Hi Rich,
I wrote of a "virtual", not an absolute, Allied monopoly of air power. I have no figures availabe but I suspect that while the Germans may have been putting up a daily average of 300-400 sorties a day, Allied sorties were averaging in the many thousands. (On D-Day itself the figure of 20,000 Allied sorties sticks in the mind for some reason, although this is doubtless far above the average) This then leads on to which sorties count as fire support, etc......
Whilst I have no reason to disagree with your analysis of the naval gun fire support, I would point out that whatever importance is attached to it as a factor in ground fighting falls 100% on the Allied side and is a genuine monopoly.
I haven't got any army projectile weights with me but I have some British naval gun projectile weights for those in a position to make comparisons:
16" - 2,461lbs
15" - 1,929lbs
14" - 1,560lbs
8" - 256lbs
6" - 100lbs
4.7" - 45lbs.
Cheers,
Sid.
P.S. For continentals 1lb = O.454Kgs.
Ambrose vs Zitterling ?
Moderator: John W. Howard
-
sid guttridge
- on "time out"
- Posts: 8055
- Joined: Thu Oct 10, 2002 4:54 am
maps
Sid,
I dont think maps would have been useful in Zetterlings books as he is not giving a precis of the campaign but a review of who , how many and what part they were able to play in the fighting, and their ability to make an efficient contribution when engaged. I myself find some maps a hinderance & prefer to have a wall hanger to refer to
The thing that struck me was that woefull inadiquacy of German transport arrangements and that of the 10 Divisions available for action only 4 were in any condition to meet the Allies at anything like full strength, and one of those was left in limbo for three days.
As to Dr Forczyk he has spent an inordanate amount of time slamming Osprey books which to me seems a waste of intelect !!
Dan
I dont think maps would have been useful in Zetterlings books as he is not giving a precis of the campaign but a review of who , how many and what part they were able to play in the fighting, and their ability to make an efficient contribution when engaged. I myself find some maps a hinderance & prefer to have a wall hanger to refer to
The thing that struck me was that woefull inadiquacy of German transport arrangements and that of the 10 Divisions available for action only 4 were in any condition to meet the Allies at anything like full strength, and one of those was left in limbo for three days.
As to Dr Forczyk he has spent an inordanate amount of time slamming Osprey books which to me seems a waste of intelect !!
Dan
-
sid guttridge
- on "time out"
- Posts: 8055
- Joined: Thu Oct 10, 2002 4:54 am
Hi Guys,
I have done a few quick calculations on the number of field guns the broadside of British warships were equivalent to:
15" Battleships with 8 Guns = 296 25pdr/105mm or 74 5.5" or 155mm field guns.
8" Crusers with 6-8 Guns = 60-80 25pdr/105mm or 15-20 5.5" or 155mm field guns.
6" Cruisers with 6-9 Guns = 24-36 25pdr/105mm or 6-8 5.5" or 155mm field guns.
4.7" Destroyers with 4-6 Guns = 8-12 25pdr/105mm or 2-3 5.5" or 155mm field guns.
To put it more crudely, in terms of weight of a single salvo:
A destroyer was roughly equivalent to a light field gun battalion or a medium field gun battery.
A 6" cruiser was roughly equivalent to 2-3 light field gun battalions or half a battalion of medium artillery.
An 8" cruiser was roughly equivalent to a couple of regiments of light field artillery or half a regiment of medium field artillery.
A 15" battleship was roughly equivalent to about five regiments of light field artillery or a couple of regiments of medium field artillery.
Of course this would all bear double checking and begs a lot of questions.
Cheers,
Sid.
I have done a few quick calculations on the number of field guns the broadside of British warships were equivalent to:
15" Battleships with 8 Guns = 296 25pdr/105mm or 74 5.5" or 155mm field guns.
8" Crusers with 6-8 Guns = 60-80 25pdr/105mm or 15-20 5.5" or 155mm field guns.
6" Cruisers with 6-9 Guns = 24-36 25pdr/105mm or 6-8 5.5" or 155mm field guns.
