to believe that WMD could be fully
> destroyed. Therefore, the United States' only options would be to
> continue the war, using WMD of its own and accepting follow-on
> casualties; to abandon the war, since the point was to occupy
> Iraq and that might seem undesirable at that point; or nuke all
> of Iraq, which would be satisfying but fairly pointless.
>
> We regard this as a very low-probability event, both because we
> don't think Hussein has nuclear weapons or effective biologicals,
> and because if he did he wouldn't have enough for sustained
> combat. On the other hand, if we are wrong and he does have
> substantial nuclear and biological weapons, this would be quite a
> scenario.
>
> Vietnam
>
> In Vietnam, the United States fought two wars. One was a
> guerrilla war against indigenous forces supplied by local
> supporters; the other was a war against a regular military force
> that was deployed on discontinuous and irregular fronts --the
> Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese. The Viet Cong were
> effectively defeated by 1966. The North Vietnamese army was never
> defeated because it had lines of supply that were politically
> beyond the reach of the United States. The NVA could continue to
> feed forces into the battle.
>
> In this scenario, the United States would readily occupy Iraq.
> Underneath that occupation, an insurrection supported from
> outside -- Saudi Arabia or Iran -- would develop. The
> insurrection would be designed to impose an extended guerrilla
> war on the United States, while making use of Iraq as a base of
> operations outside the country impossible. In order for this
> model to work, as the United States suppresses the indigenous
> rising, external forces must be available to infiltrate Iraq in
> small groups, reform into larger groups and engage the United
> States in an extended war.
>
> The northeastern highlands and the southern marshes would make
> reasonable terrain for guerrilla warfare and, depending on how
> the United States manages the political evolution after the war,
> there potentially could be a political foundation for such a war.
> The key variables for this are, first, an outside country
> prepared to play the role of North Vietnam with the trust of the
> guerrilla forces in Iraq. Second, the political configuration
> must be such that the United States would be unable to act
> militarily to close off lines of supply from these countries.
>
> We find the latter difficult to imagine. Under current
> circumstances, U.S. behavior is becoming more, not less,
> aggressive. Nevertheless, this is not an inconceivable scenario.
> We regard this as a moderately possible outcome -- although not
> on the scale of Vietnam, given the nature of the terrain in most
> of the country.
>
> Coup d'etat
>
> U.S. leaders hope that the need to conduct the war into Baghdad
> and beyond will be mitigated by a non-military event -- a
> political shift in Baghdad. The problem faced here is two-fold.
> First, any potential coupster must be convinced that the United
> States will carry the operation to a conclusion -- an issue after
> 1991. Second, he must be convinced that Hussein won't kill him
> before the coup can be carried out.
>
> The fundamental difficulty with this strategy is that Hussein has
> an excellent counter-intelligence and security service.
> Discussions carried out prior to a war could readily be detected.
> The result would be unacceptable to the Iraqi general planning
> the coup. Moreover, Hussein would not deal with him immediately,
> which would let the United States know that the plot had been
> discovered; he would wait until the last possible moment, leaving
> the United States without options. There has been intense chatter
> in the media about contacts with generals who have agreed not to
> fight and so forth. We find this highly unlikely, precisely
> because it has been reported. If it were true, it would never be
> permitted to leak. But it has leaked, and that means not only
> that it is not true, it means that it is probably U.S.
> psychological warfare designed to rattle Hussein and have him
> kill some innocent commanders.
>
> At the same time, a coup is not at all an unreasonable scenario.
> Substantial discussions are not required for a commander to know
> that Washington would welcome the overthrow of the regime in
> Baghdad. In fact, there don't have to be any discussions. The
> general who would carry out the coup would never have contact
> with the United States. He would wait to see that the United
> States is actually committed irrevocably to the war and then, at
> some appropriate moment, would try to act.
