Massed Artillery fires in the Wehrmacht

[dduff442]

Hi All,

As I understand it, each FO would direct the fire of a single Arty Bn only. Can anyone tell me whether this was purely due to supply constraints or if Heer organization made it impossible for a FO to mass the fires of several Bns at once? I'm interested mainly in observed, corrected fires and not in map fire. Examples of massed fires would be most welcome.

IIRC, one US FO in Normandy directed **SIXTEEN** Bns at a single target -- it was a simple matter of some higher-up acknowledging the priority of the target and the FDC (or whoever) patched him through to the relevant units.

Regardsio,
dduff

[Christoph Awender]

It was absolutely no problem that a VB directed more batteries. I don´t know where from you have the information that he solely directed one battery.

\Christoph

[dduff442]

Hi Christoph,

I was referring to battalions rather than batteries. Do you know of instances where a single FO directed the corrected, observed fire of several battalions at once? I'd be especially interested in instances where one FO directed the fire from battalions drawn from more than one division at once without those battalions having first been attached to his division or KG.

I've heard of the one battalion per FO rule so often its almost a truism. Incidentally fire by german artillery was calculated per battery, a process referred to as 'converging the sheaf' that wasn't duplicated in other armies. Also, since the latter stages of WWI, every individual barrel's firing characteristics were incorporated in the calculation and I presume this practise had been upheld. All of which made German fire more accurate than that of its enemies but also somewhat slower to react.

These facts suggest to me that these practices were an effort to rectify the material imbalance, but sources such as the US Army green book series have stated it was an organizational constraint. German observers were under-resourced, with only observers in Pz/PG units having radios AFAIK. The overhead on the organizational structure needed to allow patching in extra Bns on the fly would have been huge.

Regards,
dduff

[Christoph Awender]

Hello

A VB was the observer at battery level. Each battery had a officer for this purpose who set up the VB-Team which consisted of the officer, 1 driver, radio-squad and if necessary (e.g. static situation) a fieldphone squad.
If the Abteilung was used as one unit the VB of the Abteilungsstab or one selected VB of a battery directed the fire. Often there were several observers at a so called B-Stelle which directed the fire of many units from this point each one allocated a own radio frequency or fix line.

Everything was a matter of signal line connections. The lines ran from the observer to the battery - Abteilung - Regiment. If several regiments or Abteilungen were ordered to shell the same target just the fire orders of the responsible VB (line of sight) were sent to the subordinated units.
A higher headquarter like a Art.Rgts.Stab or Art.Kdr. had also signal etc... systems which made it possible to connect more regiments.

You are probably correct that the german fire system was a little bit slower reacting because they rarely used fire by map-coordinates. Mostly because the map material they had was too bad. The usual procedure was that the Arbeitsgeschütz (workgun) of the battery is directed by test shots according to angle to landscape points etc..
But here we speak about a difference of minutes until the battery calculaters measured the angles and distance to the target.

I don´t think that it was often done that ONE VB directed such a massive artillery force because such attacks also had various targets within a certain attack sector.
You are sure that 16 artillery battalions shelled the exact SAME target? Pretty waste because 16 don´t destroy more than e.g. 3. Destroyed is destroyed. You know what I mean?

\Christoph

[dduff442]

Hi Christoph,

Thanks, that's very useful information. Further to the topic, here's an excerpt from Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of 20th-Century Tactics, Doctrine, and Organization by Cpt Jonathan M. House.

(Text at http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources ... /House.asp)

Between 1929 and 1941 [...the US army...] developed a means of concentrating any amount of available artillery fire on a target of opportunity. One obvious step in this process was to have observers use new, more reliable radios instead of field telephones to communicate. More importantly, the gunnery instructors developed forward observer procedures and a firing chart that together would allow a battalion headquarters to record adjustments in the impact of artillery shells as viewed from the observer's location, instead of the battery location. Graphic firing tables compensated for differences in the locations of different batteries, and one artillery piece in each battalion was ultimately surveyed in relation to a common reference point for all artillery in that division area. The resulting fire direction centers (FDCs) could provide Infantry units with an entire battalion, or even multiple battalions, of field artillery firing on a target that only one observer could see. By contrast, throughout World War II German artillerymen had to use well-known terrain features to adjust on a target of opportunity; massed fires remained extremely difficult. Fire direction centers gave the U.S. Army a new and unprecedented degree of infantry-artillery integration.

Its actually more positive than other opinions I've seen in that it describes massed fire as 'very difficult' rather than an organizational impossibility. I can't claim to fully understand the second or third sentences above, btw, so if anyone has an explanation please post it.

