THE EASTERN-PRUSSIAN OPERATION, 1945

[Igorn]

Marko,

I found some more information, which might be interesting for you.

From the memoirs of General Pavel Batov, Commander of the Russian 65th Army: “…German retreat from Pultutsk weakened resistance of their units confronting the center of our main grouping. By the evening of January 15th, 1945 The Don Tank Corps was engaged into breakthrough but we had to change his mission. On the left flank, tanks of the German 7th Tank Division showed up again. Michail Panov, the Corps commander, turned his Tank brigades to the south and at the railroad to the east of Plonsk engaged his forces into combat with German tanks, which included Tiger and Panthers. The enemy hastily retreated to Torun and moved to the sector of our 70th Army. Retreating German units tried to hold our forces on the Vkra River, where there was tactically suitable line with heights along the western bank of the river. Germans managed to hold till noon of January 16th when our divisional artillery and assault guns were pulled out…”

From the http://www.battlefield.ru/isu122_152.html

"...The first large scale usage of the new assault guns was in summer 1944 during the Soviet offensive "Bagration", where at least 14 OTSAPs (Heavy Self-Propelled Artillery Regiments) were involved. Soon, these guns achieved the honor of very effective weapon against German "Tigers" and "Panthers". For example, in summer 1944, the half of the 502th Pz Abt (6 vehicles out 12 total) was destroyed by ISU's gun fire. Often those Heavy Self-Propelled Artillery Regiments used together with tanks and infantry and supported their attacks. Usually, those ISU's become the main defensive weapon during sudden German counter-attacks.

For example, on January 15, 1945, in East Prussia near the Brove town, Germans launched a counter-attack against the Soviet infantry that was supported by 390th Guards OTSAP (Heavy Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment). Soviet infantry retreated behind the regiment's positions. The regiment opened a direct fire. Many of the German AFVs were destroyed and most of German solders were killed. The counter-attack failed..."


Best Regards from Russia,

[Michate]

...In fact, it is even directly contradicted by other information posted by Igorn himself - the passage from Glantz which states that the losses in both the EP and Vistula-Oder operations "exceeded 660,000". cheers

I refer you to the David Glantz's book, When Titans Clashed, 1995. "...Then in less than two months, German defenses in Poland and East Prussia were torn asunder, and Soviet forces advanced up to 700 kilometers to the west, to within 60 kilometers of Berlin. In the process, German Army Groups A and Center were decimated... These catastrophic defeats lost Germany much of the industry that had been dispersed in Poland to shield it from Allied bombing. Moreover, although German losses in these operations were high (in excess of 660,000), replacement and transfers from other theaters caused German troop strength in the East to decline from 2,030,000 to just under 2,000,000 at the end of March. However, 556,000 of these troops were isolated in Courland and East Prussia and were virtually irrelevant to future operations. To make matters worse, the Soviets' 6,461,000 troops could now be concentrated on the most critical axis. For over a third of these forces, the next stop would be Berlin."

Qvist, let’s be candid. David Glantz in his book, When Titans Clashed, wrote about German losses in exess of 660,000 as of the end of March 1945. For your information, the East-Prussian operation lasted till April 25, 1945 and ended with the defeat of Koenigsberg’s and Samland’s groupings. And if you read carefully Glantz, he writes about 556,000 of German troops, which as of end of March 1945 still remained isolated in Courland and East Prussia. This is also not clear whether Glantz included Volksturm losses in his figures.

That means that the German losses in the Konigsberg District and Samland Penisula were not included in the above figure stated by Glantz. On the page 251 of his book, Glantz wrote the following: “… The final battle against Army Group North in early April was an extension of the heavy fighting throughout February and March. It took the form of the final reduction of the Konigsberg Fortress (5-9 April) and the remaining German forces on the Samland Penisula (13-25 April). In the savage fighting at Konigsberg the Soviets have killed 42,000 Germans and to have captured another 92,000. The Samland operation pushed German forces onto the narrow spit of land between the Fischer Haff and the Baltic, where, on 8 May, 22,000 surviving Germans surrendered. (David Glantz & Jonathan House, When Titans Clashed. How the Red Army Stopped Hitler, 1995.)

Best Regards from Russia,

Well, the number of German soldiers in Königsberg was just 30,000 - 35,000, thus the Soviets cannot have killed and captured 134,000.

Glantz just has taken the inflated casualty claims from the same Soviet sources that some members in this forum have so much faith in.

