I am looking for some insight into how the ending of World War I laid the foundation for World War II.
OK, as I understand it, by 1918, Russia was out of the war being preoccupied with internal revolution, and the Italian Front was effectively contained by geography (Alps) and German/Austrian Alpine troops. The German Army was able to transfer numerous divisions to the Western Front and mount an offensive. It was hoped that Paris would fall before the Americans could arrive in sufficent strength to make a difference. The Germans broke through the Allied lines and were on their way to Paris; however, German Artillery could not keep up and provide the necessary cover. The German advance came to a halt as Allied heavy guns came to bear upon them.
The German Army was exhausted and had expended its available reserves. The British Naval blockage continued to ravage the German homeland with famine and shortages. The political situation at home was tenuous as various factions demanded an end to the war and began to jocky for position in a post war Germany. Public support for the war and the Kasier responsible for it was gone.
The Allies launched a counter offensive and regained significant amounts of lost territory. The Kasier and his military high command were alarmed about the prospect of an Allied invasion of Germany itself. Also, the traditional authorities were beginning to lose control of the situation at home and feared chaos and revolution.
The Germans sued for peace and found the Allies to be receptive. The Germans accepted what they thought was a gentlemens agreement of which the details were to be worked out later. Peace was declared and the German Army was quickly removed from the front and disbanded. The German negotiators returned to the table to settle the details only to find that the English and the French had a different idea of what the gentlemens agreement actually was. The peace treaty was hammered out and essentially dictated to the Germans. It greatly favoured the Allies and imposed incredible demands upon the German economy, society, military, and nation. The Germans disbanded their Army. The Allied Army remained viable and posed at the German border. The choice for the Germans was either sign the treaty or face immediate invasion and even harsher impositions. They signed the document.
I do not understand why the Germans were so hasty in disbanding the Army and thereby eliminating a major means to bargain at the table. I believe the situation on the Western Front was bad, but not unsavagable. The German retreat appeared to have been orderly. Could the Germans have continued a spirited defense in order to bleed the Allies into accepting a peace treaty more amenible to them? The Allies were also exhausted and eager to end this costly war. Why would German negotiators be so gulliable to accept a tentative peace and believe that later negotiations with the French and the English would also benefit them? I believe that the Americans did not particitpate in this process and were not signatories to the treaty. I think President Wilson had serious misgivings about the later impact this one sided treaty would have upon Europe and the world.
All this leads to my main question. What conditions or situations existed in Germany that were so serious that Germans would sign such a disasterous treaty? They must have recoginized that they were getting the shaft! Why disband the Army so soon and abandon the front? Why not fight on for a better deal?
My secondary question relates to the mileage the Nazis got out of this. The Nazi postion on this was that Germany was "stabbed in the back." The Nazis blamed the communists, the socialists, and the Jews for the loss of the First World War and its terrible treaty. Hitler basically sought to redress what he believed were the wrongs of the ending of the First World War throughtout his dictatorship. He also strove to punish those he thought responsible for the "stab in the back." I can understand how the communists and the socialists were implicated by the Nazis because they ofcourse did not support the war effort and took action against it. I do not understand how the unfortunate Jews got blamed by the Nazis. German Jews served in the German Army in all ranks during the First World War and many with distinction. German Jews saw themselves as Germans. What happened?
Origins of World War II
Origins
WWI resulted from conditions which existed in 1914. All powers were to blame. Germany and her allies lost the war.
The US, led by Wilson, had to justify the war. Germany and her allies were tagged as culprits. The French, who had been defeated in 1870 and who wanted Alsace-Lorraine back, joined in. The Germans got screwed. Germans never forget (we still don't). We got even. We will get even again.
Gerst
The US, led by Wilson, had to justify the war. Germany and her allies were tagged as culprits. The French, who had been defeated in 1870 and who wanted Alsace-Lorraine back, joined in. The Germans got screwed. Germans never forget (we still don't). We got even. We will get even again.
Gerst
Reply.
I do not understand how the unfortunate Jews got blamed by the Nazis.
The way I always understood it was that Hitler somehow confounded the Jews and communists into one. His claim in Mein Kampf was that communism was created by the Jews as part of their conspiracy against the Aryan race. Hitler also blamed democracy on the Jews. In 1933 when the Nazis were coming to power Goebbels talked about the "Social Democratic Marxist government". Thus all the enemies of National Socialism were lumped into one and put on the Jews.
Causes of WW II
Do not complicate the issue. The justification (and it WAS justified) for WW II was WWI, nothing else. That is why, when the Germans finally wake up and smell the armpits of the French who surround them, that the Germans will see the light of day and get on with the war!
I never signed a captitulation agreement! Dis you?
Gerst
I never signed a captitulation agreement! Dis you?
Gerst
Reply.
