The Polish Campaign

[sid guttridge]

Hi 4444,

Zaloga is a very good source on Polish affairs, and not only because he is almost the only person to have written in English on the Polish Campaign.

"The Poles left France convinced......." is some way short of a specific French commitment of a specific number of divisions with a specific objective.

In fact the French did have an offensive plan - Plane E - which envisaged clearing the Germans from the west bank of the Rhine.

Must go prematurely,

Cheers,

Sid.

[Freiritter]

Thanks, Pirx.

[4444]

Could you tell me why France and England declared the after 3 days?

Well, France was a democratic country and adhered to some civilised procedures, which usually take some time. The government could have hardly embarked on the course of war without consulting the parliament. Issuing an ultimatum sounds reasonable to me as well, since at that time not few could have hoped an ultimatum might have worked. And if you issue an ultimatum, it should not be on 2-hour notice, like the Soviet one to Latvia in 1940.

[4444]

"The Poles left France convinced......." is some way short of a specific French commitment of a specific number of divisions with a specific objective

Well, this was the comment I feared when pasting the page 19 quotation. And this was the reason I decided to paste the page 11 quotation as well. Looks only the very text will convince you. Will try to send you the link where you can get it.

[4444]

I think the French have an arguable case that they were absolved from any obligation

Sid, I have an impression you got a bit carried away by other discussions you are having within this thread.

I am not discussing whether the French were cowardly or brave. I am not discussing whether they were treacherous or loyal. I am not discussing whether they should have or should have not launched an offensive. I am not discussing whether they were right or wrong.

I am discussing whether they have honoured or broken their obligations.

The protocol of May 19, 1939 had one condition, related to the casus belli agreement. This condition was fulfilled on Sep 4, 1939. There were no other strings attached. In particular, there was no condition that the French obligations are binding if the Polish government resides within the borders of Poland, nor if Warsaw is still free, nor if at last a half of the Polish troops are still fighting.

If I follow your line of reasoning than by the same token I will have to conclude that the Soviets “were absolved from any obligation” when they captured a half of Poland in 1939. After all, Molotov was pretty much right when he declared on Sep 17 that the Polish state had collapsed.

[sid guttridge]

Hi 4444,

Actually, as you probably know, that is almost exactly what Molotov told the Polish Ambassador to Moscow when he summoned him from his bed in the early hours of 17 September. He argued him that, as the Polish Government had abandoned its recognised capital and was effectively no longer in control of the state, he was withdrawing recognition and all previous bilateral agreements were therefore null. Furthermore, as the Polish Government could no longer guarantee the security of the Ukrainian and Byelorussian majority in Eastern Poland, the Red Army was moving in to fill the vacuum and protect them! (Of course this was just window dressing, because the previous month's Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact had already agreed the USSR's course of action).

My point about the Zaloga quotes is that they are vague as to French commitments. In fact, they leave open the question as to whether the French were under any contractual obligation at all. We really do need the text.

Another point that has a bearing is Polish-Romanian obligations. The two countries had a mutual defence pact against the USSR. On 17 September the Polish Government specifically absolved the Romanians from having to declare war on the USSR when it went into exile. If the Polish Government was prepared to absolve the Romanians on 17 September, why would it be reasonable to expect the French to launch a pointless attack a day later?

On the evidence available the French seem to have done the absolute minimum they were required to under their obligations to the Poles. Had the Poles managed to keep the field longer the French might then have been found more wanting, but the fact is that Poland had effectively collapsed by the time the French were apparently obliged to mount their major offensive. There was no Poland to save. In these circumstances, what advantage would the Poles have gained?

Cheers,

Sid.

[4444]

My point about the Zaloga quotes is that they are vague as to French commitments. In fact, they leave open the question as to whether the French were under any contractual obligation at all

Page 19 quotation is vague indeed. “Polish and French general staff hold meetings in France, during which France pledges major offensive against Germany two weeks after an invasion” does not seem vague to me at all.

If the Polish Government was prepared to absolve the Romanians on 17 September, why would it be reasonable to expect the French to launch a pointless attack a day later? […] In these circumstances, what advantage would the Poles have gained?