Curiously, next to the soldiers, around 130,000 civilian men, women and children were in Königsberg.

Thus the origin of the inflated figures seems to be simply the inclusion of all civilians captured by the Soviets.

The same seems to be the case for the Soviet prisoner count at Budapest, as one can read in Christian Ungvary: "Stalingrad at the Danube".

[Igorn]

Michate,

If you based your information on the General von Lasch, Koenigsberg’s fortress commandant, who wrote in his book that : “… as far as numerical strength of Koenigsberg’s garrison before commencement of the Russian assault is concerned one can give only approximate figure, because precise data is not available… Numerical strength of military personnel of Koenigsberg’s garrison was approximately 30,000-35,000 men. We have to add on top of that Volksturm… The number of civils varied from 90,000 to 130,000 men…” Lasch v. O. So fiel Konigsberg: Kampf und Untergang von Ostpreussens Hauptstadt. — Munich: Gräfe n.d, 1958. I have to dissapoint you. von Lasch was telling lies. The above passage General von Lasch wrote after war to justify his failure to defend Konigsberg fortress, which fell just in three days. But I would like to refer you to some details of the interrogation of the General Otto von Lasch, Konigsberg Fortress Commandant, conducted on April 10th, 1945 by Colonel Ivanov of the 3rd Belorussian Front published in the appendix of the Russian edition of the von Lasch's book:

Question: “What were the losses of German troops at Konigsberg?”
Von Lasch: “We lost at Konigsberg all our 100,000 grouping. We had about 30,000 wounded and many killed in actions.”
Question: “What is the significance of Konigsberg’s Fortress fall for Germany?”
Von Lasch: “Fall of Konigsberg is the loss of the largest fortress and German outpost on the East. The moral blow on the German population and Army caused by loss of Konigsberg is hard to express. German casualties in personnel and weapon at Konigsberg were very costly for German Army, which now counts every solder. Fall of Konigsberg would expedite the final collapse of all German Army….”

First point. According to Lasch’s book the Konigsberg’s garrison included not 30,000-35,000 solders BUT 30,000_35,000 men PLUS VOLKSTURM.

Second point: According to General von Lasch, as of April 1945, actual German losses at Konigsberg were standing at 100,000 men.

Third point: question regarding basis for figures published by Glantz you should address to David Glantz.

Fourth Point: As far as German defeat in Budapest and their losses there are concerned it’s a subject of a separate thread. I am now studying some good sources on the Battle for Budapest and the Balaton Operation and would be interested to discuss these topics in more details after some time.

Best Regards from Russia,

[Igorn]

200,000 Volkssturm; source? The problem with German statistics in this case is more that there probably aren't any that can give a viable picture of losses, regardless of what is included or not. Police formations and Allegemeine SS is a practically irrelevant element in this connection, numerically speaking, I would think.

Some information for my friend Qvist, defender of the defeated Nazi.

According to Panzer Operations, The Eastern Memoir of German General Erhard Raus, who was commanding General of the German Third Panzer Army in Eastern Prussia: " ...the Nazi party has begun its most ambitious military project: the mobilization of Volkssturm... In East Prussia, however, the Volkssturm did a better job than anywhere else... There the organization and training of the Volssturm made the greatest progress, as thirty-two (32) battalions were raised. All of these remained in East Prussia even when, in November, the civilian population from the northern districts had to be evacuated...Months of continuous instruction raised their standard of training to such a degree that a number of Volkssturm battalions actually managed to carry out limited combat missions... during the latter part of January, whenthe front began to give way, most of the Volkssturm battalions employed in East Prussia proved absolutely useless to the armies defending the province. Wherever they did not disintegrate entirely, they suffered heavy casualties..."

Erhard Raus

Best Regards from Russia,

[Michate]

Well, 32 Volkssturm battaillons would result in a strength of 20,000 rather than 200,000 men.

[Igorn]

Well, 32 Volkssturm battaillons would result in a strength of 20,000 rather than 200,000 men.

Some information in this regard:

".. The Volkssturm was a militia summoned in virtue of a decree of 25 September 1944. The relevant lists were compiled by the local Party organisation, and the officers were appointed largely on grounds ofpolitical reliability by the gauleiters and their subordinate kreisleiters. The size of the Volkssturm ultimately reached 1.5 million, and it is not included in the figures of German forces which have been outlined above..."