The first world war did not justify the second. In fact I actually think they are seperate wars- not one with a pause in between. The proper course was for Germany to try and have the allies revise the terms. This is exactly what the government was trying to do. Although the Weimar government admittedly failed in this regard the main things they managed to do were to stablize the economy through American loans and get the Allies to treat them on an equal footing. It was the depression that wrecked everything and lead to the Nazi reveloution. The Hitler government did succeed in revising the terms of Versailles. By 1939 Hitler had made Germany strong again and had taken 2 countries without firing a shot. The German people were largely satisfied and did not want war. But Hitler and hardcore Nazi leaders were bent on creating a German empire in eastern and possibly western Europe. It was the Nazi leadership that brought on war against the wishes of the German people by being too ambitious. So that in a nutshell was the reason for the war. The treaty of Versallies planted the seeds but it was the depression that caused those seeds to mature and the Nazi ambitions that caused the war.
The end of WWI is the reason for the "Dolchstoßlegende" who like nearly all auch myths has some basis in facts. With the political situation in Germany becoming untenable, the Kaiser stepped back and a new social-democrat government took over. This was the time in which the American president Wilson porposed his 14 points, which were hard but fair. The new German government accepted, disarmed and signed an armistice, believing that a piece treaty according to these 14 points would be made. But while France and Britain had voiced their agreement for the 14 points, they had never signed anything that they would keep to them. And the German delegation soon found out that France and Britain had some "additional demands"...this ended in piece treaties which had nothing to do with Wilsons porposal at all, but was only about punishing Germany. America never ratified these treaties.
The promoters of the "Dolchstoßlegende" accused the social democrats of demobilizing too early, either because of stupidiy or deliberately. With the German army in the field, the Germans may have been at least accepted at the negotiation table and Versialles treaty might have been not as crushing as it was. Maybe.
Be that as it may, the foundations for World War II were laid in the treaties of Versailles and St Germaine. Not that WWII was something that had to come without any chance to prevent it. If France and Britain would have at some time changed their ways and had accepted that a new order is created as "the beginning of a new peace era" instead of sticking to the order at "the end of the Great War", all could have been well. Reasons existed enough: the countless German minorities that had deliberatly been created outside of Germany AGAINST the principle of the self determination of people (one of Wilsons 14 points). The reunification of Austria with Germany could have been accepted, according to the same principle. The most dire one was armament however: The Versailles treaty demanded from ALL sides to disarm, only Germany, the alleged culprit had to do it first, so that the "threatened nations" could feel safe. In 1927 the Allied Control Council concluded that Germany had fullfilled its obligation in this respect, now it was France's and Britains turn. They did not disarm. Even Weimarian Republic German governments said then that they would re-arm Germany again in that case. When Hitler came to power he said that he would not accept that Germany can't have an Air Force and that Army and Navy sizes allowed would be to small. He offered to France an treaty that allowed Germany to have an Air Force of 50% size compared to the French one and an 300.000 soldier strong Reichswehr (France had 750.000 soldiers in his Army). France, in its wisdom, declined and demanded that Germany should stay within the limits of Versailles (which was an diffictult position since they refused to heed their part of the Versailles "bargain". Britain however signed a Naval treaty with Germany, limiting the German fleet to 35% of the size of the British one)
In 1934 France declined all further disarmament talks for the future (they had troubles with the Italians and the British about the size of their Air Force) and stated that from now on it would only rely on French strength (good job
).
World War I had been begun by all sides (one has to differentiate between the behaviour during the crisis that started the war - as I have to come to see it, the main culprit here is Russia, followed by France, then Germany, then Britain - and the years before in which the awful strategic situation of 1914 was created - main culprit here is France, then Britain, then Russia, then Germany), but with Germanies defeat Britain and France used the situation to make themselves the sole Powers in Europe (excepting the Soviet Union which was kept out as long as possible). No country and not the most democratic government had accepted the mistreatment and humiliation that was done to Germany. Take France as an example: The war in 1869 against the Prussian led German league was caused by France, started by France, declared by France...and lost by France. Simple aggession: prevention of a German nation and the aquiring of some German territory were the aim. Nonetheless, France had been treated fairly: the peace treaty of Frankfurt was not dictated but negotiated, its Great Power status was left untouched, its kept its colonies, it was not rendered powerless by imposing limits to the French military. France only lost Alsace Lorraine, a region with 1.5 million inhabitants of whom 1.3 million used German as motherlanguage (in 1872 the Alsace-Lorrainian population is allowed to "opt" for Germany or France, only 10,3% opt for France. And even in later times despite did the French ever dare to allow a plebiscit about the question. The differences between the "German" and the "French" style of taking is even in the "details": In Article 2 of the peace treaty of Frankfurt, Germany guarantees the property of all French Alsace Lorrainians. In Article 74 of the Versaille treaty the expropriation of the German Alsace Lorrainians is regulated.) The German troops leave France after two years.
But despite having signed a treaty in which France agreed that Alsace Lorraine is now German "for all eternity", the new French republic startes with the attempts to revise that treaty from day one. What did one expect from the Germans with the much harsher Versaille and St Germaine treaties?
