Raid towards Breda 1940.

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Preparations up to May 10, 1940 for the raid of the 7th French Army towards Breda.

"The worst mental disorder is to mistake one's desires for reality" (*).

The engagement of the French armies in 1940 is the subject of abundant and passionate literature. There are many clichés. Shortcuts are common to describe the land action. Details are forgotten. Memories focus on simple but false ideas. Because the Maginot Line would have been useless, because the French units would have been poorly equipped, France could only lose against a German enemy adorned with all the military virtues. It was inevitable, and moreover, that is what happened. The consequence becomes an explanation of the cause.

This is a matter of taking a reasoned step, by making a well-founded judgment on the planning of operations, to deepen the understanding of the defeat of 1940. The conduct of operations can only exceptionally compensate for the inadequacies of the operation plan. The study of the preparation of the 7th Army for combat is thus a textbook case. General Giraud's staff, in fact, planned an original action over several months, an army raid towards Holland, in a framework that was no less original, the subordination to General Gamelin, then to General Georges.

The army was thus directly confronted with two of the major problems posed to French strategists before the start of the German attack, namely the attitude of the Belgians and the Dutch, and the harmful influence of political-military considerations on the preparation of the battle

The conclusions are paradoxical, given the goal initially pursued. It appears that the French defeat was predictable on the morning of May 10. The reasons commonly cited are not, however, sufficient. More than means, it was a question of strategy.

So, why and how did General Gamelin deprive himself of his strategic reserves? It is necessary to go back to 1935 to understand it.

The preliminary procrastination.

At that time, the French high command was torn between two temptations. The first was that of the defensive to save lives and "have a few years to modernize an army that was beginning its transformation". The second, imposed by politicians, was the temptation to come to the aid of Belgium in the event of a German aggression, whatever the circumstances. A middle, pragmatic path envisaged the defense of the front, in Belgium, this double crossroads, land which links the plains of the North to Paris, riverine between the Rhine and the seaports.

It would make it possible not to abandon Antwerp and the Belgian coast to the Kriegsmarine, which is in line with British wishes, expressed from the beginning of the planning of the engagement of a BEF (British Expeditionary Force), in March 1936. Napoleon had already said it: Antwerp is "a pistol aimed at the heart of England". The protection of the populations of the large cities of the North of France would be better ensured, the front would be shortened by 250 km in France, 400 in fact with the salients, to 100 km in Belgium between Wavre and Givet. Finally, and perhaps above all, it would be possible to create a continuous front and the Belgian army would be kept in line on its territory.

In the French Plan D of 1933, the 7th Army was already in reserve at Reims, able to act in the South of the Ardennes. The future Breda maneuver appeared at the conference of November 22, 1934. General Gamelin promised the chief of staff of the Belgian army, General Cumont, a study "to improve the situation", because plan D bis ignored a German attack through Holland.
General Gamelin already had intentions, which would be constant over the period. His curious decisions during the Phoney War would have their origins in his dream of a continuous allied front, and his inability to give orders. The causes of his attitude, whether they relate to medicine or any other discipline, are beyond the scope of this article.

Quote from Bossuet written on the file containing the intelligence summaries of the 7th Army (*).

Source: La préparation jusqu'au 10 mai 1940 du raid de la 7e Armée francaise vers Breda. Didier Tanguy. RIHM n° 81Commission Française d'Histoire Militaire.

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; more.......................

Preparations up to May 10, 1940 for the raid of the 7th French Army towards Breda.

The preliminary procrastination.

In fact, the bulk of French plans were finalized as early as 1935. On April 6, after Germany reoccupied the demilitarized zone in the Rhineland, General Gamelin wrote to the Minister of War: "On the military level, a defensive attitude is initially required, supported by our permanent organizations and the major obstacles on the ground. It is only once our mobilization is complete that we can consider changing our attitude. As for our offensive action, it must be understood that it can only be considered after assembly and executed with our active forces, especially the best of them." The Commander-in-Chief was already in a position that would make him agree to easily part with his strategic reserve in 1940 in favor of action among neutrals. It remained to determine the starting point for the counterattack.

On May 15, 1936, General Gamelin described the Hollande hypothesis as "the most likely hypothesis." The constraints were already known. The Commander-in-Chief declared in 1936: "Intervention in Belgium is only interesting if the Belgians call on us before the aggression (…). If they wait to be attacked, we will arrive too late". These conclusions are confirmed by the map exercises of the High Council of War from October 1936 to April 1937, and during the winter of 1937.

After these test exercises, which today would be called wargaming, General Gamelin will specify his idea of ​​decisive flank counter-attacks against the Germans, which he now intends to launch from the favorable positions of Ghent-Antwerp held by the Belgians. He is omnipresent. "Whether in the organization of the armed forces or in the development of pacts and policy towards the powers of Central Europe, England or the Neutrals, his role is crucial".

