U.S. Army Tank Destroyers

[Freiritter]

If I'm not mistaken, tank destroyers in the U.S. Army were basically mobile, armored AT guns. ( Officially, TD units and TD crews were Artillery, not Armor. ) The medium and light tanks were to support the infantry advance, while the TDs would be the ones ( As per doctrine ) to engage German armor. But, if I'm correct, the Germans used their Jagdpanzers in their operations on the Eastern Front to provide direct, mobile AT support to the infantry, while the Panzers could remain in their doctrinal role as mobile offensive weapons, used en masse. ( I don't know whether Jagdpanzer crews wore the Waffenfarbe of the Panzertruppen or that of the Artillerie. ) Do I have it right?

Cordially,

Freiritter

[JeffF.]

The TD corps was a separate branch from both armor and artillery in the U.S. Army.

In the German & Russian armies Panzerjaeger & Tank destroyers were turretless versions using chassis of couterpart tanks. They usually carried a heavier armament then their counterpart tank (e.b. Pzkw Mark IV w/ 75mmL48 gun, Pzjr IV w/ 75mmL70 gun--a longer more effective gun). They also carried thicker armor than their counterpart tanks, were cheaper and quicker to produce.

In the British and American armies tank destroyers were turreted like their tank counterparts but had open tops (for better crew visibity), thinner armor (to give them better mobility) yet mounted more powerful guns than their tank couterparts (Sherman w/75mm, M10 tank destroyer w/ 3 inch gun). Doctrinally the TDs would be in reserve then used to destroy penetrations by panzer forces, in practice this did not work for U.S./British forces (in German doctrine/tactical practice it did). TDs then were used in practice to support frontline infantry units by being divided up sometimes as low as platoon, two-gun section or even individual TDs. Tanks in both British and American armies were doctrinally intended for "exploitation" that is to maneuver thru a gap created by the infantry divisions and not intended to fight enemy tanks (which of course they ended up doing quite often).

An interesting difference between U.S. and German Anti-tank doctrine was that German infantry would psychologically "accept" being bypassed by enemy armor, that is the German infantry would accept that their responsibility was to separate the enemy infantry from their tanks and allow the tanks to be destroyed behind them by AT guns and panzerjaeger vehicles. Allied infantry usually would not accept this and wanted the enemy armor destroyed in the same kill zone as the infantry. There were exceptions of course, the 101st defense of Bastgone has examples of U.S. forces using small arms and indirect fire to separate enemy tanks from infantry to destroy them in detail.

[Reb]

Yeah - the Americans went somewhat overboard with the TD thing in response to seeing the panzers over-run Europe. Gosh knows how many of those halftrack mounted 75s they built. Apparently they made a good support gun subsequently in the pacific...

The M-10 had a better gun than Sherman (3") but still not enough, M-18 Hellcat same deal. The M-36 Jackson was a real animal killer though with a 90 mm. It took Ike longer than it should have to convince the boys back home that he really really needed those things.

As I recall about half our TD bns were towed weapons, in 3" or 57mm. Many authors complain about the uselessness of towed AT weapons to an attacking army but the Germans seemed to do ok with them in that role and a towed AT is so much better than none at all... The problem for US production was catching back up after realizing the halftrack TD was essentially a failure. (a bunch of them were produced)

Just a thought but I wonder why we didn't stick a company of those Halftrack TDs in each Armd Inf Bn to give them some close support along the lines of Stummel or 150mm SP? My guess would be ammo supply issues but I don't really know.

reb

[JeffF.]

Both the '42 and '43 armored infantry battalions had an assault gun platoon of 3 x M8s (Stuart chassis w/ 75mm howitzer). Also each armored infantry company had 3 halftrack towed 57mm AT guns (organized as a separate plt in the '43 bn and one gun per arm inf plt in the '42 bn). The M8s were used in Direct & Indirect fire support. Some units like the 4th Arm Div abandoned their 57mm AT guns as useless (preferring to increase infantry by using AT personnel as a 4th arm inf plt).

