hello to all ; the end....................
The Bau-Pionier Bataillon 414 in Russia 1942. Based on the diary of Hauptmann Erich Landzettel.
August 08, 1942.
At 18:00 came Hauptmann Hasselkus. The Company formed in open space. The commander gave a speech and handed me a package with the "Eastern Front Medals" and pinned the ribbon over my own chest.
At noon I met a Russian civilian at workplace and asked for his roles. The Russian had a pass. He was a captain in the Russian navy who provided services for the Wehrmacht, He even could carry a gun. What was all this? .....
Source: http://www.dhm.de/lemo/forum/kollektive ... index.html
It's all folks. Raúl M .
Incidents and actions from the Eastern Front - 1941.
Moderator: sniper1shot
Re: Incidents and actions from the Eastern Front - 1941.
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.
Re: Incidents and actions from the Eastern Front - 1941.
Hello to all ; a new story about this topic.................................
The Aufklärungs-Abteilung 29 in Operation Barbarossa. First actions - June 1941.
In the night from 22 to 23 June 1941 the 29th ID (mot) marched from Sieldce and on June 23, 1941 still rested west of the Bug River. On June 24, 1941 at noon it crossed the Bug over the war bridge built northwest of Brest-Litovsk with the task of reaching the line Lyskow - Nowy Dwor - Pruzana and prevent the enemy's withdrawal eastward from the forests of Bialowieza. The AA 29 was moving forwards forming up the Group of March I, together with the Kradsch. Btl 29.
In the night from 24 to 25 June 1941, strong enemy contingents reinforced by tanks, headed by Wolkowysk toward Slonim, thus creating a difficult situation. Therefore the 29 ID (Mot) was ordered to push on the road Slonim - Zelwa and secure to the north and west and block the bridge on Zelwa and the course of the Zelwianka located far to the south. Following this order the AA 29 and the Kradsch. Btl 29 should proceed from Rozana towards Jeziornica.
A Radio vehicle Sd Kfz 263 of the AA 29 getting across the river Bug?
Sources: 29. Division, 29. Infanterie-Division (mot.), 29. Panzergrenadier-Division, Podzun-Pallas-Verlag, Bad Nauheim 1960
http://WWW.OSTFRONT.COM
Cheers. Raúl M .
The Aufklärungs-Abteilung 29 in Operation Barbarossa. First actions - June 1941.
In the night from 22 to 23 June 1941 the 29th ID (mot) marched from Sieldce and on June 23, 1941 still rested west of the Bug River. On June 24, 1941 at noon it crossed the Bug over the war bridge built northwest of Brest-Litovsk with the task of reaching the line Lyskow - Nowy Dwor - Pruzana and prevent the enemy's withdrawal eastward from the forests of Bialowieza. The AA 29 was moving forwards forming up the Group of March I, together with the Kradsch. Btl 29.
In the night from 24 to 25 June 1941, strong enemy contingents reinforced by tanks, headed by Wolkowysk toward Slonim, thus creating a difficult situation. Therefore the 29 ID (Mot) was ordered to push on the road Slonim - Zelwa and secure to the north and west and block the bridge on Zelwa and the course of the Zelwianka located far to the south. Following this order the AA 29 and the Kradsch. Btl 29 should proceed from Rozana towards Jeziornica.
A Radio vehicle Sd Kfz 263 of the AA 29 getting across the river Bug?
Sources: 29. Division, 29. Infanterie-Division (mot.), 29. Panzergrenadier-Division, Podzun-Pallas-Verlag, Bad Nauheim 1960
http://WWW.OSTFRONT.COM
Cheers. Raúl M .
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.
Re: Incidents and actions from the Eastern Front - 1941.
Hello to all ; a new story about this topic.................................
The Aufklärungs-Abteilung 29 in Operation Barbarossa. First actions - June 1941.
The reconnaissance of the AA 29 towards the Niemen as told by Hauptmann Schulze-Ingenohl, who replaced the wounded Commander, Maj. v. Blomberg:
A patrol consisting of three armored vehicles was detached from Jeziornica having as its task to reconnoiter towards the Niemen and to establish liaison with Army Group North. The last message received reported that the patrol had been engaged in combat with a Russian tank. Oberleutnant Ade, with a mixed scouting patrol, went in search of the missing comrades and additionally was to link with Army Group North. Ade found the burned remnants of the three lost vehicles but no trace of their crews. He proceeded the march towards the Niemen but without meeting any German soldier on the north bank. After waiting some time, the Oberleutnant gave the order to return, but at that time the patrol was attacked by Russian tanks, and the Officer was shot in the head. His men fought desperately, and were able to report about the situation by radio. In this unequal struggle only survived two motorcyclists who took refuge in the forests.
