Greenhorn, the Scapa Flow story USED to be that simple, but in the last 18 months there's been a couple of books published and some diving done on the wrecks....
Its clear now that he gave the order to scuttle in reaction to what he THOUGHT was a British attempt to occupy the German fleet, it being at that point on parole and not full surrender. I think their radios had been confiscated - those that had them - but the ships themselves were still fully armed. However, as with the rest of Germany in that time there'd been an outburst of Bolshevism among the fleet personnel on a couple of occasions, and the officers no longer controlled all the ships of the fleet. What had happened was that some officers in the fleet had received snailmail from homer giving details of what was being reported in the press about the progress - or not - at Versailles - and others, on being allowed ashore, had seen British newspapers. Some of these "reports" were blue-sky thinking on the status of the fleet and what should be done with it, and in the news vacuum Von Rueter gave selected officers, those allowed to travel betweeen ships - orders to prepare them for scuttling. In several cases this had to be done without the knowledge of their crews, especially the semi- or fully mutinous ones!
On the day of the scuttling, when word was given, these officers tried to visit again ship by ship, but on several there was armed opposition to their action, and American divers have found signs of watertight doors NOT left open etc, where crews had attempted to undo the preparations for scuttling!!!
Should the Graf Spee have gone down swinging?
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phylo_roadking
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Paul Lakowski
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why does this thread report that there are 15 posts , when I only can read 13? Why does it say there is a second page when there are no posts on that second page?
just curious.
re GS ; while ammo was down to 50%, Ajax used up 823 x 6" shells while Achilles fired 1242 shells. How many shells do these cruisers normally carry?
Bey displayed the same hesitation at Narvik when he could have gotten 2-4 of his destroyers out of the fiord, before the Brits came back days later.
Those German destroyers didn't see scuttling their ships as an option until they had fought out of their options and grounded their warships.
Lack of scouting capability?
Personally I view the entire SG mission flawed based on Scheers WW-I Cruiser squadrons actions. No matter what people may say, they achieved very little for the loss of the entire squadron. Given the contrast with the notable success of the Auxiliary Cruisers during WW-I , I would have thought the obvious lesson would have been to use Auxiliary Cruisers for overseas commerce warfare. Divert limited funding to purchase second hand freighters in the 1930s and secretly overhaul them for such commerce warfare overseas and keep the cruisers and battlecruisers with the WW-II equivilent of the "Hochseeflotte".
For the price of just one GS class they could have overhaulled 30-40 Auxiliary Cruisers through out the early to mid 1930s and dispatched 1/4 or 1/3 of them just prior to the war starting...sending the rest off individually after that.
Better yet each Division created in the mid 1930s cost the german economy 180million RM. The man power and funding and resources of just one division could have been redirected into training /conscripting personnel for these auxiliary warships , funding their purchase & conversion , plus fund the construction of barracks for the expanded naval personnel.
just curious.
re GS ; while ammo was down to 50%, Ajax used up 823 x 6" shells while Achilles fired 1242 shells. How many shells do these cruisers normally carry?
Bey displayed the same hesitation at Narvik when he could have gotten 2-4 of his destroyers out of the fiord, before the Brits came back days later.
Those German destroyers didn't see scuttling their ships as an option until they had fought out of their options and grounded their warships.
Lack of scouting capability?
Personally I view the entire SG mission flawed based on Scheers WW-I Cruiser squadrons actions. No matter what people may say, they achieved very little for the loss of the entire squadron. Given the contrast with the notable success of the Auxiliary Cruisers during WW-I , I would have thought the obvious lesson would have been to use Auxiliary Cruisers for overseas commerce warfare. Divert limited funding to purchase second hand freighters in the 1930s and secretly overhaul them for such commerce warfare overseas and keep the cruisers and battlecruisers with the WW-II equivilent of the "Hochseeflotte".
For the price of just one GS class they could have overhaulled 30-40 Auxiliary Cruisers through out the early to mid 1930s and dispatched 1/4 or 1/3 of them just prior to the war starting...sending the rest off individually after that.