4.7" Destroyers with 4-6 Guns = 8-12 25pdr/105mm or 2-3 5.5" or 155mm field guns.
To put it more crudely, in terms of weight of a single salvo:
A destroyer was roughly equivalent to a light field gun battalion or a medium field gun battery.
A 6" cruiser was roughly equivalent to 2-3 light field gun battalions or half a battalion of medium artillery.
An 8" cruiser was roughly equivalent to a couple of regiments of light field artillery or half a regiment of medium field artillery.
A 15" battleship was roughly equivalent to about five regiments of light field artillery or a couple of regiments of medium field artillery.
Of course this would all bear double checking and begs a lot of questions.
Cheers,
Sid.
Dan,I dont think maps would have been useful in Zetterlings books as he is not giving a precis of the campaign but a review of who , how many and what part they were able to play in the fighting, and their ability to make an efficient contribution when engaged
I assume that you have read Zetterling's book in the meantime. I am researching the 326. ID (later VGD) and was considering this book, however the review by Dr. Forczyk somewhat concerned me.
How much detail is there in respect to the divisional level and below? Is there an easy way to identify references to specific units?
Thanks for your comments.
Cheers,
Christian
Sid, I said I was quibbling...sid guttridge wrote:Hi Guys,
All well and good and all, but it still ignores the real world rate-of-fire, ammunition and range restrictions the naval guns were subject to.I have done a few quick calculations on the number of field guns the broadside of British warships were equivalent to:
For example, let us assume a sustained ROF of about two rounds per minute and a total of roughly 1,200 rounds in the magazines (okay, so I'm too lazy to look up Warspite - which was absent one turret anyway15" Battleships with 8 Guns = 296 25pdr/105mm or 74 5.5" or 155mm field guns.
). So the four turrets may actually fire for a sustained 75 minutes or so. Now if we assume an effective range of about 27,000 meters, then while sitting offshore the battleship may engage targets, allowing for about a 1,000 meter safety zone, that are about 18,000 meters inland, which in terms of the shoalwater off the mouth of the Orne, means that they were barely in range to shoot on a line roughly Hubert-Folie - Soliers - Frenouville. So they were quite important in breaking up the attacks by 12.SS-Panzer and 21 Panzer during the first week, but were of steadily lesser value as the campaign stretched on.Frankly, give me the 296 field pieces.
Total tactical and interdiction sorties by Eighth and Ninth Air Forces forD-Day week (6-12 June) were 10,686 or an average of about 1,527 per day. Even adding in an assumed equivalent number of RAF sorties (probably a high estimates) and you only have about an 8 to 10-to-1 advantage for the Allies. But somewhere I've got the figures and breakdown for the D-Day sorties themselves, I'll try to dig them out.sid guttridge wrote:Hi Rich,
I wrote of a "virtual", not an absolute, Allied monopoly of air power. I have no figures availabe but I suspect that while the Germans may have been putting up a daily average of 300-400 sorties a day, Allied sorties were averaging in the many thousands.
But again - remember - I'm quibbling....
Ration Strength of AOK 7 as of 1 June 1944
The ration strength of AOK 7 was given in some detail in the monthly report of the Armeeintendant dated 5 June 1944. The units reported and the organization of the army was:
XXV AK – 265.ID, 275.ID, 343.ID, and 353.ID.
LXXIV AK – 77.ID and 266.ID.
LXXXIV AK – 91.ID, 243.ID, 319,ID, 352.ID, 709.ID, and 716.ID.
II FJK – 3.FJD and 5.FJD.
21.PzD.
