A conversation between Hitler and his staff in juli 1943 quoted from Befehl im Widerstreit,Adolph Heusinger,Rain Wunderlich Verlag 1950, pp 265-268. Illustrates the disagreements between Hitler and his commanders after the failure of the Kursk offensive.
'Chief of the general staff: The strong russian attacks in the area of Charkow and against the Orel bend continue unabated. Specifically at Manstein on the northwing of AGC the situation west of Charkow has aggravated .I see a strong danger for the link to AGC.
Hitler : Manstein is a good commander when he has ample forces. He does not understand how to find solutions in crisises.
Chief of the general staff: I think that the situation forces us to make comprehensive considerations. May I start with the basic principle of the russian operations. Without a doubt the objective of their offensive is, to break through in the direction of Kieve,separate AGS and AGC and then push AGS against the Sea of Azov. THe forcal point of the Russians is clearly against the northwing of Manstein.
Hitler: Both Armygroups will at least prevent that the link between them is lost. The Russian can do everything and we are not even capable to cut off this miserable Kursk salient.
Chief of the general staff: The attack started too late.
Hitler: The command only started the business halfheartedly.-What can happen now to support the front. From where can we take foreces. Jodl?
Chief of the Wehrmachtführungsstab: The east must fend for itself. The west has been combed clean, Italy needs every man,because otherwise Sicily cannot be held. Maybe we can release forces in Norway.
Chief of the general staff : They would come too late. I see only the possibility to give up the Donets area and this way release forces for the Kiev area.
Hitler: Obviously,vacate and vacate. Then we will soon end up at the border of the Reich.. And the russian gets his land without losing a man.
Chief of the general staff: If we remain in front then we are in danger of losing our troops. We would only do the russian a favour,we play his game.
Hitler: What should become of the Kuban bridghead?
Chief of the general staff: We will have to give that up in any case. It does not serve the purpose you want to achieve as we cannot go on the offensive anymore.
The russian knows that too and does not see in it a threat anymore.
Hitler: Do not think you will gain forces this way. They will all be needed for the Crimea. And what do you think of the effect on Turkey. The gentlemen ignore the political consequences.
Chief of the general staff: We cannot sacrifice divisions for Turkey.
Hitler: Zeitzler,you are much impressed by the Russians. One needs the nerves to see such crisises through. Wenn I give up the Donets area, then I can put an end to the war in a few months. Then we do not have enough coal anymore.
Chief of the general staff: Speer has told me that it is not so bad. Anyway,lately we have not been able to get much coal out of the Donets area because of the railway situation
Hitler: How does Speer get these informations? Towards you? That is what I still lacked, that he involves himself in the military command.
Chief of the general staff: I asked him for it.
Hitler: Do not come up with vacating again,Zeitzler! We will hold the Donets area.
Chief of the general staff: Then we at least subordinate to Manstein the whole front to the sea of Asov. It cannot be that still large parts are subordinated to Armygroup Kleist to the north of the sea of Azov. The command must be in one hand.
Hitler: So mister Manstein can do what he wants. He will vacate the whole of the Ukraine,only to operate. How I can feed the german people is indifferent to him. Zeitzler,we must keep the matter in hand ourselves. Otherwise Manstein will face us with the fait accompli.
Chief of the general staff: We could impose restraints on him.
Hitler: I know how that goes. Then the reports will be made in such a way hat only remains the solution he wants. I have experienced that enough. If only I could rely on the reporting. All only think of themselves and their sector. The commanders in chief do not care about the global situation. We will see how we will cope.
Chief of the generalstaff: Than please authorise at least that a defenseline is built on the Dnjepr. It is urgently needed.
Hitler: Good,I agree . But take care that the front does not hear about it. And have calculated how long it takes to transport two divisions of AGN to the area of Kiev. And see to it that the setting up of new units in the Heimat is somewhat quickened.
Chief of the Wehrmachtführungsstab: But they were destined for Italy.
Hitler: One has to see where they are needed more urgently. But Zeitzler, you should get the vacating of the Kuban bridghead and the Donets area out of your head. Pay attention,tomorrow things will look completely different.
On the way home.
Chief of the general staff:At least he has authorized the Dnjepr position. This toughness is to despair.
Chief of the operations section: it costs us decisive time everytime. The troop has to pay for it. When we do not give freedom of action to Manstein,we will not come out from the dependence on the enemy.
Chief of the general staff: Nothing new to me. But make that clear to the Fûhrer!....'
Strategic and operational decisions summer 1943
Moderator: sniper1shot
Re: Strategic and operational decisions summer 1943
1)this is dating from 1950,when Hitler was the designated scape-goat
2)all this is about AGS,and the situation of AGC is not mentioned
2)all this is about AGS,and the situation of AGC is not mentioned
Re: Strategic and operational decisions summer 1943
This is a conversation which took place at the time. When it was published, has no importance.