Motorcycles of Aufklärungs-Abteilung 29 in Russia June of 1941.
Sources: 29. Division, 29. Infanterie-Division (mot.), 29. Panzergrenadier-Division, Podzun-Pallas-Verlag, Bad Nauheim 1960
http://WWW.OSTFRONT.COM
Cheers. Raúl M .
The Aufklärungs-Abteilung 29 in Operation Barbarossa. First actions - June 1941.
The reconnaissance of the AA 29 towards the Niemen as told by Hauptmann Schulze-Ingenohl, who replaced the wounded Commander, Maj. v. Blomberg:
A patrol consisting of three armored vehicles was detached from Jeziornica having as its task to reconnoiter towards the Niemen and to establish liaison with Army Group North. The last message received reported that the patrol had been engaged in combat with a Russian tank. Oberleutnant Ade, with a mixed scouting patrol, went in search of the missing comrades and additionally was to link with Army Group North. Ade found the burned remnants of the three lost vehicles but no trace of their crews. He proceeded the march towards the Niemen but without meeting any German soldier on the north bank. After waiting some time, the Oberleutnant gave the order to return, but at that time the patrol was attacked by Russian tanks, and the Officer was shot in the head. His men fought desperately, and were able to report about the situation by radio. In this unequal struggle only survived two motorcyclists who took refuge in the forests.
Motorcycles of Aufklärungs-Abteilung 29 in Russia June of 1941.
Sources: 29. Division, 29. Infanterie-Division (mot.), 29. Panzergrenadier-Division, Podzun-Pallas-Verlag, Bad Nauheim 1960
http://WWW.OSTFRONT.COM
Cheers. Raúl M .
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.
Re: Incidents and actions from the Eastern Front - 1941.
Hello to all ; more follows.................................
The Aufklärungs-Abteilung 29 in Operation Barbarossa. First actions - June 1941.
Upon hearing the latest news the Abteilung's Commander, Maj. v. Blomberg, gathered all the detachment and came to the aid of those comrades in distress. On the way they met with the members of the first patrol who were wounded but had no fatal casualties. Shortly after the AA 29 clashed with superior infantry forces which had the support of tanks, so the German had to fall back while fighting and suffering heavy losses in men and material. The next day the rest of the detachment, commanded by Oberleutnant Storl, took a bloody revenge against the Russian tanks, loosing a light armoured scout vehicle in turn. In a secondary route that led to Slonim, the detachment had established a blocking position and engaged in combat with Russian tanks, which together with infantry elements, sought to break there. As the guns of 50 mm had no effect against the powerful armored, the sappers crawled through ditches and threw mines beneath them, hence after being immobilized the tanks were destroyed by anti-tank fire; the infantry was wiped out with machine gun fire.
A column of Soviet tanks and vehicles destroyed around Slonim......
Sources: 29. Division, 29. Infanterie-Division (mot.), 29. Panzergrenadier-Division, Podzun-Pallas-Verlag, Bad Nauheim 1960
http://WWW.OSTFRONT.COM
Cheers. Raúl M .
The Aufklärungs-Abteilung 29 in Operation Barbarossa. First actions - June 1941.
Upon hearing the latest news the Abteilung's Commander, Maj. v. Blomberg, gathered all the detachment and came to the aid of those comrades in distress. On the way they met with the members of the first patrol who were wounded but had no fatal casualties. Shortly after the AA 29 clashed with superior infantry forces which had the support of tanks, so the German had to fall back while fighting and suffering heavy losses in men and material. The next day the rest of the detachment, commanded by Oberleutnant Storl, took a bloody revenge against the Russian tanks, loosing a light armoured scout vehicle in turn. In a secondary route that led to Slonim, the detachment had established a blocking position and engaged in combat with Russian tanks, which together with infantry elements, sought to break there. As the guns of 50 mm had no effect against the powerful armored, the sappers crawled through ditches and threw mines beneath them, hence after being immobilized the tanks were destroyed by anti-tank fire; the infantry was wiped out with machine gun fire.
A column of Soviet tanks and vehicles destroyed around Slonim......
Sources: 29. Division, 29. Infanterie-Division (mot.), 29. Panzergrenadier-Division, Podzun-Pallas-Verlag, Bad Nauheim 1960
http://WWW.OSTFRONT.COM
Cheers. Raúl M .
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.
Re: Incidents and actions from the Eastern Front - 1941.
Hello to all ; the end.................................
The Aufklärungs-Abteilung 29 in Operation Barbarossa. First actions - June 1941.