The numerical strengths by category were:
Units of the:
1). Heer (Army) – 169,344 and 38,139 horses
2). SS-u.Polizei im Wehrmachteinsatz (SS and Police units under armed forces control) – 716
3). Luftwaffe (Air Force) – 39,827
4). Marine (Navy) – 4,900
5). Ausl.Freiwillige getrennt nach Neutralität (foreign volunteers, according to treaties of neutrality) – 10,773
6). Angehorige verbünd. Mächte getrennt nach Nationalitäten (personnel of allied powers, according to nationality) – 583
7). Organization Todt – 36,779
. Reichs Arbeits Dienst (National Labor Service) – 1,490
9). Sonst.Reichsdeutsche Wehrmachte Gefolge u.a. (miscellaneous ethnic Germans including civilian camp followers and so on) – 1,152
10). Nichtsreichsdeutsche Gefolge u.a. (non-German civilian camp followers, including those of the OT and RAD) – 5,003
11). Kriegsgefangene (prisoners of war) – 1,159
12). Internierte (civilian internees) – 635
Also the following troops of the army (including both Heer and SS) were supplied by the food services of the Military Command in France:
13). Southwest Region – 14,262 and 1,718 horses
14). Northwest Region – 24,494 and 1,257 horses
It is noted that the basic changes since the last report (1 April) was to the strengths of the Heer (+46,757) and Luftwaffe (16,327). That was due to the arrival of reinforcements to divisions and the arrival of 91.ID and II FJK with 5.FJD. These figures may be compared to the total of the Heer divisional strengths as follows:
77.ID (1 June) – 9,095 + 1,410 HiWi 6
91.ID (est.) – 7,500 (number of HiWi unknown) 6
243.ID (1 May) – 11,529 + at least 442 HiWi – 8
265.ID (1 June) – 9,385 + 341 HiWi 6
266.ID (1 March) – 8,852 (number of HiWi unknown) 6
275.ID (1 June) – 10,768 + 1,560 HiWi 6
319.ID (1 June) – 12,276 (including HiWi?) 8
343.ID (1 June) – 11,021 (including HiWi?) 6
352.ID (1 March) – 12,734 + at least 335 HiWi 6
353.ID (1 June) – 11,544 + 1,786 HiWi 6
709.ID (1 May) – 12,320 + 333 HiWi 8
716.ID (1 May) – 7,771 (including HiWi?) 6
21.PzD (1 June) – 16,297 (number of HiWi unknown)
Total = 141,092 and at least 6,207 HiWi
Thus, divisional troops comprised about 67.8 percent of the 208,100 Heer (lines 1, 13 and 14 above, which may include a small number of SS) German troops in 7.AOK. HiWi account for more than 54.7 percent of the 11,356 foreign “volunteers” (lines 5 and 6 above) and in fact all of the “volunteers” may have been HiWi, the Osttruppen appear to have been counted simply as Heer in line 1. This would mean that the “non-HiWi” divisional total was 135,934 or 65.3 percent of the Heer total. The 24 battalions (note that there were only 78 “German” divisional grenadier battalions in the army, not including 21.Pz.Div.) and one battery of Ostruppen – with their attachment and alternate designation where known – were:
I./Gren.Regt.Ost-Mitte (275.ID)
II./Gren.Regt.Ost-Mitte (343.ID)
III./Gren.Regt.Ost-Mitte (266.ID – IV./GrenRegt.897)
Ost-Reiter-Abt.281 (AOK 7, engaged in anti-Partisan operations)
Ost-Radf.Btl.285 (265.ID)
Ost-Btl.439 (716.ID – IV./Gren.Regt.726)
Ost-Btl.441 (716.ID)
Ost-Btl.561 (709.ID, but attached to 243.ID)
Ost-Battr.582 (77.ID)
Ost-Btl.602 (AOK 7, engaged in anti-Partisan operations)
Ost-Btl.627 (77.ID)
Ost-Btl.629 (266.ID – IV./Gren.Regt.899)
Ost-Btl.633 (343.ID)
Ost-Btl.634 (265.ID)
Ost-Btl.635 (Gren.Regt.z.b.V.752)
Ost-Btl.636 (265.ID, minus 2 Kpn. attached to 275.ID)
Ost-Btl.642 (716.ID – IV./Gren.Regt.736))