With the French and British behaviour a war about some question, created by the Versailles or St Germaine treaties was likely, even if Germany had been ruled by a social democratic Chancelorette. But France and Britain enjoyed their position too much, besides the whole point of WWI had been to neutralize Germany, with which one otherwise had to share the cake. Others, Italians, Poles, Americans, Soviets did their own part to make a war more likely.
And since the important nations, primarily France and Britain had not changed their behaviour that had contributed to bring WWI about, in any way, WWII seemed in some aspects as a second phase of WWI or as a repetition. The constellations were similiar and again France and Britain did nor prove to be up to the challenge to defeat Germany. In WWI they had gotten off well: their ally Russia had been defeated, too and struggled to acommodate Bolshevism for the next time. And the Americans went home again after helping their European Allies to total victory (most probably because of economic reasons, see Nye comission http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nye_Committee ). But after WWII Soviets as well as American stayed in Europe. And with that France's and Britains time as Great Powers ended.
The promoters of the "Dolchstoßlegende" accused the social democrats of demobilizing too early, either because of stupidiy or deliberately. With the German army in the field, the Germans may have been at least accepted at the negotiation table and Versialles treaty might have been not as crushing as it was. Maybe.
Be that as it may, the foundations for World War II were laid in the treaties of Versailles and St Germaine. Not that WWII was something that had to come without any chance to prevent it. If France and Britain would have at some time changed their ways and had accepted that a new order is created as "the beginning of a new peace era" instead of sticking to the order at "the end of the Great War", all could have been well. Reasons existed enough: the countless German minorities that had deliberatly been created outside of Germany AGAINST the principle of the self determination of people (one of Wilsons 14 points). The reunification of Austria with Germany could have been accepted, according to the same principle. The most dire one was armament however: The Versailles treaty demanded from ALL sides to disarm, only Germany, the alleged culprit had to do it first, so that the "threatened nations" could feel safe. In 1927 the Allied Control Council concluded that Germany had fullfilled its obligation in this respect, now it was France's and Britains turn. They did not disarm. Even Weimarian Republic German governments said then that they would re-arm Germany again in that case. When Hitler came to power he said that he would not accept that Germany can't have an Air Force and that Army and Navy sizes allowed would be to small. He offered to France an treaty that allowed Germany to have an Air Force of 50% size compared to the French one and an 300.000 soldier strong Reichswehr (France had 750.000 soldiers in his Army). France, in its wisdom, declined and demanded that Germany should stay within the limits of Versailles (which was an diffictult position since they refused to heed their part of the Versailles "bargain". Britain however signed a Naval treaty with Germany, limiting the German fleet to 35% of the size of the British one)
In 1934 France declined all further disarmament talks for the future (they had troubles with the Italians and the British about the size of their Air Force) and stated that from now on it would only rely on French strength (good job
).World War I had been begun by all sides (one has to differentiate between the behaviour during the crisis that started the war - as I have to come to see it, the main culprit here is Russia, followed by France, then Germany, then Britain - and the years before in which the awful strategic situation of 1914 was created - main culprit here is France, then Britain, then Russia, then Germany), but with Germanies defeat Britain and France used the situation to make themselves the sole Powers in Europe (excepting the Soviet Union which was kept out as long as possible). No country and not the most democratic government had accepted the mistreatment and humiliation that was done to Germany. Take France as an example: The war in 1869 against the Prussian led German league was caused by France, started by France, declared by France...and lost by France. Simple aggession: prevention of a German nation and the aquiring of some German territory were the aim. Nonetheless, France had been treated fairly: the peace treaty of Frankfurt was not dictated but negotiated, its Great Power status was left untouched, its kept its colonies, it was not rendered powerless by imposing limits to the French military. France only lost Alsace Lorraine, a region with 1.5 million inhabitants of whom 1.3 million used German as motherlanguage (in 1872 the Alsace-Lorrainian population is allowed to "opt" for Germany or France, only 10,3% opt for France. And even in later times despite did the French ever dare to allow a plebiscit about the question. The differences between the "German" and the "French" style of taking is even in the "details": In Article 2 of the peace treaty of Frankfurt, Germany guarantees the property of all French Alsace Lorrainians. In Article 74 of the Versaille treaty the expropriation of the German Alsace Lorrainians is regulated.) The German troops leave France after two years.
But despite having signed a treaty in which France agreed that Alsace Lorraine is now German "for all eternity", the new French republic startes with the attempts to revise that treaty from day one. What did one expect from the Germans with the much harsher Versaille and St Germaine treaties?
With the French and British behaviour a war about some question, created by the Versailles or St Germaine treaties was likely, even if Germany had been ruled by a social democratic Chancelorette. But France and Britain enjoyed their position too much, besides the whole point of WWI had been to neutralize Germany, with which one otherwise had to share the cake. Others, Italians, Poles, Americans, Soviets did their own part to make a war more likely.