On June 27, 1941 in the morning, the Division was deployed on a security mission along a front of 60-70 kms from Slonim up to Zelwianka. Right, on Slonim was the IR 71, westbound between the Holynka and Dereczyn was the AA 29 with the Kradsch. Btl 29 and astride the Zelwa and further south was the IR 15, facing northwest and west. Southwest of Jeziornica and along the Zelwianka, facing west towards Rozana, assured the MG Btl 5 which had been attached to the 29. ID (Mot).
In the course of those days were rejected several strong attempts of the enemy in order to break through the advanced positions of the AA 29 and the Kradsch. Btl 29, the situation improved when the front was reinforced with the II. / IR 71 in the Holynka sector.
A doctor of the AA 29 amputated the forearm of a Russian prisoner who has been wounded...........
A Russian casualty....................
Sources: 29. Division, 29. Infanterie-Division (mot.), 29. Panzergrenadier-Division, Podzun-Pallas-Verlag, Bad Nauheim 1960
http://WWW.OSTFRONT.COM
It's all folks. Cheers. Raúl M .
The Aufklärungs-Abteilung 29 in Operation Barbarossa. First actions - June 1941.
On June 27, 1941 in the morning, the Division was deployed on a security mission along a front of 60-70 kms from Slonim up to Zelwianka. Right, on Slonim was the IR 71, westbound between the Holynka and Dereczyn was the AA 29 with the Kradsch. Btl 29 and astride the Zelwa and further south was the IR 15, facing northwest and west. Southwest of Jeziornica and along the Zelwianka, facing west towards Rozana, assured the MG Btl 5 which had been attached to the 29. ID (Mot).
In the course of those days were rejected several strong attempts of the enemy in order to break through the advanced positions of the AA 29 and the Kradsch. Btl 29, the situation improved when the front was reinforced with the II. / IR 71 in the Holynka sector.
A doctor of the AA 29 amputated the forearm of a Russian prisoner who has been wounded...........
A Russian casualty....................
Sources: 29. Division, 29. Infanterie-Division (mot.), 29. Panzergrenadier-Division, Podzun-Pallas-Verlag, Bad Nauheim 1960
http://WWW.OSTFRONT.COM
It's all folks. Cheers. Raúl M .
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.
Re: Incidents and actions from the Eastern Front - 1941.
Hello to all ; something more I've found over there........................
Fighting in Kozin - July 1941.
On July 4, 1941 at 0620 hours the Ia (Ops Offr) of the 168. ID explained the situation to IR 429 and issued the following warning order:
Warning at once, providing security due north with all elements.
The II. / IR 429 should move toward Kozin immediately.
At 09:30 hours the IR 429 Commander stated:
The II. / IR 429 (reinforced) should block the road Kozin-Werba.
At 10:45 hours, fulfilling orders, the II. / IR 429 marched from Kozin heading towards Werba. While on the move to Werba, in consideration of the incoming reports about the presence of strong enemy still west of the extensive wooded area, the battalion was stopped and then committed north of Kozin in support of the I. / IR 429.
Seizing a soviet bunker around Kosin..............
Sources: http://radkovsky.twschwarzer.de/div.htm%20#%20DOK11
"Orig Foto Russ Bunker 103 Einnahme Kampf Kosin"
http://relicfinder.info/forum/viewtopic ... &start=340
Cheers. Raúl M .
Fighting in Kozin - July 1941.
On July 4, 1941 at 0620 hours the Ia (Ops Offr) of the 168. ID explained the situation to IR 429 and issued the following warning order:
Warning at once, providing security due north with all elements.
The II. / IR 429 should move toward Kozin immediately.
At 09:30 hours the IR 429 Commander stated:
The II. / IR 429 (reinforced) should block the road Kozin-Werba.
At 10:45 hours, fulfilling orders, the II. / IR 429 marched from Kozin heading towards Werba. While on the move to Werba, in consideration of the incoming reports about the presence of strong enemy still west of the extensive wooded area, the battalion was stopped and then committed north of Kozin in support of the I. / IR 429.
Seizing a soviet bunker around Kosin..............
Sources: http://radkovsky.twschwarzer.de/div.htm%20#%20DOK11
"Orig Foto Russ Bunker 103 Einnahme Kampf Kosin"
http://relicfinder.info/forum/viewtopic ... &start=340
Cheers. Raúl M .
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.
Re: Incidents and actions from the Eastern Front - 1941.
Hello to all ; more follows........................
Fighting in Kozin - July 1941.