Better yet each Division created in the mid 1930s cost the german economy 180million RM. The man power and funding and resources of just one division could have been redirected into training /conscripting personnel for these auxiliary warships , funding their purchase & conversion , plus fund the construction of barracks for the expanded naval personnel.
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sid guttridge
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Hi Paul,
The pocket battleships were built before German Army rearmament even began in the mid 1930s. Thus the pocket battleships never competed with the army for rearmament resources. Less pocket battleships therefore wouldn't translate into more army units.
It should also be pointed out that auxiliary cruisers were employed in WWII in addition to the pocket battleships rather than instead. The two were not mutually exclusive.
Furthermore, while it required regular warships to handle pocket battleships, the British could deploy their own auxiliary merchant cruisers to counter German auxiliary cruisers. British AMCs were usually rather inferior to German raiders because the former were fitted with obsolete armament removed from WWI era warships, whereas the latter had up to date pieces and fire control systems. Nevertheless, only a few hits could potentially force a raider to abort its mission.
On the expense side, it should also be noted that six large supply vessels were specially built in the late 1930s to support the three pocket battleships. (Altmark was one of this class). However, half of them were deliberately built in demilitarised Danzig in order not to impinge on German rearmament.
I would also return to a point I mentioned above. The pocket battleships were not built with opposing the UK in mind. They were built with a view to disrupting the martime communications of France. Given the much smaller size of the French fleet, they might well have been effective in this role.
More pocket battleships would probably not have been a good idea, but none would also have simplified greatly the early-war threat posed to the British, who had to keep cruiser squadrons in the Caribbean and South Atlantic as long as they were potentially on the loose.
Cheers,
Sid.
The pocket battleships were built before German Army rearmament even began in the mid 1930s. Thus the pocket battleships never competed with the army for rearmament resources. Less pocket battleships therefore wouldn't translate into more army units.
It should also be pointed out that auxiliary cruisers were employed in WWII in addition to the pocket battleships rather than instead. The two were not mutually exclusive.
Furthermore, while it required regular warships to handle pocket battleships, the British could deploy their own auxiliary merchant cruisers to counter German auxiliary cruisers. British AMCs were usually rather inferior to German raiders because the former were fitted with obsolete armament removed from WWI era warships, whereas the latter had up to date pieces and fire control systems. Nevertheless, only a few hits could potentially force a raider to abort its mission.
On the expense side, it should also be noted that six large supply vessels were specially built in the late 1930s to support the three pocket battleships. (Altmark was one of this class). However, half of them were deliberately built in demilitarised Danzig in order not to impinge on German rearmament.
I would also return to a point I mentioned above. The pocket battleships were not built with opposing the UK in mind. They were built with a view to disrupting the martime communications of France. Given the much smaller size of the French fleet, they might well have been effective in this role.
More pocket battleships would probably not have been a good idea, but none would also have simplified greatly the early-war threat posed to the British, who had to keep cruiser squadrons in the Caribbean and South Atlantic as long as they were potentially on the loose.
Cheers,
Sid.
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Enrico Cernuschi
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Hello Gentlemen,
let me agree 100% with Sid about the fact that real life is quite different from a wargame and the effect the pocket BBs had on the British and French naval strategy in 1939/1940.
Let me propose you, anyway, a further wargame style question. How much do you believe would have been effective a cruise, so much praised by Grossadm. Raeder, by Lutzov or Scheer in the Atlantic Ocean during 1942 or, better, 1943 with the support of the last supply ship available?
A curious
EC
let me agree 100% with Sid about the fact that real life is quite different from a wargame and the effect the pocket BBs had on the British and French naval strategy in 1939/1940.
Let me propose you, anyway, a further wargame style question. How much do you believe would have been effective a cruise, so much praised by Grossadm. Raeder, by Lutzov or Scheer in the Atlantic Ocean during 1942 or, better, 1943 with the support of the last supply ship available?
A curious
EC
Ciàpla adasi, stà léger.
