Allied Defensive Doctrine
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Allied Defensive Doctrine
I've recently read an U.S. Army paper on the Wehrmacht defensive doctrine's evolution on the Eastern Front in WWII. It was an interesting read and detailed that the basic doctrine had evolved in the year of 1917. The doctrine was called Elastic Defense and envisioned a defense in depth with troops arrayed in small groups throughout the main defense zone, located behind a forward security zone of outposts. Behind this, was the artillery and counterattack reserves. The troops in the main zone were to maneuver about the MZ, to take whatever advantages they could to essentially, bog down and dissipate the enemy's attack, while the reserves came up to throw the enemy back. I read that in the Desert Campaign, Brit/CW troops had adopted South African laager formations for all-around defense for armored car/armored units and the brigades had formed into box-like strongpoints as a main line of resistance. While British artillery would support the boxes in contact and maybe combined arms groups would relieve any boxes that were in heavy contact. So, what were the salient points of Allied defensive practices during the war?
Hello Freiritter
Hope you get a good reply - I read the same paper and am wondering the same thing, but I do not know enough about allied defensive tactical doctrine as such to provide an answer.
Just a point of detail. I don't think the Desert campaign is a very good guide to overall allied tactics, because of the peculiar circumstances it was fought under. Box defenses were mounted in a situation were there was no continous front line on the open desert flank. Interestingly, under conditions not too dissimilar in that sense from those that caused the Germans to employ a similar practice in Russia in the winter of 1941/42.
cheers
Hope you get a good reply - I read the same paper and am wondering the same thing, but I do not know enough about allied defensive tactical doctrine as such to provide an answer.
Just a point of detail. I don't think the Desert campaign is a very good guide to overall allied tactics, because of the peculiar circumstances it was fought under. Box defenses were mounted in a situation were there was no continous front line on the open desert flank. Interestingly, under conditions not too dissimilar in that sense from those that caused the Germans to employ a similar practice in Russia in the winter of 1941/42.
cheers
Well ... To reduce this to bumper sticker slogans: if the essence of German defensive doctrine was elastic defence backed up by immediate counter-attack, the basis of Allied defensive doctrine was infantry doggedly remaining in place and breaking up German attacks with overwhelming firepower.
Ground was held by infantry -- both the US and even more Brit/CW doctrine for armour specified that they would seldom remain in the front line, emplaced to fire on any attackers. They would withdraw out of contact (perhaps a km or two to the rear) into what the Brits called "rear rallies", there to await further orders (ie to move up and counter-attack or at least fire into a German attack). These infantry defensive postions were dug in, but generally did not feature continuous trench lines a la WW I. They were hopefully sited on tactically advantageous ground, usually interpretted to mean cover (forrest or village) overlooking decent fields of fire, ideally with a height advantage. Of note, reverse slopes were not usually emphasized. The front often consisted of what amounted to company strongpoints, hopefully cited to be mutually supporting and dominate the vital ground, but not as I said above, a continuous trench line.
Elastic defence in depth was not so much a feature of Anglo-American defensive practice, but to a certain extent this was achieved by the practice of putting about two thirds of the available forces in the front line, and the remaining third in depth. This was generally true at all levels of command. Thus, a platoon would put two sections (or squads if you prefer) along their frontage, with the third in depth; the company would put two platoons up and the third in depth; a battalion would put two or three companies in the line; and a brigade would put two batallions up; and a division would put two brigades up. That was generally the extent of emplaced forces holding a front.
Note that this means that if a "division" was holding a sector of the front, actually across that divisional frontage was:
- two brigades, but each of those brigades only had two battalions up (= total of four battalions);
- each of those four battalions only had two or three companies up (say 2.5 x 4 = 10 companies total along the div front)
Since as I was saying companies tended to be deployed in company strongpoints (notwithstanding the "two thirds" practice I was describing above, the depth third of a company and platoon would have all been within the company strongpoint), that seems to be the reasonable bottom-end to finish this little analysis. Bottom-line: a full strength division in the line had about ten companies (out of about 36) holding its frontage. The rest were deployed back throughout the div area, to a depth of say ... 5 to 10 km.