>
> This is certainly a scenario being hoped for in Washington -- and
> it is a possible one, particularly if it is clear that the Iraqi
> army is collapsing. Of course, that will be the point at which
> the United States least needs the coup. We regard this scenario
> as reasonably probable.
>
> Iraqi Covert Counterattack
>
> The Iraqis have no reason to confine the war to their own
> territory. Quite the contrary, being able to open a front in the
> enemy's territory is logical. The issue is ability. Obviously,
> Iraq has no conventional force projection capability. It does
> have some unconventional capabilities, particularly if working in
> alliance with international paramilitary groups like al Qaeda.
>
> Under this scenario, the Iraqis would attempt to preserve their
> regime either through deterrence or through imposing high pain in
> attacking countries while sustaining resistance at home. From
> Hussein's point of view, the second problem is the key. If he
> begins the paramilitary campaign early, it provides justification
> for a U.S. attack. If he starts it after the attack, he must
> survive long enough to reap the rewards.
>
> This strategy works only if the Iraqis and allies have pre-
> deployed special operators in target countries -- including all
> those who participate in the U.S. coalition. Immediately upon war
> initiation, these groups would have to strike in such a way that
> they can influence the war. In other words, they must calibrate
> their attacks to demonstrate their capabilities but not use up
> their resources. They must demonstrate that the attacks will
> occur as long as U.S. forces continue advancing or remain on
> Iraqi soil.
>
> Calibration of the attacks to achieve these ends, along with
> calibration of timing, will be extraordinarily difficult to
> achieve. Moreover, if this is done in alliance with al Qaeda,
> there will be profound strategic tension. Hussein's interest is
> in preserving himself and his regime. He has a high ability to
> absorb risks toward this end, but a low tolerance for delay. Al
> Qaeda wishes to preserve itself as well, which leads it to high
> tolerance for delay and low tolerance for risk. Synchronizing
> these views and also calibrating the attacks to achieve their
> ends will prove overwhelmingly complex.
>
> We think there is a reasonably high probability of some attacks
> within the territory of coalition partners, but a low probability
> of success in deterring the continuation of the war.
>
> Iraqi victory
>
> This is the least likely scenario. As a military matter, Iraq's
> direct defeat of the United States is difficult to envision. Even
> nuclear weapons would lead only to retaliation. Outright victory
> is implausible, given relative force structures.
>
> At the same time, there are potential strategies, many already
> discussed, in which Iraqi action does not defeat U.S. military
> forces but creates political pressures that might lead to war
> termination. In our view, the United States has a higher
> tolerance for casualties and military reverses than the Iraqis
> might think. Even in Vietnam, it took more than four years for a
> serious anti-war movement to begin, and it never did command a
> majority, as the 1972 election demonstrated.
>
> The greatest threat to the United States is not Iraq but the
> outbreak of another, more threatening war in some other area,
> causing the United States to break off combat and transfer its
> forces elsewhere. In our view, this is not likely to happen.
> Neither the North Korean threat nor any other issue is likely to
> deflect the United States from Iraq.
>
> We regard the possibility of Iraqi military victory as extremely
> low.
>
> Conclusion
>
> These scenarios are not meant to be either exhaustive or
> thorough-going examinations of the possibilities. They are
> designed to provide a range of possibilities and tracks along
> which this conflict might move. The essential conclusion we have
> reached is that:
>
> 1. There is no single, obvious path this war will take.
> 2.: The most important variables are the capabilities of the
> Iraqi soldier and his officer. This is simply unknown at this
> point.
> 3. The higher the quality of Iraqi forces, the more options open
> up for the Iraqis and the more paths the war might take.
> 4. Time, in the short run, is Iraq's ally. In the long run, it is
> America's. In the short run, time increases political pressure on
> the United States. In the long run, Iraq cannot compete with the
> United States.
> 5. If speculation about Iraqi forces is correct, the war could
> end almost immediately upon beginning. A somewhat higher
> capability still would bring war termination within a month.