Sid, I am afraid we are running in circles. I have not challenged you whether the French were cowardly or brave. I have not challenged you whether they were treacherous or loyal. I have not challenged you whether they should have or should have not launched an offensive. I have not challenged you whether their offensive would have been pointless or useful. I have not challenged you whether their offensive would have been reasonable or illogical. The point you make above is perfectly valid for these discussions. It is irrelevant for discussing whether the French have honoured or broken their obligations.

Actually, as you probably know…,

Yes, I know. This is exactly why I have allowed myself this rhetorical figure. Mr NarKomInDiel Molotov just took the liberty of absolving the USSR from obligations according to his liking, as you suggested the French should have done in Sep 1939.

On the evidence available the French seem to have done the absolute minimum they were required to under their obligations to the Poles

I am afraid this is not correct. Even if we disregard the sources I have given you and even if we agree that the only “evidence” acceptable is a very text of a document. If this is the case, I doubt you have any evidence supporting the stand that the Franco-Polish agreement listed “some sort of offensive action” etc as what is required of the French.

We really do need the text

I would rephrase it, if I may. You really need the text. I think I have once seen a collection of documents (including this one) in an on-line bookstore, but Murphy is with me and I can not trace this site back. I keep trying. Hope you are looking for it via your channels as well.

[sid guttridge]

Hi 4444,

I owe you an apology. For some reason the word "pledge" escaped my gaze. Zaloga is stronger on the subject than I thought. Sorry.

The French did not absolve themselves from their obligations to Poland in September 1939. They stayed in the war, took in the Polish soldiers and airmen that the Polish Government ordered into exile on 17-18 September and formed two divisions and several air force squadrons out of them.

What the French did not do was mount an offensive designed to relieve pressure on Poland when Poland had already effectively collapsed and its government and high command had fled abroad. Had Poland, its armed forces, its government and high command still been effectively in the field on 18 September and not either already in exile or under orders to flee abroad, then, in my opinion, the obligations on the French would have stood.

I personally have my doubts that the French could or would have launched an offensive on 18 September, but the fact is that the entire raison d'etre of the promised offensive was already gone by that date and, I would submit, the obligation on them to mount it evapourated at the same time.

If the Poles had managed to hold out for another few days the truth about French intentions would probably have been exposed. As it is, I would suggest that the French have a reasonable case that they did fulfil their minimum obligations to Poland. This is nothing to be proud of, but it is not the disgrace that some would claim.

I think that in essence neither the Poles nor the French had anticipated the speed of the Blitzkrieg when they made their mutual agreement (whatever it was) in May. Both assumed that, by WWI rates of advance, the Poles would still have a viable army in the field in the west of their country that was worthy of relief by the 15th day of French mobilisation. It proved not to be the case. Altered circumstances changed both French and Polish plans. On that day the Polish government pragmatically went into exile with such of its forces as it could rescue and the French pragmatically did not mount their offensive.

If the French were to have launched an offensive on 18 September, I would suggest that they should only have done so if it was in their own self interest, Poland being irredeemable by then. I don't know the exact balance of forces in the West at this time, but it seems to me that a drive that pushed the Germans over the Rhine, when they were clearly at their weakest in the theatre, might might well have been to France's advantage. If this really was a viable missed opportunity, then I suggest that that is where criticism of the French would best lie. But that is for another thread.......

Cheers,

Sid.

[sid guttridge]

Hi guys,

I have found a photocopy of French deployments on 12 September 1939 taken from a Polish book "Wojna Polska" by Moczulski.

On p.551 it gives the following balance of forces on the Franco-German border between Luxemburg and the Rhine. This is where Plan E (presumably the general offensive the Poles were expecting) was planned to be launched.

France:Germany
Armies 3:1
Corps 8:3
Infantry Divisions 31:12
Motorised Divisions 4:0
Infantry Brigades 1:1
Cavalry Divisions 1:0
Tank Battalions 18:0

The odds are approximately 3:1 in favour of the French, who had approximately half their army deployed on this sector.

I think that this slightly overestimates real French strength on 12 September as I know that the French IX and XII Corps were still en route to the front on that day. However, it is probably a good estimate of French strength after they had arrived.

