The Japanese: More Formidable than the Germans!!

[Commissar D, the Evil]

Hi Folks, I found this posted by a reputable source on another site. Check it out! Of course, it excludes the Ostfront:

The question periodically comes up (not that it really mattered much to the participants) of who was the more formidable foe, with the Germans usually "winning" based on an undocumented reputation. I thought the following was interesting. In April 1945 the Army's Surgeon General formulated statistics comparing casualty rates in the Pacific and Europe. The numbers cited below are for number of casualties per 1000 men per day in actual ground combat, exclusive of disease and other losses. In simple mayhem, the Japanese win, hands down. Figures compared seven SWPOA and POA campaigns* to Italy and Western Europe.

The numbers are cited in the format Pacific - Europe - ratio:

KIA - 1.78 - 0.36 - 5.2x
MIA - 5.50 - 1.74 - 3.1x
MIA - 0.17 - 0.06 - 2.8x
TOTAL - 7.45 - 2.16 - 3.26x

Bottom line - your chances of survival were far better against the Germans.

* I would question whether the numbers are truly disproportionate enough, since the analysis includes a couple of relative "walkovers" like Attu and the Marshalls, and excludes some bloodbaths like the Gilberts.

The primary source is JCS 924/15 25 April 1945.

[Sam H.]

Interesting, but I would think that you would also have to compare total cas. - after all, if you lose 1,000 men per day or 5,000 men per day is more important (in the concept of total war) than the % of Cas. you suffer.

[C. Udentz]

The information provided is largely irrelevant. A proper analysis is required.

No mathematician could determine or even comment on the figures submitted. I can see the ratios if nothing else. It means little unless more empirical evidence is forthcoming.

I look forward to this - if possible.

Udentz.

[Guillermo]

Commissar,

What is the "Gilbert bloodbath"?

Guillermo

[Commissar D, the Evil]

Hi Guillermo, the Gilbert Islands include Makin Island and especially the island of Tarawa. Tarawa was one of those inch by inch fights with very heavy U.S. casualties.
I believe U.S. casualties were 1027 killed in action or died of wounds, 2292 wounded in action, and 88 missing/presumed dead. The Japanese garrison consisted of 2,600 imperial marines, 1,000 Japanese workers and 1,200 Korean workers. Of the Japanese Garrison, 17 Japanese surrendered and 129 Korean laborers survived (some had fought with the garrison).
I think that kind of casualty ratio shows the difference between fighting an elite, dug-in Japanese force and the fighting on the Western Front.

Best Regards,
~D

[Guillermo]

Hi Guillermo, the Gilbert Islands include Makin Island and especially the island of Tarawa. Tarawa was one of those inch by inch fights with very heavy U.S. casualties.
I believe U.S. casualties were 1027 killed in action or died of wounds, 2292 wounded in action, and 88 missing/presumed dead. The Japanese garrison consisted of 2,600 imperial marines, 1,000 Japanese workers and 1,200 Korean workers. Of the Japanese Garrison, 17 Japanese surrendered and 129 Korean laborers survived (some had fought with the garrison).
I think that kind of casualty ratio shows the difference between fighting an elite, dug-in Japanese force and the fighting on the Western Front.

Best Regards,
~D

Commissar,

Your figures pale compared to the Ostfront. Your fellow commissars were savage and had no regard to human life. Stalin's order were to be obeyed utmost.

Guillermo

[Commissar D, the Evil]

Guillermo, the country, the nation, the psople had to be saved from the Hitlerite beasts. If we were soft, the night of Nazi genocide would have fallen over the Soviet Union and then, the entire world. If all of our men had fought as well as the Japanese defenders of Tarawa, no nazi would ever have seen the spires of Moscow.

Regards,
~D

[Fridolin]

Mmmmm...
As you all know, there are lies, d***d lies and statistics, and these could be one of the latter.
No one doubts the will (note I avoid the term 'fanaticism') of the Japanese soldiers and officers to die for Emperor and Country. But, as Patton once said, war is not about dying for your Country, but about making the little bas****d on the other side die for his.
Even making the enemy pay a heavy price for killing you is not necesssarily sound in military terms, because after battle, you all will be dead while the enemy will still have soldiers and, remember, save for Iwo and in a way Tarawa, in no Pacific battle the marines took more or as many casualties as the Japanese. The marines always killed more soliders than they lost, so they were more efficient at killing (probably because they had huge fire support), and that taking into account marines started in the worst possible situation (disembarking) while the Japanese were dug in in a way unknown in the more fluid European battlefields.
In the end, the balance of casualties was against the Japanese, whatever casualties USA troops took.