> Unexpectedly high capabilities could extend the war for several
> months.
>
> We expect the United States to win. We would be surprised by
> neither the collapse of the Iraqi army nor by strong resistance
> by some elements of it. We would be very surprised to see broad
> resistance, the ability to establish a sustained guerrilla
> movement beyond random terror attacks, or to find that the Iraqis
> have nuclear weapons. We think it most likely that we will see a
> war lasting between two and four weeks. But once the first shot
> is fired, all guesses become meaningless.
Henrik
> STRATFOR'S GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT
> http://www.stratfor.com
> 14 March 2003
>
> =================================================================
>
> Featured On Stratfor Today, For Members Only:
>
> * War Plan: Scenarios
> http://www.stratfor.biz/Story.neo?storyId=211472
>
>
> Today's Featured Analysis
>
> War Plan: Scenarios
> ==============
>
> Both the U.S.-led military coalition and Iraq have their war
> plans, which have been described in some detail in this series.
> The Iraqi war plan is more traditional, because Iraq must fix its
> deployments prior to war. Mobility is not likely to be an option.
> The Americans, highly mobile and, they believe, much clearer on
> events on the battlefield, go into the war with a framework for
> operations and the belief that the battle will evolve along some
> general lines, with numerous surprises and opportunities during
> the course of the war. They have less a war plan than a library
> of war options.
>
> That said, wars are not fought by plans. They are fought by
> military forces guided by plans; the intersection of those plans
> with each other, and the natural friction, unintended
> consequences and failures that constitute the battlefield,
> ultimately constitute the war. What would have happened at the
> Battle of Midway had U.S. aircraft not accidentally stumbled onto
> the Japanese fleet? This is not to say that wars are wholly
> unpredictable, particularly in the broadest sense. But wars are
> surprising processes, and it is essential to remember the number
> of wars in which the outcome surprised everybody, including the
> winners.
>
> Somewhere between randomness and fortune-telling, there are a
> range of reasonable scenarios that describe what might happen in
> a war. Some are more probable then others, and many overlap or
> complement each other. The usefulness of scenarios is not so much
> their predictive as their instructional value. They identify
> variables that might influence a war's outcome. They identify the
> significant and insignificant variables. After the war, these are
> "what ifs" -- before a war, these are guideposts.
>
> We will present, simply as models, nine possible outcomes of the
> war. These are in no particular order and, to emphasize, they are
> not mutually exclusive -- in terms of either outcome or
> implementation.
>
> 1991 Redux
>
> The essence of the 1991 experience was that the Iraqis, attacked
> on multiple levels by U.S. airpower, collapsed completely on the
> Kuwaiti battlefield, posing very little effective resistance at
> that time. There were several causes: The troops deployed in
> Kuwait were generally of poor quality and unmotivated; Iraq had
> no effective plan for the devolution of command; there was an
> extended, counter-force air campaign; Iraqi troops had no
> intelligence on U.S. force movements once the war was under way.
>
> In the 2003 scenario, the planned counterforce bombardment will
> be more limited; the terrain will be much larger, more varied and
> will contain Baghdad; the quality of troops is uncertain; the
> Iraqis have a plan for devolution and a war plan that minimizes
> the need for intelligence by minimizing maneuver and counter-
> attack options.
>
> In this scenario, the key elements are:
>
> 1. Iraqi troop capabilities must be universally and appallingly
> low.
> 2. Iraqi plans for devolving command must fail, and troops must
> be effectively leaderless.
>
> If these two things -- which really amount to one thing, a very
> bad army - hold true, then we might see a repeat of 1991.
> However, if there is any substantial improvement in one or both
> of these variables, that is not going to happen.
>
> We regard this outcome as moderately high, but far from certain.