It should also be borne in mind that the Siegfried Line fortifications, which were strongest in this area, would have been a force multiplier for the Germans.

Of course this tells us nothing about French intentions, but it is clear that they had built up sufficient preponderance of force on the part of the border not covered by the Rhine to have launched Plan E within a few days of 12 September.

Cheers,

Sid.

[BullsEye]

Hello everyone,

On this discussion on Poland I'm taking the position that much of the trouble was caused by Poland herself. While not ignoring the fact that Poland was bordered by two very powerful countries who had claims on Polish territory, it seems to me that Polish foreign policy during this period was rather unrealistic in that it believed itself to be a more powerful country militarily than was the case. Its pursuit of a "third way", that of not favoring either Germany or Soviet Russia, was itself a counterproductive proposition, being that Poland was not sufficiently powerful to deter either of these two potential adversaries from forcing Polands hand if they so desired. If Poland had followed a path of gaining powerful allies while following this "third way" then one could at least give the Poles credit for attempting a risky proposition at least possible, but the Poles went out of their way to antagonize possible allies by pursuing an aggressive foreign ploicy. If Polish Foreign Miniter Jozef Beck had adopted a more conventional approach in protecting his countries interest it might have been possible for Poland to have tilted the balance of power in Europe, which would have prevented either Hitler or Stalin from the pursuit of enlarging their empires, depending on whom Beck decided to align his countries future with.

Let's take the possible position that Beck had allowed the USSR access to Czechoslovakia through Polish territory when Hitler was threatening the Czechs and Slovaks prior to Munich. If this access had been granted, or even if Beck had hinted that the Soviets would be permitted to use Polish territory to allow their honoring their defense pact with Czechoslovakia, then Czech president Eduard Benes would have not permitted Czech territory from being taken without a fight, and this might have had the deterrence effect on Hitler.

Or let's be more realistic, realising that Beck was a strident anti-communist. A more likely alliance would be one between Poland and Germany. Looking at the two issues which divided Poland and Germany both Danzig and the Polish Corridor were seen by the majority of British and French statesmen as the issue on which Germany stood on firmer ground. Beck knew this yet still persisted on pursuing a bellicose or recalcitrant attitude towards German claims. If Beck had been more flexible and realistic he would not have spurned Ribbentrops offer of a "joint solution" to all possible German-Polish differences. What was on Ribbentrops mind was not only reasonable but would have guaranteed Poland their eastern borders with Soviet Russia. What Ribbentrop first suggested was the full restoration of Danzig to the Reich, to the building of an autobahn and railway, both extra-territorial, across the "Danzig Corridor" in Polish Pomerania, and for Poland to join the Anti-Comintern Pact. In return the German government would guarantee Poland's economic rights and railway access to Danzig, extend the 1934 German-Polish Non-Agression Pact from the originally scheduled 10 years to 35 years, and a guarantee of Polands frontiers.

Since we know that Beck did neither of these things it can be argued, with considerable correctness, that Becks stubborness led to the eventual clash with Germany for which Poland and most of Europe had to suffer considerable agony.

Regards,

Oscar

[4444]

The French did not absolve themselves from their obligations to Poland in September 1939

Yes they did.

They stayed in the war, took in the Polish soldiers and airmen that the Polish Government ordered into exile on 17-18 September and formed two divisions and several air force squadrons out of them.

This is very nice of them, but this is not what the Franco-Polish agreement was about.

What the French did not do was mount an offensive

and this is why they defaulted on their commitments

…designed to relieve pressure on Poland when Poland had already effectively collapsed and its government and high command had fled abroad. Had Poland, its armed forces, its government and high command still been effectively in the field on 18 September and not either already in exile or under orders to flee abroad, then, in my opinion, the obligations on the French would have stood

The protocol of May 19 did not specify that French obligations are binding only if “Poland, its armed forces, its government and high command still been effectively in the field”. They were binding regardless of the above.

the fact is that the entire raison d'etre of the promised offensive was already gone by that date

In my humble opinion the French raison d’etre was very much there, and it has been dramatically proven in May 1940. But the question of the French raison d’etre is not the point of my challenge.

