Hitler's Moscow order

[timobrienwells]

Hi Osterhase,in reply to your post.Congratulations on a great collection of books.There are several there that I would love to have.You also have L im RFZ it appears-wonderful.The thing I can't understand is this.Why didn't you just write your own comment about it instead of cutting and pasting?That incident was very confusing .I would still very much like to get a scan of page 384 if you can do it.If you could put it on a PM that would be great.Thank-you.

In relation to the books I have and the quotes I have used,virtually none of it appears in Stolfi.I can give you any page of Guderian or Manstein that you want.I don't have Warlimont or Speer here in Thailand,but I can get anything from those 2 in 48 hours if need be.

"If I were going to tackle the mid-August Logistical situation...." Well your last few posts have tended to suggest that you have already done this,but no matter: the 4 points you have come up with sound like a good plan.Lets go through them 1 by 1.

1]a}Dispositions:-well that should be easy,we already know them fairly well.b}Heer Memorandum 18/08/41:-This was the appreciation of the whole Ostfront given by Brauchitsch of the same date was it not?I did not know that it was a mid-august Typhoon proposal though.Do you have any more details on it,I have not been able to find much.I seem to recall that Hitler then wrote a counter-memorandum to it on Aug 22[?]in which he rejected the reasoning behind it,while insulting most of the general staff as well.If that plan can be found,it would answer a lot of questions

2]"Reference German logistic capabilities as of mid Aug..." OK,this is the heart of it.a}Does Schueler devote a lot of pages to the mid aug situation?You have already given me his conclusion,so I dont suppose you could also send me a few of the pages in regards to this critical period?If it is too much trouble, then dont bother,but if there is an easy way to do it,I would very much appreciate it.I have my German dictionary with me,so I would love to do the translating.b}Do you have the DA Pam 20-26a document,or is it readily available somewhere.?

3]"Cross examine" Yes,ofcourse.Only one problem here.Halder's Diaries are either in or they are out.Which one is it?If we are going to be selective about what we do or dont use,then there has to be a compelling reason for it.

4]"End the post with an analysis...." Excellent!However 2] and 3] are where we need to get the hard data,so the analysis can be credible.

Now as I said that sounds like a good plan to me,but as you said,you are pushed for time.On the other hand,I have got heaps of it at the moment,so I would be willing to do the leg work so to speak,to collate the data etc.As such could you direct me to any sites etc that can add to the picture?Thank-you.That book you have,The Moscow Option,surely must contain some information of value? Regards Tim Wells

[Osterhase]

Nice collection Jason, I'd love to visit . Do you collect militaria also?

I'm not opposed to refining the idea of sorting through the sources further to sharpen our image of AGC Logistics mid Aug. 41.
I'd prefer a "division of labor" to increase the efficiency of the effort though. Another possible method would be a reading group, one book at a time.
A potential outcome may be an information paper posted here at Feldgrau that becomes a source for others.

I can't scan anything today, we are getting buried in snow and I can't get to the office (and I have work due tomorrow )

Here's a few better pics and perspective on how I approach studying Op Barbarossa. As briefly as I can summarize:
I start with a firm understanding of the German military thought process in WWII from a philosophical standpoint in order to understand what drives Wehrmacht doctrine.
http://s171.photobucket.com/albums/u294 ... ctrine.jpg

-The professional journal of the German General Staff- 1938-1944-
http://s171.photobucket.com/albums/u294 ... ournal.jpg

After analyzing an author's take/opinion on a historical situation/decision/battle/etc. from a philosophical standpoint I then check it against doctrine (quite a bit in books from last pic and this pic contains branch specific tactics but still relates heavily to doctrine):
http://s171.photobucket.com/albums/u294 ... anuals.jpg

Using that process has almost always helped decide right away if an author is worth their salt or not before I even get into the real details of their book. If I go beyond that with a book I start digging through the details, looking up references, citations and usually buying more books (tangents created by a good bibliography). Luckily my professional development as an Army Officer and Logistician makes understanding German military manuals more like digesting a nuance in another system as opposed to learning something completely foreign.

Oh, and Jason I see you have the series on GD. Thought you might like these-
http://s171.photobucket.com/albums/u294 ... ent=GD.jpg

I'll be seeing those boys in May at the Panzertruppenschule in Munster (boozin all night listening to war stories of the Ostfront at the Deutschehaus http://www.deutscheshausmunster.de
There's an awesome b&w pic in the dining room of an Infantry battalion marching in front of the hotel before the war, and the facade of the hotel and town square looks exactly the same today (twilight zone stuff...)