And since the important nations, primarily France and Britain had not changed their behaviour that had contributed to bring WWI about, in any way, WWII seemed in some aspects as a second phase of WWI or as a repetition. The constellations were similiar and again France and Britain did nor prove to be up to the challenge to defeat Germany. In WWI they had gotten off well: their ally Russia had been defeated, too and struggled to acommodate Bolshevism for the next time. And the Americans went home again after helping their European Allies to total victory (most probably because of economic reasons, see Nye comission http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nye_Committee ). But after WWII Soviets as well as American stayed in Europe. And with that France's and Britains time as Great Powers ended.
"Tell my mother I died for my country. I did what I thought was best."
John Wilkes Booth
April 12, 1865
John Wilkes Booth
April 12, 1865
Re: Origins of World War II
LANKIR wrote:I do not understand why the Germans were so hasty in disbanding the Army and thereby eliminating a major means to bargain at the table. I believe the situation on the Western Front was bad, but not unsavagable. The German retreat appeared to have been orderly. Could the Germans have continued a spirited defense in order to bleed the Allies into accepting a peace treaty more amenible to them? The Allies were also exhausted and eager to end this costly war. Why would German negotiators be so gulliable to accept a tentative peace and believe that later negotiations with the French and the English would also benefit them?
The Germans agreed to the armistice because they were beaten. Flat-out, plain and simple *BEATEN*, rather like they were in, say, early 1945. Ludendorf told the German govt this in no uncertain terms (although he wasn't so keen on such clarity about the matter after the war).
When will it ever end? People seem to get their history from inter-war German school textbooks or something.LANKIR wrote:The Germans sued for peace and found the Allies to be receptive. The Germans accepted what they thought was a gentlemens agreement of which the details were to be worked out later. Peace was declared and the German Army was quickly removed from the front and disbanded. The German negotiators returned to the table to settle the details only to find that the English and the French had a different idea of what the gentlemens agreement actually was. The peace treaty was hammered out and essentially dictated to the Germans. It greatly favoured the Allies and imposed incredible demands upon the German economy, society, military, and nation. The Germans disbanded their Army. The Allied Army remained viable and posed at the German border. The choice for the Germans was either sign the treaty or face immediate invasion and even harsher impositions. They signed the document.
There is nothing especially mysterious about the end of World War I. Nor was there some "gentleman's misunderstanding" in which perfidious Allied politicians duped honest but gullible Germans. Come on. The Germans agreed to withdraw and disband their army, while the Allies marched in and occupied key pieces of German ground. What do you think that means? Do you think there was any doubt in their minds about what it meant? Essentially, they were quitting and throwing themselves on the Allies' mercy, and they (and everyone else) knew it.
On the contrary, Wilson was probably the driving force to the Paris Conference of 1919. Certainly, his 14 points set the general framework. More specifically, he was one of the so-called "big four" (US, France, Britain and Italy), the main Allied powers. Clearly, the Italians weren't really in the inner circle, and the real three power-brokers were Wilson, Clemenceau of France and randy old Lloyd George of Great Britain.LANKIR wrote:I believe that the Americans did not particitpate in this process and were not signatories to the treaty.
Not really. He is on record as stating that he thought the treaty they produced after months of personal negotiation amongst the Allied leadership was "pretty much the best that could be done." His major misgiving was that the US Congress refused to ratify joining the League of Nations. Probably you are thinking of the famous economist Keynes, who attended the conferrence as a junior member of the British delegation and shortly afterwards wrote a book, "The Economic Consequences of the Peace", in which he argued that it was overly vindictive and would sow the seeds for future discord.LANKIR wrote:I think President Wilson had serious misgivings about the later impact this one sided treaty would have upon Europe and the world.
LANKIR wrote:All this leads to my main question. What conditions or situations existed in Germany that were so serious that Germans would sign such a disasterous treaty? They must have recoginized that they were getting the shaft! Why disband the Army so soon and abandon the front? Why not fight on for a better deal?
See above -- they were done, beat, kaput. The only difference between 1918 and 1945 was that in 1918, they realized that it would be criminal to carry on a pointless fight, condemning tens or even hundreds of thousands to unnecessary death and visiting destruction on city and countryside to no purpose. So they faced up to the implications of that and offered terms. One might admire the moral courage of that to a certain extent. Unfortunately, that moment of clarity and moral courage got rather lost in the socio-political chaos of 1918 Germany, and the recriminations that gave rise to the "stab-in-the-back" myth. Make no doubt about it, it is a myth.
Nor, I would suggest, was the Verseilles Treaty inherently unreasonable. It left Germany essentially intact and it *DID NOT* (contrary to latter German propoganda) impose crippling reparations on Germany. I have said it before in this forum and I say it again -- I am more than willing to defend the much (unfairly) maligned Verseilles Treaty against all comers.
Cheers,
Is Germany surrounded by France? NoDo not complicate the issue. The justification (and it WAS justified) for WW II was WWI, nothing else. That is why, when the Germans finally wake up and smell the armpits of the French who surround them, that the Germans will see the light of day and get on with the war!
I never signed a captitulation agreement! Dis you?
Is Dallas, Texas in Germany? No
How old would you have to be to have signed a capitulation agreement in 1918????