Ost-Btl.643 (319.ID – IV./Gren.Regt.582)
Ost-Btl.649 (709.ID)
Ost-Btl.752 (275.ID)
Ost-Btl.795 (709.ID)
Ost-Btl.797 (709.ID – I./Gren.Regt.739, but Stab, 1., 3., and 4. Kp. were attached to Gren.Regt.z.b.V.752 and 2.Kp. to 243.ID)
Ost-Btl.798 (275.ID)
Ost-Btl.800 (265.ID)
Ost-Btl.823 (319.ID – IV./Gren.Regt.583)
Non-divisional “combat” troops of AOK 7 included (amongst others):
II./Sich.Regt.195 (1 April) – 559 and 28 HiWi (attached to the Versorgungstruppen LXXXIV AK)
II./Sich.Regt.521 (Gren.Regt.z.b.V.752)
H.K.A.Regt.1261 (709.ID)
H.K.A.Regt.1261 (243.ID)
H.K.A.Regt.1265 (319.ID)
Art.Abt.456 (est.) - 400 (Art.Regt.z.b.V.621 – 91.ID)
Art.Abt.457 (est.) – 400 (Art.Regt.z.b.V.621 – 91.ID)
Art.Abt.989 (est.) – 400 (716.ID)
E-Battr.722 – included with LXXXIV AK below
Beob.Btl.33 (243.ID)
Stell.Werf.Regt.101 (est.) – 1,200 (243.ID, I Abt. With 709.ID)
Sch.Brig.30 (18 May) – 1,878 (Radf.Btl.513, 517, and 518)
MG.Btl.16 (319.ID)
MG.Btl.17 (1 May) – 632 (243.ID)
Fest.Stamm-Trp. (18 May) – 7,452 + about 800 Kriegesmarine
Pi.Btl.Angers (6 June) – 322 + 111 HiWi
Sturm-Btl.AOK 7 (5 April) - 1,106 (709.ID)
Pz.A.u.E.Abt.100 (18 May) – 664 (91.ID)
Pz.Abt.206 (1 April) – 385 (243.ID)
Pz.Abt.213 (319.ID)
Total = 15,398+ at least 139 HiWi
These non-divisional troops amount to about 7.4 percent more of the Heer troop total, accounting for a total of 75.2 percent of the total Heer troops in AOK 7. That would indicate that nearly 25 percent were support and headquarters troops. This is much higher than the 16 percent estimated by Niklas Zetterling for German non-combat support personnel in Ob.West as a whole. Furthermore, we may also take the totals of lines 1, 5, 6, 13, and 14, which represent all of the combat and support “troops” of AOK 7 and compare it against the totals found in the divisional and non-divisional combat troops, including HiWi. In other words, the 162,836 “combat” troops made up about 74.2 percent of the total of 219,456. In addition, although the 44,424 “troops” included in lines 7, 8, 9, and 10 were mainly occupied in the construction and maintenance of installations and fortifications in France, they also provided at least part of the support infrastructure for AOK 7.
Known headquarters unit strengths were:
XXV AK (1 April) – 90 (partial, only includes Fest.Kdtr. Brest, L’Orient and St. Nazaire)
LXXIV AK (1 April) – 583
LXXXIV AK (1 April) – 1,185
Luftwaffe strength included:
II FJ Korps (17 May) – 3,363
3.FJD (22 May) – 17,420
5.FJD (22 May) – 12,836
6.FJ-Regt. (19 May) – 3,457 (91.ID)
Total = 37,076
This accounts for about 93.1 percent of the 39,827 Luftwaffe (line 3). It is possible that the remaining 2,751 were part of II./FJ-Ers.u.Ausb.Regt.1 (6., 7., 8., 9., 10., and 21. Kp.) and FJ-Ers.u.Ausb.Regt.2, which were also in the area.
One of the odder units included in the AOK 7 order-of-battle was identified as:
SS-Geolag. (or Geblag.) Batl. (or Batt. or Batr.) – the writing on the charts is very indistinct – attached to 77.ID. They obviously comprise part of the total of the 716 under line 2. But what the unit may be is a mystery to me. Anybody?
You can see that overall the numbers of Osttruppen probably were as much as 20-25 percent of the total infantry strength of the army (not including panzergrenadier, fusiliers or radfahrer). And HiWi were probably about the same proportion of the total divisional and army "support" services.