[Rich]

Yeah - the Americans went somewhat overboard with the TD thing in response to seeing the panzers over-run Europe. Gosh knows how many of those halftrack mounted 75s they built. Apparently they made a good support gun subsequently in the pacific...

There were actually three SP guns produced on the half-track chassis, only one of which was intended as a interim TD piece. The TD piece was the T-12, which utilized the M1917 75mm gun (the "French 75"). The first conversions were made of 86 in 3Q41, 50 of those were shipped to the PI and lost there, the other 36 were the nucleus of the SP TD force in the fall Carolina maneuvers that solidifed the TD concept. Another 2,116 were completed 1Q42-2Q43 and were utilized initially in the formation of the TD battalions for training until the M-10 became available. However, when TORCH was set for early November 42 no M-10 Battalions had completed equipping and training, so the inital units in operation were still equipped with the T-12. By March 1943 though all TD battalions overseas had been re-equipped and the T-12 began phasing out, with many being turned over to the USMC to equip the regimental weapons company.

The other half-track mounts were the T-30 with 75mm howitzer (500 built during 1942) and the T-19 with 105mm howitzer (324 built 1Q-2Q42). They were intended as the interim equipment for the Infantry Regiment Cannon Company, with 2 105mm and 6 75mm intended for each. They in turn were to be replaced by the M-8 75mm HMC and the M-7 105mm, but the decision to eliminate the SP Cannon Company in the reorganization of July 1943 (to save maintenance and fuel requirements) meant this was never complete, although infantry divisions engaged in the Med 1942-1943 were so organized.

As I recall about half our TD bns were towed weapons, in 3" or 57mm. Many authors complain about the uselessness of towed AT weapons to an attacking army but the Germans seemed to do ok with them in that role and a towed AT is so much better than none at all... The problem for US production was catching back up after realizing the halftrack TD was essentially a failure. (a bunch of them were produced)

None of the towed TD battalions used the 57mm, that was strictly an infantry battalion/regimental antitank piece and was never referred to as a TD gun. And there was no "failure" of the halftrack TD, it was simply an interim design and actually filled its role quite well. It only got into service in NA because the M-10 production didn't get underway until September 1942. In the short Phillipines Campaign it proved to be much more valuable than the M-5 Light Tank, given its excellent HE capability and lighter weight.

Just a thought but I wonder why we didn't stick a company of those Halftrack TDs in each Armd Inf Bn to give them some close support along the lines of Stummel or 150mm SP? My guess would be ammo supply issues but I don't really know.

reb

They did, at least until production of the M-8 75mm HMC began. Every armored infantry battalion had 3 75mm howitzers and in December 1944 it was decided to replace those with 3 M-4 105mm-armed tanks. In addition every mechanized cavalry squadron had six M-8 as well. And the changes proposed for the divisions assigned to OLYMPIC/CORONET were even more interesting, since it was planned to replace the infantry regiment cannon company with either 7 M-4 105mm or M-26 105mm.

[Reb]

Thanks for the clarification Rich.

Question - you say none of the towed TD bns had 57mm. Did any of the inf bns (armd or foot) have 3"?

best
reb

[Rich]

Thanks for the clarification Rich.

Question - you say none of the towed TD bns had 57mm. Did any of the inf bns (armd or foot) have 3"?

best
reb

Negative.

[Freiritter]

Did the U.S. Army ever field armored teams with mixed tank/tank destroyers with assault guns to support an armored infantry component?

Cordially,

Freiritter

[JeffF.]

When 10th Arm Div sent its CCB to defend Bastogne COL Roberts formed three teams each with a tank company, armored infantry company, TD platoon, recon plt artillery support etc. The TF with an arm inf bn HQ company had an M8 assault gun platoon and each tank battalion TF had a three gun 105mm Sherman AG plt as well as one AG in each company HQ tk section.

Our Rich has co-authored w/ Trevor Dupuy a book I highly recommend Hitler's Last Gamble. In the end notes section their notes on the chapter of the defense of Bastogne give a detailed composition of CCB's teams (as well as CCR/9AD's). They were nearly identical and each had their slice of supporting units.

