Is it possible to assume that Rundstedt's approach was more of geopolitical rather than military nature? I mean, he wasn't part of the July coup, but if he expected a shift of power from Hitler to the military leadership in one way or another, having a couple of PDs intact makes sense. Particularly that the actual end results was the same with the panzers wiped out in the first two months of fighting. Besides it seems to be a lose-lose situation: you push panzers to the landing zone - you face allied naval guns, you keep them in reserve - you have the inevitable build up of forces on land.
Nick
Any chance for the 12 SS Panzer division to beat the Allies
Moderator: sniper1shot
Nick
That's an interesting question. I always assumed Rundstedt's reasoning was based on long established tactical doctrine. As an aside I don't think he or any German officer really, was aware of just how devasting the Naval gunfire would be.
That there could have been a political angle to that certainly opens some doors to inquiry. Rundstedt may have guessed what the conspirators where up to and quietly decided to have forces available to react - regardless of how it went down. On the whole - I find that unlikely but I'd love to hear from some of the 'experts' on this.
cheers
Reb
That's an interesting question. I always assumed Rundstedt's reasoning was based on long established tactical doctrine. As an aside I don't think he or any German officer really, was aware of just how devasting the Naval gunfire would be.
That there could have been a political angle to that certainly opens some doors to inquiry. Rundstedt may have guessed what the conspirators where up to and quietly decided to have forces available to react - regardless of how it went down. On the whole - I find that unlikely but I'd love to hear from some of the 'experts' on this.
cheers
Reb
-
Hans Weber
- Enthusiast
- Posts: 457
- Joined: Wed Oct 09, 2002 11:48 am
Hello
I think Reb summed it up quite well:
In the end everyone was wrong. As I understand, Qvist puts a lot on the tactical concept of Rommel. It wouldnt' have helped.
In what is called the Panzer-controversy, Rommel (Heeresgruppe B) wanted to fight the enemy before and at the beach. To achieve this, he installed obstacles in front of the beach line to slow down the enemy and keep him under fire. At the beach itself, he positioned the infantry. Behind the infantry, he wanted the Panzerdivisions to be able to engage in combat with mobile Kampfgruppen after only a few hours maximum supported by artillery. He was sure that reserves kept in Central France would take approx 10 days to counterattack effectivly. This would be to late, he reasoned. Also, Allied air power would interdict quick movement. His concept was thus static to semi static
Geyr on the other side (Panzer Gruppe West) advocated a strong operational reserve of 5 to 6 mobile divisions, stationed around Paris in the woods protected against air sight and out of the range of ship artillery. His concept was thus mobile.
Rommel only had to think for his Heeresgruppe B. Rundstedt (OB West) had to think for the whole West. Of course already this fact is telling: He couldn't allow Rommel to have the Panzers in his Coastal Region, because this would denude all the other sectors in the West of any armour. There simply were not enough Panzer Divisions available.
The three ended up with a compromise. In the end there were not enough Panzer Divisions at the Coast and not enough Reserves for a mobile counterattack (Schwerpunkt). Everybody was happy and unhappy.
The whole discussion, however, actually is quite irrelevant. Both systems would not have worked and history has proven it. It is correct that a Continental Invasion is weakest at the landing. However, also the defender is weakest at the same moment. The Allies were not running into the rifles of a well prepared, alerted enemy, waiting for them at the beach. Allied planning and counterintelligence made sure of this. Also with Rommels concept, the Germans needed a reaction time, it's not like in the manouvres where you know the enemy comes at 5 o'clock in the morning because you told the umpires that you will wake up your boys at 6 o'clock. It is not possible to man the European and Norwegian Coastline like the walls of a Castle (as the word Atlantik Wall only suggested to the propaganda blinded). Of course the Allies knew they were vulnerable at the start. What didn they do? The same one does in any ordinary land battle. Put in the heaviest fire possible like an umbrella to protect the vulnerable movement ie the landings. Ship artillery and air power did exactly what Geyr feard they would: They nailed the Germans down and then blew them out. This together with the huge concentration of troops the Allied Navy (unmolested by the Marine and the Luftwaffe) could deliver at the beaches in a short time spelled doom for the best Coastal Defence (they were insufficent in the eyes of Rommel anyway who would have liked more mines, obstacles, bunkers etc.). Even at Omaha Beach they were breached by the end of the first day. Only the few heaviest works lasted some days longer and were of no tactical use once bypassed. After this, the Germans had to defend in the Hinterland exactly in the range of the ship artillery (range and caliber of ship artillery can not be compared to field artillery). Let's listen to what Meyer tells in the unit history of 12 SS and you will see what this means. He was an eyewitness.
It wasn't actually the command structure but the Allied Air that hindered the Panzer to move up front. OKW actually was not that touchy on the subject of using its reserves. Rundstedt didn't have any problems to get them once he really wanted them. He wanted to have a clear picture and had Calais in the back of his head, so wasted a few hours pondering should I or should I not and he didn't protest against the freezing of 12. SS, especially as they were still allowed to move after 3 hours. These hours were not pivotal. Also a better performance of 21. PD wouldn't hav saved the day. After all, not only a rather cumbersome way to get them up, but also the fact they had a British Para Division landing on their heads stood in the way of a good show.
Allied Air power however proved Geyr wrong. Its not the direct effect the aircraft had on the ground, this one is often exagerated. The simple fact that they were around hindered effective movement by day and the bombers had worked for months to destroy vital lines of communication. This was putting every German time table in shambles.
I think it was Zetterling who made a point that a lot of the Panzer Divisons were not battle ready in June. This is very true for some, but not all. Anyway the lack of Panzer Divisions, not their state was the main problem. Even with Führerweisung Nr. 51 in their back the Germans were never able to give all to the Western Front that was needed. Hence the problem of reserves and where to place them.
So the real problem: With the Marine out, the Luftwaffe out and the Heer semi out, on the other side the Allies dominating the Coastline with heavy fire and ruling the skies, the question where to place the reserves became somewhat a theoretical one.
There is a conspiracy theory running wild with the late deployement of 116. PD. Schwerin was not what you call a Nazi and Guderians son was Ia in Div HQ. I have my doubts about this, for various reasons. First, it made no sense to commit 116.PD earlier as it was in no good shape in June, second, it was in the region where German HQ still anticipated the main Allied thrust. However, we certainly can forget about such ideas when it comes to OB West planning. The process behind the situation in June 44 is well documented and it grew over a long period of time. Discussions on how to make use of the reserves and solutions were made before some Officers toyed with the idea to dispose of Hitler and using his own reserves for that, and as I outlined earlier, it was quite a normal military thing.
Cheers
Hans
I think Reb summed it up quite well:
In the end everyone was wrong. As I understand, Qvist puts a lot on the tactical concept of Rommel. It wouldnt' have helped.
In what is called the Panzer-controversy, Rommel (Heeresgruppe B) wanted to fight the enemy before and at the beach. To achieve this, he installed obstacles in front of the beach line to slow down the enemy and keep him under fire. At the beach itself, he positioned the infantry. Behind the infantry, he wanted the Panzerdivisions to be able to engage in combat with mobile Kampfgruppen after only a few hours maximum supported by artillery. He was sure that reserves kept in Central France would take approx 10 days to counterattack effectivly. This would be to late, he reasoned. Also, Allied air power would interdict quick movement. His concept was thus static to semi static
Geyr on the other side (Panzer Gruppe West) advocated a strong operational reserve of 5 to 6 mobile divisions, stationed around Paris in the woods protected against air sight and out of the range of ship artillery. His concept was thus mobile.