[Jason Long]

Osterhase,
Nah, no militaria. That would take money away from the books <grin>. Curiously enough Chicago got about 6 inches dumped yesterday and things are pretty messed up right now.

I wouldn't mind working on such a paper with you, but unfortunately I'm getting ready to move and I'm not sure which books I'm going to be able to keep out of storage.

I don't worry so much about doctrine, but rather more on what was actually accomplished so I get lots of operational and unit histories. Ideally I'd supplement them with the actual unit records, but that's a bit beyond my finances at something like 60 bucks per roll of microfilm. I got into all this through wargaming so I tend to focus on unit strengths, numbers and orders of battle, but I've learned to pay lots of attention to things like logistics and force-to-space ratios. Unfortunately nobody does really good logistical analyses of major campaigns. I suppose they just wouldn't sell, but I'm surprised that the various militaries haven't done more of them with hard numbers; generally all I see is pretty superficial stuff.

Dividing up the responsibilities would probably be best as my German is pretty bad, enough so that I can only pick and chose with Schuler, et al.

Jason

[Osterhase]

I don't worry so much about doctrine Gaff!!!
lol, I guess I focus on that (doctrine) because I'm concerned more with the WHY and HOW than the WHAT (becomes academic if you know the other two) happend part because thats how we predict future events (any other approach for the military mindset would be reactive rather than proactive). I usually just keep it simple with "Doctrine is defined as the fundamental principles that guide actions".

My German is good enough to hold a conversation, but still leaves a bit to be desired. The real difficult material is the original stuff written in gothic or Sutterlin script.

I know a few folks that miht be interested in taking part in a research effort. Let's pursue it for a bit and see what develops I guess. Fair enough?

[Jason Long]

I really, really hate Gothic script. I'm very happy that very few post-war books use it, aside from Paul's history of 18th Pz/ArtD. I have tremendous problems deciphering the letters when when the damn thing is in English. Caused some problems for me when I was working on cataloging some incunabula that my library had bought. I had a hard time even trying to look for an existing catalog record because I couldn't always figure out how to spell the title.

I'm not sure when I'll be able to recover my books from storage, but maybe I'll try and keep of the AGC/Barbarossa books with me. The Lage Ost map book for sure, if for no other reason that it's hard to find a box big enough to fit!

[timobrienwells]

Hi Jason,in reply to your post.
"the whole advance of AGC's southern flank required 24thPz Korps,plus all of 4th and 2nd Armies."<.......>What do you mean by that?Weren't there atleast 6 divisions[23,292,263,137,15,286]in the line at Smolensk-Elnya-Roslavl by 9/8/41?None of those went south.

"an attack by the Pz Korps southwest of Kritschev"<.......>You obviously mean 'southeast' don't you?4th panzer started out at Klimovitchi did it not?This attack only involved 3 infantry divisions,while the screen along the Sosh was provided by 6[31,112,17,131,34,258,7] divisions of 2nd army and the 1st cavalry division.

"But when do you want the attack on Moscow to begin?"<.......>Well it should have and could have begun on the 15th or 16 th at the latest.The 47th corps was assembled in the Roslavl area,with the 263rd,23rd,and 197th infantry divisions covering the north side of the Roslavl-Moscow highway.[263 rd and 137th were in the same area]This was the very same jump off position that Guderian wanted to use in his plan submitted to OKH on AUG 4th.By Aug 14th,the battle in the Kritschev area was over and Kostiukovitchi had been captured.If then on the 15th or 16th,47th corps had struck out from east of Roslavl,then 24th corps could have follwed as a second wave/right flank guard.4th army would have followed in the train of PG2.2nd armywith 9 divisions[and 1st cavalry] could have manned the line Propoisk-Kostiukovitchi.Added to these would be the 4 reserve divisions[167,293,45,260]manning the line Gomel-Propoisk.More to follow.

[timobrienwells]

Hi Jason,to continue.

"Without 4th army and the panzersI really doubt that 2nd army is capable of pushing on to the Gomel-Unetscha line."<.....>Actually you are right,it is better if they do not! Gomel was taken without a fight on Aug 20th.Therefore,the less south 2nd army goes the less likelihood of any threat to operations of PG2.2nd army was well able to defend this line.

