Market Garden

[Freiritter]

If I'm not mistaken, Market Gardeen was an airborne assault to secure several bridgeheads in the Netherlands so British armor could push to the Rhine. I would like to ask some questions concerning it. Was the operation under Monty's 21st Army Group command? How were the German defenders able to respond so quickly? ( Were there strong German forces in the area already? ) Why did the British paras have such a hard time? Why did the operation end as it did?

[wwiibuff]

You aked a Mouthful.

There are some good histories of this operation. Agurably the best is Cornelius Ryan's A Bridge to Far.

The operation was to seize several bridges by US, British and Polish Paras. The US dropped the 101, and 82 airborne the Brits the first with the Polish Brigade as reinforcements. In that order respectively north to south. The final bridge, the bridge to far, was in Arnhem over the Rhine.

The op was under 21st Army Group. XXX Corps under Horrocks was the ground element that was to assault up the highway.

Amongst the problems was the fact the Brits were trying to force a major offensive up one road. This road was dificult to keep open and provided few options. The Germans were able to react because they had units refitting in the vicinity including the 9th and 10th SS Panzer divisions. These outfits had been treated badly in previous actions, were short men and material but, they were exprienced, and had heavier weapons than the paratroopers.

The op was criticized, even at the time, at least by Americans on the ground, as being slow moving and not very aggressive. IMHO I always thought it was a very risky operation for Montgomery who always struck me as being conservative and not agressive at all. Out of character I would call it.

[Freiritter]

Thanks, wwiibuff. But what was the Allied intelligence picture at the time? Were these refitting units known to be there? Did Monty expect little to no resistance on the highway? How heavy of resistance did the U.S. Airborne encounter?

[Martin Schenkel]

The operation was to seize several bridges by US, British and Polish Paras. The US dropped the 101, and 82 airborne the Brits the first with the Polish Brigade as reinforcements. In that order respectively north to south.

The order is reversed (unless I misunderstood your post. The US divisions were in the south, the Brits to the north.

[Martin Schenkel]

But what was the Allied intelligence picture at the time? Were these refitting units known to be there?

Intelligence knew the divisions were there, but the actual strength of the divisions was debatable. Some (including Monty) felt the divisions were too weak to resist. Other planners thought they would still be strong enough to fight back.

[wwiibuff]

Schenkel you are correct, I wrote that wrong, I should have said south to north. The Americans were in the south the Brits, and Poles, the north at Arnhem.

[wwiibuff]

Thanks, wwiibuff. But what was the Allied intelligence picture at the time? Were these refitting units known to be there? Did Monty expect little to no resistance on the highway? How heavy of resistance did the U.S. Airborne encounter?

One of the problems was the intelligence, or perhaps more accurately how well it was received. These units were not appreciated for their combat potential. I don't recall offhand but, I believe some officers might not have believed they were in the area.

The US airborne faced some very bitter fighting. In the book and movie A Bridge to Far there is a very dramatic sequence of one battalion making a riverine assault to seize the opposite bank and prevent a bridge from being blown up.

The US paras were committed, against doctrine, for something like seventy days. After XXX Corps reached the US troops they were largely responsible for trying to keep the supply line open. In spite of their best efforts the road was cut at different points several times.

I am sorry I don't recall more specifics, I don't have time to look up more exact figures right now. I'll try to later.