Rommel only had to think for his Heeresgruppe B. Rundstedt (OB West) had to think for the whole West. Of course already this fact is telling: He couldn't allow Rommel to have the Panzers in his Coastal Region, because this would denude all the other sectors in the West of any armour. There simply were not enough Panzer Divisions available.
The three ended up with a compromise. In the end there were not enough Panzer Divisions at the Coast and not enough Reserves for a mobile counterattack (Schwerpunkt). Everybody was happy and unhappy.
The whole discussion, however, actually is quite irrelevant. Both systems would not have worked and history has proven it. It is correct that a Continental Invasion is weakest at the landing. However, also the defender is weakest at the same moment. The Allies were not running into the rifles of a well prepared, alerted enemy, waiting for them at the beach. Allied planning and counterintelligence made sure of this. Also with Rommels concept, the Germans needed a reaction time, it's not like in the manouvres where you know the enemy comes at 5 o'clock in the morning because you told the umpires that you will wake up your boys at 6 o'clock. It is not possible to man the European and Norwegian Coastline like the walls of a Castle (as the word Atlantik Wall only suggested to the propaganda blinded). Of course the Allies knew they were vulnerable at the start. What didn they do? The same one does in any ordinary land battle. Put in the heaviest fire possible like an umbrella to protect the vulnerable movement ie the landings. Ship artillery and air power did exactly what Geyr feard they would: They nailed the Germans down and then blew them out. This together with the huge concentration of troops the Allied Navy (unmolested by the Marine and the Luftwaffe) could deliver at the beaches in a short time spelled doom for the best Coastal Defence (they were insufficent in the eyes of Rommel anyway who would have liked more mines, obstacles, bunkers etc.). Even at Omaha Beach they were breached by the end of the first day. Only the few heaviest works lasted some days longer and were of no tactical use once bypassed. After this, the Germans had to defend in the Hinterland exactly in the range of the ship artillery (range and caliber of ship artillery can not be compared to field artillery). Let's listen to what Meyer tells in the unit history of 12 SS and you will see what this means. He was an eyewitness.
It wasn't actually the command structure but the Allied Air that hindered the Panzer to move up front. OKW actually was not that touchy on the subject of using its reserves. Rundstedt didn't have any problems to get them once he really wanted them. He wanted to have a clear picture and had Calais in the back of his head, so wasted a few hours pondering should I or should I not and he didn't protest against the freezing of 12. SS, especially as they were still allowed to move after 3 hours. These hours were not pivotal. Also a better performance of 21. PD wouldn't hav saved the day. After all, not only a rather cumbersome way to get them up, but also the fact they had a British Para Division landing on their heads stood in the way of a good show.
Allied Air power however proved Geyr wrong. Its not the direct effect the aircraft had on the ground, this one is often exagerated. The simple fact that they were around hindered effective movement by day and the bombers had worked for months to destroy vital lines of communication. This was putting every German time table in shambles.
I think it was Zetterling who made a point that a lot of the Panzer Divisons were not battle ready in June. This is very true for some, but not all. Anyway the lack of Panzer Divisions, not their state was the main problem. Even with Führerweisung Nr. 51 in their back the Germans were never able to give all to the Western Front that was needed. Hence the problem of reserves and where to place them.
So the real problem: With the Marine out, the Luftwaffe out and the Heer semi out, on the other side the Allies dominating the Coastline with heavy fire and ruling the skies, the question where to place the reserves became somewhat a theoretical one.
There is a conspiracy theory running wild with the late deployement of 116. PD. Schwerin was not what you call a Nazi and Guderians son was Ia in Div HQ. I have my doubts about this, for various reasons. First, it made no sense to commit 116.PD earlier as it was in no good shape in June, second, it was in the region where German HQ still anticipated the main Allied thrust. However, we certainly can forget about such ideas when it comes to OB West planning. The process behind the situation in June 44 is well documented and it grew over a long period of time. Discussions on how to make use of the reserves and solutions were made before some Officers toyed with the idea to dispose of Hitler and using his own reserves for that, and as I outlined earlier, it was quite a normal military thing.
Cheers
Hans
Hello Hans
I agree practically fully with what you say. The only substantial exception would be the assesment that both Rommel's and Geyr's approach was equally doomed to failure - AFAICS, there was no possibility whatsoever of putting Geyr's strategy into practice, while in the case of Rommel's the prospects it is perhaps not quite as possible to be completely sure, though certainly the balance of probability is very hevaily against it indeed. It is not my argument that Rommel's approach had a good chance to succeed or that there were no good arguments against it - rather, it is that the alternatives were neccessarily worse still. Certainly, there were not enough Panzer Divisions in the West to fulfill the requirements of that approach fully, but the same can be said of any other approach chosen short of evacuating France.
Some specifics:
cheers
cheers
I agree practically fully with what you say. The only substantial exception would be the assesment that both Rommel's and Geyr's approach was equally doomed to failure - AFAICS, there was no possibility whatsoever of putting Geyr's strategy into practice, while in the case of Rommel's the prospects it is perhaps not quite as possible to be completely sure, though certainly the balance of probability is very hevaily against it indeed. It is not my argument that Rommel's approach had a good chance to succeed or that there were no good arguments against it - rather, it is that the alternatives were neccessarily worse still. Certainly, there were not enough Panzer Divisions in the West to fulfill the requirements of that approach fully, but the same can be said of any other approach chosen short of evacuating France.
Some specifics:
This I find an unsatisfactory argument. Firstly, the likelihood of the main allied effort taking place someplace else than HG B's sector was remote. Secondly, even if divisions were stationed in the coastal region, this does not mean they could not be moved elsewhere if there was a need for this and if the invasion did not happen to take place in the sector they were. If the invasion did take place in the sector they were, well, then they were already in the right spot. Thirdly, there indeed simply were not enough Panzer Divisions available - but such a situation is at least as much an argument in favour of takingt the risk of concentrating their effort where the risk is deemed greatest as it is of covering everything insufficiently.He couldn't allow Rommel to have the Panzers in his Coastal Region, because this would denude all the other sectors in the West of any armour. There simply were not enough Panzer Divisions available.
There wouldn't have been enough reserve for a mobile counterattack at a a later stage even if that reserve had contained every Panzer Division in the West. On the other hand, there might have been enough Panzer Divisions at the coast with maximum luck - and the heart of my logic here is that a high risk yielding at least a small chance is prefereable to an initial low risk yielding no chance.The three ended up with a compromise. In the end there were not enough Panzer Divisions at the Coast and not enough Reserves for a mobile counterattack (Schwerpunkt). Everybody was happy and unhappy.
cheers
cheers
-
Hans Weber
- Enthusiast
- Posts: 457
- Joined: Wed Oct 09, 2002 11:48 am
Hello Qvist
I still don't see why Rommel's concept should have the edge over Geyr's. In the end, both have pro and cons. What is important, however, is the fact that none could have worked under the conditions given. It boils down to the discussion on the values of static or mobile defence. There are several interesting aspects. First one is that if you think you can hold a line, you are fighting over it. In this case you concentrate on the line and pull together your mobile assets not too far away. If you are thinking that you can't hold, you are waiting for a good oportunity to get at the enemy where he is soft, possibly by a flanking attack with a fast and hard attack. The more troops you have, the more your defense goes from mobile to static. Static in the sense that you want to protect a sector and holding ground, while on moblie defense, holding ground is not your prime goal, but destroying the enemy. I don't have to tell you with whom Hitler agreed more... It is a interesting change in the thinking of a General who was once known for its skill in manouvering, to switch back to a old concept and forget about the modern ways of military thinking, as Rommel did. Probably his brushes with the RAF changed his mind.
