Those of us who have participated in these conversations before are aware that the German plan required collecting almost 3,000 river barges as the primary cross channel transport. These river barges were engaged in commerce up until the Germans started requisitioning them and at tops speeds of a few knots they weren't going anywhere fast. Furthermore a significant number of those gathered were found to be in condition that made their use problematic. Many of the rest required signficant modifications as well. Even had the plan existed in say May I don't see how they could have been ready to launch an invasion in June certainly and July would be extremely problematic.phylo_roadking wrote: ... the shipping wasn't gathered or ready;....
Maps for Seelöwe
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Re: Maps for Seelöwe
Re: Maps for Seelöwe
lwd wrote:Those of us who have participated in these conversations before are aware that the German plan required collecting almost 3,000 river barges as the primary cross channel transport..phylo_roadking wrote: ... the shipping wasn't gathered or ready;....
The barge fleet was collected....
3.200 were refurbished and modified with drive-off ramps.lwd wrote:[These river barges were engaged in commerce up until the Germans started requisitioning them and at tops speeds of a few knots they weren't going anywhere fast. Furthermore a significant number of those gathered were found to be in condition that made their use problematic..
Mid-September 1.900 were ready in their departure ports. Only 1.150 were needed for the first assault wave.lwd wrote:[Many of the rest required signficant modifications as well. Even had the plan existed in say May I don't see how they could have been ready to launch an invasion in June certainly and July would be extremely problematic.
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Re: Maps for Seelöwe
That's the first I've seen that that many were modified with drive off ramps. What are your sources for this?Leandros wrote: 3.200 were refurbished and modified with drive-off ramps.
Which has little bearing on the ability to launch a June invasion.Mid-September 1.900 were ready in their departure ports. Only 1.150 were needed for the first assault wave.lwd wrote:[Many of the rest required signficant modifications as well. Even had the plan existed in say May I don't see how they could have been ready to launch an invasion in June certainly and July would be extremely problematic.
Re: Maps for Seelöwe
Not many - 3.200! Honestly, lwd - you are discussing Seelöwe without knowing this....? Read my book!lwd wrote:That's the first I've seen that that many were modified with drive off ramps. What are your sources for this?
In June, no. But, I find it a rather strong argument if you mean it had little bearing on an eventual invasion if they did'nt have ready barges or not....?lwd wrote:Which has little bearing on the ability to launch a June invasion.
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Re: Maps for Seelöwe
IIRC only a fraction were modified - COULD be modified....to lower the ramps themselves. A greater number required a large "A-frame" to be assembled by the men on board, then the ramp lowered....I.E. the A-frame assembled under fire But by far the greatest number required the ramp to be assembled after the barge was beached I.E. after they had been left high and dry.Not many - 3.200! Honestly, lwd - you are discussing Seelöwe without knowing this....?
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Re: Maps for Seelöwe
I am more with Phylo_King on this. However, his transcript from Halder's visit in September is rather selective both on the conditions in the ports as well as loading equipment and the available number of Ju52's. If I remember correctly the port commanders did not see the sunken ships as a problem. This is detailed in my bok on Sea Lion (Halder's Diary).Florin wrote:You are mentioning September, October... If there was ever an excellent moment to invade Great Britain, it was in June or July.
After that, forget about it.
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Re: Maps for Seelöwe
They did have drive-off ramps.... ....during training it took 4-5 minutes to assemble them (diary of 17th infantry division). I don't see what high and dry has got to do with it....wouldn't that be the ideal - as the opposite of drifting around... ...phylo_roadking wrote:IIRC only a fraction were modified - COULD be modified....to lower the ramps themselves. A greater number required a large "A-frame" to be assembled by the men on board, then the ramp lowered....I.E. the A-frame assembled under fire But by far the greatest number required the ramp to be assembled after the barge was beached I.E. after they had been left high and dry.Not many - 3.200! Honestly, lwd - you are discussing Seelöwe without knowing this....?
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Re: Maps for Seelöwe
Yes, they were all "drive off" ramps....but there were at least three different ways they were deployed
2/ the barge has to wait for the NEXT high tide until it is refloated - leaving it open to the RAF/FAA. Landing craft that don't rely on grounding can pull up their ramp and get the hell outta Dodge once they're empty!