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Paul Lakowski
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Admiral Raeder took over in 1928 and under the Muller and Schleicher governments that heralded Defense minister Groeners 'limited rearmament drive'. The missions given to Panzerschliff were a direct result of Groeners intervention. Groener nearly canceled the program several times due to the lack of realistic missions. Many viewed the money spent on them as wasted and could have been better spent funding Knaus fleet of multi engined bombers for the 'Risk Luftwaffe'.
During this period ~ 100 million RM were spent on warhips construction, mostly for support ships, not counting the completion of the 'Koln' Cruisers and 'Scheer' PBC. During this period German ship building industry slumped, due to shortage of orders from the 'Great Depression' and many shipworkers were put out of work. So they had the funds and ship building capacity to indulge in such a programme, as well as overhaul the bulk of the ToV Reichmarine fleet of the late 1920s/Early 1930s.
The whole point of commerce raiding was not to fight RN warships. The whole point of commerce raiding was to avoid RN/Allied warships and attack enemy commercial ships. By far the most effective cadidate for this role in both wars was the UBoat , but these had limitations in range and endurance.
Commercial vessels could cruise for over a year and use their ambiguious design & disguises , to avoid contact with enemy warships and hunt down enemy shipping. Since 3/4 of all shipping was not escorted and dispatched individually, civilian based raiders were much better suited to that mission. Warships could not help but attract attention no matter were they went, Stealth is much better in such a mission. I'm given to understand that allies had to divert considerable naval assets to constantly hunt down just a handfull of these raiders and it was not until mid war when they had effect.
Historically these commercial raiders also had a limited ability to resupply Uboats, further extending their effectiveness and endurance.This way priceless capital ship construction could be used in selective /sequential raids operating out of European waters. In the first few years of the war this was quite effective. Such raiders could also be employed to transmit code signals when enemy shipping is detected as in support of "Operation Berlin" in 1941.
During this period ~ 100 million RM were spent on warhips construction, mostly for support ships, not counting the completion of the 'Koln' Cruisers and 'Scheer' PBC. During this period German ship building industry slumped, due to shortage of orders from the 'Great Depression' and many shipworkers were put out of work. So they had the funds and ship building capacity to indulge in such a programme, as well as overhaul the bulk of the ToV Reichmarine fleet of the late 1920s/Early 1930s.
The whole point of commerce raiding was not to fight RN warships. The whole point of commerce raiding was to avoid RN/Allied warships and attack enemy commercial ships. By far the most effective cadidate for this role in both wars was the UBoat , but these had limitations in range and endurance.
Commercial vessels could cruise for over a year and use their ambiguious design & disguises , to avoid contact with enemy warships and hunt down enemy shipping. Since 3/4 of all shipping was not escorted and dispatched individually, civilian based raiders were much better suited to that mission. Warships could not help but attract attention no matter were they went, Stealth is much better in such a mission. I'm given to understand that allies had to divert considerable naval assets to constantly hunt down just a handfull of these raiders and it was not until mid war when they had effect.
Historically these commercial raiders also had a limited ability to resupply Uboats, further extending their effectiveness and endurance.This way priceless capital ship construction could be used in selective /sequential raids operating out of European waters. In the first few years of the war this was quite effective. Such raiders could also be employed to transmit code signals when enemy shipping is detected as in support of "Operation Berlin" in 1941.
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phylo_roadking
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Paul, I've highlighted two quotes from your post. the first is of course that's why commerce rading was important. WWII has better examples of Uboats operating VERY far from home such as in the Indian Ocean - BUT both wars have examples of commerce raiders operating all over the world to disrupt traffic, such as the beef trasnports from South America, and traffic in the China Seas and the Indian Ocean. Uboats operating at THAT sort of distance was VERY like, say the RAF bombing the Falklands 25 years ago - it took EIGHT mid-air refuelings to get them there....and the TANKERS had to refuel too! Whereas "merchant cruisers" were designed with extra fuel bunkerage, and KMS surface raiders carried huge reserves.The whole point of commerce raiding was not to fight RN warships. The whole point of commerce raiding was to avoid RN/Allied warships and attack enemy commercial ships.