July 04, 1941. For three days we combed the forest between Werba and Dubno, without supplies and left to ourselves. In one of the woods we stumbled upon a large number of Russian tanks and trucks. Three days watching the booty, which included maps with the deployment of the Soviet tank divisions mobilized against Germany and Romania. The Russians deployed in front of us by Werba were heavily punished and fled into the woods.
On July 05, 1941 they were completely destroyed at Kozin by the I. Battalion (IR 429), artillery and Flak. Our infantry was marching far behind yet. The Division Commander (168 ID), GM / GL Dr. Hans Mundt, and the Commander of the Regiment (IR 429), O (SS-OFhr) Arnold Altvater-Mackensen, were removed from their assignments.
July, 05 GM / GL Dr. Hans Mundt ; replaced by GM (GL) Gerhard Steinbauer; DKiG replaced on July 06, by O (GM) Wilhelm Haverkamp; on July, 08 finally took over GM / GL Dietrich Kraiß.
http://www.geocities.com/~orion47/WEHRM ... _HANS.html
July, 05 O (SS-OFhr) Arnold Altvater-Mackensen; repleced by OTL Joachim Szalla; DKiG and on July, 08 took over O (GM) Erich Gruner.
http://www.dws-xip.pl/reich/biografie/l ... 76226.html
Source: http://www.wilhelm-radkovsky.de/wjr-tit.htm
Any idea what happened there and why both commanders were fired.......TIA. Cheers. Raúl M .
Fighting in Kozin - July 1941.
July 04, 1941. For three days we combed the forest between Werba and Dubno, without supplies and left to ourselves. In one of the woods we stumbled upon a large number of Russian tanks and trucks. Three days watching the booty, which included maps with the deployment of the Soviet tank divisions mobilized against Germany and Romania. The Russians deployed in front of us by Werba were heavily punished and fled into the woods.
On July 05, 1941 they were completely destroyed at Kozin by the I. Battalion (IR 429), artillery and Flak. Our infantry was marching far behind yet. The Division Commander (168 ID), GM / GL Dr. Hans Mundt, and the Commander of the Regiment (IR 429), O (SS-OFhr) Arnold Altvater-Mackensen, were removed from their assignments.
July, 05 GM / GL Dr. Hans Mundt ; replaced by GM (GL) Gerhard Steinbauer; DKiG replaced on July 06, by O (GM) Wilhelm Haverkamp; on July, 08 finally took over GM / GL Dietrich Kraiß.
http://www.geocities.com/~orion47/WEHRM ... _HANS.html
July, 05 O (SS-OFhr) Arnold Altvater-Mackensen; repleced by OTL Joachim Szalla; DKiG and on July, 08 took over O (GM) Erich Gruner.
http://www.dws-xip.pl/reich/biografie/l ... 76226.html
Source: http://www.wilhelm-radkovsky.de/wjr-tit.htm
Any idea what happened there and why both commanders were fired.......TIA. Cheers. Raúl M .
- Attachments
-
- Generalmajor Gerhard Steinbauer Acting Commander of the 168. ID till July 06, 1941..................
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=5&t=81983&start=0#p734110 - image014.jpg (28.27 KiB) Viewed 13042 times
- Generalmajor Gerhard Steinbauer Acting Commander of the 168. ID till July 06, 1941..................
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.
Re: Incidents and actions from the Eastern Front - 1941.
Hello to all ; more follows........................
Fighting in Kozin - July 1941.
Source: http://relicfinder.info/forum/viewtopic ... &start=340
Cheers. Raúl M .
Fighting in Kozin - July 1941.
Source: http://relicfinder.info/forum/viewtopic ... &start=340
Cheers. Raúl M .
- Attachments
-
- A Pak 36 of 37 mm fighting in Kozin area ............................
- image015.jpg (66.08 KiB) Viewed 12994 times
-
- Soviet partisans are interrogated in the Unit's CP.....................
- image017.jpg (60.35 KiB) Viewed 12994 times
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- A wounded German soldier in the First Aid Station of Zubrinka .........................
- image019.jpg (49.1 KiB) Viewed 12994 times
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.
Re: Incidents and actions from the Eastern Front - 1941.
Hello to all ; one report about early engagements with T-34/76...........
On Jun 25, 1941 the 63 and 64 Tank regiments of the 32 Tank Div (4th Armored Corps), counterattacked parts of the 125 ID near Lviv/Lwow/Lemberg, nevertheless both regiments withdrew to its starting positions after losing 15 tanks...........
Sources: http://waralbum.ru/90779/
http://waralbum.ru/90788/
Anyone has detailed info about it? Cheers. Raúl M
Feliz Navidad - Feliz Natal - Frohe Weihnachten - Joyeux Noël - Merry Christmas - Wesołych Świąt!.