3/ once refloated - the ramp has to be disassembled
Also - I sincerely doubt this timing was for those ramps that had to be fully assembled by hand...as opposed to the prefabricated ramps that could just be hauled out, or deployed by A-frame And as above, it's going to be a sh1t of a job done under fire...
1/ you have to either BE run aground....or wait until you're left high and dry by the ebbing tide - leaving you exposed for some considerable time to artillery and MG fire...I don't see what high and dry has got to do with it....wouldn't that be the ideal - as the opposite of drifting around...
2/ the barge has to wait for the NEXT high tide until it is refloated - leaving it open to the RAF/FAA. Landing craft that don't rely on grounding can pull up their ramp and get the hell outta Dodge once they're empty!
3/ once refloated - the ramp has to be disassembled
4-5 minutes under fire before you can get off the barge and even think of finding cover means an awful lot of dying...during training it took 4-5 minutes to assemble them (diary of 17th infantry division)
Also - I sincerely doubt this timing was for those ramps that had to be fully assembled by hand...as opposed to the prefabricated ramps that could just be hauled out, or deployed by A-frame And as above, it's going to be a sh1t of a job done under fire...
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Re: Maps for Seelöwe
Nor IIRC did Halder...what he saw as the real problem was that little or no attempt had been made at the time of his visit to repair/replace the cargo handing equipment he viewed necessary.However, his transcript from Halder's visit in September is rather selective both on the conditions in the ports as well as loading equipment and the available number of Ju52's. If I remember correctly the port commanders did not see the sunken ships as a problem.
As for the number of Ju52s - that figure doesn't come from Halder - it comes from a range of other sources; regarding the losses in Norway, William Green reports 150 total losses throughtout the entire course of that campaign I.E. first week of April to first week of June. Regarding the numbers lost in the Low Countries - the information comes from a similar range of sources, beginning with those German sources used by Callum MacDonald for "Crete:The Lost Battle"
(A quote from a German source; MacDonald gives chapter-by-chapter mini bibliographies but doesn't footnote each individual quote.)"Of the 430 Ju52s engaged in the operation, two-thirds either never returned from Holland or were so badly damaged as to be write offs."
From William Green...
It's worth noting that William Green notes that only 475 in total were available for operations in the West as a result of the ongoing losses in Norway by May 10th; of those, as we've seen 430 were used in Holland alone with WELL over half of those being destroyed or severely damaged."...losses mainly from anti-aircraft gunfire, were extremely heavy; in the five days that it took the Wehrmacht to crush the Netherlands, no fewer than 167m Junkers were totally destroyed, and a similar numberbadly damaged. By the end of 1940 a total of 1,275 Ju 52/3ms had been delivered to the Luftwaffe, of which some 700 had already been struck off charge."
Also, Ju52 manufacture was slow as of 1940, no more than 22-24 a month that's well under 100 "new builds" arriving with the Transportgruppen by the putative mid-September Sealion date.
But the final word on numbers should actually go to the distinguished German aviation historian Heinz Nowarra....and Junkers' official historian! In his history of the Ju52 he records that the "total loss" rate for Holland ran to 51% of the 430 Ju52s used KG zbV1 lost between 61 and 63 aircraft, while KG zbV2 lost from 140 to 157! He then notes this 51% loss rate did NOT include the seriously damaged Ju52s - and those scattered all over Holland with damaged undercarriages etc that had to be retrieved over the next few weeks! The loss rates of KG zbV11 and 12 meant that they had to be disbanded...
Eventually - Junkers (and Fokker!) were able to retrieve and put back into service a hundred or so damaged or marooned aircraft; Junkers did what they did a year later after Crete, and established a "RE-production line" that disassembled damaged Ju52s and cobbled togather the best bits to form flightworthy aircraft.....not unlike what Beaverbrook's CRO was busy doing with RAF fighters acros the Channel!
BUT - that means that while ~@370 aircraft were lost totally during the campaigns in Norway and the West - NOT counting those too damaged to be repaired By Junkers/Fokker ....only some ~175-180 new builds/repaired aircraft arrived with the Luftwaffe by mid-September - a NET loss of well over 200 Ju52s for the FJ's part of the final version of the Sealion plans....