It is also interesting to note the possible decline in the strength of OT-truppen from 73,965 on 15 February to the 41,782 given above. However it is difficult to determine what exactly is included in the above, since the February totals were broken down according to OT-Stab, OT-Firmen, Schutzkommando, NSKK, Deutsche OT-Arbeiter, and Auesland OT-Arbeiter and it is difficult to tell whether or not all of those would have been drawing on AOK 7 for rations.
Anyway - enjoy.
Rich
The ration strength of AOK 7 was given in some detail in the monthly report of the Armeeintendant dated 5 June 1944. The units reported and the organization of the army was:
XXV AK – 265.ID, 275.ID, 343.ID, and 353.ID.
LXXIV AK – 77.ID and 266.ID.
LXXXIV AK – 91.ID, 243.ID, 319,ID, 352.ID, 709.ID, and 716.ID.
II FJK – 3.FJD and 5.FJD.
21.PzD.
The numerical strengths by category were:
Units of the:
1). Heer (Army) – 169,344 and 38,139 horses
2). SS-u.Polizei im Wehrmachteinsatz (SS and Police units under armed forces control) – 716
3). Luftwaffe (Air Force) – 39,827
4). Marine (Navy) – 4,900
5). Ausl.Freiwillige getrennt nach Neutralität (foreign volunteers, according to treaties of neutrality) – 10,773
6). Angehorige verbünd. Mächte getrennt nach Nationalitäten (personnel of allied powers, according to nationality) – 583
7). Organization Todt – 36,779
. Reichs Arbeits Dienst (National Labor Service) – 1,4909). Sonst.Reichsdeutsche Wehrmachte Gefolge u.a. (miscellaneous ethnic Germans including civilian camp followers and so on) – 1,152
10). Nichtsreichsdeutsche Gefolge u.a. (non-German civilian camp followers, including those of the OT and RAD) – 5,003
11). Kriegsgefangene (prisoners of war) – 1,159
12). Internierte (civilian internees) – 635
Also the following troops of the army (including both Heer and SS) were supplied by the food services of the Military Command in France:
13). Southwest Region – 14,262 and 1,718 horses
14). Northwest Region – 24,494 and 1,257 horses
It is noted that the basic changes since the last report (1 April) was to the strengths of the Heer (+46,757) and Luftwaffe (16,327). That was due to the arrival of reinforcements to divisions and the arrival of 91.ID and II FJK with 5.FJD. These figures may be compared to the total of the Heer divisional strengths as follows:
77.ID (1 June) – 9,095 + 1,410 HiWi 6
91.ID (est.) – 7,500 (number of HiWi unknown) 6
243.ID (1 May) – 11,529 + at least 442 HiWi – 8
265.ID (1 June) – 9,385 + 341 HiWi 6
266.ID (1 March) – 8,852 (number of HiWi unknown) 6
275.ID (1 June) – 10,768 + 1,560 HiWi 6
319.ID (1 June) – 12,276 (including HiWi?) 8
343.ID (1 June) – 11,021 (including HiWi?) 6
352.ID (1 March) – 12,734 + at least 335 HiWi 6
353.ID (1 June) – 11,544 + 1,786 HiWi 6
709.ID (1 May) – 12,320 + 333 HiWi 8
716.ID (1 May) – 7,771 (including HiWi?) 6
21.PzD (1 June) – 16,297 (number of HiWi unknown)
Total = 141,092 and at least 6,207 HiWi