>
> The Italian Campaign
>
> What made the Italian campaign of 1943-45 interesting was that it
> was without successful, decisive breakouts -- Anzio proving the
> point. It was a campaign of yards, not miles, and it dragged out
> for an extensive period of time. German resistance in Italy was
> made possible by the terrain, the superb quality of the German
> troops on the defensive and the quality of German command under
> Mannstein.
>
> The Iraqi terrain is only suitable for this sort of war in the
> northeastern quadrant; it would be a long reach to compare the
> best Iraqi troops with ordinary Wehrmacht soldiers, and there are
> probably no Mannsteins in the Iraqi army. However, between the
> urban areas and river lines south of Baghdad, to Baghdad itself
> and the mountains in the northeast, the willingness of Iraqi
> forces to take casualties over an extended period of time
> potentially could extend the war dramatically. Iraq does not have
> the internal industrial base to sustain a multi-year war effort,
> but it can sustain a war for months. We regard this as a low-
> probability outcome -- and it must be remembered that, in the
> end, the Germans lost in Italy.
>
> Cease-Fire
>
> There are multiple cases of partial victories in which the
> attacking force could not complete the mission for a variety of
> reasons -- military and political -- wound up taking territory
> and then being forced to accept a cease-fire in place, with the
> new frontier being the point where the forward line of troops
> ended. Israel in 1967 is a case where the best that could be
> achieved was a redefinition of borders without regime change or
> armistice. The Korean War was a case in which both sides had to
> concede that their war aims were unattainable, accepting a cease-
> fire that became a border.
>
> The dependency in this scenario is troop quality and devolution
> of command. It also requires Iraq to be able to inflict
> substantial casualties on U.S. and coalition forces, while being
> able to sustain high intensity operations. The latter is the
> greatest bottleneck to the ability to sustain high intensity
> conflict from the Iraqi point of view. It is not clear that Iraqi
> forces have the logistical basis for conducting the kind of
> extended war of attrition that would be required to impose a
> cease-fire. The key variable is political. If the U.S. threshold
> for casualties is low, then the ability to use, for example,
> chemical weapons coupled with urban warfare to attrit U.S. troops
> could create a situation where the United States might have
> limited appetite for continuing the campaign in the northeast.
> Under those circumstances, the United States might accept a
> cease-fire.
>
> In another scenario, the ability of Iraqi special forces to
> penetrate the United States and allied countries to carry out a
> range of high-intensity operations against civilian populations
> potentially could create a domestic political situation in which
> the United States is forced to accept a cease-fire in place.
> However, if the Iraqis were in a position to create this
> situation, it is not clear that they would accept a cease-fire.
>
> The key for this scenario is that Iraqi resistance be
> sufficiently capable and sustained to create a situation in which
> the lines have become relatively stable and casualties are
> acceptable on the Iraqi side but unacceptable on the American.
> The center of gravity of this plan is Baghdad. If the United
> States finds that the battle for Baghdad has drained U.S.
> resources, Washington might accept a cease-fire, rather than
> victory, as its conclusion.
>
> We regard the probability of this outcome as moderately low.
>
> Stalingrad
>
> The Battle of Stalingrad was a massive confluence of forces in an
> urban environment. Neither side expected this to be a decisive
> battle, but it evolved into one. Stalingrad had two phases: One
> was the German offensive, the other was the Soviet counter-
> offensive. The German offensive's was characterized by a highly
> mobile force of inferior size that was drawn into an urban
> environment in which mobility declined and in which numbers were
> critical. The Germans were drained by the battle, opening the
> opportunity for counter-attack. The key variable is a massive
> urban environment in which all variables except numbers and urban
> fortifications became irrelevant.
>
> At Stalingrad, the key was the ability of the Soviets to feed
> forces into the battle faster than the Germans could. The Iraqis
> do not have this ability -- probably not from a morale level and
> certainly not from a numeric standpoint. Nor will the United
> States commit the German error of feeding mobile, trained forces
> into a meat grinder. The United States will decline combat in
> this environment, while the Iraqis will not be able to sustain
> it.