Adapted to France we can say that the exponents of the static defense were found with 7. Armee, 15. Armee and Wbf Ndl. This is due to the fact that they had more troops at their disposal and thus could man a line (partially at least). The 1. Armee, which was able only to secure, not to hold the coastline advocated mobile defense. Of course the Germans knew that the likelyhood for an attack in the Northern sector was bigger. This assessment is already reflected on the disposition of troops. I'm not telling stories here. The defense concepts of the different Armies filed to OB West are known today.
The big disadvantage of any static defense is that you fix a line. You know it and of course the enemy knows it. Intelligence on enemy dispositions is prime information. With this decision, you loose any moment of surprise and liberty of manouvre. The Germans could have fixed a line of defense let's say 35 km inland, on a major river or reinforcing any other inland obstacle. I don't say this would have been wiser. I just say it is a possibility. Once you have drawn your line, you begin to fortify it. The Germans really outdid themselves with this. But I don't think the Normandy beaches held any big secrets for the attackers, their maps were probably more accurate than the German ones. What the attacker does next is positioning his firing elements on the known positions and let loose with everything he has. If it doesn't kill the man, it does at least keep his head down. The Allies could move in ships and air without any major problem and establish a firebase which proved enough.
Now back to the actual situation in France. If we look at the map we can see that Heeresgruppe B reserves (21. 116 and 2. PD) were stationed quite near the coastline, which shouldn't surprise us with Rommel in charge. Among the OB West reserves all but one (17.SS) were in the sector of Heeresgruppe B. 12 SS was actually roughly the same distance away from the Channel as 21. PD with PLD a little bit behind but still West of Paris. Armeegruppe G only had 11. (on the Biscay for the eventuality of Atlantic attack), 9. on the Gulf of Lyon (Mediterranean) and 2. SS inbetween, nothing near a coastline, but ready to move to either side. There was actually hardly worse spot to land for the Allies than in Normandy with 4 PD close by and another 2 still near. I think that this illustrates that Rommel's concept didn't work in reality. In the sector it was established best, it failed. And with this dispostion of troops illustrated, I still think it was not possible to leave the other sectors with no moblie reserves at all. You couldn't take away the 3 Pz. Divs from Armeegruppe G without inviting landings on this shoreline. That the Allies were capable to do this, they showed with Anvil and Dragon.
Finally, I take up a point I made ealier. The Panzer Division was not meant for static defense. It was a mobile attacker. Infantry divisions are far better for defense, as static defense also implies manpower (infantry) to hold ground. In Normandy they were in an enviroment not made for them and bled white. In the end this is a fact neither Rommel nor Geyr could have changed. Both wanted them not to use as infantry of course, but this campaing has shown with many examples (couterattack by I. SS Pz Korps in the first days of June, Operation Lüttich etc.) that it actually doesn't matter if your Panzer spearhead is not capable of moving 5 km or 100 km, if the simple fact remains that it's actually not moving aggressivly at all and thus better deployed without wheels and tracks, so the other guys have something to range in their guns and loosing time while doing so. In the end what you are saying is just that: Move some Panzer Division in their way, that will make some problems. They did, essentially because of their higher firepower and their armour vs. an ordinary Infantry unit. But the Allies were in position to shell and bomb them into oblivion as they stood in place and I don't see any advantage in this.
Cheers
Hans
Hans
I still don't see why Rommel's concept should have the edge over Geyr's. In the end, both have pro and cons. What is important, however, is the fact that none could have worked under the conditions given. It boils down to the discussion on the values of static or mobile defence. There are several interesting aspects. First one is that if you think you can hold a line, you are fighting over it. In this case you concentrate on the line and pull together your mobile assets not too far away. If you are thinking that you can't hold, you are waiting for a good oportunity to get at the enemy where he is soft, possibly by a flanking attack with a fast and hard attack. The more troops you have, the more your defense goes from mobile to static. Static in the sense that you want to protect a sector and holding ground, while on moblie defense, holding ground is not your prime goal, but destroying the enemy. I don't have to tell you with whom Hitler agreed more... It is a interesting change in the thinking of a General who was once known for its skill in manouvering, to switch back to a old concept and forget about the modern ways of military thinking, as Rommel did. Probably his brushes with the RAF changed his mind.
Adapted to France we can say that the exponents of the static defense were found with 7. Armee, 15. Armee and Wbf Ndl. This is due to the fact that they had more troops at their disposal and thus could man a line (partially at least). The 1. Armee, which was able only to secure, not to hold the coastline advocated mobile defense. Of course the Germans knew that the likelyhood for an attack in the Northern sector was bigger. This assessment is already reflected on the disposition of troops. I'm not telling stories here. The defense concepts of the different Armies filed to OB West are known today.
The big disadvantage of any static defense is that you fix a line. You know it and of course the enemy knows it. Intelligence on enemy dispositions is prime information. With this decision, you loose any moment of surprise and liberty of manouvre. The Germans could have fixed a line of defense let's say 35 km inland, on a major river or reinforcing any other inland obstacle. I don't say this would have been wiser. I just say it is a possibility. Once you have drawn your line, you begin to fortify it. The Germans really outdid themselves with this. But I don't think the Normandy beaches held any big secrets for the attackers, their maps were probably more accurate than the German ones. What the attacker does next is positioning his firing elements on the known positions and let loose with everything he has. If it doesn't kill the man, it does at least keep his head down. The Allies could move in ships and air without any major problem and establish a firebase which proved enough.
Now back to the actual situation in France. If we look at the map we can see that Heeresgruppe B reserves (21. 116 and 2. PD) were stationed quite near the coastline, which shouldn't surprise us with Rommel in charge. Among the OB West reserves all but one (17.SS) were in the sector of Heeresgruppe B. 12 SS was actually roughly the same distance away from the Channel as 21. PD with PLD a little bit behind but still West of Paris. Armeegruppe G only had 11. (on the Biscay for the eventuality of Atlantic attack), 9. on the Gulf of Lyon (Mediterranean) and 2. SS inbetween, nothing near a coastline, but ready to move to either side. There was actually hardly worse spot to land for the Allies than in Normandy with 4 PD close by and another 2 still near. I think that this illustrates that Rommel's concept didn't work in reality. In the sector it was established best, it failed. And with this dispostion of troops illustrated, I still think it was not possible to leave the other sectors with no moblie reserves at all. You couldn't take away the 3 Pz. Divs from Armeegruppe G without inviting landings on this shoreline. That the Allies were capable to do this, they showed with Anvil and Dragon.
Finally, I take up a point I made ealier. The Panzer Division was not meant for static defense. It was a mobile attacker. Infantry divisions are far better for defense, as static defense also implies manpower (infantry) to hold ground. In Normandy they were in an enviroment not made for them and bled white. In the end this is a fact neither Rommel nor Geyr could have changed. Both wanted them not to use as infantry of course, but this campaing has shown with many examples (couterattack by I. SS Pz Korps in the first days of June, Operation Lüttich etc.) that it actually doesn't matter if your Panzer spearhead is not capable of moving 5 km or 100 km, if the simple fact remains that it's actually not moving aggressivly at all and thus better deployed without wheels and tracks, so the other guys have something to range in their guns and loosing time while doing so. In the end what you are saying is just that: Move some Panzer Division in their way, that will make some problems. They did, essentially because of their higher firepower and their armour vs. an ordinary Infantry unit. But the Allies were in position to shell and bomb them into oblivion as they stood in place and I don't see any advantage in this.
