Antiaircraft Artillery in the Polish Campaign.

[tigre]

Hello to all. Just a little question: does anyone know which Antiaircraft Artillery Abteilung is the ones mentioned in the following article?. I assume the commanding officer was Major v. Minden the author.

Antiaircraft Artillery in the Polish Campaign
The Experience of an Antiaircraft Battalion
(Die Flakartillerie in Polenfeldzug, gemessen an dem Erfahrugen eine Flakabteilung, by Major V. Minden. Military Review, Sep 1940)

On the whole, the German large antiaircraft materiel and motorcycle equipment gave a very good account of themselves. One fact must be borne in mind. During the training period, in order to spare the equipment, the movements of antiaircraft artillery were confined almost entirely to excellent German highways. In Poland, however, our experiences were limited to but one good road—Warsaw to Lodz—and in the main we were obliged to make constant use of the poor sandy roads. Our drivers deserve a great deal of credit for the excellent manner in which they handled their vehicles in the movements over very difficult terrain. Much trouble was experienced in maintaining the rate of speed necessary to afford protection at the proper time. No one had ever thought that the Poles could be driven back so rapidly. The roads of deep saud might even have been considered impracticable for the movement of tractors, which often had to be resorted to in order to dislodge the trucks that had become bogged down in the sand. Many of these movements were carried out during the night and those during the day were of such great length that the drivers had little time for rest and scarcely more to devote to maintenance. It was quite nioticeable that the motor vehicle operatoos had acquired the spirit of the old horse-drawn organization’s—’’first the horse, then the rider,” modifying this slogan into ,"First the engine, then the driver. ” In order to reduce poor stretches of road to a minimum it was necessary for the leader of each unit to conduct a preliminary reconnaissance over the route which he expected to travel.

In passing motor columns on dusty roads which were either poorly marked or not marked at all, the role of the motorcyclist was one of constant drndgery. His peacetime tmilling showed its value; by strenuous effort his mission was usually accomplished. It is well to reflect how often the motorcycle messenger is sinned against. His employ ment on missions of minor importance should be deferred until such time when they may be included with others.
Conserving his strength will increase his value and he will be on hand when required. With his single companion he is often confronted with situations that require independent action and that will test the resources of a man with steady nerves.

In modern war, involving the movement of masses, the march will always remain a problem, the solution of which, to a great extent, will be a deciding factor in victory defeat. A clear conception of the manner in which it had be accomplished must be understood by the motor vehicle operator, as well as by the column commander. One column must not overtake another column. Columns which are halted on the road must not be passed until its command has been informed. Otherwise the halted column may start while it is being overtaken, an action which will result in to two parallel columns moving on the same highway. In the rear of a large column there should always be an officer charged with the mission of Preventing other columns from tempting to outdistance it. When there is considerable traffic on the highway, experience has proven that the first phase of the movement should cover as long a stretch as possible and that the longer rests be confined to the last phaseof the march.

Our aircraft had accomplished such thorough work in preparing the way, that during the first days we saw no Enemy airplanes at all. Our attacking squadrons had power behind them and the destruction by the diving Stukas was terrible. When judged on the basis of the number of hostile planes encountered, it must be conceded that our unit did very good work. Out of five enemy planes that we recogize we brought down three. Due to our rapid advance and our overburdened system of communications ,it was difficult to maintain contact with the rear. Consequently too little was known concerning the victories won by the antiaircraft artillery. One battalion alone brought down seventeen planes and another twelve, accomplishments which did much to establish confidence in our arm and prove its worth. During one gloomy, drizzling morning, when the clouds lay but six hundred feet above a small Polish city and no one had expected the approach of a hostile plane, the sound of an engine was suddenly heard and for a moment an airplane flew ghost-like along the lower edge of the clouds. Instantly the airplane alarm signal was sounded. In the fog the nationality of the plane could not be determined, but the shadowy outline well fixed in our memory, indicated it to be a single-seater pursuit PZL. The few seconds available were sufficient to enable two guns to get into action with the result that both guns fired a total of forty rounds before the plane disappeared from sight. A few seconds later we received one congratulatory message from the I Corps for bringing down the plane. The order to keep a man in the gun pointer’s seat ready to fire at any time, born of the experience that every second is decisive, paid well in this particular case. 1 cannot help but reflect on the words of one of my
former commanders, words which I also impressed on my organization, “The heaviest demands are made on the antiaircraft artilleryman; he must wait for days and even weeks and then, suddenly, he is forced to perform quick and accurate, work within a few seconds".