But the original question was about a 'formidable enemy', that is, an enemy with the capability of defeating you, not of making you pay a heavy price for your victory. In no Pacific battle were the Japanese capable of inflicting a complete defeat on the Marines (or Army) at division level or higher: their equipment, training, logistic support, etc. were simply not up to the task. They could resist in a basically passive defence, knowing they were going to die in the end, and only hoping thatt they could kill in the proccess americans in a 1:10 ratio, which they NEVER achieved as seen above. In this, they were also underestimating America's will to fight when it really mattered (a common mistake by dictatorships when dealing with 'soft' democracies). In circumstances other than passive defence in heavily fortified islands (such as open plains plains in China, or even in the main islands of Japan), the underequipped and obsolete -by 1944 standards- Japanese divisions would have been more easily defeated than at Iwo or Tarawa... see Manchuria.
On the other hand, the Germans were quite capable of inflicting heavy casualties AND defeating Allied units at division level or above, whenever the odds were at all bearable, not because of their capability to 'kill' more people -and receiving even more casualties-, but because of tactics, equipments, doctrine and logistics that allowed them to defeat enemy units without being anihilated themselves in the process.

There is some sort of a law of diminishing returns in defensive warfare, and the Japanese seem not to have known of it. After a certain point, when your main defensive line has been reached and breached, prolonging static defense only add to your fatalities without inflicting comparable ones on the attacking force. At his point, you're actually taking MORE casualties than you are inflicting, and the delaying of the enemy's main effort is not commensurate to your own erosion. A bit later, your'e taking even more casualties while not giving anby. If Japanese casualties could be split among the different phases of fighting, we would find that a very high percentage was taken in the later stages, when sacrifice was in vain because defeat was certain.

In my final analysis, at the GI level, the Japanese in island wafare probably were worse enemies, and even more formidable, because they did not abide by the rules, and had to be killed, not defeated. But in other tactical circumstances, and at regimental level and above, the Germans were a much more dangerous enemy than the Japanese, because they could outmanouvre, outsmart and beat you, even while not taking or causing casualites as heavy as in the Pacific islands.
War is not about killing as many enemies as possible, knowing that you are going to die in return, and that overall in the end you'll have more dead, but about defeating the enemy and surviving yourself. And that last, surviving to fight another day with increased experience, is what in the end makes you formidable.
Cheers

[Tom Houlihan]

Keith Bonn's When The Odds Were Even is an interesting study along these lines. During the battles for the Vosges Mountains, during Operation Nordwind, many of the American 'advantages' were unable to be brought into play. For a good part of that campaign, it came down to GI v. landser. This study compares doctrine, willingness to follow doctrine, training, supply, tactics, etc. While not perfect, it comes closest to an even match between the US and German soldiers.

[Fridolin]

Agree, but up to a point. His basic contention is (against Martin van Creveld, Dupuy and others), that an American unit was in WWII not only as good as, but more efficcient, that an equivalent German unit. But I believe that his starting point was flawed, because even in the Vosgues in late 1944-early 1945, the odds were NOT even, but heavily loaded. The Wehrmacht was a shadow of its former shelf, its veterans were so worn out as to be almost apathetic, while replacements were almost useless (Luftwaffe ground crews, children, disabled soldiers). NCOs and officers knew defeat was close; Luftwaffe was non-existent (while Allies could hope than as soon as weather cleared they would obtain overwhelming air support).
On the other hand, even if GI's were tired, they were in a much better shape; units were kept up to strenght, logistics were incomparable.
Simply the odds were not even if a cursory glance at numbers may seem so.
I believe M. Doubler's Closing with the enemy and B. Cooper's Death Traps are much better renderings of GI's war in Europe that Bonn's. They are not so intent in proving a thesis, but they novewer provide IMO better reasons for the (in my opinion) certain superiority of an American Division over the average German Pz. Div. -not to mention Ind. Divs. in the latter aprt of the war: units basically up-to-strenght, better material (except in AFVs), incomparably better logistics, better artillery, better communications, experienced but not exhausted veterans, etc. THis IMHO more than compensates for the German's superiority at the operational and tactical level, better NCO's and officers and a more flexible organization.
Cheers

[Craig]

I reckon it comes down to the size of the frontline, or length of it to describe it better.