Re: Strategic and operational decisions summer 1943
A conversation between Heusinger and Busse in december 1943 (Befehl im Widerstreit p 285-287).
'December 1943
Chief of AGS on the phone.
We have sent today a situation report in view of the russian breakthrough at Kiev and I should ask you to submit it as soon as possible.
Chief of the operations section: Hopefully it does not contain any expressions Hitler will immediately
hook into. You know how distrustfully he looks at all proposals by Manstein, how he almost seeks to prove to him that he is smarter himself. He only needs to find one phrase which he thinks incorrect and the whole report is dismissed. Can Manstein not come himself?
Chief of AGS : Only if he is called as nothing comes from this. He cannot assert himself against Hitler's dialectic.
Chief of the operations section : He should not fight against the dialectic. Not long ago, Himmler said' Manstein is a believing chistian and cannot be faithfull.'
Chief of AGS : Outrageous. So,one shoots at ones best people.
Chief of the operations section : Hopefully your reoport takes the same line as we : giving up the Nikopol bridghead,delaying action on the southwing of the Armygroup, strong concentrations to the west of Kiev to counterstrike.
Chief of AGS : Precisely our thoughts. We have had the focal point of our forces on the wrong wing for months. It is a miracle that we have not been thrown into the black sea. When all details are further ordered from above, then you do not need a fieldmarshall but a corporal can command the Armygroup.
Chief of the operations section : At first we need to obtain the vacating of the Crimea, then the conclusions can be drawn more easily.
Chief of AGS: We are looking at things the same way and above all have refused the possibility of opening the link to the Crimea from the bridghead Nikopol.. Herr Schörner who has been sent to us will also not be able to change that. Even with 10 Führer mandates in his pocket.
Another thing: can Koch and his Reichskommissariat Ukraine not disappear? Only one can command in the area of the Armygroup. Koch is superfluous , he makes things more difficult.
Chief of the operations section : the Generalquartiermaster has tried for a long time to get rid of him.Hitler does not want to makes this open admission of defeat. Koch can only be beaten out of the Ukraine by the Russians.
Chief of AGS : And a last thing. About these Feste Plätze. One cannot declare whatever city into a Feste Platz when it is not suitable terrainwise and divisions are need for its defense.
Chief of the operations section : Hitler has acceeded to our idea that the Armygroups can propose their Feste Platze themselves. More could not be obtained. But maybe more limitations can be pushed through.
Chief of AGS : At least one ray of light.'
'December 1943
Chief of AGS on the phone.
We have sent today a situation report in view of the russian breakthrough at Kiev and I should ask you to submit it as soon as possible.
Chief of the operations section: Hopefully it does not contain any expressions Hitler will immediately
hook into. You know how distrustfully he looks at all proposals by Manstein, how he almost seeks to prove to him that he is smarter himself. He only needs to find one phrase which he thinks incorrect and the whole report is dismissed. Can Manstein not come himself?
Chief of AGS : Only if he is called as nothing comes from this. He cannot assert himself against Hitler's dialectic.
Chief of the operations section : He should not fight against the dialectic. Not long ago, Himmler said' Manstein is a believing chistian and cannot be faithfull.'
Chief of AGS : Outrageous. So,one shoots at ones best people.
Chief of the operations section : Hopefully your reoport takes the same line as we : giving up the Nikopol bridghead,delaying action on the southwing of the Armygroup, strong concentrations to the west of Kiev to counterstrike.
Chief of AGS : Precisely our thoughts. We have had the focal point of our forces on the wrong wing for months. It is a miracle that we have not been thrown into the black sea. When all details are further ordered from above, then you do not need a fieldmarshall but a corporal can command the Armygroup.
Chief of the operations section : At first we need to obtain the vacating of the Crimea, then the conclusions can be drawn more easily.
Chief of AGS: We are looking at things the same way and above all have refused the possibility of opening the link to the Crimea from the bridghead Nikopol.. Herr Schörner who has been sent to us will also not be able to change that. Even with 10 Führer mandates in his pocket.
Another thing: can Koch and his Reichskommissariat Ukraine not disappear? Only one can command in the area of the Armygroup. Koch is superfluous , he makes things more difficult.
Chief of the operations section : the Generalquartiermaster has tried for a long time to get rid of him.Hitler does not want to makes this open admission of defeat. Koch can only be beaten out of the Ukraine by the Russians.
Chief of AGS : And a last thing. About these Feste Plätze. One cannot declare whatever city into a Feste Platz when it is not suitable terrainwise and divisions are need for its defense.
Chief of the operations section : Hitler has acceeded to our idea that the Armygroups can propose their Feste Platze themselves. More could not be obtained. But maybe more limitations can be pushed through.