Cheers
Hans
Hans
Salerno and Anzio (to a lesser extent) give us an idea of what Naval gunfire can do to the panzers.
On the other side of it is how effective individuals tanks were on static defense in the bocage.
Given that Omaha was the only beach where there was any hope of holding of the invaders one does suspect that having first class panzer troops close to the beaches could have made a difference.
Rommel was certainly right about one thing - stop them on the beaches or you won't stop them at all. So playing devil's advocate here - wouldn't it have been worth the losses to the panzers to be able to beat the allies to a pulp on the beaches? If Omaha had gotten even a little bit worse Bradley was prepared to evacuate. What if two or more beaches had been turned into Omahas - along with the werfers and gunfire that the panzers could deploy it is certainly food for thought.
In my own opinion however - I think big fat targets like a panzer division would have been pretty much flattened by naval gunfire and air attack.
Ultimately though -the question may have been one of nerve - would Ike have lost his nerve if the Germans could have killed enough of his men? Maybe...Churchill was not over enthused about a second front anyway and the risk of fighting the panzers at the beaches might have been worth it. Hitler took a much bigger risk in the Ardennes.
Had the Germans pushed the invader back into the sea the chance of another invasion within two years was small I should think. The Russians would have been very disheartened - the whole strategic picture would have changed. I should think it would have been worth sacrificing every panzer division in France to pull that off.
The real question is simple: would sacrificing the panzers have accomplished the task of kicking the allies back into the sea? I don't know.
cheers
Reb
On the other side of it is how effective individuals tanks were on static defense in the bocage.
Given that Omaha was the only beach where there was any hope of holding of the invaders one does suspect that having first class panzer troops close to the beaches could have made a difference.
Rommel was certainly right about one thing - stop them on the beaches or you won't stop them at all. So playing devil's advocate here - wouldn't it have been worth the losses to the panzers to be able to beat the allies to a pulp on the beaches? If Omaha had gotten even a little bit worse Bradley was prepared to evacuate. What if two or more beaches had been turned into Omahas - along with the werfers and gunfire that the panzers could deploy it is certainly food for thought.
In my own opinion however - I think big fat targets like a panzer division would have been pretty much flattened by naval gunfire and air attack.
Ultimately though -the question may have been one of nerve - would Ike have lost his nerve if the Germans could have killed enough of his men? Maybe...Churchill was not over enthused about a second front anyway and the risk of fighting the panzers at the beaches might have been worth it. Hitler took a much bigger risk in the Ardennes.
Had the Germans pushed the invader back into the sea the chance of another invasion within two years was small I should think. The Russians would have been very disheartened - the whole strategic picture would have changed. I should think it would have been worth sacrificing every panzer division in France to pull that off.
The real question is simple: would sacrificing the panzers have accomplished the task of kicking the allies back into the sea? I don't know.
cheers
Reb
-
Dackel Staffel
- Associate
- Posts: 710
- Joined: Sat Jan 17, 2004 3:04 pm
Hi,
The strategy of the panzers near the beaches involved to have the air suprematy over the panzers to protect them by the fighters from the Jabo and to protect them from the guns's ships by sinking them with bombers. But in 1944, the Luftwaffe couldn't do that.
The only solution was more guns sheltered, more infantry in bunkers, more mines and obstacles on the beaches from Norway to Spain and from Spain to Italy. Some kind of Hindenburg line. But even for that, the germans did all they could but it's wasn't enough.
Reb, you have forgotten Gela in Sicily.
So long.
The strategy of the panzers near the beaches involved to have the air suprematy over the panzers to protect them by the fighters from the Jabo and to protect them from the guns's ships by sinking them with bombers. But in 1944, the Luftwaffe couldn't do that.
The only solution was more guns sheltered, more infantry in bunkers, more mines and obstacles on the beaches from Norway to Spain and from Spain to Italy. Some kind of Hindenburg line. But even for that, the germans did all they could but it's wasn't enough.
Reb, you have forgotten Gela in Sicily.
So long.
All we need it's a Dackel in each pocket
The assumption that Allied air power prevented (and would have prevented any other) German operational manoeuvre needs to be closely examined.
The definitive study on this has yet to be written, but there are significant grounds for believing that had Rundstedt and Geyr been allowed to follow their operational concept (keep a strong central reserve of pz divs and then mount an operational counter-stroke once it was clear where and how the Allied advance was developing), then the Allied air power -- strong as it was -- would not have negated this. Consider:
- air-to-grd weapons technology circa 1944 was not particularly effective vs point armoured tgts (ie individual tanks). This has been widely remarked upon now, and the counter-argument is that attacks against soft-skinned logistic support were effective and that there was also a significant morale effect against pz crews (many tanks being found abandoned). Both of those counter-arguments have merit, but do not change the fact that Allied air power could not really destroy pz formations.
- no German pz divs (or any other divs) were prevented from arriving in battle worthy condition. Losses suffered in movements to the front have often been exaggerated in the literature, frequently by German officers after the war looking for a scape-goat to blame their defeat on. See for instance Zetterling's analyses of the actual pz div losses on their approach marches.
- there was certainly some effect from Allied air power on the German logistic situation in Normandy, but this does not appear to have been decisive. After all, no German units were ever pushed back except after the most bitter of fighting that cost the Allies numerous casualties. In other words, German units never cracked or became combat ineffective due to supply difficulties, much less pulled back due to supply difficulties.
- German movement certainly was curtailed. We all know how they resorted to moving with max dispersion, mostly at night etc etc. But the fact is that by dint of utilizing such measures they were able to move. The clearest example of this is Op LUTTICH (their counter-offensive at MORTAIN). The Germans were able to pull a couple of corps worth of pz divs out of the line around CAEN, and shift them laterally to the West a good hundred kms. Not only was this not stopped by the supposedly overwhelming Allied air power, it wasn't even detected until ULTRA revealed the plan.
All of this leads to the interesting suspicion that just maybe that clever old coot Von Rundstedt was right after all, and that the much vaunted Rommel was wrong. In fact, that Rommel was already burned out and "psyched out" by the Allied air power. Had he kept his nerve and stuck to traditional German operational doctrine, the Germans might have done to our landings in Normandy what Guderian did to the Russians at Kharkov.
Thank God they didn't get the chance to try.
The definitive study on this has yet to be written, but there are significant grounds for believing that had Rundstedt and Geyr been allowed to follow their operational concept (keep a strong central reserve of pz divs and then mount an operational counter-stroke once it was clear where and how the Allied advance was developing), then the Allied air power -- strong as it was -- would not have negated this. Consider:
- air-to-grd weapons technology circa 1944 was not particularly effective vs point armoured tgts (ie individual tanks). This has been widely remarked upon now, and the counter-argument is that attacks against soft-skinned logistic support were effective and that there was also a significant morale effect against pz crews (many tanks being found abandoned). Both of those counter-arguments have merit, but do not change the fact that Allied air power could not really destroy pz formations.
- no German pz divs (or any other divs) were prevented from arriving in battle worthy condition. Losses suffered in movements to the front have often been exaggerated in the literature, frequently by German officers after the war looking for a scape-goat to blame their defeat on. See for instance Zetterling's analyses of the actual pz div losses on their approach marches.
- there was certainly some effect from Allied air power on the German logistic situation in Normandy, but this does not appear to have been decisive. After all, no German units were ever pushed back except after the most bitter of fighting that cost the Allies numerous casualties. In other words, German units never cracked or became combat ineffective due to supply difficulties, much less pulled back due to supply difficulties.
