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The offensive battles against Cassino.

Attack of the NZ Corps February 13-18, 1944.

The completely exhausted II AC was replaced by the New Zealand AC. This consisted of the 2nd New Zealand Division and the 4th Indian Division.
Plan: February 15 air bombardment of the monastery. 4th Ind Div advances N past Cassino over the hill towards the monastery. The 2nd Div approaches the city from the Pastinelle area. In order to avoid observation, attacks should be carried out especially at night.

Execution. On February 15 the monastery was bombed: 240 bombers, B-17, B-25 and B-26, dropped 500 tons of bombs (500 and 250 kg each) on the monastery and largely destroyed it. (Alleged losses: 20 German soldiers and 300-400 civilians.) A German counterattack into the deployed 4th Ind Div caused heavy casualties and forced the attack to be postponed. So the monastery had to be constantly held down until the 18th, as the 2nd NZ Div had begun its attack on the 15th. This came to the train station, but had to go back because the Germans destroyed every bridge with artillery, so that heavy supplies failed to arrive.

During the period February 13-30 a number of night attacks were successful, but each time the positions became untenable during the day. Several regroupings took place during these days, but there was no success. The Liri valley remained closed. The action of the 4th Ind Div, which was deployed over the heights north of the monastery, also made relatively good progress during the night, but not as far as the monastery. Here too, the positions achieved could not be maintained during the day.

Reasons for failure:
The destruction of the monastery failed to destroy the German defenses. Apparently only a small number of them had taken cover in the monastery's cellars. For the most part they were scattered across the terrain and on the rear slope ready for a short-range counterattack.

The British's night attacks were always met by German defensive fire, which could be triggered in time and was well positioned. Actions during the day were, if not impossible, then only conceivable with larger support resources (German observation capabilities). The forces of two divisions were not numerous enough to advance on the city and the heights north of it.

In addition to the corps' own artillery, the artillery groups of the withdrawn II US Corps, the artillery of the CEF and 3 additional medium caliber Art Rgt fired in support of the two divisions of the NZ Corps. But direct support of the infantry was usually not possible because the Germans fought at short distances.

The difficulties in supplying the shock troops were too great due to the enemy's visibility into the supply columns and the bridges as well as due to the bad weather and ground conditions. The motor trucks had to be replaced by pack animals.

Source: Die Angriffsschlachten gegen Cassino. Schuler, Ernst. ASMZ Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift. Band (Jahr): 117 (1951). Heft 5

Cheers. Raúl M .

Feliz Navidad - Feliz Natal - Frohe Weihnachten - Joyeux Noël - Merry Christmas - Wesołych Świąt!

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The offensive battles against Cassino.

13th-23rd March 1944 (2nd attack phase).

Plan: This time the attack was to be carried out at night again, from the same area and again with two divisions. The town of Cassino was to be held down with massed fire while a British brigade was to advance onto the castle hill and another brigade was to pass through the first brigade via point 435 (Gallows Hill) and take the monastery. Another division had to take over the flank protection on the right.

Implementation: On March 15th From 08:30 to 12:00 hours, 16 groups of the strategic and tactical air force - one group every 15 minutes - (600 aircraft: Marauder and Baltimore) dropped 1100 t of bombs (500 kg each). 100 planes provided fighter protection.

From 12:00 to 20:00 hours, 890 guns continuously shelled the city area with a total expenditure of 200,000 rounds.

From 13:00 to 17:00 hours, 54 tons of bombs (10-500 kg each) were dropped by fighter-bombers to directly support the ground troops, but the precision of this bombing was poor due to the large amount of smoke.

They managed to occupy the castle hill and from there two thirds of the city. Parts of the attack troops even reached the gallows hill south of the monastery. As a result of the severe destruction of the city and the steepness of the terrain, the tanks were unable to advance. The connection with the accompanying artillery was not quick enough and was sometimes even broken, so that our own troops were fired upon in the area of Gallows Hill.