Chief of AGS : At least one ray of light.'
Re: Strategic and operational decisions summer 1943
Yes,it had importance,because,at that time ,everything that was published was biased.julian wrote:This is a conversation which took place at the time. When it was published, has no importance.
Btw :the conversation does not prove anything.
Re: Strategic and operational decisions summer 1943
Historical facts are what they are and the conversations took place. They illustrate the disagreements between Hitler and his commanders. And the professionals were right.
Re: Strategic and operational decisions summer 1943
Fragment from a conversation between the Chief of staff of Armygroup North and Zeitzler in january 1944 (Heusinger, Befehl im Widerstreit, P295-296)
'Chief of AGN : Does the Führer at least not see that it had been better that he would have listened more to your proposals concerning the operational decisions of the last year and a half.
Chief of the general staff : He invents all possible justifications in hindsight to justify his decisions. So he alleges today that ,if he had not held Stalingrad, the Kaukasus army would have been lost. Or for example,the attack against Kursk had decisively weakened the Russian summer offensive. You cannot get through to him. Now I fight for the vacating of the Crimea and the Dnjepr bridghead Nikopol. He does not want to give up the Crimea because of Turkey, Nikopol because of the ore. I fight with him for the giving up of the Tcherkassy bridghead. He wants to set up an attack from there to regain Kiev. Time and time again I ask for the setting up of rearward defenslines.He believes it will break the willt to resist of the troops. I point out the overlong frontsectors of the divisions. He recklesly pretends that they were not shorter in the west in 1915/1917. And when I refute that with documents, he throws them wordlessly on the table. With your Army Group it was first the regard for Finland,now the loss of prestige at giving up the Leningrad front,now the significance of the oilslate of Narwa for the U Boats which he invoked for his decision to stay.
Chief of AGN : That is to despair.
Chief of the general staff: Even that would not be bad if one could discern a global planning of the war effort. But there is nothing to be seen from that. We fight in Russia,in Italy, soon in the west,-on the seas and in the far east,without putting the different theatres under a general line, without strategic plan. We fight now here, now there, but without coherence. Nobody feels respnsible for global planning. In a year everything will be over. Believe me ! I am starting to give up.
Now I fight desperately for an improvement ,but I can not do this for long anymore.
Chief of AGN : Who should do it then? Then everything will sink into chaos. No, you should stay as long as something can be saved.
Chief of the general staff: I told the same thing to Heusinger when he did not want anymore a few weeks ago. But the time will come when I cannot give away my honest name anymore. '
'Chief of AGN : Does the Führer at least not see that it had been better that he would have listened more to your proposals concerning the operational decisions of the last year and a half.
Chief of the general staff : He invents all possible justifications in hindsight to justify his decisions. So he alleges today that ,if he had not held Stalingrad, the Kaukasus army would have been lost. Or for example,the attack against Kursk had decisively weakened the Russian summer offensive. You cannot get through to him. Now I fight for the vacating of the Crimea and the Dnjepr bridghead Nikopol. He does not want to give up the Crimea because of Turkey, Nikopol because of the ore. I fight with him for the giving up of the Tcherkassy bridghead. He wants to set up an attack from there to regain Kiev. Time and time again I ask for the setting up of rearward defenslines.He believes it will break the willt to resist of the troops. I point out the overlong frontsectors of the divisions. He recklesly pretends that they were not shorter in the west in 1915/1917. And when I refute that with documents, he throws them wordlessly on the table. With your Army Group it was first the regard for Finland,now the loss of prestige at giving up the Leningrad front,now the significance of the oilslate of Narwa for the U Boats which he invoked for his decision to stay.
Chief of AGN : That is to despair.
Chief of the general staff: Even that would not be bad if one could discern a global planning of the war effort. But there is nothing to be seen from that. We fight in Russia,in Italy, soon in the west,-on the seas and in the far east,without putting the different theatres under a general line, without strategic plan. We fight now here, now there, but without coherence. Nobody feels respnsible for global planning. In a year everything will be over. Believe me ! I am starting to give up.
Now I fight desperately for an improvement ,but I can not do this for long anymore.
Chief of AGN : Who should do it then? Then everything will sink into chaos. No, you should stay as long as something can be saved.
Chief of the general staff: I told the same thing to Heusinger when he did not want anymore a few weeks ago. But the time will come when I cannot give away my honest name anymore. '
Re: Strategic and operational decisions summer 1943
It is obvious that any autobiography of a German general,published after the war,would have as aim to exculpate the generals of the responsability of the defeat and to put this responsability on Hitler .julian wrote:Historical facts are what they are and the conversations took place. They illustrate the disagreements between Hitler and his commanders. And the professionals were right.