I would submit, the obligation on them to mount it evapourated at the same time

I do not think there was any stipulation that the French obligation to mount a full-scale offensive “evaporates” in any condition

I would suggest that the French have a reasonable case that they did fulfil their minimum obligations to Poland

Sid, it would be more acceptable to me if you write “that the French have a reasonable argument not to fulfil their minimum obligations to Poland”. At that time some might have thought that defaulting on French obligations is to the interest of France.

“This is nothing to be proud of, but it is not the disgrace that some would claim

As underlined few times already, I am not discussing whether the French were disgraced or honoured by their Sep 1939 actions. I am allowing the others to judge whether breaking an obligation to Poland was or was not a disgrace for France.

[Der Untermensch]

much of the trouble was caused by Poland herself

yes, by the very fact of its existence

Its pursuit of a "third way", that of not favoring either Germany or Soviet Russia, was itself a counterproductive proposition, being that Poland was not sufficiently powerful to deter either of these two potential adversaries from forcing Polands hand if they so desired

Sir, it takes little to imagine where “favouring” one or another would lead to. Option A: Germany takes over the Corridor, Wartheland and Silesia, reducing Poland to a buffer state. Option B: Poland ehtusiastically joins the free family of Soviet nations.

antagonize possible allies by pursuing an aggressive foreign ploicy

aggressive foreign policy… you mean Poland had designs on Dresden, Hamburg and Munich? Or maybe it planned an offensive against the USSR and intended to capture Moscow?

If Poland had followed a path of gaining powerful allies

It actually had. Do you doubt that France and the UK were “powerful”, or do you rather doubt they were “allies”?

If Polish Foreign Miniter Jozef Beck had adopted a more conventional approach in protecting his countries interest it might have been possible for Poland to have tilted the balance of power in Europe

Poland tilting the balance of power… gosh, and they say we the subhumans have a grandeur mania …

Let's take the possible position that Beck had allowed the USSR access to Czechoslovakia through Polish territory when Hitler was threatening the Czechs and Slovaks prior to Munich

The Soviets were not prepared and acutally unwilling to help CSRS, and the Poles knew that. The Poles would have never allowed the Soviets through, and Moscow knew that. The whole offer was nothing more that a Soviet marketing. Pretty much efficient, since your post proves how long some myths can hold.

Or let's be more realistic…

Hard to believe that knowing all we know about the Nazis, their designs and their attiture, some people still seem to live in 1939 and believe that just this one concession (Rheinland, Memel, Sudetenland, Bohmen, Corridor) and Mr Hitler and his boys would eventually settle down.

Since we know that Beck did neither of these things it can be argued, with considerable correctness, that Becks stubborness led to the eventual clash with Germany for which Poland and most of Europe had to suffer considerable agony

Yes, it really takes a fool to defend your country against an aggression, instead of handing a half of it to the aggressor for the sake of suiting European interests, even if these interests had been indeed about feeding Mr Hitler with one meal after another

[sid guttridge]

Hi 4444,

So, in essence, are you suggesting that, regardless of the lack of usefulness to another contracting party or the number of casualties to be endured to no purpose, a state has an absolute obligation to commit national suicide simply because at some time in the past it has undertaken to do something that changed circumstances have made completely redundant?

Cheers,

Sid.

[sid guttridge]

Hi Der Untermensch,

I think there is a case to be made that the Poles did not adopt the most pragmatic diplomatic course in the 1930s and that they both helped to give Hitler a free hand and on occasion rode on his coat tails.

In 1934 Poland signed a ten treaty with Germany that relieved Hitler from having to watch his back when confronting France.

In March 1938 Poland became the first country to replace its ambassador in Vienna with a consul and give the Anschluss de facto recognition, weeks before any plebiscite to test Austrian popular will.

Then, still in March, while the world was still focused on Austria, Poland issued an ultimatum to Lithuania over border recognition and threatened war, even though the League of Nations supported the Lithuanian position.