Thus, divisional troops comprised about 67.8 percent of the 208,100 Heer (lines 1, 13 and 14 above, which may include a small number of SS) German troops in 7.AOK. HiWi account for more than 54.7 percent of the 11,356 foreign “volunteers” (lines 5 and 6 above) and in fact all of the “volunteers” may have been HiWi, the Osttruppen appear to have been counted simply as Heer in line 1. This would mean that the “non-HiWi” divisional total was 135,934 or 65.3 percent of the Heer total. The 24 battalions (note that there were only 78 “German” divisional grenadier battalions in the army, not including 21.Pz.Div.) and one battery of Ostruppen – with their attachment and alternate designation where known – were:
I./Gren.Regt.Ost-Mitte (275.ID)
II./Gren.Regt.Ost-Mitte (343.ID)
III./Gren.Regt.Ost-Mitte (266.ID – IV./GrenRegt.897)
Ost-Reiter-Abt.281 (AOK 7, engaged in anti-Partisan operations)
Ost-Radf.Btl.285 (265.ID)
Ost-Btl.439 (716.ID – IV./Gren.Regt.726)
Ost-Btl.441 (716.ID)
Ost-Btl.561 (709.ID, but attached to 243.ID)
Ost-Battr.582 (77.ID)
Ost-Btl.602 (AOK 7, engaged in anti-Partisan operations)
Ost-Btl.627 (77.ID)
Ost-Btl.629 (266.ID – IV./Gren.Regt.899)
Ost-Btl.633 (343.ID)
Ost-Btl.634 (265.ID)
Ost-Btl.635 (Gren.Regt.z.b.V.752)
Ost-Btl.636 (265.ID, minus 2 Kpn. attached to 275.ID)
Ost-Btl.642 (716.ID – IV./Gren.Regt.736))
Ost-Btl.643 (319.ID – IV./Gren.Regt.582)
Ost-Btl.649 (709.ID)
Ost-Btl.752 (275.ID)
Ost-Btl.795 (709.ID)
Ost-Btl.797 (709.ID – I./Gren.Regt.739, but Stab, 1., 3., and 4. Kp. were attached to Gren.Regt.z.b.V.752 and 2.Kp. to 243.ID)
Ost-Btl.798 (275.ID)
Ost-Btl.800 (265.ID)
Ost-Btl.823 (319.ID – IV./Gren.Regt.583)
Non-divisional “combat” troops of AOK 7 included (amongst others):
II./Sich.Regt.195 (1 April) – 559 and 28 HiWi (attached to the Versorgungstruppen LXXXIV AK)
II./Sich.Regt.521 (Gren.Regt.z.b.V.752)
H.K.A.Regt.1261 (709.ID)
H.K.A.Regt.1261 (243.ID)
H.K.A.Regt.1265 (319.ID)
Art.Abt.456 (est.) - 400 (Art.Regt.z.b.V.621 – 91.ID)
Art.Abt.457 (est.) – 400 (Art.Regt.z.b.V.621 – 91.ID)
Art.Abt.989 (est.) – 400 (716.ID)
E-Battr.722 – included with LXXXIV AK below
Beob.Btl.33 (243.ID)
Stell.Werf.Regt.101 (est.) – 1,200 (243.ID, I Abt. With 709.ID)
Sch.Brig.30 (18 May) – 1,878 (Radf.Btl.513, 517, and 518)
MG.Btl.16 (319.ID)
MG.Btl.17 (1 May) – 632 (243.ID)
Fest.Stamm-Trp. (18 May) – 7,452 + about 800 Kriegesmarine
Pi.Btl.Angers (6 June) – 322 + 111 HiWi
Sturm-Btl.AOK 7 (5 April) - 1,106 (709.ID)
Pz.A.u.E.Abt.100 (18 May) – 664 (91.ID)
Pz.Abt.206 (1 April) – 385 (243.ID)
Pz.Abt.213 (319.ID)
Total = 15,398+ at least 139 HiWi
These non-divisional troops amount to about 7.4 percent more of the Heer troop total, accounting for a total of 75.2 percent of the total Heer troops in AOK 7. That would indicate that nearly 25 percent were support and headquarters troops. This is much higher than the 16 percent estimated by Niklas Zetterling for German non-combat support personnel in Ob.West as a whole. Furthermore, we may also take the totals of lines 1, 5, 6, 13, and 14, which represent all of the combat and support “troops” of AOK 7 and compare it against the totals found in the divisional and non-divisional combat troops, including HiWi. In other words, the 162,836 “combat” troops made up about 74.2 percent of the total of 219,456. In addition, although the 44,424 “troops” included in lines 7, 8, 9, and 10 were mainly occupied in the construction and maintenance of installations and fortifications in France, they also provided at least part of the support infrastructure for AOK 7.