Large scale operations in Europe were spread out over many miles while in the Pacific it could come down to hundreds of metres. All that firepower and all those men in such a small area is the reason for the atrocious casualty rate.

[Fridolin]

Guillermo, the country, the nation, the psople had to be saved from the Hitlerite beasts. If we were soft, the night of Nazi genocide would have fallen over the Soviet Union and then, the entire world. If all of our men had fought as well as the Japanese defenders of Tarawa, no nazi would ever have seen the spires of Moscow.

Regards,
~D

If the Soviets had fought like the Japanese at Tarawa in June-December 1941, Moscow would have fallen because the Russian army would have been anihilated west of Vyazma.
Glory to the Red Army!!!

[Tom Houlihan]

The Wehrmacht was a shadow of its former shelf, its veterans were so worn out as to be almost apathetic, while replacements were almost useless (Luftwaffe ground crews, children, disabled soldiers). NCOs and officers knew defeat was close; Luftwaffe was non-existent (while Allies could hope than as soon as weather cleared they would obtain overwhelming air support).
On the other hand, even if GI's were tired, they were in a much better shape; units were kept up to strenght, logistics were incomparable.

Okay, I will grant that the Wehrmacht was tired. Many of the veterans were worn out, but I don't know if I'd agree with the apathetic part.
The replacements did border on useless (not necessarily by their own fault - lack of training), but there was a comparable situation on the American side. I can't recall the program off the top of my head, but it was one of those technical training programs that they dumped, and put the guys in the infantry. Quite similar actually.
Also, units like TF Hudelson were grossly undertrained, and in point of fact, they were not supposed to be anywhere near German soldiers. As it turned out, they were in the front lines!
Sure the Luftwaffe was non-existent, but for quite some time, so was the USAAF.
Like I said, the comparison isn't perfect, but it's about as close as you're going to get. I've read it, and I've discussed many of the points with the author. Actually, it wasn't until I read Engler's [/i]Final Crisis that I realized how easily that offensive could have gone the other way!

Have a good day!

[Fridolin]

Yes, you're completely right it was not the fault of the excellent Luftwaffe ground troops that they were fed into the front line without proper training.
Also, you're right in that USA replacements were not much good in terms of training, etc., but after all they were mostly young, fit men, even if their IQ's were not of the highest standard (best material going to the rear instead of to the front as was the case in the Wehrmacht). On the other hand, the Germans were by early 1945 scraping the bottom of the barrel.

As for 'apathetic' men, I'd refer to those studies by Shaw and Marchand that show that after some 40 days oif continuous combat even veterans reach a exhaustion stage that finally leads to a 'vegetative stage' after 60 days or so, when soldiers no longer give a damn...

Anyway, my main points with Bonn's book are, first, that he's comparing the US Army at its pint of maximum efficiency (not at Kasserine...!) with a completely exhausted Wehrmacht. Second, that even if temporarily the USAAF was not in force, or weather conditions eroded logistics, the odds were not even in the Vosgues in late 1944-early 1945.

BTW what's the time there?

[Commissar D, the Evil]

Hi Fridolin my friend. I agree with you about the uses and abuses of statistics and I believe the report quoted has limited usefulness. I think though that the underlying conclusion is correct: fighting in the American Army in Europe against the Germans was a safer bet per soldier than fighting in the Pacific against the Japanese.
Now, of course, the terrain and size of the units involved were totally different. However, I'd simply point out that on Tarawa, an island not included in the study, the Invasion force was 35,000 strong. This gave it a manpower superiority of at least 10-1. I won't hazard a guess at the invasion force's overwhelming firepower advantage.
My point is, what would an elite German unit done in the face of 10-1 odds? Either retreated or surrendered.
And, I'd add that in none of these scenarios were the Japanese able to count on sizable reinforcements, resupply or aircover.
So, for my money, a single Japanese Imperial Marine Brigade on an island is worth an SS-PanzerGrenadier Division on the steppes of Russia in terms of its ability to hold ground.

Best Regards,
~D