Hitler...there was a painter! He could paint an entire apartment in ONE afternoon! TWO coats!! Mel Brooks, The Producers
@PaulJ
What you are telling is mostly wrong. And I really regret that there is no smiley who shakes his head.
-It is not true that conditionless surrednder was the only option, the Reichswehr still had some fighting power left. The new German government simply assumed that, after being offered the 14 points that any ongoing defiance would make matters worse. Considering the nature of the Versaille treaty this can indeed be disputed.
But "Dolchstoßlegende", that evolved afterwards, claimed that the social democrat goevernment did gave up a possible draw or German victory by wgiving in, and that they did it possibly even deliberatly out of sheer malice. And that is indeed highly doubtful.
-Wilson was ineed an important figure, since without American intervention a German conditionless surrender would not have been achieved in all likelihood. Without their support the war would have ended as a weak Allied victroy, a draw or a weak German victory. No one can say. But what one CAN say is however that each of theses would have been incomparably better than the complete Allied victory that did happen. For Germany, Europe and, in the long run, even for France and Britain. And I personally do hope that there is a special place reserved in Hell for Presidents of the United States of America who intervene in European wars...
- While the 14 points may have been the "framework" of the negotiations, the endresult had nearly nothing to do with them anymore. Wilsons influence dwindled, the more American troops left Europe, and France and Britain deleberately drew the negotiations out (which did not keep the British from continuing to starve the Germans... 100.000 civlians, many of them children died because of the ongoin British embargo of food and medicine during the Versaille treaty negotiations in Germany.
Wilson himself has said that "under the circumstances, the Versailles treaty was the best what could be done". That is a purely relative statement. And he said that to defend himself from lots of critics, whole cohorts of American politicians and diplomats, who originally having supported Wilson, quitted service out of protest, because of the Versailles treaty. Take the point about the "right of theself determination of peoples" and then check the Versailles/St Germaine treaties. In was obvious that there was not much left of the moral attitude 14 points anymore. The "Peace"-treaty that was drafted was about greed, vengeance and power...at the dispense of any moral. Even British made remarks like "If such a treay would have been imposed on us, we would already condition our kids in school to rest not until it is ripped apart and revisioned"...Some doubtful comments came even from Lloyd George.
- I personally find it interesting how the incredible propaganda nonsense, the British and French created during WWI, seems to have effect on Anglo-Franco-American mindset till today. But if one investigates WWI and the treaties of Versailles and St Germaine according to the actual facts, there cannot be much good said about the role the French, British and Americans played. Like it or not.
What you are telling is mostly wrong. And I really regret that there is no smiley who shakes his head.
-It is not true that conditionless surrednder was the only option, the Reichswehr still had some fighting power left. The new German government simply assumed that, after being offered the 14 points that any ongoing defiance would make matters worse. Considering the nature of the Versaille treaty this can indeed be disputed.
But "Dolchstoßlegende", that evolved afterwards, claimed that the social democrat goevernment did gave up a possible draw or German victory by wgiving in, and that they did it possibly even deliberatly out of sheer malice. And that is indeed highly doubtful.
-Wilson was ineed an important figure, since without American intervention a German conditionless surrender would not have been achieved in all likelihood. Without their support the war would have ended as a weak Allied victroy, a draw or a weak German victory. No one can say. But what one CAN say is however that each of theses would have been incomparably better than the complete Allied victory that did happen. For Germany, Europe and, in the long run, even for France and Britain. And I personally do hope that there is a special place reserved in Hell for Presidents of the United States of America who intervene in European wars...
- While the 14 points may have been the "framework" of the negotiations, the endresult had nearly nothing to do with them anymore. Wilsons influence dwindled, the more American troops left Europe, and France and Britain deleberately drew the negotiations out (which did not keep the British from continuing to starve the Germans... 100.000 civlians, many of them children died because of the ongoin British embargo of food and medicine during the Versaille treaty negotiations in Germany.
Wilson himself has said that "under the circumstances, the Versailles treaty was the best what could be done". That is a purely relative statement. And he said that to defend himself from lots of critics, whole cohorts of American politicians and diplomats, who originally having supported Wilson, quitted service out of protest, because of the Versailles treaty. Take the point about the "right of theself determination of peoples" and then check the Versailles/St Germaine treaties. In was obvious that there was not much left of the moral attitude 14 points anymore. The "Peace"-treaty that was drafted was about greed, vengeance and power...at the dispense of any moral. Even British made remarks like "If such a treay would have been imposed on us, we would already condition our kids in school to rest not until it is ripped apart and revisioned"...Some doubtful comments came even from Lloyd George.
- I personally find it interesting how the incredible propaganda nonsense, the British and French created during WWI, seems to have effect on Anglo-Franco-American mindset till today. But if one investigates WWI and the treaties of Versailles and St Germaine according to the actual facts, there cannot be much good said about the role the French, British and Americans played. Like it or not.
"Tell my mother I died for my country. I did what I thought was best."
