3rd Panzer Army and Bagration

[julian]

A quote from Vitebsk, Otto Heidkämpfer Vowinckel Verlag 1954 pp 177-178

"Anyway, the 3rd Panzer Army had to look forward to confronting the enemy pincer attack with the available forces, of which half were fixed unwantedly in the Vitebsk bend. According to the opinion of the Panzer AOK from this resulted the necessity to give up the sticking out bend and while abandoning Vitebsk ,retreat in a timely fashion in the Tiger position. Through this the front of the Panzer Army ,while taking into account the many lakes, would be shortened by around 70 km in the new position. The width of the divisional sectors which resulted from this would have made possible the making available of one to two divisions as Army reserve , the taking out of sufficient infantry reserves to feed the defensive battle, a doubling of the artillery defensive power and the antitankdefense and any necessary concentration in the defense.

......In this position it was the firm conviction of the Panzer AOK, that the 3.Panzer Army would have been able to see through the defensive battle for a longer time without outside help. At least one can suppose that the soviets would not have broken through the Tiger position as fast as was succeeded on 22 june on both sides of Witebsk.
Therefore, time would have been gained. And the high command could also have convinced itself that the judgment of the Pz AOK about enemy strength and objectives was correct. In timely fashion reinforcements could have been supplied to the Panzer Army. Though it is true that it would have been more correct to make available from the beginning for the defense in the Tiger position a fully mobile reserve, therefore a mot. or Panzer division, because only with such one could operate successfully against a broken through mobile enemy.
In the to be defended Tiger position all advantages were on the side of the Panzer Army. As a very favorable defensive position in almost its entire length by its natural position it leaned against many long lakes and the Düna. In months long labour this position had been built up. It was only twothirds of the length of the Vitebsk bend , practically however considerably much shorter because of the many lakes in the front.
A pulling back of the front in this position on 21 june , the day before the firmly expected major attack, would have messed up all preparations of the soviets. It would have been achieved that the image the enemy would have had about the situation of the front would not be correct anymore at the monent when he advanced to attack. The soviets would not only have had to redisposition artillery and infantry, which in itself would have postponed the attack on the Tiger position by several days and it would have shaped the the general attack plan in a non unified fashion. They would also have had to go over to a different attack method in view of the chain of lakes and the Düna in front of their new front. Finally, in their attack against our rear guards in the old position, they would have strongly exposed themselves. All this would maybe after all have made the high command think about what was to be expected from the enemy. "

Heidkämpfer who was chief of staff of 3rd Panzer Army, explains what difference a retreat on the Tiger position before the start of Bagration would have made in favour of 3rd Panzer Army.