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Re: Maps for Seelöwe
Plenty of good points to work on here....you'd do well not make such a sensation out of it.....
What should the defenders fire at? The hundreds of vessels out at sea, the beached barges, the storm-troopers that had landed in stormboats before the barges beached, the enemy soldiers securing the barges to the shore or those streaming down the side-mounted gangways (not the drive-off ramps) or the aircraft overhead giving support to the landing forces...? It is a little funny, in discussions like this it is often as if the Germans wouldn't fire back....This is actually what provoked my interest in Sea Lion. The ridiculing of the German plan. It simply did not conform with the happenings at the time....
See above.
All this is put in context in my book...... ..
They were to be run aground - and secured with poles and lines fore and aft. Drive-off could start right away. However, one need to know the build-up of the landing waves as such to understand the proceedings. This is what the Germans trained on....phylo_roadking wrote:1/ you have to either BE run aground....or wait until you're left high and dry by the ebbing tide -...
What fire - from whom - at whom...?.....I can give you details on force compositions for the landing forces at the four beaches. Can you detail the defence for me? I would appreciate that very much.phylo_roadking wrote: leaving you exposed for some considerable time to artillery and MG fire...-...
What should the defenders fire at? The hundreds of vessels out at sea, the beached barges, the storm-troopers that had landed in stormboats before the barges beached, the enemy soldiers securing the barges to the shore or those streaming down the side-mounted gangways (not the drive-off ramps) or the aircraft overhead giving support to the landing forces...? It is a little funny, in discussions like this it is often as if the Germans wouldn't fire back....This is actually what provoked my interest in Sea Lion. The ridiculing of the German plan. It simply did not conform with the happenings at the time....
This really didn't matter as the barges of the first wave was actually dispensable. Again, all this was in the German planning. If there is anything there is concensus on regarding Sea Lion it is the fact that the RAF could do very little to hinder the invasion. If the RAF tried to attack the grounded barges it wouold be a nice diversion from important targets. If attacking low-level they would be slaughtered by AAA like they were in France.phylo_roadking wrote:2/ the barge has to wait for the NEXT high tide until it is refloated - leaving it open to the RAF/FAA. Landing craft that don't rely on grounding can pull up their ramp and get the hell outta Dodge once they're empty!...
See below.phylo_roadking wrote:3/ once refloated - the ramp has to be disassembled ...
phylo_roadking wrote:4-5 minutes under fire before you can get off the barge and even think of finding cover means an awful lot of dying... ...
See above.
It is your privilege to doubt anything I and others write on this..... ....but, you haven't got the ramps right. Just to be a little finicky, there wasn't really any assembly at all. On the first ramp version it was. Later it was switched to two solid one-piece balks which were simply pulled out by the crews.phylo_roadking wrote:Also - I sincerely doubt this timing was for those ramps that had to be fully assembled by hand...as opposed to the prefabricated ramps that could just be hauled out, or deployed by A-frame ..
Well, war is shitty.....and, again, what should which defenders fire at. When unloading by the ramps started from the actual barges the storm-troopers would be well in-land.phylo_roadking wrote:And as above, it's going to be a sh1t of a job done under fire....
All this is put in context in my book...... ..
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Re: Maps for Seelöwe
OK! In Halder's diary it is stated in September (or August): Luftwaffe (feldzugmeister) reports 1.000 transports available. 750 operational.phylo_roadking wrote:As for the number of Ju52s - that figure doesn't come from Halder - it comes from a range of other sources; regarding the losses in Norway, William Green reports 150 total losses throughtout the entire course of that campaign I.E. first week of April to first week of June. Regarding the numbers lost in the Low Countries - the information comes from a similar range of sources, beginning with those German sources used by Callum MacDonald for "Crete:The Lost Battle"
In my book I have an appendix called: Halder's Diary. I have included everything concerning Sea Lion in the period June-October.
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Re: Maps for Seelöwe
Ah so it's an add for your book?Leandros wrote:Not many - 3.200! Honestly, lwd - you are discussing Seelöwe without knowing this....? Read my book!lwd wrote:That's the first I've seen that that many were modified with drive off ramps. What are your sources for this?