Anyway, enough of that. As regards the conduct of the defence itself, it would probably be fair to say that mobility was not a feature of the conduct of the defence. Troops were expected to hold on until forced back, at which point the battle would be picked up by the next position back, if it came to that. The real basis of the defence was what I haven't mentioned yet -- firepower, in particular artillery, the one arm in which the Anglo-Americans unquestionably excelled over the Germans. By 1944 both the US and Brit/CW armies had extremely flexible and responsive systems for the radio direction of artillery, and all of those company strongpoints could call down truly astounding amounts of fire. (While they were still in range of the channel this included naval gun fire support.) When forward controllers were present they might well have air support circling overhead too.
Think of all the Allied defensive actions of 44-45. The panzer counterattacks around Caen were met by British/Canadian infantry who hunkered down in Norman villages turned strongpoints and called down fire to break the attacks up, in a manner that reminds one of the British squares at Waterloo more than anything else. The Americans held Mortain against the German offensive there with a crust one division thick -- the 30th US Infantry Division hunkered down in its strongpoints on the forested hills overlooking the town and called down the greatest tactical airpower ever seen on the long columns of panzers working their way up to the town. I could go on but you get the idea.
Which method is superior? Historians and theorists tend to admire the German method as more deft and artful. On the other hand, those sturdy British and Canadian infanteers did hold their ground around Caen, and the US G.I.s did hold the heights overlooking Mortain. Whereas the Germans...
Ground was held by infantry -- both the US and even more Brit/CW doctrine for armour specified that they would seldom remain in the front line, emplaced to fire on any attackers. They would withdraw out of contact (perhaps a km or two to the rear) into what the Brits called "rear rallies", there to await further orders (ie to move up and counter-attack or at least fire into a German attack). These infantry defensive postions were dug in, but generally did not feature continuous trench lines a la WW I. They were hopefully sited on tactically advantageous ground, usually interpretted to mean cover (forrest or village) overlooking decent fields of fire, ideally with a height advantage. Of note, reverse slopes were not usually emphasized. The front often consisted of what amounted to company strongpoints, hopefully cited to be mutually supporting and dominate the vital ground, but not as I said above, a continuous trench line.
Elastic defence in depth was not so much a feature of Anglo-American defensive practice, but to a certain extent this was achieved by the practice of putting about two thirds of the available forces in the front line, and the remaining third in depth. This was generally true at all levels of command. Thus, a platoon would put two sections (or squads if you prefer) along their frontage, with the third in depth; the company would put two platoons up and the third in depth; a battalion would put two or three companies in the line; and a brigade would put two batallions up; and a division would put two brigades up. That was generally the extent of emplaced forces holding a front.
Note that this means that if a "division" was holding a sector of the front, actually across that divisional frontage was:
- two brigades, but each of those brigades only had two battalions up (= total of four battalions);
- each of those four battalions only had two or three companies up (say 2.5 x 4 = 10 companies total along the div front)
Since as I was saying companies tended to be deployed in company strongpoints (notwithstanding the "two thirds" practice I was describing above, the depth third of a company and platoon would have all been within the company strongpoint), that seems to be the reasonable bottom-end to finish this little analysis. Bottom-line: a full strength division in the line had about ten companies (out of about 36) holding its frontage. The rest were deployed back throughout the div area, to a depth of say ... 5 to 10 km.
Anyway, enough of that. As regards the conduct of the defence itself, it would probably be fair to say that mobility was not a feature of the conduct of the defence. Troops were expected to hold on until forced back, at which point the battle would be picked up by the next position back, if it came to that. The real basis of the defence was what I haven't mentioned yet -- firepower, in particular artillery, the one arm in which the Anglo-Americans unquestionably excelled over the Germans. By 1944 both the US and Brit/CW armies had extremely flexible and responsive systems for the radio direction of artillery, and all of those company strongpoints could call down truly astounding amounts of fire. (While they were still in range of the channel this included naval gun fire support.) When forward controllers were present they might well have air support circling overhead too.
Think of all the Allied defensive actions of 44-45. The panzer counterattacks around Caen were met by British/Canadian infantry who hunkered down in Norman villages turned strongpoints and called down fire to break the attacks up, in a manner that reminds one of the British squares at Waterloo more than anything else. The Americans held Mortain against the German offensive there with a crust one division thick -- the 30th US Infantry Division hunkered down in its strongpoints on the forested hills overlooking the town and called down the greatest tactical airpower ever seen on the long columns of panzers working their way up to the town. I could go on but you get the idea.
Which method is superior? Historians and theorists tend to admire the German method as more deft and artful. On the other hand, those sturdy British and Canadian infanteers did hold their ground around Caen, and the US G.I.s did hold the heights overlooking Mortain. Whereas the Germans...