"it seems that the link up was considerably further south near Romodan....."<......>Yes,that is correct.The link up with 1st panzer on Sep 16th was at Lochovistsa[?],125 miles due east of Kiev.This however is not a problem,as the essential task is to prevent any interference with the operations of AGC.The advance of both 6th army and 1st panzer would ensure that the 4 armies in the Kiev district would be denied freedom of action.Moreover,the orders of Sep 8th committed all 4 armies to the defence of the Ukrainian capital.As such,due to the lack of mobility,these forces would not have constituted a threat to the southern flanks of AGC.

"5th army merely pinned them down and had nothing to do with the other armies in the sector."<.....>No, you have missed the point.The 5th army was the most EASTERLY of the 4 armies in the Kiev district.All the others were either west or south-west.So,if any army had the chance of escape,it was the 5th.However, in the scenario we are talking about,escape would have been possible,but that is doubtful given the orders of Sep 8th.

[Jason Long]

"the whole advance of AGC's southern flank required 24thPz Korps,plus all of 4th and 2nd Armies."<.......>What do you mean by that?Weren't there atleast 6 divisions[23,292,263,137,15,286]in the line at Smolensk-Elnya-Roslavl by 9/8/41?None of those went south.

True, but those divisions didn't belong to 4th Army at the time.

"an attack by the Pz Korps southwest of Kritschev"<.......>You obviously mean 'southeast' don't you?4th panzer started out at Klimovitchi did it not?This attack only involved 3 infantry divisions,while the screen along the Sosh was provided by 6[31,112,17,131,34,258,7] divisions of 2nd army and the 1st cavalry division.

On 8 August, according to the Lage Ost maps, 3rd PzD is astride the Roslavl-Kritschev road, east of Kritschev, while 4th PzD is north-east of 3rd's position. The next day 3rd PzD is shown due east of Klimtovitchi while 4th is SE of Klimtovichi. On the 10th 3rd PzD is due west of Klimtovichi while 4th is south of the town. So yes, I should have said attacking in a south-westerly direction to be precise.
As for the infantry divisions 258. and 34. crossed the Sosh, while 7. attacked Kritschev. The other divisions (31., 112., 17., 167., 1. KD) of XII and XIII Corps start attacking between the Sosh and Dneister on the 12th.

"But when do you want the attack on Moscow to begin?"<.......>Well it should have and could have begun on the 15th or 16 th at the latest.The 47th corps was assembled in the Roslavl area,with the 263rd,23rd,and 197th infantry divisions covering the north side of the Roslavl-Moscow highway.[263 rd and 137th were in the same area]This was the very same jump off position that Guderian wanted to use in his plan submitted to OKH on AUG 4th.By Aug 14th,the battle in the Kritschev area was over and Kostiukovitchi had been captured.If then on the 15th or 16th,47th corps had struck out from east of Roslavl,then 24th corps could have follwed as a second wave/right flank guard.4th army would have followed in the train of PG2.2nd armywith 9 divisions[and 1st cavalry] could have manned the line Propoisk-Kostiukovitchi.Added to these would be the 4 reserve divisions[167,293,45,260]manning the line Gomel-Propoisk.More to follow.

Well, things aren't quite that simple on 15 August. XXXXVII. PzK has only 17 PzD, east of Roslavl, and 29 MotID in Seschtinskaya respectively. 263, 197 and 23 are actually along the line of the Desna east of the Roslavl-Smolensk highway. 137 is moving north along that highway to reinforce the Yelnaya salient. 78 is in reserve a little north of Roslavl. 10 PzD is holding the southeastern base of the Yelnaya Salient while 18 PzD is in reserve behind it. And, of course, Reich and GD are holding the northwestern base of the Salient until relieved by 137 and 263 on the 18th.