>
> The more likely outcome to a Stalingrad would be an American
> probe into the city, possibly by airmobile or airborne forces.
> These forces become surrounded and defeated; the United States
> attempts to break through to these forces and either makes the
> linkup and withdraws or fails to link up and withdraws. The
> United States is much more likely to shift attention elsewhere,
> or even accept a cease-fire, than go into a well-defended
> Baghdad. The Iraqis' ability to pose such a defense is also
> doubtful.
>
> However, the unexpected happens -- and the search for incremental
> solutions to problems that are not recognized for what they are
> is a trap for all commanders. There we will regard the odds of
> this scenario as moderately low, rather than simply low, because
> in war, accidents do happen.
>
> WMD
>
> There is no precedent for this scenario. Assume for the moment
> that Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein actually had operational weapons
> of mass destruction -- including not only chemical weapons, which
> Iraq certainly has, but nuclear and biological weapons as well,
> including battlefield nuclear weapons. In other words, assume
> that the worst fears of the United States already have been
> realized.
>
> The most rational usage of these weapons is preemptive, simply
> because the moment prior to war is the time of highest
> concentration of forces and because the damage is being inflicted
> in another country. Deploying biological weapons in Kuwait prior
> several days before a U.S. attack is launched will allow the
> toxins to take effect. This could delay or even prevent a war. If
> it were possible to deliver nuclear weapons into northern Iraq,
> this would be the second blow. Any attack that materialized at
> this point would result in chemical and tactical nuclear attack.
>
> The United States at this point would face a dilemma. If it
> called off its own attack, it would leave Hussein in command of
> the region. If it pressed the attack, it would have to destroy
> all WMD. Now, since this originated in an intelligence failure,
> there would be no reason to believe that WMD could be fully
> destroyed. Therefore, the United States' only options would be to
> continue the war, using WMD of its own and accepting follow-on
> casualties; to abandon the war, since the point was to occupy
> Iraq and that might seem undesirable at that point; or nuke all
> of Iraq, which would be satisfying but fairly pointless.
>
> We regard this as a very low-probability event, both because we
> don't think Hussein has nuclear weapons or effective biologicals,
> and because if he did he wouldn't have enough for sustained
> combat. On the other hand, if we are wrong and he does have
> substantial nuclear and biological weapons, this would be quite a
> scenario.
>
> Vietnam
>
> In Vietnam, the United States fought two wars. One was a
> guerrilla war against indigenous forces supplied by local
> supporters; the other was a war against a regular military force
> that was deployed on discontinuous and irregular fronts --the
> Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese. The Viet Cong were
> effectively defeated by 1966. The North Vietnamese army was never
> defeated because it had lines of supply that were politically
> beyond the reach of the United States. The NVA could continue to
> feed forces into the battle.
>
> In this scenario, the United States would readily occupy Iraq.
> Underneath that occupation, an insurrection supported from
> outside -- Saudi Arabia or Iran -- would develop. The
> insurrection would be designed to impose an extended guerrilla
> war on the United States, while making use of Iraq as a base of
> operations outside the country impossible. In order for this
> model to work, as the United States suppresses the indigenous
> rising, external forces must be available to infiltrate Iraq in
> small groups, reform into larger groups and engage the United
> States in an extended war.
>
> The northeastern highlands and the southern marshes would make
> reasonable terrain for guerrilla warfare and, depending on how
> the United States manages the political evolution after the war,
> there potentially could be a political foundation for such a war.
> The key variables for this are, first, an outside country
> prepared to play the role of North Vietnam with the trust of the
> guerrilla forces in Iraq. Second, the political configuration
> must be such that the United States would be unable to act
> militarily to close off lines of supply from these countries.
>
> We find the latter difficult to imagine. Under current
> circumstances, U.S. behavior is becoming more, not less,
> aggressive. Nevertheless, this is not an inconceivable scenario.