- German movement certainly was curtailed. We all know how they resorted to moving with max dispersion, mostly at night etc etc. But the fact is that by dint of utilizing such measures they were able to move. The clearest example of this is Op LUTTICH (their counter-offensive at MORTAIN). The Germans were able to pull a couple of corps worth of pz divs out of the line around CAEN, and shift them laterally to the West a good hundred kms. Not only was this not stopped by the supposedly overwhelming Allied air power, it wasn't even detected until ULTRA revealed the plan.
All of this leads to the interesting suspicion that just maybe that clever old coot Von Rundstedt was right after all, and that the much vaunted Rommel was wrong. In fact, that Rommel was already burned out and "psyched out" by the Allied air power. Had he kept his nerve and stuck to traditional German operational doctrine, the Germans might have done to our landings in Normandy what Guderian did to the Russians at Kharkov.
Thank God they didn't get the chance to try.
-
Dackel Staffel
- Associate
- Posts: 710
- Joined: Sat Jan 17, 2004 3:04 pm
Helo Hans
Just some short words at this time, and at the risk of repeating myself -
cheers
Just some short words at this time, and at the risk of repeating myself -
andI still don't see why Rommel's concept should have the edge over Geyr's. In the end, both have pro and cons
My point would be that I fail to see that there were any pros in Geyr's approach in the situation as it existed. If there were, THEN it would have been a question of the values of static or mobile defense. As it is, I would still contend that Rommel's was the better option in this specific situation, not through the inherent merits of the approach as such but by default. As events bore out, there did not exist any possibility for mobile operations and a static defence was what HG B was in any case compelled to fight - and I do not think this was altogether unforeseeable.It boils down to the discussion on the values of static or mobile defence.
cheers
Hello Paul
I agree that on the strength of the present evidence, allied air forces would not have made it impossible for German panzer divisions to move. But it would have put them at a disadvantage mobility-wise if they had attempted to fight such a campaign - that is, at an even greater disadvantage than they already were, due to the static character of many German divisions and the general motorisation of the allied forces. In any case, there was never the slightest possibility of putting such a strategy into action - there was no alternative to committing Panzer Divisions to the defensive fighting in Normandy if the Germans were to avoid a speedy collapse of their defensive line.
cheers
I agree that on the strength of the present evidence, allied air forces would not have made it impossible for German panzer divisions to move. But it would have put them at a disadvantage mobility-wise if they had attempted to fight such a campaign - that is, at an even greater disadvantage than they already were, due to the static character of many German divisions and the general motorisation of the allied forces. In any case, there was never the slightest possibility of putting such a strategy into action - there was no alternative to committing Panzer Divisions to the defensive fighting in Normandy if the Germans were to avoid a speedy collapse of their defensive line.
cheers
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Hans Weber
- Enthusiast
- Posts: 457
- Joined: Wed Oct 09, 2002 11:48 am
Hello Qvist
I can't help it if you don't see any pros with Geyr's position. I do and I think the Panzer controversy is actually the concept of area defense vs. mobile defense. As both concepts failed in Normandy for the reasons I outlined above, i.e air supremacy and fire superiority, I don't see much sense to find out which was the better of two solutions that wouldn't have worked anyway under the given circumstances. That's a little bit to much theory for my taste, and I said earlier that with the turn of the actual events, the controversy proved to be irrelevant. What interests me however are the postitions behind the arguments and the parameters for the decision making process. I try to understand things before I lable them.
Cheers
Hans
I can't help it if you don't see any pros with Geyr's position. I do and I think the Panzer controversy is actually the concept of area defense vs. mobile defense. As both concepts failed in Normandy for the reasons I outlined above, i.e air supremacy and fire superiority, I don't see much sense to find out which was the better of two solutions that wouldn't have worked anyway under the given circumstances. That's a little bit to much theory for my taste, and I said earlier that with the turn of the actual events, the controversy proved to be irrelevant. What interests me however are the postitions behind the arguments and the parameters for the decision making process. I try to understand things before I lable them.
Cheers
Hans
Hello Hans
Well, I deserved that jib on account of my over-short previous post written under constraint of time, and also on account of my faithful repetition of position without too much in the way of elaborate argument. Also I realise that you have acquainted yourself with the process far better than I have and that it is possible that the perpsective I endeavor to put on this may not ultimately be valid. I am uncomfortably aware of being in a position I don't much care for - that of putting forward a general judgment that appears as overly simplistic to people better acquainted with the subject matter than I am. Nevertheless, I retain a degree of confidence in my logic here, though I am alive to the possibility of having to revise it. Anyway, time for me now to go into it at a little more length, and we shall see.
1. I instinctively sympathise with this:
You are also correct that my point is somewhat theoretical. That is, I am aware that the course of action I am defending as preferable to the one actually taken had many factors against it, including commonly accepted military thinking that no commander would abandon easily, an absence of complete freedom for OB West in determining these things, several factors impacting on both command arrangements and unit dispositions that were beyond the control of the persons in question and also that the discussion inevitably reflected not only different strategic approaches but also different perspectives resulting from the various persons’ different areas of responsibility. In light of this, it is not difficult to make sense of the dispositions actually made, but I think there remains a case to be made against it, a case that is above all justified by the critical nature of the situation. To an extent, that case relies on hindsight, but not completely so. Fundamentally, my case is that while it is understandable that the Germans did not base their dispositions on Rommel's premise that the only chance for defeating the invasion lay in defeating it during the first 1 or 2 days, it would have been better for them if they did. An important reason why this can be claimed is what is known through hindsight, but it is clear that the essential elements were anticipated at the time, by Rommel. Furthermore, I think you are almost certainly correct that the Germans would have been defeated regardless what dispositions they made. However, that was hardly a perspective the commanders at the time could take, and so it is a question of which approach gave the greater possibility of victory (or rather, if there was any approach that gave any possibility whatsoever of victory). The less the chance for that, the more justified an approach that was unconventional or risk-frought in their own eyes. It hardly seems possible that there were no options open to them that was not prefereable to a strategy that fell apart almost immediately, and for foreseeable reasons.
2. It is not difficult to understand Geyr's or Rundstedt's thinking. It represents sound general principles and is entirely in line with normal practices in the German Army. No commander can be called a fool for attempting to maintain a strong operational reserve or for attempting to achieve decent defensive coverage everywhere. The approach taken is the one you would expect.
3. It is however in my opinion undeniably the case that Rommel's arguments against this approach were essentially correct, as borne out by events. What is notable is furthermore that it was put forward by a general that was hardly in any way a proponent of static warfare as a matter of doctrinal preference or principle, and that it was put forward well before the invasion took place. This is significant in my opinion because it demonstrates that it was possible to foresee the factors that rendered mobile defense an irrelevant option.
4. It can be argued then that there were arguments, known to the German command and borne out by later events, to the effect that given all known factors, a response along lines that were normal and generally sound would in all likelihood not be feasible in this particular case. Rundstedt and Geyr can hardly be called fools for not accepting the validity of these arguments, but it remains that if they were valid (and it appears to me that they were), then there was in reality no real option to attempting something else, however radical.
5. One point where I do disagree with you is that both approaches were attempted and that both failed. Rather, I would say that neither was attempted.