2nd Army is encircling Rogachev with 1. KD about 10-20 km north of Gomel, east of Uvarovitchi. 34 and 258 are both about 20 km south of the Sosh with 4th PzD sitting in Kommundary. I don't know where Kostiukovitchi is, but Propoisk is already behind German lines on the 15th. On the 15th I count 293, 45, 134, 260, 267, 255, 52, 31, 131, 112, 17, 167, 34 and 258 ID and 1 KD between Petrikovo, west of Gomel, and Kommundary, plus 7, 252 and 162 in army reserve. A grand total of 18 divisions. If we grant that they continue the attack until they take Gomel around the 19th or 20th that will set up a line Petrikovo-Gomel-line of the Besed River until it turns north east of Kommunary-Zhukovka on the Desna (NW of Bryansk). This approximates the actual front line on the 19th, except for everything east of Kommunary, which had been blown wide open by XXIV PzK's attack south. This is about 400 km altogether although the 240 km between Gomel and Zhukovka is the most critical and will require 10 more divisions. The 160 km between Petrikovo and Gomel was screened by 4 divisions (293, 45, 134, 260 as the Soviets couldn't exert much pressure there. So there are three infantry divisions and a cavalry division left over that can cover 2 PzGrp as it heads east. That's enough for about 100 km, or most of the way to Suchinitschi. But note there's no reserve if they do this. Personally I'd at least use the cavalry as army reserve in this situation.
The 100 km gap betwen AGC and AGS on this date will have to be covered by 6th Army.

[Jason Long]

"it seems that the link up was considerably further south near Romodan....."<......>Yes,that is correct.The link up with 1st panzer on Sep 16th was at Lochovistsa[?],125 miles due east of Kiev.This however is not a problem,as the essential task is to prevent any interference with the operations of AGC.The advance of both 6th army and 1st panzer would ensure that the 4 armies in the Kiev district would be denied freedom of action.Moreover,the orders of Sep 8th committed all 4 armies to the defence of the Ukrainian capital.As such,due to the lack of mobility,these forces would not have constituted a threat to the southern flanks of AGC.
"5th army merely pinned them down and had nothing to do with the other armies in the sector."<.....>No, you have missed the point.The 5th army was the most EASTERLY of the 4 armies in the Kiev district.All the others were either west or south-west.So,if any army had the chance of escape,it was the 5th.However, in the scenario we are talking about,escape would have been possible,but that is doubtful given the orders of Sep 8th.

I think that you're a little confused about the situation in Southwestern Front. 5th Army was the westernmost army and defended Kiev itself. See Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed, the map on p. 50. It wasn't going to be able to do much other than that. 26 and 37 Armies, which defended the line of the Dnepr would be preoccupied with fending off, probably ultimately unsuccessfully, AGS. However, 21, 40, 13 and 3 Armies of the Southwest and Bryansk Fronts would retain perfect freedom to mess with AGC. Much as they did when 13 and 3 Armies unsuccessfully attacked into Guderian's flank on 2 Sep. Incidentally only 21 Army was captured historically.

[timobrienwells]

Hi Jason.

5th army was along the line Cherigov-Sosnitsa on 26/8.It was not defending Kiev.As 5th army moved east to Priluki,37 army was defending Kiev on 18/9.<....>Quote from commander 5th army,"we had received orders from the army group to evacuate the area and withdraw eastwards and had already begun to do so,when we received contrary orders to turn about and to defend in all circumstances."

"mess with AGC" No,in an august Typhoon,any soviet threat would be too far away to be able to stop Guderian going from Roslavl to Vyasma to Moscow.Just as the attacks by timoshenko on 13/7,and by 13th and 3rd armies on Sep 2nd were repelled,the same would be for any action in the more northern axis of Bryansk-Kaluga.The Oka river running from Kaluga to Kolomna would have provided a natural barrier while Guderian enveloped Moscow.The defensive strength of the infantry divisions in the line Vyasma-Kaluga would have sufficed to allow Guderian's offensive to run it's course.The key defensive position being Roslavl to the south-west

"Incidentally only 21 army was captured" What is this supposed to mean?? Was 21 army 665,000 strong?

[timobrienwells]

Hi Jason in reply to your post.

Those dispositoin look right.Thank you for that.I counted the divisions the other night and I think I came up with 18 as well.Glantz is obviously a good resource.

Guderian gives a slightly different picture for his divisions around the 14 th/15th.Everything you said accept that 10 th panzer was free from the line by this stage.Does Glantz confirm that?Also apparently Reich and GD were already in rest areas north-west of Yelnaya by the 10th of Aug.Your movements for 137 are accurate.

"So there are three infantry divisions and a cavalry division that can cover PG2 as it heads east"<....>Well 4 divisions is obviously not enough to cover a flank from Roslavl to Moscow.The question seems to be if the goal had been to 'contain' the south-western front rather than 'destroy' it,then how many of those 18 divisions could have been spared to support an offensive action?It appears that Guderian could have,in theory,had his 3 corps available by around the 16th or 17th.