[Freiritter]

Cool. One thing I'm curious about. From what I've seen, U.S. armored divisions had three Combat Commands: CCA, CCB and a Combat Command Reserve. What were these? Did armored divisions have an organic TD element?

Cordially,

Freiritter

[JeffF.]

The two heavy armored divisions (2nd and 3rd-and 1st until JUL '44) had two combat command HQ. The '43 so-called light armor division had 3 combat commands, two of them intended to be primary combat hq (CCA & CCB) and one reserve HQ (CCR). These are the modern equivalents of U.S. Army brigade HQ. Their only organic troops are a HQ company (and CCR had a much smaller HQ reflecting its intended reserve role). These combat command hq were led by either a Brigadier General or a Colonel. These HQ were intended to be flexible and would command tank/armored inf bns, armored engineer, sp arty as each mission required.

Corps units like TD bns, AA bns and medium arty bns were often attached to divisions. Often combat commands would receive a 'slice' usually a company of TDs or AA. Med arty was usually kept under division control in what is called 'General Support' while the organic SP 105mm arty bns were in Direct Support of the combat commands.

The heavy armor divisions also had three regimental hq (two armor, one arm inf). One of these usually served as the CCR of a heavy arm div.

Some armor divisions had their CCRs augmented by attaching independent armor group HQ (nearly identical to combat commands intended to control attached independent armor battalions). Later, CCRs would be retitled Combat Command C to reflect their now equal status.

[Freiritter]

So, if I understand it right, a combat command was intended to be a base with which to create fluid task forces from organic/attached elements within the division, as the tactical situation developed. Further, if I'm not mistaken, Teams were small, combined arms tactical formations from within a combat command, like the three armored teams of CCB, 10th Armored Division at Bastogne. But, what did the term, Task Force, denote? I saw a documentary which stated that a task force in the U.S. Army was a combined arms group from a company to a regiment in size, broadly similar to a German Kampfgruppe in practice.

Cordially,

Freiritter

[Reb]

You're on it Freiwitter

The Americans had institionalized the German method. Dunagin wrote once (to my utter amazement) that German organizations were terrible but they were adept enough to rise above them. Not sure I agree - the regimental org has some pluses as far as admin go.

But the open ended US method took it a whole new place. As the war continued the need for more inf became obvious so a tank battalion (around which a Combat Command was based) might get a battalion or more of leg inf plus their own armd inf.

Parenthetically, I think we'd find with modern US armd forces that were they to engage a serious first world tank heavy threat force that they would be dreadfully short of inf and would soon be using a/b troops for that task.

Rich might be able to correct me on this but I believe the proportion that worked best was a company of tanks to a battalion of inf - which gave the infantry company a platoon of tanks in support. Since that could be approached from two separate directions - ie the infantry div with attached armour, or the armour div with attached inf, it's not hard to see the modern org used by tank heavy forces where the nonenclature is 'armd' or 'inf' based on the proportion of tank and mech bns.

cheers
reb

[JeffF.]

This was any force temporarily organized specifically for a task or mission. Thus a combat command or a team were both task forces. Regimental combat teams would also fit that description.

[Freiritter]

I dug around and discovered some notes I took after a documentary. This was a rough outline of an U.S. Army armored division Orbat. How accurate is it?
_____________________________________________________________


U.S. Army Armored Division

2 Armored Regiments

1 Armored Infantry Regiment

1 Tank Destroyer Battalion

1 Recon Battalion ( I imagine that the Recon bn was probably mechanized cavalry. )

1 Armored Engineer Battalion

1 Signal Company

Armored Field Artillery Battalions (#?)
_____________________________________________________________

As for German organization, I find it similar to U.S. organization, except that the Germans fielded smaller formations and were light on artillery and logistics/service troops. Combat commands and Task Forces I feel endowed the Army with more flexibility than was apparent to me before.

Cordially,

Freiritter