> We regard this as a moderately possible outcome -- although not
> on the scale of Vietnam, given the nature of the terrain in most
> of the country.
>
> Coup d'etat
>
> U.S. leaders hope that the need to conduct the war into Baghdad
> and beyond will be mitigated by a non-military event -- a
> political shift in Baghdad. The problem faced here is two-fold.
> First, any potential coupster must be convinced that the United
> States will carry the operation to a conclusion -- an issue after
> 1991. Second, he must be convinced that Hussein won't kill him
> before the coup can be carried out.
>
> The fundamental difficulty with this strategy is that Hussein has
> an excellent counter-intelligence and security service.
> Discussions carried out prior to a war could readily be detected.
> The result would be unacceptable to the Iraqi general planning
> the coup. Moreover, Hussein would not deal with him immediately,
> which would let the United States know that the plot had been
> discovered; he would wait until the last possible moment, leaving
> the United States without options. There has been intense chatter
> in the media about contacts with generals who have agreed not to
> fight and so forth. We find this highly unlikely, precisely
> because it has been reported. If it were true, it would never be
> permitted to leak. But it has leaked, and that means not only
> that it is not true, it means that it is probably U.S.
> psychological warfare designed to rattle Hussein and have him
> kill some innocent commanders.
>
> At the same time, a coup is not at all an unreasonable scenario.
> Substantial discussions are not required for a commander to know
> that Washington would welcome the overthrow of the regime in
> Baghdad. In fact, there don't have to be any discussions. The
> general who would carry out the coup would never have contact
> with the United States. He would wait to see that the United
> States is actually committed irrevocably to the war and then, at
> some appropriate moment, would try to act.
>
> This is certainly a scenario being hoped for in Washington -- and
> it is a possible one, particularly if it is clear that the Iraqi
> army is collapsing. Of course, that will be the point at which
> the United States least needs the coup. We regard this scenario
> as reasonably probable.
>
> Iraqi Covert Counterattack
>
> The Iraqis have no reason to confine the war to their own
> territory. Quite the contrary, being able to open a front in the
> enemy's territory is logical. The issue is ability. Obviously,
> Iraq has no conventional force projection capability. It does
> have some unconventional capabilities, particularly if working in
> alliance with international paramilitary groups like al Qaeda.
>
> Under this scenario, the Iraqis would attempt to preserve their
> regime either through deterrence or through imposing high pain in
> attacking countries while sustaining resistance at home. From
> Hussein's point of view, the second problem is the key. If he
> begins the paramilitary campaign early, it provides justification
> for a U.S. attack. If he starts it after the attack, he must
> survive long enough to reap the rewards.
>
> This strategy works only if the Iraqis and allies have pre-
> deployed special operators in target countries -- including all
> those who participate in the U.S. coalition. Immediately upon war
> initiation, these groups would have to strike in such a way that
> they can influence the war. In other words, they must calibrate
> their attacks to demonstrate their capabilities but not use up
> their resources. They must demonstrate that the attacks will
> occur as long as U.S. forces continue advancing or remain on
> Iraqi soil.
>
> Calibration of the attacks to achieve these ends, along with
> calibration of timing, will be extraordinarily difficult to
> achieve. Moreover, if this is done in alliance with al Qaeda,
> there will be profound strategic tension. Hussein's interest is
> in preserving himself and his regime. He has a high ability to
> absorb risks toward this end, but a low tolerance for delay. Al
> Qaeda wishes to preserve itself as well, which leads it to high
> tolerance for delay and low tolerance for risk. Synchronizing
> these views and also calibrating the attacks to achieve their
> ends will prove overwhelmingly complex.
>
> We think there is a reasonably high probability of some attacks
> within the territory of coalition partners, but a low probability
> of success in deterring the continuation of the war.