Kostiukovitchi is about 30 miles due south of Kritschev.Where is Zhukovka?Does Glantz give a date for the fall of Rogachev? Regards Tim Wells

[Jason Long]

5th army was along the line Cherigov-Sosnitsa on 26/8.It was not defending Kiev.As 5th army moved east to Priluki,37 army was defending Kiev on 18/9.<....>Quote from commander 5th army,"we had received orders from the army group to evacuate the area and withdraw eastwards and had already begun to do so,when we received contrary orders to turn about and to defend in all circumstances."

My mistake, 5th Army was North and NE of Kiev.

"mess with AGC" No,in an august Typhoon,any soviet threat would be too far away to be able to stop Guderian going from Roslavl to Vyasma to Moscow.Just as the attacks by timoshenko on 13/7,and by 13th and 3rd armies on Sep 2nd were repelled,the same would be for any action in the more northern axis of Bryansk-Kaluga.The Oka river running from Kaluga to Kolomna would have provided a natural barrier while Guderian enveloped Moscow.The defensive strength of the infantry divisions in the line Vyasma-Kaluga would have sufficed to allow Guderian's offensive to run it's course.The key defensive position being Roslavl to the south-west

And just where are those divisions to defend the Vyazma-Kaluga line supposed to come from? The only divisions available to 2 PzGr, 2nd and 4th Armies that I haven't already listed are the 3 of XX Corps holding the Yelnaya Salient? If Guderian turns east, rather than south, AGC is still in contact all along it's southern flank with the Soviets. And who'd going to drive Vyazma-Kaluga anyways? 3rd PzGrp?

You're doing exactly what Stolfi does; you're glossing over the obvious difficulties that AGC would have trying to lunge to Moscow by airily referring to Soviet defeats earlier in the campaign when the situation would be vastly different and totally non-comparable because the German force to space ratio would simply suck, on the order of 50 km per division, to cover the distance from Petrikovo to Kolomna.

You need to detail your offensive scheme because I don't see the Germans going anywhere near Bryansk if Guderian heads east on the 15th. He'd mostly likely have run something like Roslavl-Suchinitschi-Kaluga-Serpukhov because he simply didn't have the force available to make a wider envelopment.

I see a lot of hand-waving away of any difficulties with you and Stolfi because you refuse to provide sufficient details to support your thesis. Furthermore you have total contempt for the Soviets and don't seem to believe that they can muster any sort of attack that might be able to rupture the German defenses, even when a single division is covering up to 50 km! Defeating the Soviets is one thing when 3 divisions are covering that 50 km, but it's a far, far different thing when there's only one to do the same job.

"Incidentally only 21 army was captured" What is this supposed to mean?? Was 21 army 665,000 strong?

Read my post a little more closely, Tim, instead of taking cheap shots. Only 21st Army was captured of the four that I mentioned on the northern flank of the Kiev Salient. All the others fell back.

[Jason Long]

Guderian gives a slightly different picture for his divisions around the 14 th/15th.Everything you said accept that 10 th panzer was free from the line by this stage.Does Glantz confirm that?Also apparently Reich and GD were already in rest areas north-west of Yelnaya by the 10th of Aug.Your movements for 137 are accurate.

10th Pz is holding the southern shoulder of the Yelnaya Salient until the 22nd when it's refitting in Potschinok. GD had been relieved briefly, but was ordered back into the lines on the 9th and wasn't finally relieved until the night of 18/19th August. Reich wasn't relieved the 19th. Are you starting to get the picture that Guderian might be shading the truth about the status of XXXXVI PzK to bolster his magical plan?

"So there are three infantry divisions and a cavalry division that can cover PG2 as it heads east"<....>Well 4 divisions is obviously not enough to cover a flank from Roslavl to Moscow.The question seems to be if the goal had been to 'contain' the south-western front rather than 'destroy' it,then how many of those 18 divisions could have been spared to support an offensive action?It appears that Guderian could have,in theory,had his 3 corps available by around the 16th or 17th.

See above; XXXXVI Corps was forced to remain in Yelnaya until the 19th and wasn't recommitted to battle until the 1st of September. So only XXXXVII and XXIV PzK would be initially available. Those 18 divisions are required to merely contain Southwestern Front. Didn't you pay attention to my earlier post? A frontage of 25km per division isn't anywhere near enough for offensive action.