When I see "modified with drive off ramps" it implies that they are part of the barge not something you have to assemble after it grounds itself. Rather brings to question the quality of your book IMO.
In June, no. But, I find it a rather strong argument if you mean it had little bearing on an eventual invasion if they did'nt have ready barges or not....?[/quote]lwd wrote:Which has little bearing on the ability to launch a June invasion.
That wasn't what I sadi though was it?
Re: Maps for Seelöwe
Consensus among who? The RAF was a very serious impediment to Sea Lion and the Germans recongnized it.Leandros wrote: .... If there is anything there is concensus on regarding Sea Lion it is the fact that the RAF could do very little to hinder the invasion.
That assumption is rather problematic. The ship born AA would for the most part have been far less effective than that on the ground in France. From what I recall there was also rather limited ammo stocks particularly of heavy AA with the invasion fleet.If the RAF tried to attack the grounded barges it wouold be a nice diversion from important targets. If attacking low-level they would be slaughtered by AAA like they were in France.
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Re: Maps for Seelöwe
Fred, the Luftwaffe Transportgruppen never EVER mustered 1,000 Ju52s; it COULD theoretically muster that number of "transport" aircraft....but that includes floatplanes, impressed civilian types, Ju90s, FW200A/Bs etc., etc., etc....OK! In Halder's diary it is stated in September (or August): Luftwaffe (feldzugmeister) reports 1.000 transports available. 750 operational.
On the 31st of August 1939 - the gruppen mustered only 552 aircraft, of which 547 were Ju52s.
On the eve of WESERUBUNG - 573 Ju52s (150 lost)
On the eve of Fall Gelb - 475 Ju52s in total, 430 given over to ops in Holland.
On the eve of MERKUR in May 1941 - 483 Ju52s
As a result of the losses on Crete...
On the eve of BARBAROSSA - only 238 serviceable Ju52s.
And the FJ were geared to using Ju52s, they hadn't as yet worked through any other types - apart from the DFS 230! They went through a long period of experimentation in the Spring of '42 in various new types - but in 1940 they were stuck with the Iron Jenny.
Do we assume the Germans did anything approaching the same two years' worth of sand sampling and experimentation in water retention, sand plasticity etc. that the Allies did for OVERLORD? I take it for instance you know the legend of Malcolm Cambell and the pogo stick???...They were to be run aground - and secured with poles and lines fore and aft. Drive-off could start right away.
I'm not aware that infantry in beach defences would waste time shooting at aircraft overhead rather than the grey uniforms in front of them...What should the defenders fire at? The hundreds of vessels out at sea, the beached barges, the storm-troopers that had landed in stormboats before the barges beached, the enemy soldiers securing the barges to the shore or those streaming down the side-mounted gangways (not the drive-off ramps) or the aircraft overhead giving support to the landing forces...?
IF they managed to take a port in useable condition, and one that allowed easy egress into the hinterland; Dover for instance with access limited (by cliffs!) to two railway tunnels and one road...This really didn't matter as the barges of the first wave was actually dispensable. Again, all this was in the German planning.
The RAF's bomber aircraft given over to Army GHQ control were NOT to attack barges, they were to attack choke points etc. for forces leaving the beaches; it was the Fleet Air Arm's job to do that, and much research was actually done in two periods of testing into what damage to barges - on the same types of barge as the RAF could observe the Germans mustering - FFA gravity ordnance would actually do.If there is anything there is concensus on regarding Sea Lion it is the fact that the RAF could do very little to hinder the invasion. If the RAF tried to attack the grounded barges it wouold be a nice diversion from important targets.
IIRC the defence of the Meuse and Albert crossings concentrated the AA assets of nearly two full divisions; there's a lot more for those divisions hitting the beaches to defend against rather than concentrate their AA assets in one or two places.If attacking low-level they would be slaughtered by AAA like they were in France
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Re: Maps for Seelöwe
Fred...
What sources did you use for the British defences for your book?What fire - from whom - at whom...?.....I can give you details on force compositions for the landing forces at the four beaches. Can you detail the defence for me? I would appreciate that very much.
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