This is the only competence in land warfare where modern US sources claim absolute superiority for their forces over the Wehrmacht, AFAIK. While no German commander would ever have had the resources to direct ca. 256 tubes (i.e. 16 Bns) at a single target of opportunity, the passage above suggests that US historians perceive a unique insight inherent in US doctrine, viz that enabling a single observer actually to have sufficient time to effectively control all 16 bns at once.

If anyone has knowledge of artillery ops and can explain the passage above or knows of incidents where the Heer did effectively mass fires on the fly, thanks in advance for your assistance.

Regards,
dduff

[Achilles]

The British artillery system was probably if anything superior to the US version. As early as 1942 the artillery had a doctrine and method to call multi battery concentrations. They were known as Mike (regiment), Uncle (division), Victor (corps), William (army) and Yoke (AGRA). Victor level concetrations were not unusual by the end of the war. We are talking 1000 guns +. This could be requested with 15-20 minutes.

Note these are on-call concentrations against targets of opportunity not planned barrages.

I understand Christoph reasoning about why some many guns should be used but when you have a surplus of ammunition and gun capacity why not use it? e.g I spot a panzer battalion refuelling...do I call in a regiment level stonk and probably destory most of it or do a go for a Corps or higher and completely obliterate it? If there are no restraints I'm going to make absolutely sure such a valuable target is destroyed.

One wonders what would have happened in the East if such artillery capacity had been available to the Heer.

[Christoph Awender]

I can just speak of the german side because I know nearly nothing about allied artillery tactics. Fact is that the observers also used radios and could call in artillery support.
The manuals show that they never would use such massive amount of guns at one single target also if they would have had them available.
There was always a lack of artillery at the front and massive attacks always had several point targets.
I disagree with those who say that they were not able to call in all available guns on one target - The point is that this was not the tactic they worked with.
Looking at the communcation systems of artillery units they were able to get connection to all connected artillery units through the Art.Rgts.Stäbe or Art.Kdre.

A random example:
Operation "Fackel" 12.5.1940 258.Inf.Div. had available:
II./61, IV./209, 5./258, II./258, I/108, II./51, II./179, IV./258, IV/260, I/258, III./258.
This was 2-3 Abteilungen per regiment sector and all Abteilungen were able to attack targets of opportunity in all other sectors. These were directed by Beob.Abt.15 under Art.Kdr.15.

\Christoph

[BobM]

To resurect a very old thread....

You are probably correct that the german fire system was a little bit slower reacting because they rarely used fire by map-coordinates. Mostly because the map material they had was too bad. The usual procedure was that the Arbeitsgeschütz (workgun) of the battery is directed by test shots according to angle to landscape points etc..
But here we speak about a difference of minutes until the battery calculaters measured the angles and distance to the target

Clould anyone tell me, in a multi battery shoot, for example a battalion concentration, did each battery have to fire it ranging rounds separately or could the ranging shots of one battery be used by another?

Cheers

Bob

[sniper1shot]

I just finished a memoir, "Walking Away from the Third Reich" where the author called in an Arty strike on a Russian Encampment. Within minutes he was talking to "higher ups" and he had bigger guns under his command for bigger salvos. Bigger calibres were added within minutes of this second strike. In the end the Russain camp was destroyed. Recce confirmed the destruction and the author was awarded the German Cross for his actions.

[Epaminondas]

Forget the name of the top of my head, but one the mass market German memiors in english deals with an artillery officer in an infantry division.

He explicitly mentions radios.

===

I think the US-German differnces in artillery doctrine and usage have to with supply. The German's just didn't have the massive artillery shell surplus to "waste" 16 battalions fire on individual targets; Germany produced LESS artillery shells in WWII then WWI!

Frequently German higher command would limit fire missions to one or two shots per battery, and one battery per mission... if you can only fire 4-12 shells at a target, you dam well better spend an extra 30 seconds to make sure you hit!

when you are dumping 16 batteries on a target, accuracy really doesn't matter...

===

What impressed alot German POWs at Normady wasn't the numbers of tubes of artillery the allies had, it was the number shells avaible!

===

While high point of the american meathod is a ton of firepower quickly; the down side is a bloated logistical tail. Germany and Russia did just fine, achieving fantasic results with a logisitical tail a fraction of that needed by Americans.

For instance, the massive bases in Iraq serving Burgar King to the Fobbits might help their morale; but requires an order of magnitude more convoys to get those supplies to the REMFs.... and coresponding more losses to the convoys.

Bigger is not always better....

[BobM]

Forget the name of the top of my head, but one the mass market German memiors in english deals with an artillery officer in an infantry division.

.

If you could check the name and author iId be greatful - I'd realy like to read that book

Cheers

Bob

[sniper1shot]

Wonder if you are talking about "In Deadly Combat", If I am not mistaken that memoir is about a German Artilleryman. , nope that one is on a German PAK gunner...Gottlob H. Biderman......Still looking.