The reconnaissance of fire positions for heavy batteries cannot be started too early. It is only when we can fire from the very start far over the heads of oim own infantry into the air space of the enemy, that we can place a sufficient number of shots in the air to give real protection, keep enemy reconnaissance planes far enough .from our own lines and scatter his combat planes so that our fighters can make short work of them. This implies that the officer making the reconnaissance (battery commander or reconnaissance officer) must go forward with tbe infantry and make the reconnaissance as soon as the terrain is free of, the enemy. Each gun position, as well as each change of position, must be determined well in advance and must be coordinated with each element of the command.

In the new fire position the battery commander must establish communications as soon as possible with the troops on his right, his left and to the front, in order to safeguard against the effect of hostile surprise. The protection of the flanks against scattered hostile forces, or against those which have effected a break.through, must be provided for constantly by the antiaircraft artillery.

At one time we were engaged in attacking” a fort which bad been putting up a stubborn defense. All available artillery would be required to break down its resistance. Upon offering the corps my batteries, one battery was released for this purpose and dispatched to the division needing it most. It was assigned to the front infantry line, a railroad embankment just high enough for our gun barrels to reach over, and adequate for tbe protection of our crews. One gun was placed on the embankment, two were quickly entrenched, and the fourth was placed under cover and limbered up. As the infantry continued to sweep the enemy with tire, the light artillery smoked out a machine-gun nest and blew out the entire machine-gun emplacement; explosive shells knocked the enemy sharpshooters out of the trees, and then we began the bombardment of the fortress. It was in fights such as this that we won respect for our young arm.

The reconnaissance of positions for engaging ground targets is just as important as that made in tbe case of air targets. The approach and the return must he thoroughly considered mld studied. Surprise is an important element of success and must be taken into consideration when going into position. While being drawn by a vehicle over the last stretch of 200 yards before reaching the emplacement, we covered the gun with an improved iron shield.

The complex nature of our arm and the excellence of its equipment will continue to prove their value as the war Progresses. We should understand clearly that the pride in our young arm is justified, and that it is one responsibility to increase and fortify it.

Regards. Tigre.

[Lorenz]

Rudolf von Minden. Promoted to Oberst 1.10.1942. Spent the rest of the war in the Abt. Flak/Aviation Technical Equipment in HQ OKL. I don't know which Flak-Abt. he commanded during the Polish Campaign.

[tigre]

Thank you Lorenz; this Flak Abteilung (v. Minden) was under I AK. Cheers. Tigre.

[Shadow]

Greetings "tigre" -

I (01) Armeekorps:
II./Flak-Regt.-11 (gem.)
III./Flak-Regt.-11 (gem.)
Stab Art.Regt.z.b.V.-501
II./s.Art.Regt.-37 (gem.)
s.Art.Abt.-506 (gem.)
II./s.Art.Regt.-47 (gem.)
Grenzschutz-Regt.-21
11 Inf.Div.
61 Inf.Div.
Pz.Div. “Kempf”

From: http://www.axishistory.com/index.php?id=6464

Hope this is of some help.

[Lorenz]

Flak-Regimentsstab 11
Oberst Ernst Buffa (Jun 39 - Oct 39)
I./Flak-Rgt. 11
(unknown)
II./Flak-Rgt. 11
Obstlt. Eugen Hesse (c.Jul 39 - Nov 39)

By process of elimination, it appears likely that it’s I./Flak-Rgt. 11.

--Lorenz

[tigre]

Hello folks.

According to the Axis Order of Battle 1 Sep 1939 - The Invasion of Poland
by John Mulholland (The link posted by Shadow), the I./Flak-Regt.-11 was under XXI AK and the II. and III./Flak-Regt.-11 were under I AK since Lorenz listed Obstlt. Eugen Hesse (c.Jul 39 - Nov 39) as commander of II./Flak-Reg. 11, v Minden was the III./Flak-Reg 11's commanding officer. Thank you both, Lorenz and Shadow for helping me. Cheers. Tigre.

[Lorenz]

Hello folks.

According to the Axis Order of Battle 1 Sep 1939 - The Invasion of Poland
by John Mulholland (The link posted by Shadow), the I./Flak-Regt.-11 was under XXI AK and the II. and III./Flak-Regt.-11 were under I AK since Lorenz listed Obstlt. Eugen Hesse (c.Jul 39 - Nov 39) as commander of II./Flak-Reg. 11, v Minden was the III./Flak-Reg 11's commanding officer. Thank you both, Lorenz and Shadow for helping me. Cheers. Tigre.

Uh oh........There was no III./Flak-Rgt. 11. Besides, where a Flak-Rgt. had three Abteilungen, the III. Abt. was always a Flakscheinwerfer-Abt. equipped with searchlights and no weapons. These were always stationary, too. About 70% of the Flak-Regimenter had a III.(scheinw.) Abteilung, but Flak-Rgt. 11 was one of those that did not.

