Winter War - Night Raids.

Foreign volunteers, collaboration and Axis Allies 1939-1945.

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tigre
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Winter War - Night Raids.

Post by tigre »

Hello to all :D; Soviet point of view.....................

Winter War - Night Raids.

During action on the Finnish front, small raiding parties did important work. Protected by darkness or inclement weather these parties approached enemy fortifications not only to capture prisoners to extract valuable information from them, but they also frequently accomplished important missions. More than once a raiding partynsucceded in bringing back valuable information on enemy strength and disposition, as well as on the situation of his antitank and anti-infantry obstacles, and the nature of his permanent fortifications.

Night reconnaissance can never be standardized - the Finnish war has proved this. Every change in the general situation brings changes in the methods of each individual reconnaissance. The commander must be vigilant to adjust himself to the ever-changing picture of battle.

On 5 January 1940, at sunset, a Sovict observer noticed that the Finns placed an OP at the edge of the woods, to the southeast of Hill 655 (or 65.5?). Upon learning this , the Soviet company commander decided to capture the two Finnish soldiers at the OP.

At about 1:00 AM a raiding party was sent out, consisting of the company commander, the company political instructor and three soldiers . The party was supported by a rifle platoon, which took up position in brushwood at a distance of some 300-400 meters.

The night was cold, the snow was deep everywhere. The men moved forward slowly but surely. Four hours later at the edge of the woods, a dark spot was observed at 50-60 meters. The party continued to advance by crawling. When only a few meters from the dark spot a shot was heard, which missed its mark but served to reveal that the dark spot was a Finnish soldier.

Thereupon the company commander tossed an unloaded hand grenade at the Finn, and while the latter squatted in his skirmish trench, waiting for the explosion, he was beset by two of the Russians who promptly gagged him, tied his hands, and proceeded to pull the prisoner into the brushwood.

Meanwhile the Finns opened fire against the party, but to no avail, since the mission was accomplished. The prisoner was the noncommissioned officer in command of the field OP.

Worthy of special attention in this exploit was the resourcefulness of the company commander in tossing the hand grenade when he did. Had he hesitated but a few seconds , the mission would have failed.

Source: Catalog of Selected Periodical Articles. Military Review. June 1941.

Any idea about the location of that hill? Cheers. Raúl M 8).
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.
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Re: Winter War - Night Raids.

Post by tigre »

Hello to all :D; more....................

Winter War - Night Raids.

Frequently there are instances when the mission can be accomplished only by penetrating the enemy position. In such case, of course, it will be advisable to employ large raiding parties, reinforced by pioneers. The following illustrates this :
Report was received from a Soviet OP that every morning and evening a group of 3 to 5 Finns runs to the rear from a fortification in the Summa sector, through a communication trench, returning the same way. The Soviet commander decided to go around the fortification at night, in order to capture a prisoner and to learn about the nature and strength of the fortification (later disclosed as one of the principle fortifications of the Summa sector).

On the night of 13 January a party of 22 men led by the company commander, set out on a raid. For two days prior to the raid, the company commander had observed the object of reconnaissance and the activity around the fortification. He led his men with all assurance and decision. One half of the party were pioneers and the party was supported by two infantry platoons in concealed positions at a distance of 300-400 meters.

At 4:00 AM the party approached the fortification from the rear and descended into the communication trench. The fortification had two doors, of which the first had been demolished by Soviet artillery, and the second was intact. Half an hour later, at the very moment when the Soviet commander was busy making a sketch of the fortification, the second door opened and two Finnish soldiers appeared.

One of the Russians, who was hiding in the ruins of the first door, waited until the first of the two Finns reached him, and then struck this Finn slightly in the right shoulder with a bayonet. The Finn uttered a few unintelligible words and fell. The second Finnish soldier fired his rifle and ran back, slamming the door. Two or three minutes later the adjacent pill boxes, which apparently were warned by the second Finn by telephone, fired several flares and opened heavy machine-gun fire.

All this, however, was without avail. Making use of covered paths, the party, which had now dispersed, returned to Soviet lines without suffering any losses. An hour and a half later the prisoner was brought to headquarters. He stated that he was captured while en route to relieve a field post located some 150-200 meters to the front of the fortification. This in- formation, together with the sketch made by the company commander, served to good purpose.

It is readily evident that the success of this raid was due entirely to the diligence of the company commander in his careful, two- day study of the terrain of action. Inasmuch as the success or failure of reconnaissance depends entirely on the concealment of movement of personnel, special attention must be paid to clothing, armament and equipment. All extra articles must be left behind. Short coats should be worn, especially when on skis. The rifle may be cumbersome. When crawling, therefore, the soldier should be equipped with an automatic, hand grenades and trench knife. Each man should have a map on which the situation is not to appear; also a compass and a watch.

While a dark night is conducive to successful reconnaissance, darkness alone should not be the only factor. Weather, too is most important. On the Finnish front best reconnaissance work was accomplished during snowfall, in fog or blizzard.

Source: Catalog of Selected Periodical Articles. Military Review. June 1941.

It's all. Cheers. Raúl M 8).
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.
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