On Jun 25, 1941 the 63 and 64 Tank regiments of the 32 Tank Div (4th Armored Corps), counterattacked parts of the 125 ID near Lviv/Lwow/Lemberg, nevertheless both regiments withdrew to its starting positions after losing 15 tanks...........
Sources: http://waralbum.ru/90779/
http://waralbum.ru/90788/
Anyone has detailed info about it? Cheers. Raúl M
Feliz Navidad - Feliz Natal - Frohe Weihnachten - Joyeux Noël - Merry Christmas - Wesołych Świąt!.
- Attachments
-
- Tanks T-34/76 belonging to the 63 Tank Regiment destroyed near Lviv/Lwow - Jun 25, 1941................
- image004.jpg (23.72 KiB) Viewed 12020 times
-
- image002.jpg (33.75 KiB) Viewed 12020 times
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.
Re: Incidents and actions from the Eastern Front - 1941.
Hello Valery ; here goes...............
Ambush at Melniki - June 1941.
Sources: ARMY PAMPHLET NO. 20-290. TERRAIN FACTORS IN THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN.
FMS MD # 183. Operations of the 255 ID in Russia.
142# 6x Orig_ Foto Gräber i_ R_ 487 Russland bei eBay_de 1918-1945 (endet 20_01_08 212400 MEZ)
Dr.Rolf Hinze "Bug, Moskwa, Beresina",
Erloschene Spuren. Soldat der 267 ID. Eine Illustrierte Dokumentation
Cheers. Raúl M .
Ambush at Melniki - June 1941.
Sources: ARMY PAMPHLET NO. 20-290. TERRAIN FACTORS IN THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN.
FMS MD # 183. Operations of the 255 ID in Russia.
142# 6x Orig_ Foto Gräber i_ R_ 487 Russland bei eBay_de 1918-1945 (endet 20_01_08 212400 MEZ)
Dr.Rolf Hinze "Bug, Moskwa, Beresina",
Erloschene Spuren. Soldat der 267 ID. Eine Illustrierte Dokumentation
Cheers. Raúl M .
- Attachments
-
- image077.jpg (56.02 KiB) Viewed 9442 times
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- March's route of the 267 ID.................................................
- image079.jpg (46.49 KiB) Viewed 9442 times
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.
Re: Incidents and actions from the Eastern Front - 1941.
Hello to all ; more.............................
Advance towards the Dvina (Düna) 1941.
A vanguard detachment (Vorausabteilung) broke into a town; Suddenly, Soviet soldiers open fire from their hiding places. The chief of the German detachment is wounded ... Quickly everyone jumps into cover. The enemy seems to take position mainly in and between the trees to the right of the street ...... There is already a German mortar group which takes position ... and opens fire on the edge of the forest ...........
From the exit of the town, a hostile armored vehicle emerges ... the decision is fast and the order arrives: antitank to the front (Pak nach vor) .......... two minutes later the first projectile left the barrel........ The first shot was impact, quickly followed by two more shots. Hurray the tank burns........
Even as the anti-tank gun continues firing, the motorcyclists (kradschützen) go on to the assault of the place..................................
The commanding officer is wounded..................................................
Quickly a mortar group takes position there........................................
Sources: Berliner Illustrierte Zeitung, Nr. 31, 31. Juli 1941, 50. Jahrgang.
These images were obtained by PK-Mann Gustav von Estorff, who died in action. A comrade retrieved von Estorff's camera and published the story. Cheers. Raúl M .
Advance towards the Dvina (Düna) 1941.
A vanguard detachment (Vorausabteilung) broke into a town; Suddenly, Soviet soldiers open fire from their hiding places. The chief of the German detachment is wounded ... Quickly everyone jumps into cover. The enemy seems to take position mainly in and between the trees to the right of the street ...... There is already a German mortar group which takes position ... and opens fire on the edge of the forest ...........
From the exit of the town, a hostile armored vehicle emerges ... the decision is fast and the order arrives: antitank to the front (Pak nach vor) .......... two minutes later the first projectile left the barrel........ The first shot was impact, quickly followed by two more shots. Hurray the tank burns........
Even as the anti-tank gun continues firing, the motorcyclists (kradschützen) go on to the assault of the place..................................
The commanding officer is wounded..................................................
Quickly a mortar group takes position there........................................
Sources: Berliner Illustrierte Zeitung, Nr. 31, 31. Juli 1941, 50. Jahrgang.
These images were obtained by PK-Mann Gustav von Estorff, who died in action. A comrade retrieved von Estorff's camera and published the story. Cheers. Raúl M .