Back to square one.

--Lorenz

[tigre]

Houston, we have a problem here.

So quoting the author

A few seconds later we received one congratulatory message from the I Corps for bringing down the plane.

I assume he was under this Corps and the I./Flak-Reg is listed under the XXI AK. Wow, I'll check others OOB for the polish campaign. Thank you Lorenz; an interesting day lie ahead. Cheers. tigre.

[Lorenz]

Good luck, Tigre! Let us know what you find out.

--L.

[tigre]

Hello Lorenz, nevertheless in this OOB for the I AK there was an III./Flak Reg 11.




Taken from Dr. Leo Niehorster web site http://orbat.com/site/ww2/drleo/011_ger ... ps_01.html

However, my research goes on. Regards. Tigre.

[Lorenz]

Tigre wrote:

Hello Lorenz, nevertheless in this OOB for the I AK there was an III./Flak Reg 11.

There is something very strange here, Tigre, and I hope Dr. Leo can come forward and explain it.

There is no III./11 according to Koch, Horst-Adalbert - Flak: Die Geschichte der deutschen Flakartillerie und der Einsatz der Luftwaffenhelfer (Bad Nauheim: Podzun Verlag, 1965). Anhang 6, Truppenliste der Flakartillerie, beginning on p.476 and ending on p.650, is a nearly 200 page list of every Flak unit in existence from August 1939 to the end of the war. There is no III./11.

Also, in Tessin, Georg - Verbände und Truppen der deutschen Wehrmacht und Waffen-SS im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1945, Dritter Band (Frankfurt/M: Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GMBH, c.1967), p.218, there is no III./11, nor is there in the subsequently published errata pages (Berichtigungen Band III).

Nor, according to Kannapin, Norbert - Die deutsche Feldpostübersicht 1939-1945, 3 Bde (I – III) (Osnabrück, 1980-82), was a Feldpost number ever issued to a III./11, which is not listed anywhere in this publication.

Nor, according to Tessin, Georg – Deutsche Verbände und Truppen 1918-1939: Altes Heer, Freiwilligenverbände, Reichswehr, Heer, Luftwaffe, Landespolizei (Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1974), pp.299-303 and 439, was there ever a III./11; here, Tessin traces the formation of Flak-Rgt. 11 showing its initial formation in 1935 and its evolution right through to 31 August 1939. There was never a III./11 and Tessin goes out of his way to show this.

Finally, some 20 years ago I read the c.300-page 8.Abt./Lw. Genst. manuscript on the Luftwaffe’s participation in the Polish Campaign in which each and every participating unit was delineated in exacting detail. There was no III./11. This manuscript can be found in NARA WashDC: RG 242 (T-971 - the so-called von Rohden Collection).

So the ball is now in Dr. Leo’s court. If he can cite 3 or more corroborating primary documents that show the existence of this Abteilung, then he has my total attention and I will be most grateful. Until then, I am treating III./Flak-Rgt. 11 as non-existent and unknown to the Luftwaffe. The only possibility, as I see it, anyway, is that some other Flak unit received the temporary tactical designation III./11 for the duration of the Polish Campaign for some totally unexplained and unknown reason.

Cheers,

--Lorenz

[tigre]

Hello Lorenz, really you took my breath away quoting such kind of sources. It seems that herr v. Minden has caused a big mess here, the problem has deepened. Anyway, I dug about the 11. Flak-Regiment's OOB and you've right. Regards. Tigre.

[Shadow]

Ooops !!

Looks like a mistake on the part of the author.

Digging back through my research data I must agree with Lorenz that there never was a III./Flak-Rgt.11 during the Polish campaign, or ever.

My records show it being formed from the staff of the old Flak-Rgt.3 around June of 1939 and being placed under the command of Luftgaukommando.1 in Konigsberg.

Now I wish I could decipher what the unit is, on the fuzzy Gliederung copy I have, which I assumed was III./Flak-Rgt.11?

Oh well, back to the old magnifying glass I guess !!

Sorry for the confusion guys.

Best regards,

John Mulholland

[Tom Houlihan]

This might sound foolish, but is there any chance it might be a Heer Flak Abteilung?

[Lorenz]

This might sound foolish, but is there any chance it might be a Heer Flak Abteilung?

Well, by golly, there was a Heeres-Flakartillerie-Regimentsstab 11 (Standort: Allenstein/East Prussia), and on 1 September 1939 it had three organic Abteilungen: I., II. and III. But the selbständige Heeres-Flakabteilungen were almost all numbered in the 200-series and from 501 to 510, according to Tessin.

So, Tom. it looks like you may have hit pay dirt. The Flak regiment in question was most likely Heer rather than Luftwaffe.

Excellent!

--Lorenz