John Wilkes Booth
April 12, 1865
John Wilkes Booth
April 12, 1865
Origins
Thank you Kitsune for the insight. Do you think it possible that the Social Democratic Government hurried to disband the army because they feared the army may have taken action against them? I cannot imagine that the German Officer Corps would have embraced the Versailles Treaty. I doubt that German officers would have been eager to abandon the front and send the army home if they had known what kind of deal was in store for Germany. I think it very plausible that the German Army could have continued a defensive action against the advancing Allies and made them pay dearly for every kilometer. First World War tactics favoured the defender. Also, I believe that the drain on the German economy caused by the Versailles Treaty was greatly magnified by the worldwide depression of the 1930's. The German economy was devastated during the 1930's because of the obligations imposed by the treaty. Germans started to look to blame something or someone for their misery. The belief that they had been robbed became a unifying force, which was misused and abused by the Nazis. I suppose to understand the end of the First World War one needs to consider how it started. I do not believe that the First World War was ideological or territorial in nature. It appears to have been economic in origin. As my father once put it, the French and the English both had a empire and the Germans wanted one too. The competition was not appreciated. The English would build three battleships every time the Germans built one. The strain on the British economy was substantial because of this pre-war arms race. History demonstrates that the English often reacte aggressively when they feel their economy is threatened by a competitor.
Re: Origins
Of course they could have. But to what end? To see even more people killed before the same inevitable end was reached? Why do you seem to feel that that would have been somehow "better?" The only arguement I can imagine that it would have been better is that it might have taught the Germans that they were truly beaten, a lesson that in the end they didn't absord until the end of another go-around.LANKIR wrote:I think it very plausible that the German Army could have continued a defensive action against the advancing Allies and made them pay dearly for every kilometer.
Well ... no. Let me quote briefly Margaret MacMillan's excellent and widely aclaimed recent book "Paris, 1919" (which I heartily recommend): "historians are increasingly coming to the conclusion that the burden [of reparations payments] was never as great as Germany and its sympathizers claimed" (p 181). It has been pointed out, for instance, that the amount subsequently spent by the Nazi regime in the 1930s on rearmament dwarfed what it Verseilles asked of Germany.LANKIR wrote:The German economy was devastated during the 1930's because of the obligations imposed by the treaty.
This one I am with you on. Yes, the Germans *BELIEVED* that they were suffering under reparations, and yes, they looked for somone to blame, and yes, the Nazis were able to capitalize upon this. None of that, of course, makes it actually true that they were suffering under an unjust imposition.LANKIR wrote:Germans started to look to blame something or someone for their misery. The belief that they had been robbed became a unifying force, which was misused and abused by the Nazis.
Once again, I would concur with you on the first part; the First World War was not ideological or territorial in nature. I would suggest that it was not, however, economic either. It was a balance-of-power miscalculation, and the German plan for dealing with any crisis that went too far was to invade its neighours to east and west and seek their decisive defeat.LANKIR wrote:I do not believe that the First World War was ideological or territorial in nature. It appears to have been economic in origin.
Yet somehow, it was Germany that invaded her neighbours, not the British or French. Funny that.LANKIR wrote:History demonstrates that the English often reacte aggressively when they feel their economy is threatened by a competitor.
And now, for fun, lets close with the much invoked, but seldom actually read, Fourteen Points of President Wilson (I paraphrase somewhat for brevity):
1. Open diplomacy -- no more secret treaties etc
2. Freedom of navigation upon the seas.
3. Free trade between all nations.
4. General disarmament "to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety."
5. Impartial adjustment of all colonial claims.
6. Evacuation of all Russian territory (by the Central powers) and her entry into the family of nations.
7. German withdrawal from Belgium and re-establishment of her legitimate government.
8. German withdrawal from all French territory, and the return of Alsace-Lorraine to Franch to redress "the wrong doen to France by Prussia in 1871."
9. Readjustment of the borders of Italy along lines of nationality.
10. The peoples of Austia-Hungary should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development.
11. Central powers withdrawal from Rumania, Serbia and Montenegro; Serbia to get access to the sea; all Balkan states to be allowed to freely choose their destiny amongst themselves "by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality."
12. Turkish portions of the Ottoman Empire to have their sovereignty, but the other nationalities of the Ottoman Empire to have self-determination.
13. The creation of an independent Polish state, in all areas inhabited by Polish populations.
14. A general association of nations to be formed (ie what became the League of Nations).
Note that Germany was called to withdraw from all of the territory she had captured in the war and in particular was to give back Alsace-Lorraine.
Cheers,
@PaulJ
As far as Belgium is concerned: Germany asked Britain on 31th of July 1914 if it would stay neutral in this conflict if Germany would forego any marching through Belgium territory. Britain did neither promise neutrality nor peace. 3 days later it declared war on Germany because of violation of Belgiums borders. Britain could have saved Belgium without loosing one soldier but didn't chose to do so. Funny that.