- Attachments
-
- The German officer, although wounded, continues to give orders calmly and clearly ......................
- image078.jpg (43.75 KiB) Viewed 9084 times
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.
Re: Incidents and actions from the Eastern Front - 1941.
Hello to all ; after a while...........
Night Raid on the Village of Khotomlya (Chotomlja).
Our rifle division held a frontage of almost forty kilometers. The forward edge ran along the river Severnyi Donets, but the enemy had managed to retain a few bridgeheads on our bank. We were opposed by the German 294th Infantry Division which consisted of three full-strength infantry and one artillery regiments.
Our division received the following mission : to activate the defense, to wear out the enemy, and to destroy his manpower and matériel. Considering the frontage, the lack of manpower and matériel, and the fairly large forces of the enemy, this mission was quite difficult.
The commander of the division organized a small but mobile detachment equipped with automatic weapons. This "destroyer battalion," as it was called, consisted of specially selected officers and men, mostly volunteers.
As a result of several successful engagements in which this battalion had participated, the army command became interested in it and began using it for various combat missions, chiefly of a reconnaissance character. A second "destroyer battalion" was organized in the division. The battalions , by their bold and sudden attacks (mostly at night) on separate strongpoints, headquarters, depots, and other objectives of the enemy, played an important part in the accomplishment of the mission of our division. One of the episodes in the battle activities of these destroyer battalions is described below:
The Germans were getting ready for a holiday, and it was expected that their vigilance would be somewhat weakened. The division commander, therefore, ordered the two battalions to raid the village of Khotomlya, one of the largest enemy strongpoints on our left bank of the river, on the eve of the holiday. The mission of the battalions was to destroy the village garrison, to capture matériel and prisoners, and then to withdraw without engaging in any protracted battles because of the weakness of the battalions-about 300 officers and men.
Three days were allowed for the preparation of the raid. This time was used for a careful reconnaissance. Reconnaissance in force carried out by our small reconnaissance detachments established the fact that the Germans had no outposts around the village (they were obviously afraid that our reconnaissance patrols would "remove" them). The location of ring positions in the outskirts were determined, and an estimate of the enemy forces was made.
Comparing these figures with the information obtained from the prisoners taken in our sector, our staff came to the conclusion that Khotomlya was defended by four infantry companies, one machine-gun company, a battery of 37-mm antitank guns, and a battery of 81- mm mortars of the 515th Infantry Regiment.
Sources: Military Review. August 1944 (translation of an article from the Voyennyi Vestnik (Military Journal) June 1943).
Cheers. Raúl M
Night Raid on the Village of Khotomlya (Chotomlja).
Our rifle division held a frontage of almost forty kilometers. The forward edge ran along the river Severnyi Donets, but the enemy had managed to retain a few bridgeheads on our bank. We were opposed by the German 294th Infantry Division which consisted of three full-strength infantry and one artillery regiments.
Our division received the following mission : to activate the defense, to wear out the enemy, and to destroy his manpower and matériel. Considering the frontage, the lack of manpower and matériel, and the fairly large forces of the enemy, this mission was quite difficult.
The commander of the division organized a small but mobile detachment equipped with automatic weapons. This "destroyer battalion," as it was called, consisted of specially selected officers and men, mostly volunteers.
As a result of several successful engagements in which this battalion had participated, the army command became interested in it and began using it for various combat missions, chiefly of a reconnaissance character. A second "destroyer battalion" was organized in the division. The battalions , by their bold and sudden attacks (mostly at night) on separate strongpoints, headquarters, depots, and other objectives of the enemy, played an important part in the accomplishment of the mission of our division. One of the episodes in the battle activities of these destroyer battalions is described below:
The Germans were getting ready for a holiday, and it was expected that their vigilance would be somewhat weakened. The division commander, therefore, ordered the two battalions to raid the village of Khotomlya, one of the largest enemy strongpoints on our left bank of the river, on the eve of the holiday. The mission of the battalions was to destroy the village garrison, to capture matériel and prisoners, and then to withdraw without engaging in any protracted battles because of the weakness of the battalions-about 300 officers and men.
Three days were allowed for the preparation of the raid. This time was used for a careful reconnaissance. Reconnaissance in force carried out by our small reconnaissance detachments established the fact that the Germans had no outposts around the village (they were obviously afraid that our reconnaissance patrols would "remove" them). The location of ring positions in the outskirts were determined, and an estimate of the enemy forces was made.
Comparing these figures with the information obtained from the prisoners taken in our sector, our staff came to the conclusion that Khotomlya was defended by four infantry companies, one machine-gun company, a battery of 37-mm antitank guns, and a battery of 81- mm mortars of the 515th Infantry Regiment.
