U.S. Army Tank Destroyers

[Reb]

Freiwitter

The Orbat you posted is for the 'heavy' armd div. After 1943 only the 2nd and 3rd (and for a while the 1st) divs retained that org. The others went to the 'light' div org. You can look at 2nd Armd and see that it was used more like a pz Korps - particuarly subsequent to Normandy - with beaucoup attachments. The CO Ernie Harmon was up to the job.

Here is the 1943+ 'light' org

3 bn armd inf (halftracks with 3 x 57mm AT per Company)
3 tank bn (Sherman, stuart - approx 51 Shermans, 17 Stuart)
3 arty bn (M7)
1 recon bn (Stuart, M-8 assault gun, armd cars)
1 eng bn

Note that TD were never organic in any of the orgs but in both cases there were TD and AA bns attached as a matter of routine. There were a number of smaller org changes as well - late in the war Sherman 105mm support tanks were added. Numbers of weapons varied but heavy and light were the primaries.

[Freiritter]

Interesting. What was the point of having light or heavy armored divisions? I remember seeing in previous posts that TD bns were formations organic at the Corps level.

Cordially,

Freiritter

[Reb]

Freiwitter

To a certain extent the US was following the tactical trends - the 'heavy' div was mostly tanks, originally regiments of two light tank bns and one heavy (Grant or Sherman) then two heavy bns and one ligth. Reminds me (surely no accident) of the original German pz divs.

There were something like six or more major and minor reorgs. The 'light' division org became the final primary org and lasted through the end of the war. Not sure why they kept 2nd and 3rd on the old establishment but my guess would be as a control for the experiment.

Organizations tend to change as tactics evolve and weapons improve. An ormoured div with hundreds of light tanks (ironically called a 'heavy' div) was certainly of scant use on a 1943 battlefield.

cheers
reb

[The Fighting Egg]

PIATs and Bazookas.. I like them both. And Panzerschrecks and Panzerfausts too. Gonna buy one soon.

Oh yeah.. Just wanna say. I saw a Flammenwerfer41 on auction a few days ago.

http://www.tradera.com/auction/aid_5300336

Only 3 left in the world

[Rich]

This was any force temporarily organized specifically for a task or mission. Thus a combat command or a team were both task forces. Regimental combat teams would also fit that description.

Close but not quite. At the time the term "team" was adopted to denote any tactical formation organized by a division or sub-unit of a division for a particular operation. They were identified by the team commander and in some cases - as in armored divisions - could have a semi-continuous existance under the name of the team commander, although the sub-units assigned to the team could change frequently. The armored division teams are probably the best known.

A task force however, was slightly different. They were semi-permanent formations assembled for a specific mission or operation, that often had little or no affiliation with a division. Usually the task force "name" was assigned as a codename or as a descriptor of whatthe task force's function was. Thus the 1st Airborne Task Force was a division-sized airborne force comprised of the 1st SS Force, the 551st PIB and 509th PIB, along with chemical mortar and PFA assets for the invasion of southern France. Another would be the Ranger Task Force assembled for Anzio, as would Galahad Force (Merrill's Marauders - a newspaper term) in the CBI. All three had a provisional task force headquarters element organized, which is one thing that identifies them as different from a "team."

[JeffF.]

There was no docrinal point ion having both. The armor division evolved into what was informally titled the Light Armored Division trying to correct the imbalance of the '42 heavy division (not enough infantry). The ETO made a specific request to keep the 2nd and 3rd Armored Division under the old organization after it received orders to reorganize them. The ETO received special permission to retain them under their old organization.

[Reb]

An interesting side issue with armour organization is the US (and UK) forces had another whole armour force - the infantry support tanks organized in Tank Groups (sort of an admin HQ really) with up to five bns usually in the 700 series. There as many or more tanks in these units as there were in the 16 or so armd divs (we had a 20th div but don't recall a 17,18 or 19th). (UK kept this stuff in Army Tank Brigades)

thus a US inf div on operations had one or more tank bns and one or more TD bns plus extra artillery and attached AA (particularly halftrack auto weapons stuff). An Inf Div had almost enough trucks to move the div in one jump and there were plenty available for attachment. Changes one's perspective when reading about infantry divisions standing up the attack of "Hitler's vaunted panzers."

It also explains the break down in logistics subsequent to Normandy.

A US inf div (or UK - look at Epsom) was apt to have as many AFV or more than a panzer div when attacking. Plus the added advantage of nine bns of infantry.

An interesting (and to me, amusing) issue is how US/UK writers bemoan the German "advantage" in proportion of panzergrenadiers to tanks, based supposedly upon their experiences on the Ost Front. (though more realalistically the lower proportion of tanks came from doubling the number of divs by halving the size of the tank element.)

Then one reads the German perspective and Guderian is complaining that the pz divs are too weak in tanks/inf to be truly operational because they lack the high percentage of tanks (he liked 400 per div) needed to do the job. Maybe the two sides should have swapped equipment!

And after reading about the 'Tiger Fright' experienced by allied tankers it is certainly amusing to read German accounts of being intimidated by the new Sherman 'super tanks.' It always looks different from the other side of the hill. Which leaves it to us to sort out the facts of the matter which is to me, a hell of a lot of fun!

cheers
reb

[JeffF.]

According to our Rich's article on militaryhistoryonline on U.S. Armor there were 63 independent armor battalions. Compared with the 6 bns in 2 & 3 Arm Divs and the 3 in each of the remaining 14 arm divs that puts the majority in non-divisional units in supporting roles. I don't recall reading any instances where more than one tank bn was attached to an infantry division though I believe there were a few periods where a division would have both a towed and an SP TD bn (at least for a short time). I don't think the tank destroyer groups or armor groups were ever used tactically (except when some of the latter were used to augment some CCRs of armored divisions to enable them to be full tactical HQ).

[Rich]

There was no docrinal point ion having both. The armor division evolved into what was informally titled the Light Armored Division trying to correct the imbalance of the '42 heavy division (not enough infantry). The ETO made a specific request to keep the 2nd and 3rd Armored Division under the old organization after it received orders to reorganize them. The ETO received special permission to retain them under their old organization.

From another post of mine at a different forum:

"The change occured with effect 15 July 1943. The seperate medium tank battalions in Italy began changing in October and November 1943 while the rainy season interrupted operations. However, 1st AD was retained as the Fifth Army reserve throughout, so could not afford the month-plus time required for the changeover. About half of the division was then committed to SHINGLE in early January 1944 and thus agains the changeover was delayed. Finally, at the end of the Rome Campaign it was withdrwan in August to make the change.

In England 2nd and 3rd AD were both tasked as the armored reserve in OVERLORD, filling essentially the same task as CCB, 1st AD at Anzio. It was felt that the redundancies built into the divisions (which McNair believed to be inefficiences) meant that the divisions were more robust. However, a second major factor was that the equipment required to make the change, including 42 M-4 105mm, were not going to be available until July, when the light armored divisions themselves were going to begin to be available. It was finally felt that the changeover simply wasn't worth it in the circumstances and Marshall granted Eisenhower's request for the two divisions to be exempted."

Part of what made the heavy division robust was that they included a lot of non-combat capability as well. One major problem with the light division organization discovered after they were employed in July and August was that they had insufficient truck space to haul their basic load, requiring the more or less permanent attachment of two QM Truck Companies to them for the duration. More significant initially in Normandy - I suspect - was that the heavy division Engineer Battalion included a Treadway Bridge Company (those "spun off" in the reoprganization were the main source of the corps Treadway Bridge Companies) a very valuable asset in Normandy.