As for the notion of maintaining a strong Panzer Reserve for a decisive counterstroke, it was made irrelevant within days of the invasion through the simply neccessity for committing the immediately available Panzer formations to the line as soon as possible, and then by the gradual absorption of the remainder as the defending forces were gradually whittled down. Rundstedt’s intended strategy was never put into action, because there was never any possibility for it to be put into action. As such, we do know that it did not work, or rather that it was irrelevant, infeasible. Rather, OB West was compelled into a policy of releasing Panzer divisions piecemeal while attempting to preserve some reserves. This ensured that the German forces were not left without coverage in other sectors and conserved forces that could be used to bolster the line at requisite points in time; as long as the allies were winning the build-up race, it also made complete defeat simply a matter of time.
Concerning the approach favored by Rommel, that was hardly attempted either – for the first 36 hours or so, there was only one Panzer Division in action against the invading forces, insufficient to even deal adequately with local challenges. Possibly you are thinking of the inconclusive results achieved by 21st and 12th SS PzDs in their early counteroffensive operations, but here I would say that these reveal lost opportunities as well as inherent limitations, and that it could just as easily be argued . 21st PzD managed to find an open right flank for the forces advancing on Caen from Sword – but could not exploit it due to its own wide open left flank against the forces advancing from Juno. Obviously, with a Panzer Division operating on its left flank it would not have been. This is not say that in such a case 21st PzD can reasonably be xepected to have overrun Sword beach, but it is to say that there existed possibilities that could not be taken advantage of due to the absence of forces. When the first elements of 12th SS PzD went into action, they inflicted a serious setback on the Canadian spearheads advancing on Caen, after which the Canadians, having achieved after all a sufficient immediate defensive depth for their bridgehead, went over to a defensive stance and in turn inflicted a firm rebuff on Meyer the following night. What this seems to indicate to me is that there existed opportunities and scope for German offensive action during the first two days or so, while the allied forces were engaged in landing, securing their beachheads, establishing contact between them and advancing not only to secure important objectives, but also to gain a minimum of defensive depth. It does not appear that allied air forces or naval artillery essentially eliminated German freedom of action at this point. And in any case, the drawbacks of operating within range of naval guns is something of a self-defeating argument, given that the only way to avoid it would be to withdraw beyond their range – which would essentially amount to conceding inevitable defeat.
6.There is one – and only one – precondition why anyone would contemplate Rommel’s approch, and that is acceptance of the judgment that to the extent it was possible to defeat the invasion at all, it only existed during the first 48 hrs or so. If you accept that: Certainly, there were not enough forces to implement Rommel’s approach – at least not throughout the OB West area. But there was always the option of simply accepting the risk inherent in concentrating the mobile forces in the most likely landing areas (Calais, Normandy). If the guess was wrong, well, then any chance for a speedy defeat of the landings are gone. But firstly, the allies have then at least landed in Brittany, Southwest France or the Mediterranean, rather than in the immediately more dangerous sectors. Secondly, your position for reinforcing the invasion front is not fundamentally worse than it would be if most of the Panzer forces were scattered around France. And thirdly, if you concentrate them nowhere, then you have zero possibility wherever they land.
Also, if you accept that, then a logical implication of this would be local control of forces without OKW/OB West consent in each case, and also a general emphasis on speedy reaction. Whether this implication would have resulted in a significantly different command arrangement on the German side is a different matter, but it is at least possible.
7. Let us return to the events as they did unfold. One thing is the argument of which approach gave the better opportunities in terms of campaign outcome, another is which provided the better situation relative to the actual situation the Germans found themselves in – which was that their forces along most of the invasion front, and certainly in the British sector, were within a short time pushed beyond any capability of maintaining even a tenuous defensive line, which neccessitated speedy commitment of mechanised formations – in all, it required the commitment of three Panzer Divisions in the British sector and a Panzergrenadier division in the US sector before the situation can be said to have been relatively stabilised. The emphasis then was in any case on swift intervention – and it does appear to me that a concentration in the Normandy and Calais sectors would have facilitated this more than the course chosen did.
Well Hans, that is the line of argument of this amateur, as clearly as I can put it - and having attempted to put it as clearly and as logically as possible thus making it also sound firmly convinced - more so than I strictly speaking have reason for. Comments to your post in separate post below.
Best regards,
Qvist
Well, I deserved that jib on account of my over-short previous post written under constraint of time, and also on account of my faithful repetition of position without too much in the way of elaborate argument. Also I realise that you have acquainted yourself with the process far better than I have and that it is possible that the perpsective I endeavor to put on this may not ultimately be valid. I am uncomfortably aware of being in a position I don't much care for - that of putting forward a general judgment that appears as overly simplistic to people better acquainted with the subject matter than I am. Nevertheless, I retain a degree of confidence in my logic here, though I am alive to the possibility of having to revise it. Anyway, time for me now to go into it at a little more length, and we shall see.
1. I instinctively sympathise with this:
So do I, generally speaking, and I understand if you find it tiresome to meet stubborn opposition from someone who in this specific case has not entered into it to the same detailed degree that you have. I certainly do, whenever that is the case. And it is usually the case that when one does go into it, the arguments for the course actually taken turn out to be stronger than they may appear when viewed from a distance, so to speak, or at least the constraints are often more compelling. But as said, I still believe I have a point here that is worth making.What interests me however are the postitions behind the arguments and the parameters for the decision making process. I try to understand things before I lable them.
You are also correct that my point is somewhat theoretical. That is, I am aware that the course of action I am defending as preferable to the one actually taken had many factors against it, including commonly accepted military thinking that no commander would abandon easily, an absence of complete freedom for OB West in determining these things, several factors impacting on both command arrangements and unit dispositions that were beyond the control of the persons in question and also that the discussion inevitably reflected not only different strategic approaches but also different perspectives resulting from the various persons’ different areas of responsibility. In light of this, it is not difficult to make sense of the dispositions actually made, but I think there remains a case to be made against it, a case that is above all justified by the critical nature of the situation. To an extent, that case relies on hindsight, but not completely so. Fundamentally, my case is that while it is understandable that the Germans did not base their dispositions on Rommel's premise that the only chance for defeating the invasion lay in defeating it during the first 1 or 2 days, it would have been better for them if they did. An important reason why this can be claimed is what is known through hindsight, but it is clear that the essential elements were anticipated at the time, by Rommel. Furthermore, I think you are almost certainly correct that the Germans would have been defeated regardless what dispositions they made. However, that was hardly a perspective the commanders at the time could take, and so it is a question of which approach gave the greater possibility of victory (or rather, if there was any approach that gave any possibility whatsoever of victory). The less the chance for that, the more justified an approach that was unconventional or risk-frought in their own eyes. It hardly seems possible that there were no options open to them that was not prefereable to a strategy that fell apart almost immediately, and for foreseeable reasons.
2. It is not difficult to understand Geyr's or Rundstedt's thinking. It represents sound general principles and is entirely in line with normal practices in the German Army. No commander can be called a fool for attempting to maintain a strong operational reserve or for attempting to achieve decent defensive coverage everywhere. The approach taken is the one you would expect.
3. It is however in my opinion undeniably the case that Rommel's arguments against this approach were essentially correct, as borne out by events. What is notable is furthermore that it was put forward by a general that was hardly in any way a proponent of static warfare as a matter of doctrinal preference or principle, and that it was put forward well before the invasion took place. This is significant in my opinion because it demonstrates that it was possible to foresee the factors that rendered mobile defense an irrelevant option.
4. It can be argued then that there were arguments, known to the German command and borne out by later events, to the effect that given all known factors, a response along lines that were normal and generally sound would in all likelihood not be feasible in this particular case. Rundstedt and Geyr can hardly be called fools for not accepting the validity of these arguments, but it remains that if they were valid (and it appears to me that they were), then there was in reality no real option to attempting something else, however radical.