Due to a German counter-attack, the front units were cut off at Gallows Hill and had to return to the castle because there was a lack of supplies. The monastery was neither reached nor could the gallows hill and the city be held by the English. The accompanying action of armored troops to the north, which advanced via Albaneta towards the monastery without encountering much resistance, had a surprising success. However, this action could not be exploited because no additional forces were available.

Assessment:
The attack by the heavy bombers from an altitude of 4000-5000 m in conjunction with ground operations was too imprecise. Medium and light bombers have better success from 1500-2000 m if the targets can be visibly aimed.

Cities and towns that are bombed become impassable or unusable shortly after the attack because the roads are blocked. Strong aviation and artillery influence on cities and towns is tactically more favorable for the defender than for the attacker. In difficult terrain, the artillery observer must be in the front company.

The night attacks resulted in dangerous mixing of the units, including mixing with the enemy. German prisoners described the effects of the bombing and artillery fire as terrible and devastating. The attackers' failure was all the more astonishing.

Source: Die Angriffsschlachten gegen Cassino. Schuler, Ernst. ASMZ Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift. Band (Jahr): 117 (1951). Heft 5

Cheers. Raúl M .

Feliz Año Nuevo - Happy New Year - feliz Ano Novo - gluckliches Neues Jahr - Bonne Année - Felice Anno Nuovo - Szczęśliwego nowego roku!

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The offensive battles against Cassino.

Operation Honker (3rd phase).

Plan: The 8th Army and the American 5th Army were to attack the enemy simultaneously from Mt. Cairo to the sea. An attack from the bridgehead at Anzio was to take place at a later date that was more favorable to the progress of the Honker plan.

On the right flank, the Polish Corps was to seize points 575 and 593, occupy the slopes between these two points and Road 6 and then clear the monastery of the enemy. On the left flank of the 13th Corps, the CEF under General Juin had to occupy Mt. Majo and then advance north and northwest to the Liri and Pontecorvo. The 13th Corps (4th British Division on the right, 8th Indian Division on the left, 78th Division in reserve) was to attack the enemy in the Liri Valley with the aim of establishing a bridgehead across the Gari, as a preliminary step, both for the encirclement and destruction of the enemy in the Cassino position, as well as for the general attack up the valley.

Artillery: An average of 4 regiments (around 150 guns) were available to the front divisions as divisional artillery groups. A group of 30 tubes of the heaviest caliber was formed as the Polish corps artillery. The British Corps also had such a heavy group. An artillery group from the 8th Army was designated for counter-battery firing and fired particularly against the monastery with the heaviest calibers.

Aircraft: No preparation for attack was planned. To support the advance, the German artillery positions in the Liri valley and the Atina area were to be bombed, as well as the supply routes of the German sector of the front. Direct air support was directed from Mt. Trocchio. There was always a squadron directly over the operational area. It was replaced every 15 minutes. This meant that air support could be provided within a very short period of time.

Sappers troop: The div. sappers were assigned close combat tasks with flamethrowers, clearing minefields, and removing obstacles and path improvements. An Army Corps sapper group was responsible for establishing command posts. It also had to keep the runways clear for the armored vehicles of the reserve of the army corps.

Connections: The use of radio was prohibited until the attack began. Even afterwards, radio transmission was only allowed if the wire connections failed, as the large concentration of radio resources would have disrupted traffic. Cable lines were laid through the Rapido valley. Carrier pigeons were also used.

Fogging: Enemy CPs and observation posts, all of our own artillery, and the entire Rapido Valley were fogged during the entire operation.

A deceptive maneuver in the form of an attack towards Belmonte was intended to draw the enemy's attention there. The secrecy was total. No exploration was allowed. All movement was forbidden during the day. All open positions, depots and roads were completely camouflaged. The relief of British troops was completed by April 27th. The invasion of the Polish corps' basic attack position took place on the night of May 10/11, while the attack itself began as a night attack on May 11, 2300 for both divisions.

Source: Die Angriffsschlachten gegen Cassino. Schuler, Ernst. ASMZ Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift. Band (Jahr): 117 (1951). Heft 5

Cheers. Raúl M .

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The offensive battles against Cassino.