Alright, Found the book. THIS Memoir is written by a German Artilleryman in Russia in WWII.
http://www.feldgrau.net/phpBB2/viewtopi ... ght=review

Too many books to go through on the shelves HAHAHA

[BobM]

Wonder if you are talking about "In Deadly Combat", If I am not mistaken that memoir is about a German Artilleryman. , nope that one is on a German PAK gunner...Gottlob H. Biderman......Still looking.


Alright, Found the book. THIS Memoir is written by a German Artilleryman in Russia in WWII.
http://www.feldgrau.net/phpBB2/viewtopi ... ght=review

Too many books to go through on the shelves HAHAHA

Thanks very much :)

Found copies available but £60 is a bit too rich for me

Cheers

Bob

[Rich]

I can just speak of the german side because I know nearly nothing about allied artillery tactics. Fact is that the observers also used radios and could call in artillery support.
The manuals show that they never would use such massive amount of guns at one single target also if they would have had them available.
There was always a lack of artillery at the front and massive attacks always had several point targets.
I disagree with those who say that they were not able to call in all available guns on one target - The point is that this was not the tactic they worked with.
Looking at the communcation systems of artillery units they were able to get connection to all connected artillery units through the Art.Rgts.Stäbe or Art.Kdre.
(snip)
\Christoph

I think the main differance was that the German higher artillery organization was much more linear, linkages mostly ran from top to bottom in a fairly strict heirarchy. Partly that was due to a more limited communications capability, but also it appears to be part of the obssesion with acheiving tactical aims through unity of command. So at the division all the artillery tactically subordinated to the division was under the control of the ARFU or ARKO (if available), at corps the control of the ARFU or ARKO at the division level was directly under the corps ARKO and they in turn under the HARKO, if present. All very good for rigid linear control for a specific tactical purpose, but less flexible when control neede to be exercised laterally. Furthermore, the artillery tended to be grouped by role, so the light batteries and battalions were typically attached to a regimental grouping for direct support, while the heavy howitzer batteries and battalions were grouped directly under control of the ARFU/ARKO at the division for general support, and under the corps ARKO for "breakthrough" fire support (in the attack), while the heavy direct fire weapons and Moerser (and often heavy flak) were grouped under a special staff for counterbattery and harrassing and interdiction fires.

All well and good, except that it tended to promote "stove-piping" of resources, it inhibited lateral support fires to adjacent units - the pieces were available to the units they were tactically subordinated to and no other - and slowed response times.

For the Americans, and less so the British (the limitations imposed by the stereotypical UNCLE, VICTOR, etc target selection method) though, the organization was much looser, with - mostly thanks to a larger complement of radios and telephones - many more lateral connections. Plus the organization of the FDC at battalion and group allowed quick transfer of firing data, one common reference point allowed the firing data to be shared with all units in range that were part of the communications/FDC chain. So very typically, a US division would have attached a 105mm and 155mm howitzer battalion as direct support to reinforce the fires of the four divisional battalions, as well as a field artillery group attached in general support with usually three or more 155mm howitzer, 4.5-inch gun, or 8-inch howitzer battalions. All of those battalions could fire via their own observers through their FDC or from data transmitted by any other FDC, plus they could fire using the data from any other observer/FDC in adjacent divisions, plus they could be supported by or provide support to any of the other groups attached to the corps, which generally consisted of 155mm guns, 8-inch howitzers or heavier pieces.

So couple that lateral connectivity and organizational flexibility with a relatively greater number of pieces and somewhat more ammunition (although that could be problematic) and the result inevitably is the TOT and the perception that the Amis have an unlimited number of guns and ammunition. But they weren't, a TOT could be simply two volleys by sixteen battalions in range, but that still results in 384 rounds impacting on a target nearly simultaneously, all because of the interconnectivity of the system.

Hope that helps.

You may also want to look at the off topic discussion between Nigel and myself under the "Guards Brigades" thread in the Allies section.

[Reb]

The Brits and US forces massed fires for several reasons - one of which was the relatively low hitting power of 25 pounder and 105mm.

Once they had that working right we can look at the Twin Villages fight in the Ardennes for an example of just what that massed firepower could do. (US infantry repulsing a pz div). After the firecontrol was set up right the northern shoulder of the Bulge was never really in danger as the 3rd PG Div found when they relieved 12 SS Pz.

Typically this fire included the heavier weapons too as Rich noted which makes a significant difference. I should add that ammo shortages were a real problem for the US forces, partially because of this massed fire mentality. But I doubt the Germans would have believed we were having shortages!

From my own experience I remember thinking once as our gunners hit a position on a hill (and our jets too). "If I were reading about this I'd expect the enemy to be vaporized but actually the world is bigger than it looks in a book." Amazing how much fire you have to actually mass to "destroy" a target. (unless you get some really lucky hits).

cheers
Reb