5. One point where I do disagree with you is that both approaches were attempted and that both failed. Rather, I would say that neither was attempted.
As for the notion of maintaining a strong Panzer Reserve for a decisive counterstroke, it was made irrelevant within days of the invasion through the simply neccessity for committing the immediately available Panzer formations to the line as soon as possible, and then by the gradual absorption of the remainder as the defending forces were gradually whittled down. Rundstedt’s intended strategy was never put into action, because there was never any possibility for it to be put into action. As such, we do know that it did not work, or rather that it was irrelevant, infeasible. Rather, OB West was compelled into a policy of releasing Panzer divisions piecemeal while attempting to preserve some reserves. This ensured that the German forces were not left without coverage in other sectors and conserved forces that could be used to bolster the line at requisite points in time; as long as the allies were winning the build-up race, it also made complete defeat simply a matter of time.
Concerning the approach favored by Rommel, that was hardly attempted either – for the first 36 hours or so, there was only one Panzer Division in action against the invading forces, insufficient to even deal adequately with local challenges. Possibly you are thinking of the inconclusive results achieved by 21st and 12th SS PzDs in their early counteroffensive operations, but here I would say that these reveal lost opportunities as well as inherent limitations, and that it could just as easily be argued . 21st PzD managed to find an open right flank for the forces advancing on Caen from Sword – but could not exploit it due to its own wide open left flank against the forces advancing from Juno. Obviously, with a Panzer Division operating on its left flank it would not have been. This is not say that in such a case 21st PzD can reasonably be xepected to have overrun Sword beach, but it is to say that there existed possibilities that could not be taken advantage of due to the absence of forces. When the first elements of 12th SS PzD went into action, they inflicted a serious setback on the Canadian spearheads advancing on Caen, after which the Canadians, having achieved after all a sufficient immediate defensive depth for their bridgehead, went over to a defensive stance and in turn inflicted a firm rebuff on Meyer the following night. What this seems to indicate to me is that there existed opportunities and scope for German offensive action during the first two days or so, while the allied forces were engaged in landing, securing their beachheads, establishing contact between them and advancing not only to secure important objectives, but also to gain a minimum of defensive depth. It does not appear that allied air forces or naval artillery essentially eliminated German freedom of action at this point. And in any case, the drawbacks of operating within range of naval guns is something of a self-defeating argument, given that the only way to avoid it would be to withdraw beyond their range – which would essentially amount to conceding inevitable defeat.
6.There is one – and only one – precondition why anyone would contemplate Rommel’s approch, and that is acceptance of the judgment that to the extent it was possible to defeat the invasion at all, it only existed during the first 48 hrs or so. If you accept that: Certainly, there were not enough forces to implement Rommel’s approach – at least not throughout the OB West area. But there was always the option of simply accepting the risk inherent in concentrating the mobile forces in the most likely landing areas (Calais, Normandy). If the guess was wrong, well, then any chance for a speedy defeat of the landings are gone. But firstly, the allies have then at least landed in Brittany, Southwest France or the Mediterranean, rather than in the immediately more dangerous sectors. Secondly, your position for reinforcing the invasion front is not fundamentally worse than it would be if most of the Panzer forces were scattered around France. And thirdly, if you concentrate them nowhere, then you have zero possibility wherever they land.
Also, if you accept that, then a logical implication of this would be local control of forces without OKW/OB West consent in each case, and also a general emphasis on speedy reaction. Whether this implication would have resulted in a significantly different command arrangement on the German side is a different matter, but it is at least possible.
7. Let us return to the events as they did unfold. One thing is the argument of which approach gave the better opportunities in terms of campaign outcome, another is which provided the better situation relative to the actual situation the Germans found themselves in – which was that their forces along most of the invasion front, and certainly in the British sector, were within a short time pushed beyond any capability of maintaining even a tenuous defensive line, which neccessitated speedy commitment of mechanised formations – in all, it required the commitment of three Panzer Divisions in the British sector and a Panzergrenadier division in the US sector before the situation can be said to have been relatively stabilised. The emphasis then was in any case on swift intervention – and it does appear to me that a concentration in the Normandy and Calais sectors would have facilitated this more than the course chosen did.
Well Hans, that is the line of argument of this amateur, as clearly as I can put it - and having attempted to put it as clearly and as logically as possible thus making it also sound firmly convinced - more so than I strictly speaking have reason for. Comments to your post in separate post below.
Best regards,
Qvist
Hello Hans
Well, so in a way you are saying that my argument is also applicable in reverse - i.e., since there were not enough forces to ensure a successful line defence, mobile defense becomes the option by default - and that there are good arguments for both because there are good arguments against either.
I see no fault in this as such, and understand the point.
But wouldn't it also be a case of which approach allows you to fight on the best terms - especially as neither approach is free of serious problems? It does seem to me that from this perspective what you call a static defense would, unlike in the East, be much preferable in this specific situation, given that allied forces had much greater strength potential that could be deployed with greater effect the greater the operational space, the general allied advantage in mobility, the virtual immobility of many german formations, and the possibility for allied air power to cripple German mobility even further.
Beyond this, there is also the question of the pursuit of victory, which after all the German command at least had to attempt. A very serious argument against a strategy of mobile defense in this regard is that virtually all the general factors impacting on the outcome beyond command decisions were ones that a)favored the allies and b) became stronger over time. The lack of replacements, interdicted support and supply structures, limited reinforcements, the impact of events on other fronts, shortages of supplies and fuel - all of these were factors that would make themselves increasingly felt the longer the campaign went on, and perhaps the most basic weakness of the German position in the West was their lack of sustainability. This is in itself a heavy argument in favor of attempting to defeat the invading forces immediately rather than in time.
As for Rommel, I agree that it is striking to see a general of his outlook advocate the sort of defense he did. To me, that rather underlines the somewhat unique nature of the challenge the Germans were facing in the West in 1944, the inadequacy of a standard approach to it and Rommel's capacity to judge the specifics of the situation. I do not think it can be imputed from this that Rommel had developed a general preference for static defence, or at least that has never been my impression. But you have read more on this than I have, is your impression a different one?
Sure, I am not questioning this.
cheers
I still don't see why Rommel's concept should have the edge over Geyr's. In the end, both have pro and cons. What is important, however, is the fact that none could have worked under the conditions given. It boils down to the discussion on the values of static or mobile defence. There are several interesting aspects. First one is that if you think you can hold a line, you are fighting over it. In this case you concentrate on the line and pull together your mobile assets not too far away. If you are thinking that you can't hold, you are waiting for a good oportunity to get at the enemy where he is soft, possibly by a flanking attack with a fast and hard attack. The more troops you have, the more your defense goes from mobile to static. Static in the sense that you want to protect a sector and holding ground, while on moblie defense, holding ground is not your prime goal, but destroying the enemy. I don't have to tell you with whom Hitler agreed more... It is a interesting change in the thinking of a General who was once known for its skill in manouvering, to switch back to a old concept and forget about the modern ways of military thinking, as Rommel did. Probably his brushes with the RAF changed his mind.
Well, so in a way you are saying that my argument is also applicable in reverse - i.e., since there were not enough forces to ensure a successful line defence, mobile defense becomes the option by default - and that there are good arguments for both because there are good arguments against either.