I'm given to understand that allies had to divert considerable naval assets to constantly hunt down just a handfull of these raiders
BUT - the equal point was that all these vessles kept huge numbers of surface vessels at sea and on patrol rather than carrying out any other duty. Until the last of the pocket battleships was dispatched for for want of balanced fleet support unable to leave its fiord
, transatlantic convoys required major capital ship escort.This is also what happened in WWI - commerce raiders like the Emden and the Kormoran loose around the globe meant the RN and dominion fleets had to disperse assets on patrol and escort that could have been used elswhere, and the German admiralty knew this, it was an acknowledged tactic to try and reduce the strength of the British Home Fleet and East Coast battlecruiser squadrons in 1914-18.
So in WWII the threat of pocket battleships and other raiders KEPT major fleet assets on convoy escort until the threat was gone - and away from theatres that needed them like reinforcing the RN in the Mediterranean.
Enrico - in answer to your what-if? It would have kept the "threat" very much alive in the RN and USN's eyes, would have stopped them cutting down on cruiser class and above on convoy duty. In turn, fewer fleet units supporting landings in Siciliy and Italy, and eventually Normandy. Paranoia is a wonderful thing; the care and feeding of it can make your enemy SO busy looking over his shoulder he doesnt take a step forward.
"Well, my days of not taking you seriously are certainly coming to a middle." - Malcolm Reynolds
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Troy Tempest
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phylo_roadking
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Troy Tempest
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Well, if the fact of the existance of a raider forced the RN to allocate forces to look for or be ready for the KM raider, and those forces would then by tied up and not able to do anything else until the raider was dealt with, wouldn't the KM have been able to tie up way more RN forces with three more PBships instead of one battlecruiser? Like if they hadn't of built the Gneisenau, but built three more Admiral Hipper class ships in it's place? Wouldn't having to look for three extra Hipper raiders have caused more trouble for the RN than looking for one Gneisenau? And wouldn't those three extra Hipper's have had a more reasonable chance of sinking more commerce than the one battlecruiser? Wouldn't the KM have then had more RN forces tied up and have sunk more merchant ships as well? Double trouble!
Hello from sunny Port Macquarie
Given that Hipper had short legs and a tempermental power plant. Probably not. BB's like the twins and Tirpitz kept a fair number of British ships busy even in port. Then once the US is in the addtional units mean that a raider smaller than a BB has a lot of hunters that are at least a match for her considering that even if she "wins" a battle with a US CA or large CL she's not likely to make it home afterwards. They are also more vulnerable to bombs while in port.
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Paul Lakowski
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We seem to be in agreeement re history of effects of commerce raiders. I was thinking of the prewar strategy and the thinking that evolved. Commerce raiders were so cheap in comparison to warship. If you purpose build a new military class auxiliary cruiser , your probably looking at about 30m RM , compared to 80m RM for new PBC. But if you purchase a second hand civilian freighter and modify it for commerce raiding your probably spending only 2-3m Rm.
If you look at the historical purchaseing of warships during the rearmament phase, each Rboot/SBoot probably cost more than 1m RM. So instead of each of the 50-60 Rboot built in the reamament phase, you could have purchased and converted ~30 x frieghters and convert them to Auxiliary Cruiser , plus purchase 60-100 second hand trawlers and convert them to Auxiliary KFK/Vboot to cover coastal defenses.
Your commerce raiders can cover the overseas raiding for years freeing up your capital ship building programe for concentration on North Altantic/North Sea raiders conducting operational maneuver. As Raeder refered to it 'conduct maneuvers overseas to creat opertunities in home waters'.
At the start of the war 1/2 of the RN fleet was deployed overseas to protect convoys and empire commitment against such auxiliary cruisers. One can imagine dozens of Auxiliary cruisers instead of a handfull would draw off many more and what surface raiders you committ locally could shatter convoys allowing Uboat flottilas to increase sortie effectiveness. This has the chance of becoming a realy effective combined arms operation.