>
> Iraqi victory
>
> This is the least likely scenario. As a military matter, Iraq's
> direct defeat of the United States is difficult to envision. Even
> nuclear weapons would lead only to retaliation. Outright victory
> is implausible, given relative force structures.
>
> At the same time, there are potential strategies, many already
> discussed, in which Iraqi action does not defeat U.S. military
> forces but creates political pressures that might lead to war
> termination. In our view, the United States has a higher
> tolerance for casualties and military reverses than the Iraqis
> might think. Even in Vietnam, it took more than four years for a
> serious anti-war movement to begin, and it never did command a
> majority, as the 1972 election demonstrated.
>
> The greatest threat to the United States is not Iraq but the
> outbreak of another, more threatening war in some other area,
> causing the United States to break off combat and transfer its
> forces elsewhere. In our view, this is not likely to happen.
> Neither the North Korean threat nor any other issue is likely to
> deflect the United States from Iraq.
>
> We regard the possibility of Iraqi military victory as extremely
> low.
>
> Conclusion
>
> These scenarios are not meant to be either exhaustive or
> thorough-going examinations of the possibilities. They are
> designed to provide a range of possibilities and tracks along
> which this conflict might move. The essential conclusion we have
> reached is that:
>
> 1. There is no single, obvious path this war will take.
> 2.: The most important variables are the capabilities of the
> Iraqi soldier and his officer. This is simply unknown at this
> point.
> 3. The higher the quality of Iraqi forces, the more options open
> up for the Iraqis and the more paths the war might take.
> 4. Time, in the short run, is Iraq's ally. In the long run, it is
> America's. In the short run, time increases political pressure on
> the United States. In the long run, Iraq cannot compete with the
> United States.
> 5. If speculation about Iraqi forces is correct, the war could
> end almost immediately upon beginning. A somewhat higher
> capability still would bring war termination within a month.
> Unexpectedly high capabilities could extend the war for several
> months.
>
> We expect the United States to win. We would be surprised by
> neither the collapse of the Iraqi army nor by strong resistance
> by some elements of it. We would be very surprised to see broad
> resistance, the ability to establish a sustained guerrilla
> movement beyond random terror attacks, or to find that the Iraqis
> have nuclear weapons. We think it most likely that we will see a
> war lasting between two and four weeks. But once the first shot
> is fired, all guesses become meaningless.
Quote:
<<<But once the first shot
is fired, all guesses become meaningless.>>>
He,he...Mon how can we ever loose?
Since WE and Isreal have at least 10K times the WMD's those scums can come up with.Besides we know how to defend ourself against them since we provided em in the first place, Don't think we're that stupid and did'n know of some day they might be used against us. We are still gods gift to the world = Ya' hear me!!! And don't ever forget it.
In closing with our favored Hallelujah phrase::
GOD BLESS AMERICA!
PS: Rush Limbaugh,the free worlds mouthpiece, could'nt say it any better
<<<But once the first shot
is fired, all guesses become meaningless.>>>
He,he...Mon how can we ever loose?
Since WE and Isreal have at least 10K times the WMD's those scums can come up with.Besides we know how to defend ourself against them since we provided em in the first place, Don't think we're that stupid and did'n know of some day they might be used against us. We are still gods gift to the world = Ya' hear me!!! And don't ever forget it.
In closing with our favored Hallelujah phrase::
GOD BLESS AMERICA!
PS: Rush Limbaugh,the free worlds mouthpiece, could'nt say it any better
I am not sure what you base your comments on and who is "we", but here are the numbers as compiled by the Stockhom International Peace Research Institute.Besides we know how to defend ourself against them since we provided em in the first place
Figures are trend-indicator values expressed in US $m. at constant (1990) prices. This covers all conventional arms transfers between 1973-2002:
USSR/Russia --- 25145 (57% market share)
France --- 5595 (13% market share)
China --- 5192 (12% market share)
USA --- 200 (1% market share)
Germany --- 84 (Less than 1% market share)
Cheers,
Christian