I see no fault in this as such, and understand the point. But wouldn't it also be a case of which approach allows you to fight on the best terms - especially as neither approach is free of serious problems? It does seem to me that from this perspective what you call a static defense would, unlike in the East, be much preferable in this specific situation, given that allied forces had much greater strength potential that could be deployed with greater effect the greater the operational space, the general allied advantage in mobility, the virtual immobility of many german formations, and the possibility for allied air power to cripple German mobility even further.
Beyond this, there is also the question of the pursuit of victory, which after all the German command at least had to attempt. A very serious argument against a strategy of mobile defense in this regard is that virtually all the general factors impacting on the outcome beyond command decisions were ones that a)favored the allies and b) became stronger over time. The lack of replacements, interdicted support and supply structures, limited reinforcements, the impact of events on other fronts, shortages of supplies and fuel - all of these were factors that would make themselves increasingly felt the longer the campaign went on, and perhaps the most basic weakness of the German position in the West was their lack of sustainability. This is in itself a heavy argument in favor of attempting to defeat the invading forces immediately rather than in time.
As for Rommel, I agree that it is striking to see a general of his outlook advocate the sort of defense he did. To me, that rather underlines the somewhat unique nature of the challenge the Germans were facing in the West in 1944, the inadequacy of a standard approach to it and Rommel's capacity to judge the specifics of the situation. I do not think it can be imputed from this that Rommel had developed a general preference for static defence, or at least that has never been my impression. But you have read more on this than I have, is your impression a different one?
Adapted to France we can say that the exponents of the static defense were found with 7. Armee, 15. Armee and Wbf Ndl. This is due to the fact that they had more troops at their disposal and thus could man a line (partially at least). The 1. Armee, which was able only to secure, not to hold the coastline advocated mobile defense. Of course the Germans knew that the likelyhood for an attack in the Northern sector was bigger. This assessment is already reflected on the disposition of troops. I'm not telling stories here. The defense concepts of the different Armies filed to OB West are known today.
Sure, I am not questioning this.
Well - I agree that Normandy appears to have been the sector that could most easily be reinforced from the actual German dispositions, but does this really amount to the sort of defense Rommel wanted? In the sector where it was established best, it failed - but surely it could have been established better? As for risks in Southern France and the Bay of Biscay, there was always the option pointed out in above post.Now back to the actual situation in France. If we look at the map we can see that Heeresgruppe B reserves (21. 116 and 2. PD) were stationed quite near the coastline, which shouldn't surprise us with Rommel in charge. Among the OB West reserves all but one (17.SS) were in the sector of Heeresgruppe B. 12 SS was actually roughly the same distance away from the Channel as 21. PD with PLD a little bit behind but still West of Paris. Armeegruppe G only had 11. (on the Biscay for the eventuality of Atlantic attack), 9. on the Gulf of Lyon (Mediterranean) and 2. SS inbetween, nothing near a coastline, but ready to move to either side. There was actually hardly worse spot to land for the Allies than in Normandy with 4 PD close by and another 2 still near. I think that this illustrates that Rommel's concept didn't work in reality. In the sector it was established best, it failed. And with this dispostion of troops illustrated, I still think it was not possible to leave the other sectors with no moblie reserves at all. You couldn't take away the 3 Pz. Divs from Armeegruppe G without inviting landings on this shoreline. That the Allies were capable to do this, they showed with Anvil and Dragon.
Well, as you say, there was no alternative to it, as long as there was a shortage of infantry divisions who could reach the invasion front quickly. And anyway, how effective would the Panzer Divisions, operating in conjunction with infantry formations that frequently possessed little to no mobility, have been in dealing with superior Allied forces of at least equal mobility, with complete air superiority and lots of space to deploy? The German position simply deteriorated with inevitability over time.Finally, I take up a point I made ealier. The Panzer Division was not meant for static defense. It was a mobile attacker. Infantry divisions are far better for defense, as static defense also implies manpower (infantry) to hold ground. In Normandy they were in an enviroment not made for them and bled white. In the end this is a fact neither Rommel nor Geyr could have changed. Both wanted them not to use as infantry of course, but this campaing has shown with many examples (couterattack by I. SS Pz Korps in the first days of June, Operation Lüttich etc.) that it actually doesn't matter if your Panzer spearhead is not capable of moving 5 km or 100 km, if the simple fact remains that it's actually not moving aggressivly at all and thus better deployed without wheels and tracks, so the other guys have something to range in their guns and loosing time while doing so. In the end what you are saying is just that: Move some Panzer Division in their way, that will make some problems. They did, essentially because of their higher firepower and their armour vs. an ordinary Infantry unit. But the Allies were in position to shell and bomb them into oblivion as they stood in place and I don't see any advantage in this.
cheers
This is becoming an intereting thread...
1. It has been suggested above that the debate between mobile vs static defence is moot because "regardless of which they choose, they were doomed to defeat." I personally would argue strongly against this view, which is nevertheless quite common. "What ifs" are always highly speculative (at best), but there are solid grounds for arguing that the outcome of OVERLORD did hang in the balance. And had it (the specific landings in Normandy) failed, the consequences for the Anglo-American war effort would have be incalcuably catastrophic. Suffice it to say that it is not obvious that there would have been another landing attempt that year, or indeed, ever.
2. QVist argues that the Germans would have done better if they had only whole-heartedly followed Rommel's advice. Strictly speaking, I agree. But only because I would strongly argue that the Germans would have done better if only they'd whole-heartedly followed either Rommel's advice or Geyr/Rundstedt's. In the event, Hitler produced a muddled compromise between the two that, essentially, offered the cons of both and the pros of neither. (Thank God eh?)
3. My final point for this post -- a technical point. It was asserted that the pz divs were not meant for defensive warfare, which is broadly true, but the implication in some of the posts above seems to be that inf divs would have been more effective in this role, and therefore also that the pz divs suffered more heavily than inf divs would have. In fact, I don't think there can really be any debate that a pz div was far more effective at holding grd in Normandy than any leg infantry div. Indeed, that is why they were so committed. The point is that the pz divs were capable of counter-offensives, whereas the inf divs really were not, and thus the pz divs (would have been), far more "valuable" to the Germans if saved for counter-attack, rather than committed to the line to hold ground.
1. It has been suggested above that the debate between mobile vs static defence is moot because "regardless of which they choose, they were doomed to defeat." I personally would argue strongly against this view, which is nevertheless quite common. "What ifs" are always highly speculative (at best), but there are solid grounds for arguing that the outcome of OVERLORD did hang in the balance. And had it (the specific landings in Normandy) failed, the consequences for the Anglo-American war effort would have be incalcuably catastrophic. Suffice it to say that it is not obvious that there would have been another landing attempt that year, or indeed, ever.
2. QVist argues that the Germans would have done better if they had only whole-heartedly followed Rommel's advice. Strictly speaking, I agree. But only because I would strongly argue that the Germans would have done better if only they'd whole-heartedly followed either Rommel's advice or Geyr/Rundstedt's. In the event, Hitler produced a muddled compromise between the two that, essentially, offered the cons of both and the pros of neither. (Thank God eh?)
3. My final point for this post -- a technical point. It was asserted that the pz divs were not meant for defensive warfare, which is broadly true, but the implication in some of the posts above seems to be that inf divs would have been more effective in this role, and therefore also that the pz divs suffered more heavily than inf divs would have. In fact, I don't think there can really be any debate that a pz div was far more effective at holding grd in Normandy than any leg infantry div. Indeed, that is why they were so committed. The point is that the pz divs were capable of counter-offensives, whereas the inf divs really were not, and thus the pz divs (would have been), far more "valuable" to the Germans if saved for counter-attack, rather than committed to the line to hold ground.