Then, during the Munich Crisis in September 1938 Poland not only allowed Gemany to withdraw all its divisions from the Polish border but mobilised a corps opposite Czech Tesin/Teschen, which obliged the Czechs to divert a corps of their own away from the German border. In other words, in military terms, Poland's actions took a corps out of the potential Allied order of battle during the Munich crisis.

Furthermore, whether the USSR really intended to help the Czechs at the time of Munich or not, Poland still refused passage to the Red Army.

Then, in the days after Munich, Poland annexed Tesin/Teschen off the weakened Czechs and several enclaves off the Slovaks.

Thus, by the time Hitler illegally renounced the 1934 treaty in early 1939, Poland had not only alienated Germany and the USSR, but Lithuania and Slovakia as well.

Finally, Poland refused even to consider using the almost entirely German-populated city of Danzig, which was not then even part of Poland but under League of Nations mandate, as a bargaining counter to avert war.

I am not here discussing whether Poland was right or wrong in any of the above cases.

What I am here questioning is whether Poland's policy was wise and in its own best interest between 1934 and 1939?

Cheers,

Sid.

[Der Untermensch]

Well done, Sir. A nice collection of cases.

In 1934 Poland signed a ten treaty with Germany that relieved Hitler from having to watch his back when confronting France .

A very bad example. I am not sure whether you know Poland approached France regarding a preventive war against Germany. Only once Paris had turned it down, the Poles sealed the deal with the Germans. Unless you expect the poor subhumans the invade Germany single-handedly for the sake of defending France, even against Marianne’s will.

In March 1938 Poland became the first country to replace its ambassador in Vienna with a consul and give the Anschluss de facto recognition, weeks before any plebiscite to test Austrian popular will.

An acceptable example, though little or no practical impact. If you were to judge rights or wrongs (which you say you are not doing) that would be a shame.

Then, still in March, while the world was still focused on Austria, Poland issued an ultimatum to Lithuania over border recognition and threatened war, even though the League of Nations supported the Lithuanian position.

Again, acceptable, though with little or no practical impact. The League of Nations reference is not correct, I am afraid. Please advise how the League was involved.

Then, during the Munich Crisis in September 1938 Poland not only allowed Gemany to withdraw all its divisions from the Polish border but mobilised a corps opposite Czech Tesin/Teschen, which obliged the Czechs to divert a corps of their own away from the German border. In other words, in military terms, Poland's actions took a corps out of the potential Allied order of battle during the Munich crisis.

As above. A disgrace and shame in moral terms, little or no impact in practice.

Furthermore, whether the USSR really intended to help the Czechs at the time of Munich or not, Poland still refused passage to the Red Army.

A rather bad example. Playing Polish tricks as a response to the Soviet tricks would merely rock the boat, while Mr Chancellor Hitler would have done his duty anyway.

Then, in the days after Munich, Poland annexed Tesin/Teschen off the weakened Czechs and several enclaves off the Slovaks.

Acceptable, though little or no practical impact. In terms of rights and wrongs, one of the darkest hours in our history.

Thus, by the time Hitler illegally renounced the 1934 treaty in early 1939, Poland had not only alienated Germany and the USSR, but Lithuania and Slovakia as well.

Acceptable. In terms of praxis, no impact at all. As to Poland "alienating" Germany and the USSR, maybe I will take the pleasure the deal with this later on.

Finally, Poland refused even to consider using the almost entirely German-populated city of Danzig, which was not then even part of Poland but under League of Nations mandate, as a bargaining counter to avert war.

A very bad example. Sir, do you believe the invasion of Poland was about Danzig? Do you know Mr Chancellor Hitler orderd his General Staff to prepare Fall Weiss in the spring of 1939, stating clearly that we the subhumans should be turned into slaves and our state wiped out from the map for ever, Danzig or no Danzig?

I am not here discussing whether Poland was right or wrong in any of the above cases. What I am here questioning is whether Poland's policy was wise and in its own best interest between 1934 and 1939?

This discussion has been going on among us the subhumans for some 65 years, with tonnes of papers and hectolitres of ink used. Unfortunately, the conclusion has not been announced in the Official Gazette yet. I think your advice might prove decisive in this debate.