Known headquarters unit strengths were:
XXV AK (1 April) – 90 (partial, only includes Fest.Kdtr. Brest, L’Orient and St. Nazaire)
LXXIV AK (1 April) – 583
LXXXIV AK (1 April) – 1,185
Luftwaffe strength included:
II FJ Korps (17 May) – 3,363
3.FJD (22 May) – 17,420
5.FJD (22 May) – 12,836
6.FJ-Regt. (19 May) – 3,457 (91.ID)
Total = 37,076
This accounts for about 93.1 percent of the 39,827 Luftwaffe (line 3). It is possible that the remaining 2,751 were part of II./FJ-Ers.u.Ausb.Regt.1 (6., 7., 8., 9., 10., and 21. Kp.) and FJ-Ers.u.Ausb.Regt.2, which were also in the area.
One of the odder units included in the AOK 7 order-of-battle was identified as:
SS-Geolag. (or Geblag.) Batl. (or Batt. or Batr.) – the writing on the charts is very indistinct – attached to 77.ID. They obviously comprise part of the total of the 716 under line 2. But what the unit may be is a mystery to me. Anybody?
You can see that overall the numbers of Osttruppen probably were as much as 20-25 percent of the total infantry strength of the army (not including panzergrenadier, fusiliers or radfahrer). And HiWi were probably about the same proportion of the total divisional and army "support" services.
It is also interesting to note the possible decline in the strength of OT-truppen from 73,965 on 15 February to the 41,782 given above. However it is difficult to determine what exactly is included in the above, since the February totals were broken down according to OT-Stab, OT-Firmen, Schutzkommando, NSKK, Deutsche OT-Arbeiter, and Auesland OT-Arbeiter and it is difficult to tell whether or not all of those would have been drawing on AOK 7 for rations.
Anyway - enjoy.
Rich
Hi Sid
Yes he is, I guess.
Basically this is a book that discusses aspects of the Normandy campaign, not a conventional history of it. Incidentally, Zetterling has co-written a more conventional sort of campaign history with Anders Tamelander, but as far as I know it is only available in Swedish.
cheers
YesIs Zetterling really without any maps?
No - so it's probably just as well that he doesn't give any sort of campaign descriptionIs it possible to give an adequate campaign description without resort to maps?
Is Forczyk not at least right that Zetterling's is not a book for beginners?
Yes he is, I guess.
Basically this is a book that discusses aspects of the Normandy campaign, not a conventional history of it. Incidentally, Zetterling has co-written a more conventional sort of campaign history with Anders Tamelander, but as far as I know it is only available in Swedish.
cheers
There's about a page and a half about 326. ID, which is fairly typical, though some units, notably some of the Panzer Divisions, gets more space. The level of detail varies, according, apparently, to how much information was found. The units section of the book covers almost 300 pages, and are split into GHQ Artillery formations (down to independent batallions), misc. GHQ formations, GHQ Panzer formations, Infanterie-Divisionen and Panzer-Divisionen - each arranged according to number. Units are easy to locate within this scheme, I find.I assume that you have read Zetterling's book in the meantime. I am researching the 326. ID (later VGD) and was considering this book, however the review by Dr. Forczyk somewhat concerned me.
How much detail is there in respect to the divisional level and below? Is there an easy way to identify references to specific units?
I would not be much concerned by Dr. Forczyk's review, for reasons set forth above.
cheers
I see there are some slow learners on this thread 
You have to get out of direct fire thinking before you compare artillery strengths. Arty is in the business of mobile firepower, a bty's area of influence is potentially large. However, you have to have the control arrangements to exploit this. Therefore you cannot usefully compare artillery strenghts without properly understanding their command and control and its implications. And actual practice as opposed to theory.
If your control doesn't let you shoot across div bdys and your command can't re-allocate non-div arty then long range provides minimal benefit. I would also argue that if some control isn't forward (ie below div HQ) and co-located with the close combat commanders then you capability to conduct all-arms fighting is less good in comparison to those who do have forward control.