If the lessons of WW-II were based on the experiences of WW-I , then they didn't learn that auxiliary Cruisers were far more cost effective than crusier squadrons in commerce raiding.
If you look at the historical purchaseing of warships during the rearmament phase, each Rboot/SBoot probably cost more than 1m RM. So instead of each of the 50-60 Rboot built in the reamament phase, you could have purchased and converted ~30 x frieghters and convert them to Auxiliary Cruiser , plus purchase 60-100 second hand trawlers and convert them to Auxiliary KFK/Vboot to cover coastal defenses.
Your commerce raiders can cover the overseas raiding for years freeing up your capital ship building programe for concentration on North Altantic/North Sea raiders conducting operational maneuver. As Raeder refered to it 'conduct maneuvers overseas to creat opertunities in home waters'.
At the start of the war 1/2 of the RN fleet was deployed overseas to protect convoys and empire commitment against such auxiliary cruisers. One can imagine dozens of Auxiliary cruisers instead of a handfull would draw off many more and what surface raiders you committ locally could shatter convoys allowing Uboat flottilas to increase sortie effectiveness. This has the chance of becoming a realy effective combined arms operation.
If the lessons of WW-II were based on the experiences of WW-I , then they didn't learn that auxiliary Cruisers were far more cost effective than crusier squadrons in commerce raiding.
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phylo_roadking
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LOL first reaction would be...one would shudder at the thought of "intentionally" building a "battlecruiser" by the time the Gn was laid down; most of what's described at "battlecruisers" by WWII are actually not so in the sense that they were revised designs after the battlecruiser failures of WWI on both sides...but particularly the RN! In effect...this meant puting the armour back on! BUT modern engine designs and hull designs allowed this to be done and speed still to be maximised. Maybe by only a few knots, but its those few that counted in the long stern chase typical of one-to-one battlecruiser actions. But generall no matter what changes were unmade to the basic battelcruiser idea, the major defects in the class were already identified...with even the Hood's armour busy being upgraded through 1940. Also, the Hippers were in turn in a class of their own - more like re-uprated heavy cruisers rather than pocket battleships!
As for using them - the essence of the KMS surface fleet strategy was very simple - damage the enemy...and hinder his plans at sea; and by inactivity this can be done not only at sea but also in the offices of the Admiralty and the dayrooms of admirals. As has been said elsewhere - look at the constant fear the Tirpitz created in London, and the constant drain on resources it created without ever going to sea again - off the top of my head I can think of at least five major air attacks, two chariot attempts and one x-craft attempt. I know there were Skua and Beaufighter attacks, and at least two attaces by Lancasters of 617 Sqn. Add this together with the constant monitoring by the Norwegian Resistance. And this from a vessel that HID for most of the war!
Now, if you send a Hipper class vessel to sea...it IS only a glorified heavy cruiser. The Bismarck for example could hope to outfight twice its strength e.g. Hood and PoW. And did. Whereas any Hipper-class at sea would be facing RN Patrol groups any single one of which was more than a match for it. Therefore they'd be less of a problem to deal with, even if there was three of them, than the threat - whether it materialised or not, of one (ok, i'll use the term!) battlecruiser type. In other words, a Hipper-class only had to be escorted against, or found and subsequently destroyed. A larger ship had to be escorted against, found...sufficient forces massed against it and then outfought...and THEN destroyed. And its having to keep those extra, capable numbers available in home waters "against the day" that made the ONE vessel more of a threat than the THREE.
As for using them - the essence of the KMS surface fleet strategy was very simple - damage the enemy...and hinder his plans at sea; and by inactivity this can be done not only at sea but also in the offices of the Admiralty and the dayrooms of admirals. As has been said elsewhere - look at the constant fear the Tirpitz created in London, and the constant drain on resources it created without ever going to sea again - off the top of my head I can think of at least five major air attacks, two chariot attempts and one x-craft attempt. I know there were Skua and Beaufighter attacks, and at least two attaces by Lancasters of 617 Sqn. Add this together with the constant monitoring by the Norwegian Resistance. And this from a vessel that HID for most of the war!