Kostiukovitchi is about 30 miles due south of Kritschev.Where is Zhukovka?Does Glantz give a date for the fall of Rogachev? Regards Tim Wells

Zhukovka is about 50 km NW of Bryansk, about midway between Bryansk and Roslavl. Glantz actually doesn't give a good account of the Kiev battle in that book. It's much more a survey of the first year and half of the war. I'm not sure if he's covered this area and time in his self-published Forgotten Battles series. That would have the best coverage of the Soviets. I had to use Fugate's unreliable Thunder on the Dnepr for the Soviet activities along AGC's southern flank.

Jason

[timobrienwells]

Hi Jason,in reply to your post.
"You're doing exactly what Stolfi does" Ok,before you start putting me in the waste basket along with stolfi,how about acknowledging that I am also in agreement with you about the difficulties and risks involved in this.I am trying to examine the feasability,I am not suggesting it would be a slam dunk.In retrospect my statement about the defence of the flank from Roslavl-Vyasma-Kaluga was probably a bit optimistic.

"You need to detail your offensive scheme" Yes,fair enough.In order to do that a reasonably accurate picture of the forces available needs to be made.As I said previously Guderian does give a slightly different picture for the disposition of his divisions.His maps and notations suggest that 46th corps was on the move on the 17/18th.In any case I suppose it is only a matter of a day or so.So if that is the case,would it have been possible to commit 24th corps to the initial attack on the 16th?If not,then if it were on the 17th, would it not be likely to have 47th in support as well?[Given that the 47th would dis-engage on say the 15th.]Then the 46th would be committed,on say the 19th,as a second wave?If all that is feasable then the difficult question of flank protection is what needs to be examined.

"Those 18 divisions are required to merely contain SW front" Well if that is so,then there would not be sufficient forces for flank protection of PG2.Of the total infantry divisions for 4th,2nd and PG2,I count 25 including the 2 security divisons,so that still sounds a bit thin.Can we go over this Rogachev-Roslavl thing again?By my map it is 130 miles or there-abouts.Gomel-Roslavl is about the same.What would be the minimum number required to man this line?I still tend to think that there should be some available,assuming that they are not also required for either Rogachev-south or Gomel-south.What about the extra forces needed for any inner lines of encirclement east of Yelnaya?

"contempt for the soviets" No,dont get me wrong,I dont have contempt for the Soviets! What I want to determine is what kind of forces the Soviets could have thrown at Guderian's southern flank at this time.What
I meant by referring to earlier battles was that PG2's southern flank from Sluzk-Krichev-Prudki during the Smolensk phase was around 160 miles.Timoshenko's attacks on 13/7 involved 20 divisions,and were fended off by just 3 divisions[1st Cav,10th mot,and 4thPz] of PG2.Do you have any info therefore of Soviet forces which could strike the flanks of PG2 from around the Bransk-Orel-Tula axis around mid-august?

Vyasma-Kaluga.> Guderian also talks about a link-up with Hoth at Vyasma,in a similar vein to the October Typhoon.Then heading to Kolomna-east of Moscow for another link with Hoth.Apparently it was meant to be similar to the double envelopment of Bialstok-Minsk.

"3rd Pz Grp"<....>Well IF there was sufficient flank protection,and IF Guderian was able to bring all 3 corps to the battle,then yes,I think they would have had a good chance of obtaining the objective.
Regards Tim Wells

[Jason Long]

Hi Jason,in reply to your post.
"You're doing exactly what Stolfi does" Ok,before you start putting me in the waste basket along with stolfi,how about acknowledging that I am also in agreement with you about the difficulties and risks involved in this.I am trying to examine the feasability,I am not suggesting it would be a slam dunk.In retrospect my statement about the defence of the flank from Roslavl-Vyasma-Kaluga was probably a bit optimistic.

My impression from your earlier posts was that you did regard it as a slam dunk and I was getting exasperated at your seeming obtuseness.

"You need to detail your offensive scheme" Yes,fair enough.In order to do that a reasonably accurate picture of the forces available needs to be made.As I said previously Guderian does give a slightly different picture for the disposition of his divisions.His maps and notations suggest that 46th corps was on the move on the 17/18th.In any case I suppose it is only a matter of a day or so.So if that is the case,would it have been possible to commit 24th corps to the initial attack on the 16th?If not,then if it were on the 17th, would it not be likely to have 47th in support as well?[Given that the 47th would dis-engage on say the 15th.]Then the 46th would be committed,on say the 19th,as a second wave?If all that is feasable then the difficult question of flank protection is what needs to be examined.