Sources: Military Review. August 1944 (translation of an article from the Voyennyi Vestnik (Military Journal) June 1943).
Cheers. Raúl M
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.
Re: Incidents and actions from the Eastern Front - 1941.
Hello to all ; more..........
Night Raid on the Village of Khotomlya (Chotomlja).
The village of Khotomlya occupied an area three kilometers along the river and two kilometers wide. There was a grove on our side which was about 800 meters from the houses ; a flat field extended between the grove and the village. It was decided:
To attack at night;
To attack frontally for the purpose of simultaneous destruction of all firing positions in the outskirts;
To refrain from artillery preparation so as to insure complete suddenness of attack;
To get across the flat field by crawling (preliminary training was to be carried out in preparation for this );
To employ a combat formation consisting of company chains; not to echelon the battalions; to put all the force in the first effort in order to attain complete success at once;
To have a small reserve;
To launch the assault by shouting " hurrah" in order to reveal to the commander to what depth our units had penetrated.
During the preparation for the attack and reconnaissance, the commanders of all units had become familiar with the terrain. Each one of them was assigned the exact line of departure for the attack, the objective, and the place of assembly in the village. The latter was extremely important because during night battles not only individuals and squads but even whole platoons often get lost. In designating the direction of the attack the name of the nearest street was also indicated. Churches, windmills, and separate buildings were used as reference points. For the reporting of targets the village was divided into numbered sectors. All men were supplied with arm bands. Each one knew the password.
At 10:00 p.m. both battalions, combined in one group under one commander, left the line of departure and moved in the direction of the village. The advance guard paved the way, and a specially created squad for the evacuation of booty followed the battalions.
Communication with the division staff and the supporting artillery was accomplished by radio ; communication with the companies was by messengers and rockets.
Sources: Military Review. June 1944 (translation of an article from the Voyennyi Vestnik (Military Journal) June 1943).
Cheers. Raúl M
Night Raid on the Village of Khotomlya (Chotomlja).
The village of Khotomlya occupied an area three kilometers along the river and two kilometers wide. There was a grove on our side which was about 800 meters from the houses ; a flat field extended between the grove and the village. It was decided:
To attack at night;
To attack frontally for the purpose of simultaneous destruction of all firing positions in the outskirts;
To refrain from artillery preparation so as to insure complete suddenness of attack;
To get across the flat field by crawling (preliminary training was to be carried out in preparation for this );
To employ a combat formation consisting of company chains; not to echelon the battalions; to put all the force in the first effort in order to attain complete success at once;
To have a small reserve;
To launch the assault by shouting " hurrah" in order to reveal to the commander to what depth our units had penetrated.
During the preparation for the attack and reconnaissance, the commanders of all units had become familiar with the terrain. Each one of them was assigned the exact line of departure for the attack, the objective, and the place of assembly in the village. The latter was extremely important because during night battles not only individuals and squads but even whole platoons often get lost. In designating the direction of the attack the name of the nearest street was also indicated. Churches, windmills, and separate buildings were used as reference points. For the reporting of targets the village was divided into numbered sectors. All men were supplied with arm bands. Each one knew the password.
At 10:00 p.m. both battalions, combined in one group under one commander, left the line of departure and moved in the direction of the village. The advance guard paved the way, and a specially created squad for the evacuation of booty followed the battalions.
Communication with the division staff and the supporting artillery was accomplished by radio ; communication with the companies was by messengers and rockets.
Sources: Military Review. June 1944 (translation of an article from the Voyennyi Vestnik (Military Journal) June 1943).
Cheers. Raúl M
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Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.
Re: Incidents and actions from the Eastern Front - 1941.
Hello to all ; more..........
Night Raid on the Village of Khotomlya (Chotomlja).
At 0100 the battalions had reached the edge of the grove near the village. The enemy illuminated its forward edge by rockets and fired his machine guns once in a while, figuring that if our fighters attempted to approach the village they would consider themselves detected and would fire back. Knowing these not- too-clever tricks, our men paid no attention to this firing. The companies began crawling. An hour passed. According to the plan, the battalion had to reach the line of departure for the assault by this time, but the commander decided to wait another half hour. That half hour also passed.
Suddenly a German sentinel detected a group of fighters who had crawled up too close to him and sent up a warning rocket. Quite accidentally the rocket was red, and inasmuch as a red rocket was our signal for assault, our men rushed into the village. The blow was so sudden that the Germans could not organize any serious resistance. They jumped out of the houses undressed and presented a perfect target for our tommy gunners. Our men threw grenades into the houses, broke into the buildings, and destroyed the enemy with bayonets and fire.