Yeah and "Funny That" both the Russians and the French tried to invade Germany, too. That was the plan and is somehow conveniently forgotten by you. The French had an army almost as large as the Imperial German one, the Russian army was far larger. And the idea was to conduct a coordinated attack on Germany from both sides. Both mobilized before Germany. Russian troops entered East Prussian soil before war was declared against them by Germany. Russian low grade officers even asked their superiors wether ornamental unifoms should be packed in for the victory parade in Berlin. Is Germanyies behaviour really so difficult to understand? The only problem was that both the French and Russian invasions failed miserably. And only because of that the Germans fought on foreign soil througout the war. But if things had gone as planned by the French and Russian military leadership, the war would have fought in Western and Eastern Germany. It's true.Yet somehow, it was Germany that invaded her neighbours, not the British or French. Funny that.
As far as Belgium is concerned: Germany asked Britain on 31th of July 1914 if it would stay neutral in this conflict if Germany would forego any marching through Belgium territory. Britain did neither promise neutrality nor peace. 3 days later it declared war on Germany because of violation of Belgiums borders. Britain could have saved Belgium without loosing one soldier but didn't chose to do so. Funny that.
"Tell my mother I died for my country. I did what I thought was best."
John Wilkes Booth
April 12, 1865
John Wilkes Booth
April 12, 1865
Origins
Thank you all who have contributed to this topic so far. I wish to question the assertion that Germany was beaten. This may have been the case strategically, but was not so apparent to the average German soldier or citizen. The old world rule was that your capital city had to be taken before you were considered beaten. No Allied troops ever stood on German soil during the war. It came as a revelation to most returning German soldiers that they had lost. Initially, many German soldiers believed that that they were the victors or that at least the war was a draw. These German soldiers were back home and disbanded when the full impact of Versaille set in. It is not surprizing that they believed someone or something betrayed them. I'm not saying that they were actually betrayed; however, in this case, the perception was as powerful and had the same effect. Germans believed they had been cheated, abused, and humiliated by others. This sentiment fed the fire to come.
The French and the English were intent on punishing Germany as the culprit and neutralizing Germany as a competitor. They attempted to do so with the Versaille Treaty. I recognize that many English, French, and Americans believed that this strategy was misguided and dangerous and made great efforts to temper those seeking vengeance. It was only by their efforts that Germany remained relatively intact and viable. I suppose it was not hard to sell this to the radicals because it would be necessary to allow the Germans some kind of government and economy if payments were expected.
I am still seeking to know who exactly in the German Army and/or government made the decisions to abandon the front and disband the army before a treaty was negotiated and signed. Has history forgotten or excused these individuals? In the end, I think one needs to conclude that it was Germans who betrayed Germans and not the communists, socialists, or Jews. The French and the English were only doing what was in their nature. More over, it is only natural to seek to benefit from an advantage. It was a failing of the Germans to allow such an advantage to exist.
The French and the English were intent on punishing Germany as the culprit and neutralizing Germany as a competitor. They attempted to do so with the Versaille Treaty. I recognize that many English, French, and Americans believed that this strategy was misguided and dangerous and made great efforts to temper those seeking vengeance. It was only by their efforts that Germany remained relatively intact and viable. I suppose it was not hard to sell this to the radicals because it would be necessary to allow the Germans some kind of government and economy if payments were expected.
I am still seeking to know who exactly in the German Army and/or government made the decisions to abandon the front and disband the army before a treaty was negotiated and signed. Has history forgotten or excused these individuals? In the end, I think one needs to conclude that it was Germans who betrayed Germans and not the communists, socialists, or Jews. The French and the English were only doing what was in their nature. More over, it is only natural to seek to benefit from an advantage. It was a failing of the Germans to allow such an advantage to exist.
All right LANKIR, allow me to make some reading suggestions. John Keegan is usually good for intro overviews of campaigns, allow me to quote from his "The First World War".
So, in a nutshell, Germany collapsed as the Allies were closing in. And closing in they were. Contrary to the sterotype of First World War static trench warfare, by this time considerable movement had returned to the war. See the links below to the US Military Academy military atlas for some excellent maps portraying this.
http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/web03/ ... p%2023.htm
http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/web03/ ... p%2022.htm
So, if you want to know "who decided to call it quits", there's your answer -- the German Army did. Ludendorff admitted they were beat, then tried to change his mind and was forced out. His replacement and Hindenburg refused to support the Kaiser's desire to do exactly what LANKIR seems to suggest, and Wilhem II felt that his only alternative was to abdicate and run away. Germany then more or less collapsed. The order in the German armies was only in that they were anxious to get the hell home -- and only lasted until they reached there, at which point they all essentially "self-demobilized." There was no armed force available to any German government to continue the war. Period. Whatever certain selective memoirs tried to suggest afterwards.
If those German soldiers LANKIR cites were so shocked to find when they got home that they had lost, one might ask them what they thought they were doing home out of uniform rather than with their units.