Guderian is sort of correct. 17th PzD and 29th MID were starting their drive to the south on the 17th and 18th, but 18th PzD was moving from behind the Yelnaya Salient to an area just south of Roslavl where it would remain until the 26th, which suggests it wasn't ready to participate in any thrust to Moscow until then.
It would probably be possible to pull XXIV PzK away from their attacks in the vicinity of Kommundary on the 15th to ready them for follow up duties to 17th PzD and 29th MID of XXXVII PzK which would have to lead any attack. Neither of these last two divisions did anything until the 17th so I presume that they really weren't ready for offensive operations until then, but they might have been able to kick things off a couple of days earlier. They certainly weren't decisively engaged prior to the 17th. I really don't think that XXXXVI PzK was going to be able to participate until around the 30th; they'd taken some severe losses during their defense of Yelnaya. But they ought to be able to form a third echelon by then.

"Those 18 divisions are required to merely contain SW front" Well if that is so,then there would not be sufficient forces for flank protection of PG2.Of the total infantry divisions for 4th,2nd and PG2,I count 25 including the 2 security divisons,so that still sounds a bit thin.Can we go over this Rogachev-Roslavl thing again?By my map it is 130 miles or there-abouts.Gomel-Roslavl is about the same.What would be the minimum number required to man this line?I still tend to think that there should be some available,assuming that they are not also required for either Rogachev-south or Gomel-south.What about the extra forces needed for any inner lines of encirclement east of Yelnaya?

Well, I certainly wouldn't count on the security divisions for anything in the front lines. If you drop below a frontage of 25km per division you risk a Soviet attack blowing through your defenses, while even a frontage of 25 km won't work against attacks like those the Soviets mustered at Yelnaya Bend. As I said earlier to defend Gomel-Zhukovka will require 10 divisions with the westernmost part of the salient requiring 4 more. So 14 divisions to cover the flank from Petrikovo all the way to the Desna SW of Roslavl. 137, 15, 292, 268, 78, 23 and 197 were manning the Yelnaya Salient and the Desna line south of Yelnaya and would presumably form the inner face of any pocket at Vyazma. Not much left over is there?

"contempt for the soviets" No,dont get me wrong,I dont have contempt for the Soviets! What I want to determine is what kind of forces the Soviets could have thrown at Guderian's southern flank at this time.What
I meant by referring to earlier battles was that PG2's southern flank from Sluzk-Krichev-Prudki during the Smolensk phase was around 160 miles.Timoshenko's attacks on 13/7 involved 20 divisions,and were fended off by just 3 divisions[1st Cav,10th mot,and 4thPz] of PG2.Do you have any info therefore of Soviet forces which could strike the flanks of PG2 from around the Bransk-Orel-Tula axis around mid-august?

There's not much at hand although there is mention that Bryansk Front makes two attacks into Guderian's flank as he drives south and both fail miserably. Not least because Stavka failed to mass all those forces into one attack. I'm not so much worried about the initial stage of any drive to the East, but rather in the later stages as the German flank extends and thins. With the Soviets free to concentrate in the Bryansk-Orel-Tula area they might be able to muster enough forces for a serious counter-attack.

Vyasma-Kaluga.> Guderian also talks about a link-up with Hoth at Vyasma,in a similar vein to the October Typhoon.Then heading to Kolomna-east of Moscow for another link with Hoth.Apparently it was meant to be similar to the double envelopment of Bialstok-Minsk.

That's a fairly decent way to go about things and would probably work reasonably well in the beginning. But I think that things get a lot dicier after Vyazma without any equivalent to the Bryansk Pocket to eliminate those Soviets along the southern flank. Remember that Vyazma-Kolomna is 280 km, or roughly another 11 divisions strictly for flank security.

"3rd Pz Grp"<....>Well IF there was sufficient flank protection,and IF Guderian was able to bring all 3 corps to the battle,then yes,I think they would have had a good chance of obtaining the objective.

I think that I've shown that there wouldn't have been anywhere near enough flank protection once they crossed the Desna and that all three panzer corps couldn't have participated at the beginning of the offensive.