The Germans in the rear of the village ran across the river and opened from there a disorganized mortar fire on the southern
outskirts of the village. German officers who stayed in the village attempted to direct this fire by rockets, but our men also released German rockets and confused the enemy mortarmen. The enemy fled.
The mission was accomplished and the commander signaled to withdraw. Our units captured four 37-mm guns, ten machine guns, six mortars of various calibers, great quantities of gas masks, rifles, and overcoats, and three prisoners. Seven hundred Germans ran from three hundred Soviet fighters. The enemy casualties were over three hundred killed and wounded. Our losses were forty men, mostly wounded.
After the attackers had left the village, at first mortar and then artillery fire was heard. Then the enemy, having gathered his forces, attacked the village, but his blow struck an empty place. This example of night attack is interesting because its purpose was not reconnaissance but diversion. Such " harassing" operations are characteristic of active defense on an extended front. The experiment in this mission of using specially selected men was successful, because it enabled the commanders to prepare and thoroughly train the men for their assignment.
Night operations call for simplicity in maneuver and small depth of combat formations. Such was the case in the above example and this, no doubt, contributed to the success of the engagement. However, there were faults in the organization of the attack. Had the German guard not signalled with a red rocket, which happened to be our signal for attack, and had that signal not been given just when the companies were ready for the jump, or if the sentinel had noticed the attackers sooner and succeeded in giving the alarm, the battle might have ended differently. It was a happy coincidence that was really responsible for our success.
To assure success in such an action as this, communication between the commander and his companies should be better organized, all signals should be duplicated, and the time for reaching the line of departure by the companies determined more accurately.
Sources: Military Review. June 1944 (translation of an article from the Voyennyi Vestnik (Military Journal) June 1943).
It´s all. Cheers. Raúl M
Night Raid on the Village of Khotomlya (Chotomlja).
At 0100 the battalions had reached the edge of the grove near the village. The enemy illuminated its forward edge by rockets and fired his machine guns once in a while, figuring that if our fighters attempted to approach the village they would consider themselves detected and would fire back. Knowing these not- too-clever tricks, our men paid no attention to this firing. The companies began crawling. An hour passed. According to the plan, the battalion had to reach the line of departure for the assault by this time, but the commander decided to wait another half hour. That half hour also passed.
Suddenly a German sentinel detected a group of fighters who had crawled up too close to him and sent up a warning rocket. Quite accidentally the rocket was red, and inasmuch as a red rocket was our signal for assault, our men rushed into the village. The blow was so sudden that the Germans could not organize any serious resistance. They jumped out of the houses undressed and presented a perfect target for our tommy gunners. Our men threw grenades into the houses, broke into the buildings, and destroyed the enemy with bayonets and fire.
The Germans in the rear of the village ran across the river and opened from there a disorganized mortar fire on the southern
outskirts of the village. German officers who stayed in the village attempted to direct this fire by rockets, but our men also released German rockets and confused the enemy mortarmen. The enemy fled.
The mission was accomplished and the commander signaled to withdraw. Our units captured four 37-mm guns, ten machine guns, six mortars of various calibers, great quantities of gas masks, rifles, and overcoats, and three prisoners. Seven hundred Germans ran from three hundred Soviet fighters. The enemy casualties were over three hundred killed and wounded. Our losses were forty men, mostly wounded.
After the attackers had left the village, at first mortar and then artillery fire was heard. Then the enemy, having gathered his forces, attacked the village, but his blow struck an empty place. This example of night attack is interesting because its purpose was not reconnaissance but diversion. Such " harassing" operations are characteristic of active defense on an extended front. The experiment in this mission of using specially selected men was successful, because it enabled the commanders to prepare and thoroughly train the men for their assignment.
Night operations call for simplicity in maneuver and small depth of combat formations. Such was the case in the above example and this, no doubt, contributed to the success of the engagement. However, there were faults in the organization of the attack. Had the German guard not signalled with a red rocket, which happened to be our signal for attack, and had that signal not been given just when the companies were ready for the jump, or if the sentinel had noticed the attackers sooner and succeeded in giving the alarm, the battle might have ended differently. It was a happy coincidence that was really responsible for our success.
To assure success in such an action as this, communication between the commander and his companies should be better organized, all signals should be duplicated, and the time for reaching the line of departure by the companies determined more accurately.
Sources: Military Review. June 1944 (translation of an article from the Voyennyi Vestnik (Military Journal) June 1943).
It´s all. Cheers. Raúl M
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.