Operation Honker (3rd phase).

Carrying out the attack: On May 11th, at 11:00 p.m., the entire artillery of the 8th and 5th armies opened fire. From 11:00 p.m. to 11:40 p.m., over 1,000 guns from the 8th Army shelled the enemy battery positions near Belmonte - Atina, Terelle, Passo Corno, in the Liri valley, with the heavyweight in the Polish Corps sector. (A total of 2,400 guns on a 40 km front, one gun per 15 m, 10.5 to 24 cm caliber.). From 11:40 p.m. to 1:00 a.m. the German infantry positions were shelled and then the infantry's advance began.

On May 13th, both Polish divisions were thrown back into their original positions. Meanwhile, the 13th Army Corps had advanced bridgeheads across the Gari, although hardly deeper than 1 km. The effect of the artillery was limited because after the fire had ended, the German artillery became active again. The effect of the Atina - Belmonte artillery group was particularly unpleasant.

The effect of the planes also proved to be limited, because as soon as they flew out of the enemy artillery area, the German artillery fire started again. The German infantry bases were not destroyed despite the heavy artillery fire. Although the 8th Army's ban on exploration was conducive to secrecy, it had disadvantageous consequences in that the Polish troops did not know enough about the terrain and for this reason did not advance in an orderly manner.

The night attacks had failed because they broke up into small and minute operations and leadership in the already difficult terrain became impossible even at the regimental level. It turned out that it was much easier to take the object of attack than to hold it afterwards. New troops must be added immediately after the conquest. This was not possible during the day or at night due to the impassability of the terrain in the narrow attack zone.

The attack on May 17th. On the right wing of the 13th Corps, the 78th Division had to push through the 4th Division. The attack of the 13th Corps was similar to that of the Polish Corps staggered in time in order to draw the enemy's artillery and reserves into the Liri valley and thus relieve the Polish Corps, whose orders remained the same. This time the attack took place during the day (6:00 a.m.). The advance of the 13th Corps was slow, but it effectively relieved the Polish corps, which had almost taken St. Angelo and the surrounding area by evening.

During the course of May 18th the 5th Polish Division held the area of St. Angelo and the 3rd that of Albaneta and the surrounding area. A tank brigade, 2 infantry battalions, a reconnaissance unit and 2 artillery regiments were then deployed for the advance to Piedimonte. On May 25, Piedimonte was taken by this Polish battle group, and to the surprise of the Germans, the tanks had advanced over the impassable heights of Albaneta and St. Angelo.

Source: Die Angriffsschlachten gegen Cassino. Schuler, Ernst. ASMZ Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift. Band (Jahr): 117 (1951). Heft 5

Cheers. Raúl M .

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The offensive battles against Cassino.

Final considerations.

Artillery. The German artillery was relatively small in number, but to exceptionally good effect thanks to the many brilliant observation opportunities on the Gustav Line. It was only slightly hampered by its own infantry, the bulk of which were on the opposite slope. Their positions were particularly well camouflaged and covered, and extensive use was made of alternating positions, so that Allied counterbattery fire met with little success. The German batteries fired mainly with time fuzes and thus achieved greater effectiveness in the densely covered terrain. In this way, especially during tank attacks, the accompanying infantry was quickly separated from the tanks.

On the Allied side, the special feature was the combination of large artillery units. Their fire used to be very precise on the indicated targets. His cooperation with the infantry was good until the liaison officers failed. Then the substitute did not arrive or did not arrive on time. In the mountains, artillery liaison officers belong not only to the battalion, but also to the company.

Tanks and anti-tanks. The Allies always used their armored vehicles as an infantry support weapon and as mobile artillery, because the Cassino terrain was an ideal field of operations for German tank destroyer troops, even where it was not mountainous. Everywhere rocks, bushes, narrow passages and obstacles offered favorable positions over short distances. For the tank, on the other hand, the circulation field was normally narrow and the already poor visibility was reduced by the nature of the terrain. Gunfights against tanks with close combat weapons were not uncommon. So it happened that the Allied tanks could not move at all without strong infantry support.