The Kaiser then abdicated, the Germans accept the stern armistice terms on offer, and order in Germany more-or-less collapsed into civil war.Ludendorff had called 8 August ... "the black day of the German army." It was 28 September [of 1918], however, that was his own black day... Ludendorff had kept his nerve with decisive effect in the critical days of August 1914. Now, however, he lost it altogether... at six o'clock he emerged to descend one floor of headquarters to Hindenburg's room. There he told the old field marshal that there was now no alternative but to seek an armistice. The position in the west was penetrated, the army would not fight, the civilian population had lost heart, the politicians wanted peace.(p 412)
The domestic consequences were swift to follow. On 29 September, a day when Germany's ally, Bulgaria, opened negotiations with the French and British on the Salonika front, the high command received the Kaiser, Chancellor and Foreign Secretary ... to advise them that Germany must now make terms of its own. ... It was decided to approach the Allies on the basis of the fourteen points. ... The conference [further decided] that only democratisation would persuade the Allies to concede the conditions for which the leadership still hoped [parts of Alsace-Lorraine and Poland -- note that this was contrary to the 14 points] ... accordingly the Chancellor resigned. In his place the Kaiser appointed, on 3 October, the moderate Prince Max of Baden, already known as an advocate of a negotiated peace... He secured from Hindenburg a written admission that "there was no further chance of forcing a peace on the enemy."(p 413)
The army at the front [in early October] ... had indeed recovered something of its old spirit and was contesting the advance of the Allies. [Ludendorff began to advocate continued fighting, much as our friend LANKIR appears to.]... Prince Max, enraged by the insubordination, confronted the Kaiser with the demand that he must now choose between Ludendorff and himself. .... On 26 October, Ludendorff and Hindenburg were summoned to Schloss Bellevue and forced to offer their resignations... Ludendorff's was accepted with the briefest of words and without thanks. Hindenburg's ... was declined.(p 414)
[The Ottoman and Hapsburg Empires then collapsed and sued for peace.]
By the first week of November, therefore, the German empire stood alone as a combatant among the war's Central Powers. Under pressure from the French, British, Americans and Belgians, the [German] army's resistance stiffened as it fell back... Behind the lines, in Germany, however, resistance was crumbling. On 30 October the crews of the High Seas Fleet, ordered to sea for a final sortie to save its honour, broke into mutiny and refused to raise steam. ... By 3 November, the day on which Austria accepted the armistice, the seaport of Kiel was in the hands of mutineers.
... The Kaiser had already left Berlin, on 29 October, for headquarters in Belgium, to be closer to the army, on whose loyalty he still believed himself able to count, and to avoid the mounting pressure to abdicate.
... On 9 November, the Berlin in turmoil and the moderate politicians threatened by street crowds ... he transferred the office of chancellor to the Majority Socialist, Friedrich Ebert.
On the same day the Kaiser, confronted his own deposition from power. Unrealistic as ever, he had spent his ten days at headquarters fantasising about turning his army against his people.
[In accordance with Prince Max's policies] the German armistice delegation had already crossed enemy lines to meet the French representatives at Rethondes ... The terms of the armistice ahd been presented to them by Foch, and stark they were...
[to summarize: - complete evacuation of all occupied territory, including all of Alsace-Lorraine; - military evacuation of the western bank of the Rhine; - three bridgeheads on the east of the Rhine at Mainz, Coblenz and Cologne; - surrender of much war-making supplies, including all U-Boats and capital ships of the navy; - repudiation of the treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest; - agreement to pay reparations; and acceptance of the continuation of the naval blockade.]
On 9 November, the Emporer met the leaders of his army... Wilhelm II still believed that, whatever disloyalities were being transacted by civilian politicians in Berlin, whatever affronts to order disturbed the streets, his subjects in field-grey remained true to their oath of military obedience. Even on 9 November he continued to delude himself that the army could be used against the people and the royal house preserved by turning German against German. His generals knew otherwise. Hindenburg, the wooden titan, heard him out in silence. Groener [Ludendorff's replacement] ... knew from soundings taken among fifty regimental commanders, that the soldiers now wanted "only one thing -- an armistice at the earliest possible moment." What about, the Kaiser asked, the military oath of loyalty? Groener uttered the unutterable. "Today," he said, "the oath is only a form of words."(p 419)
So, in a nutshell, Germany collapsed as the Allies were closing in. And closing in they were. Contrary to the sterotype of First World War static trench warfare, by this time considerable movement had returned to the war. See the links below to the US Military Academy military atlas for some excellent maps portraying this.
http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/web03/ ... p%2023.htm
http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/web03/ ... p%2022.htm
So, if you want to know "who decided to call it quits", there's your answer -- the German Army did. Ludendorff admitted they were beat, then tried to change his mind and was forced out. His replacement and Hindenburg refused to support the Kaiser's desire to do exactly what LANKIR seems to suggest, and Wilhem II felt that his only alternative was to abdicate and run away. Germany then more or less collapsed. The order in the German armies was only in that they were anxious to get the hell home -- and only lasted until they reached there, at which point they all essentially "self-demobilized." There was no armed force available to any German government to continue the war. Period. Whatever certain selective memoirs tried to suggest afterwards.
If those German soldiers LANKIR cites were so shocked to find when they got home that they had lost, one might ask them what they thought they were doing home out of uniform rather than with their units.
-
Torquez