Cristopher Duffy, Red Storm on the Reich, The Soviet March on Germany, 1945

And some more info:

"... In October 1944 Hitler had activated the Volkssturm- a home guard-under Party leadership, composed of men 16 to 60 otherwise draft exempt... He had also authorized the "Gneisenau" and "Bluecher" programs whereby some 200,000 men were to be organized into territorial divisions in the eastern military districts..."

OKH, GenStdH, Org. Abt., Kriegstagebuch, 1.10-31.10.1944. 8 Oct 44, H 1/233 file.

Earl F. Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, the German Defeat in the East.

Best Regards from Russia,

[oleg]

Well, 32 Volkssturm battaillons would result in a strength of 20,000 rather than 200,000 men.

was there some kind of defined TOE for the Volkssturm battaillon ?

[oleg]

...In fact, it is even directly contradicted by other information posted by Igorn himself - the passage from Glantz which states that the losses in both the EP and Vistula-Oder operations "exceeded 660,000". cheers

I refer you to the David Glantz's book, When Titans Clashed, 1995. "...Then in less than two months, German defenses in Poland and East Prussia were torn asunder, and Soviet forces advanced up to 700 kilometers to the west, to within 60 kilometers of Berlin. In the process, German Army Groups A and Center were decimated... These catastrophic defeats lost Germany much of the industry that had been dispersed in Poland to shield it from Allied bombing. Moreover, although German losses in these operations were high (in excess of 660,000), replacement and transfers from other theaters caused German troop strength in the East to decline from 2,030,000 to just under 2,000,000 at the end of March. However, 556,000 of these troops were isolated in Courland and East Prussia and were virtually irrelevant to future operations. To make matters worse, the Soviets' 6,461,000 troops could now be concentrated on the most critical axis. For over a third of these forces, the next stop would be Berlin."

Qvist, let’s be candid. David Glantz in his book, When Titans Clashed, wrote about German losses in exess of 660,000 as of the end of March 1945. For your information, the East-Prussian operation lasted till April 25, 1945 and ended with the defeat of Koenigsberg’s and Samland’s groupings. And if you read carefully Glantz, he writes about 556,000 of German troops, which as of end of March 1945 still remained isolated in Courland and East Prussia. This is also not clear whether Glantz included Volksturm losses in his figures.

That means that the German losses in the Konigsberg District and Samland Penisula were not included in the above figure stated by Glantz. On the page 251 of his book, Glantz wrote the following: “… The final battle against Army Group North in early April was an extension of the heavy fighting throughout February and March. It took the form of the final reduction of the Konigsberg Fortress (5-9 April) and the remaining German forces on the Samland Penisula (13-25 April). In the savage fighting at Konigsberg the Soviets have killed 42,000 Germans and to have captured another 92,000. The Samland operation pushed German forces onto the narrow spit of land between the Fischer Haff and the Baltic, where, on 8 May, 22,000 surviving Germans surrendered. (David Glantz & Jonathan House, When Titans Clashed. How the Red Army Stopped Hitler, 1995.)

Best Regards from Russia,

Igorn -general observation by that time German casualties-registering mechanism effectively broke down -so chances are, the figures that Glantz uses are Soviet estimates. And estimates of this kind regardless of origin tend to be excessive. As counter example you might recall German figure for the number of POW captured at Kiev in 1941 – it handsomely surpassed the number of personal that SWF had at the pick of its power.

[Michate]

Well, 32 Volkssturm battaillons would result in a strength of 20,000 rather than 200,000 men.

was there some kind of defined TOE for the Volkssturm battaillon ?

Do not know really. If there was, most probably there would have been quite a difference between theory and practice and wide variations between different battaillons.

But an average battaillon size of 625 men would be plausible IMO. Seidler's "Der deutsche Volkssturm" does have a few numbers abut the Volkssturm raised in Eastern Prussia, but would have to look them up.

Glantz in "When Titans clashed" did indeed use Soviet sources for these figures, IIRC he referred to Rokossovsky (I will look it up).

@ Igorn:

There was a large difference between theoretical and actual size of the Volkssturm. Most men not in the Wehrmacht were assigned to one battaillon but remained at their working stations, after they were registered and perhaps took a few days of training, the battaillons were to be raised when the necessity came, so most battalions were only raised when the enemy armies stood in front of the door and in the West not at all.
Generally Duffy is a nice read but he too relies often on Soviet literature even for his information on the Germans.

[oleg]

The reason I asked was my awareness of the fact that analogical Soviet formations (1941) tend to balloon disproportionately relative to their name. Come to think of it that was the case for most of the Soviet non-linear units. For instance penal Battalions more often than not had TOE of regular infantry regiment and the were some penal companies with up to 1000 men.