It also attracted attention that, even in the wide Liri valley, tank units were repeatedly deployed along highway number 6 (Via Casilina).

Aviation and anti-aircraft defense. In the mountains, the use of large air units to benefit ground troops is not particularly effective. There are no large targets suitable for intense bombing and direct support to the combat front is difficult because the targets to be bombed are usually difficult to identify and can hardly be located from the air. The most likely option is to bomb columns of enemy vehicles on mountain roads with no alternative options. Therefore, resupply and evacuation during the day were normally impossible. German vehicle traffic could only be carried out at night, and German tactical reserves were pushed forward and engaged locally.

For meteorological reasons, the deployment of large air units in mountainous terrain is not expected. For the defender, it is about knowing how to protect himself from attacks by smaller units and not revealing positions before the enemy has approached at a short distance, so that aviation can no longer intervene.

Source: Die Angriffsschlachten gegen Cassino. Schuler, Ernst. ASMZ Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift. Band (Jahr): 117 (1951). Heft 5

Cheers. Raúl M .

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The offensive battles against Cassino.

Final considerations.

Combat procedures. The Germans had solved their defensive task in an exemplary manner with very reduced forces. The superiority of Allied artillery and aviation was the main reason why large defenses could not be built. For this reason, the battle was fought with relatively strong and mobile reserves and with local clashes. However, a continuous system of fire barriers was organized between the occupied positions.

According to the commander of a German parachute battalion, the defender initially took refuge on the forward slope, but soon realized that the enemy was not following up the artillery fire quickly enough. That is why they stayed later on the counterslope, thus avoiding the artillery and aviation attack. They always repulsed infantry attacks with a counterattack as soon as the heights fell into the hands of the enemy.

Obstacles of all kinds, including blasting, were defended with relatively few resources, making their removal more difficult. A modern army equipped with sapper technology can overcome obstacles in the shortest possible time, but it has been proven that only 2 or 3 machine guns, used skillfully, can fundamentally change this situation: Or the enemy has to let his sappers work under fire , which he almost always refrains from doing, or has to perform time-consuming actions across terrain rich in hiding and cover. This type of small war was carried out successfully by the Germans at Cassino. Overcoming the Rapido seems to have caused great difficulties, although in reality it is just a stream (20 m wide, about 2 m deep). Even on small rivers, transportation of heavy material can only be done via bridges, and these bridges or their construction sites may always be under selective fire.

The mountains are the small man's terrain, as a German officer who fought at Cassino said. If the attacker had been able to take full advantage of his enormous material superiority, he would soon have mowed down the defenders like chaff. The actions of the Poles also clearly demonstrated that it is not material dominance that wins in the mountains, but the well-trained and persistent fighter. Perseverance over the smallest details also drove the decision when neither artillery fire nor tanks could provide support.

It seems that the Allies counted too much on the massive impact of the material and took too little into account the mountainous nature of the terrain, and also too little regarding the German tactics, which evaded the massive fire and carried out the battle in an attack and in short distances. The Allies were neither trained nor equipped for this fight.

In defense and retreat, the Germans were never limited to mere defense. Since the pursuing enemy often became careless and forgot that the one who gave in could also attack in a limited time and place, these attacks from the rear were always particularly extensive. There is no pure defense nor pure retreat. Successful fighting can only be achieved by constantly alternating between defending, retreating and advancing, making the most of all possibilities.

The battles of Cassino also show that against a well-equipped defender only well-prepared attacks with very strong fire and deeply echeloned shock columns lead to success. For a long time, the Allies did not understand the German positions and, especially, their fighting style.

The success of the German defenders in what we consider to be terrain that is not necessarily difficult demonstrates that we can also successfully solve a similar task with our infantry and good weapons, as long as we know how to evade the enemy's superiority in artillery, tanks and aircraft, conducting the defensive battle at short distances and mainly in the form of an attack.

Source: Die Angriffsschlachten gegen Cassino. Schuler, Ernst. ASMZ Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift. Band (Jahr): 117 (1951). Heft 5

That's all. Raúl M .