I'll agree that ammo logistics is a major factor, you can't fire what you haven't got. [This leads to strength comparisons and 'slice' issues - how do you count the merchant seaman and stevedores moving stuff across the channel (and their naval and air escorts), don't forget the German, Belge and French railmen, to this you could add the construction and repair capabilities for ships, rail and rolling stock not to mention AA]. As an aside on ammo expenditure, if you take the war in NW Europe as lasting 10 months then 11 Armd Div average monthly expenditure was approx 16 rds per tank and 1060 rds per 25-pdr. ATk would have been peanuts because, to quote an ATk bty comd in Normandy (7 Armd Div) they 'hardly ever fired'.
You have to get out of direct fire thinking before you compare artillery strengths. Arty is in the business of mobile firepower, a bty's area of influence is potentially large. However, you have to have the control arrangements to exploit this. Therefore you cannot usefully compare artillery strenghts without properly understanding their command and control and its implications. And actual practice as opposed to theory.
If your control doesn't let you shoot across div bdys and your command can't re-allocate non-div arty then long range provides minimal benefit. I would also argue that if some control isn't forward (ie below div HQ) and co-located with the close combat commanders then you capability to conduct all-arms fighting is less good in comparison to those who do have forward control.
I'll agree that ammo logistics is a major factor, you can't fire what you haven't got. [This leads to strength comparisons and 'slice' issues - how do you count the merchant seaman and stevedores moving stuff across the channel (and their naval and air escorts), don't forget the German, Belge and French railmen, to this you could add the construction and repair capabilities for ships, rail and rolling stock not to mention AA]. As an aside on ammo expenditure, if you take the war in NW Europe as lasting 10 months then 11 Armd Div average monthly expenditure was approx 16 rds per tank and 1060 rds per 25-pdr. ATk would have been peanuts because, to quote an ATk bty comd in Normandy (7 Armd Div) they 'hardly ever fired'.
-
sid guttridge
- on "time out"
- Posts: 8055
- Joined: Thu Oct 10, 2002 4:54 am
It may have been post war but there were some rules of thumb about equivalence between ships and batteries. However, what is total nonsense is adding up gross shell weights and using it for equivalence, the Brits had stopped doing this in about 1943 so I'm surprised to see it still being done. Their equivalence rule of thumb was the square root of the weight of explosive filling.
Of course naval gunfire had three other problems. First their limited magazine capacity. A 25-pdr bty carried over 1300 rds at first line, with second line fairly quickly available. Secondly how close to shore the captain was willing to bring his ship, and hence how far inland it could shoot. Third command and control arrangements. Surprising as it may seem you couldn't just ring up HMS Warspite and ask for a few salvos on point X. Bombardment ships were assigned a LO from COBU and the number of COBU observation parties was quite small, about 7 per division, they had artillery observers with naval communicators, they had to be in the right place. Hence naval gunfire required a degree of planning and so was far less responsive than artillery. Of course AOPs could and did sometimes observe, and in Holland the Germans reported allied aircraft dropping window on a target so that ships could engage using their own radar to observe.
And as the current Brit Director of Doctrine & Development said last year 'naval gunfire cannot be guaranteed'.
Of course naval gunfire had three other problems. First their limited magazine capacity. A 25-pdr bty carried over 1300 rds at first line, with second line fairly quickly available. Secondly how close to shore the captain was willing to bring his ship, and hence how far inland it could shoot. Third command and control arrangements. Surprising as it may seem you couldn't just ring up HMS Warspite and ask for a few salvos on point X. Bombardment ships were assigned a LO from COBU and the number of COBU observation parties was quite small, about 7 per division, they had artillery observers with naval communicators, they had to be in the right place. Hence naval gunfire required a degree of planning and so was far less responsive than artillery. Of course AOPs could and did sometimes observe, and in Holland the Germans reported allied aircraft dropping window on a target so that ships could engage using their own radar to observe.
And as the current Brit Director of Doctrine & Development said last year 'naval gunfire cannot be guaranteed'.