Now, if you send a Hipper class vessel to sea...it IS only a glorified heavy cruiser. The Bismarck for example could hope to outfight twice its strength e.g. Hood and PoW. And did. Whereas any Hipper-class at sea would be facing RN Patrol groups any single one of which was more than a match for it. Therefore they'd be less of a problem to deal with, even if there was three of them, than the threat - whether it materialised or not, of one (ok, i'll use the term!) battlecruiser type. In other words, a Hipper-class only had to be escorted against, or found and subsequently destroyed. A larger ship had to be escorted against, found...sufficient forces massed against it and then outfought...and THEN destroyed. And its having to keep those extra, capable numbers available in home waters "against the day" that made the ONE vessel more of a threat than the THREE.
"Well, my days of not taking you seriously are certainly coming to a middle." - Malcolm Reynolds
First a couple of quibles
The were hardly glofified heavy cruisers. The were simply modern heavy cruisers and hardly the best of the bunch. Even the "pocket battleshps" were accurately rerated as heavy cruisers.
As for the merchant based raiders. After a certain point they get in each others way. IE searches for one will find another. Not sure if it was intended to say that they could break up convoys or not but they would be marginal at it at best. I belive at least one took damage from an allied armed merchant that lead to it's demise. Certainly encountering a convoy with several DD's in escort much less a cruiser or BB would be fatal.
phylo_roadking wrote:... the Hippers were in turn in a class of their own - more like re-uprated heavy cruisers rather than pocket battleships!
....
Now, if you send a Hipper class vessel to sea...it IS only a glorified heavy cruiser...
The were hardly glofified heavy cruisers. The were simply modern heavy cruisers and hardly the best of the bunch. Even the "pocket battleshps" were accurately rerated as heavy cruisers.
The Bismark got extremly lucky and even so was mission killed in the engagment. She couldn't hope to do as well agains 2 modern BBs that were fully worked up.The Bismarck for example could hope to outfight twice its strength e.g. Hood and PoW. And did. ....
As for the merchant based raiders. After a certain point they get in each others way. IE searches for one will find another. Not sure if it was intended to say that they could break up convoys or not but they would be marginal at it at best. I belive at least one took damage from an allied armed merchant that lead to it's demise. Certainly encountering a convoy with several DD's in escort much less a cruiser or BB would be fatal.
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phylo_roadking
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Luck played no part in what either the Germans OR the British expected her to be able to do. Remember, at this point - on her maiden voyage - her capabilities were entirely unproven. But the Admiralty expected to have to concentrate at least three BBs to sink her in a straight engagement. So whether she could or couldn't "do as well" is entirely moot - its what both sides thought she could do that they had to plan for!!!The Bismark got extremly lucky and even so was mission killed in the engagment. She couldn't hope to do as well agains 2 modern BBs that were fully worked up
She wasn't "mission killed" in that engagement, that occured when she took the first torpedo hits. It was the loss of bunkered fuel oil that forced the course change towards Brest and brought her within range of Ark Royal. Remember, for a short time after that until she was acquired again from the air, the Suffolk and Norfolk lost contact with her and at THAT point she was truly "loose" in the Atlantic - exactly her intended mission!
"Well, my days of not taking you seriously are certainly coming to a middle." - Malcolm Reynolds
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Paul Lakowski
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Auxiliary Cruisers averaged 15-16 enemy ships sunk each. What was the average shipping lost to surface raiders? I count 55 merchant ships from 9 surface raiders or about 6 each.
Given that something like 2000 civilian ships were at sea in any month, its unlikely even 100 Auxiliary Cruisers would be in each others way, given how hugh the oceans of the world were.
Given that something like 2000 civilian ships were at sea in any month, its unlikely even 100 Auxiliary Cruisers would be in each others way, given how hugh the oceans of the world were.