Only fanbois will dispute this .
Re: Strategic and operational decisions summer 1943
Hitler would be very disappointed in the admirors of his alleged military genius because they try to act as if he did not make certain decisions instead of defending these decisions.
Anyway,the disagreements between Hitler and his commanders are part of the historical record which is simply illustrated here.
Anyway,the disagreements between Hitler and his commanders are part of the historical record which is simply illustrated here.
Re: Strategic and operational decisions summer 1943
Conversation between Heusinger and the chiefs of staff of the Army Groups in june 1943 (Befehl im Widerstreit 256-257)
Chief of the operations section: The war stands for us under the sign of lack of forces. Over time we cannot defend the area we gained. But Hitler believes he does not need to give up anything,be it from reasons of war economy,political or military. And,no doubt he will also fight to the last for Italy because of Mussolini.
Chief of AGC : Then he must draw the consequences in the east. With such a depletion of forces we cannot stay put in a winding front. Hitler has to see that. We have proven by the Büffel movement that shortening the front can be successfull.
Chief of the operations section: Certainly,but he will not admit it openly. He thinks he can shorten the front by the attack at Kursk and the shortening of the Kursk bend.
Chief of AGS : But is it not already too late for this attack.
Chief of the operations section: I fear this too. Until the 10th june I was in favour of it. Now the risk seems too high for me. I would prefer to operate from the backhand. Hitler also does not feel at ease. But the fieldmarshalls did not field any more serious reservations. -Zeitzler had warned . We cannot wage these internal struggles alone.
Chief of AGC: Which fights do you mean?
Chief of the operations section : Especially the one about the organistion of the top. Hitler must create a commander in chief East. That is the minimum requirement. Zeitzler has already done preliminary work but without support he cannot carry it through. Do me a favour and push your commanders in chiefs to do something before it is too late.
Chief of AGS : Hitler barely lets them speak. He almost drives over them.
Chief of the operations section: As long as the fieldmarshalls allow it. It is time they show their teeth and threaten to resign.
Chief of AGN : That does not help. Then more willing men will take their place.
Chief of the operation section: Unfortunately you are right. In spite of that it seems important to me to make clear to the Führer that Fieldmarshalls are not corporals. We have to wait for a favourable opportunity. I will give you a sign. I hope that we chiefs continue to collaborate as closely as possible.
Chief of AGC : About that you certainly cannot complain. What we arrange with you underhand must of course not be known to anybody.
Chief of the operations section: I thank you for that. It is not possible any other way. Hitler hates the general staff since the time of Beck because he holds it politically untrustworthy. Schmundt wants to strengthen the role of the adjudants to create a counterweight against us. But Zeitzler still resists this.'
Chief of the operations section: The war stands for us under the sign of lack of forces. Over time we cannot defend the area we gained. But Hitler believes he does not need to give up anything,be it from reasons of war economy,political or military. And,no doubt he will also fight to the last for Italy because of Mussolini.
Chief of AGC : Then he must draw the consequences in the east. With such a depletion of forces we cannot stay put in a winding front. Hitler has to see that. We have proven by the Büffel movement that shortening the front can be successfull.
Chief of the operations section: Certainly,but he will not admit it openly. He thinks he can shorten the front by the attack at Kursk and the shortening of the Kursk bend.
Chief of AGS : But is it not already too late for this attack.
Chief of the operations section: I fear this too. Until the 10th june I was in favour of it. Now the risk seems too high for me. I would prefer to operate from the backhand. Hitler also does not feel at ease. But the fieldmarshalls did not field any more serious reservations. -Zeitzler had warned . We cannot wage these internal struggles alone.
Chief of AGC: Which fights do you mean?
Chief of the operations section : Especially the one about the organistion of the top. Hitler must create a commander in chief East. That is the minimum requirement. Zeitzler has already done preliminary work but without support he cannot carry it through. Do me a favour and push your commanders in chiefs to do something before it is too late.
Chief of AGS : Hitler barely lets them speak. He almost drives over them.
Chief of the operations section: As long as the fieldmarshalls allow it. It is time they show their teeth and threaten to resign.
Chief of AGN : That does not help. Then more willing men will take their place.
Chief of the operation section: Unfortunately you are right. In spite of that it seems important to me to make clear to the Führer that Fieldmarshalls are not corporals. We have to wait for a favourable opportunity. I will give you a sign. I hope that we chiefs continue to collaborate as closely as possible.
Chief of AGC : About that you certainly cannot complain. What we arrange with you underhand must of course not be known to anybody.
Chief of the operations section: I thank you for that. It is not possible any other way. Hitler hates the general staff since the time of Beck because he holds it politically untrustworthy. Schmundt wants to strengthen the role of the adjudants to create a counterweight against us. But Zeitzler still resists this.'