[donwhite]

Oleg,

Are there any sources available of the number formed and designations of Soviet Penal units used during WWII? I'm under the impression that these units don't show up in 'Boevoi sostav sovetskoi armii' (Though my understanding of Russian is practically nil!)? I knows Charles Sharp mentions the odd penal unit where it served with a particular rifle division etc.

Cheers

[oleg]

Oleg,

Are there any sources available of the number formed and designations of Soviet Penal units used during WWII? I'm under the impression that these units don't show up in 'Boevoi sostav sovetskoi armii' (Though my understanding of Russian is practically nil!)? I knows Charles Sharp mentions the odd penal unit where it served with a particular rifle division etc.

Cheers

The only official data available to me comes form 2nd edition of Krivosheev book. His numbers of people that went through various penal units are :
1942 – 24993
1943 – 177694
1944 -143457
1945- 81766

427910 –altogether

He gives 1944 as an example. According to the book the number of penal battalions fluctuated form 15 in January to 8 in May . Number of penal companies fluctuated even to the greater degree form 199 to 301. Total losses for 1944 amounted to 170298. The number surpasses the number of people who went through these units because the later does not include permanent personnel. Also casualty number contains records for the people how got sick or wounded more than ones. On average losses among penal units surpassed those of regular ones by the magnitude from 3 to 6 times.

[Igorn]

As a matter of fact, I can tell you how many of these were lightly wounded and returned to their units within a few days - probably none. Krivosheev's figures are based on hospitalisation records, and omit light cases where soldiers stayed with their units. The average time spent by a wounded soldier in hospital was if I remember correctly 79 days...

And now some facts stated in the Christopher Duffy's "Red Storm on the Reich":

"Medical Services: The Soviets applied to shattered human beings the same basic principle which they applied to broken vehicles, that is, they gave their first priority to the units which could be put together with little delay and returned to the front line. In the case of the solders the category of such 'lightly wounded' covered about 40 per cent of all casualties. Medium cases made up 37 per cent, and the severely wounded about 23 per cent. Army by army, the casualties in the tank formations did not differ greatly from one campaign to another:

Losses in Tank Armies:

Vistula-Oder Operation:

1st Guards Tank Army -14.5% (casualties as proportion), 27.0% (proportion of casualties returned to service)
2-nd Guards Tank Army -7.2% (casualties as proportion), 31.5% (proportion of casualties returned to service)
3rd Guards Tank Army -8.7% (casualties as proportion), 24.0% (proportion of casualties returned to service)

East Prussian Operation:

5th Gurads Tank Army - 17.5% (casualties as proportion), 24.0% (proportion of casualties returned to service)
Christopher Duffy's, Red Storm on the Reich. The Soviet March on Germany, 1945, London, 2001, PP.350-351.

Best Regards from Russia,

[Igorn]

You assume that a large part of the tank losses were in reality minor repairs, without any basis for it and without any reference to either the source providing the figure or normal Soviet reporting practices for tank losses.

And now reality and facts:

"... On 11 November 1944 STAVKA put all the facilities for mechanical repair under unified command, a measure which increased their productivity by 50 per cent. A significant role was played by the recovery tractors and workshops of the damaged vehicle assembly points(SPAMS), which attended to running repairs. The more difficult cases were left for repair at the army, corps or Front level. The results were quite remarkable. In the first six days of the Vistula-Order Operation, The Eight Guards Army had a total of 159 tanks and assault guns disabled, but only 71 of them permanently inoperable. In January 1945 as a whole the 1-st Belorussian Front carried out 3,786 successful repairs of tanks and assault guns, and the 1st Ukrainian Front 4,267. This means that many of the vehicles were patched up more than once..."

Christopher Duffy, Red Storm on the Reich. The Soviet March on Germany, 1945, London 2001, P. 349

Best Regards from Russia,

[Michate]

Igorn,

Duffy has quoted data that a certain share of soldiers returned to service, which is no secret and basically at the same line as Krivosheev, (and I do happen to have some similar data for German wounded who returned to service).

As to the tank repair, Duffy gives roughly 8,000 repaired AFVs while Krivosheev lists losses as 1267.

I do not know much about Soviet loss reporting practice, but there is at least a reasonable chance that Krivosheev gives those losses of tanks which were not repaired or only at the factories in the rear area.

Will come back to the Volkssturm question but have to go to library to get the books, will take some days time.