In January 1938, taking up the key ideas of Plan D bis, the Echo Plan kept the 7th Army in reserve between Arras and Reims. The first of the three forms of intervention in Belgium, the northern variant of the plan, was a simple advance of the national resistance position towards the Escaut to the east of Lille, covered by the cavalry. This maneuver would later be called the "Escaut Plan". This French plan had a major flaw. It was a reaction plan. The initiative was German. The big question that the Allied High Command was asking itself was therefore: how to ward off the surprise of the German attack?

The design of this maneuver would also be made difficult by the mediocrity of Franco-Belgian relations. Initially, the Treaty of Locarno obliged France to help Belgium. However, King Leopold's decision to implement a policy of independence, a policy explained in his declaration of October 14, 1936, cast doubt on Belgian loyalty to its allies. For French strategists, relations with Belgium can be summed up in one expression: "the puzzle of Belgian neutrality". These relations are the key to planning the engagement of the Allied forces in Belgium.

The uncertainty about Belgian consent will push the Allied command to think about planning that adds Belgian hypotheses to hypotheses about the German enemy. The work of the general staff will then often appear as a series of contradictions between the desirable and the possible, particularly with regard to deadlines, the defensive position that is actually prepared on the border and the one on which it is planned to fight. Thus, why fortify the North when Allied Belgium offers us a protective glacis?

Source: La préparation jusqu'au 10 mai 1940 du raid de la 7e Armée francaise vers Breda. Didier Tanguy. RIHM n° 81Commission Française d'Histoire Militaire.

Cheers. Raúl M .

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Preparations up to May 10, 1940 for the raid of the 7th French Army towards Breda.

The strength of the 7th Army.

General Giraud will be in command of the 7th Army throughout the fake war, from the mobilization. He is described as a man more confident than pessimistic, more a trainer of men than a calculator. He claims to have baraka (in Islam, it is a kind of blessing), that is, luck in combat. Wounded, taken prisoner and escaped during the First World War, he then participated in the conquest of Morocco, before becoming a student and then a teacher at the Higher War School.

On September 2, 1939, the advanced echelons of the 7th Army Headquarters arrived at the small town of Pargny-les-Reims. The high command chose this deployment in the Reims region, between the northern border and Paris, because the railway and road communication routes would allow the army to intervene quickly towards the less fortified areas of the north-eastern front.

The last formations of organic elements installed in the territory of the 17th Military Region of Toulouse, under the orders of Colonel Damidoux, landed in the Reims region on 27 September, putting an end to the army's concentration phase.

Lieutenant Colonel Devinck, head of the 4th Office of the 7th Army from 3 September 1939 to 30 June 1940, detailed the concentration of the army southwest of Reims. The organic elements came, for the most part, from the southwest and the south of France. The head of the 4th Office confirms the dissimilar appearance of the units, the difficulties of installation, the lack of military training of part of the personnel, the shortages of equipment and weapons. He also notes the variety and sometimes wear and tear of motor vehicles.

The headquarters and organic elements of the army represent 1,000 officers, 21,000 soldiers, 3,300 animals, 1,200 horse-drawn vehicles and 2,300 motor vehicles. Lieutenant Colonel Devinck points out several problems that will influence operations. In particular, the responsibilities of the generals commanding the artillery and the army engineers are poorly defined. They combine a tactical function and a department head function, two activities that will come into conflict during operations. "A commander of weapons, at the "army" level, cannot be simultaneously absorbed by the front, which runs the game, and by the rear, which provides him with the means, given their quantities, their importance and their multiple origins.

It is still planned that the transport of certain ammunition will be drawn by horses, although this supply has priority in all armies. Medical resources are not sufficiently autonomous. The service does not have its own means of transport, the volume of supplies is important. As for the horse-drawn train, the requisition only foresees "a waste of the resources of the Gascon and Pyrenean countryside."

From the beginning, during the mobilization and concentration of the army, the General Staff methodically addressed the problem of increasing power. First of all, it is a question of regulating the operation of the teams that will design future actions. The 3rd Office of the 7th Army distributed a memorandum on September 4 to explain the organization of the army to its subordinates. This note is complemented by an instruction on the internal functioning of the General Headquarters.

This General Headquarters is composed of two groups. The first group covers the territorial zone of the front occupied by the army. The second group covers the rear area, also called the "stage zone".

Source: La préparation jusqu'au 10 mai 1940 du raid de la 7e Armée francaise vers Breda. Didier Tanguy. RIHM n° 81Commission Française d'Histoire Militaire.

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; more.......................

Preparations up to May 10, 1940 for the raid of the 7th French Army towards Breda.

The strength of the 7th Army.

The 1st group includes a general staff, troop and service commands, and the troops of the headquarters. It represents 249 officers and 840 men. The general staff is divided into four offices:

- 1st Office: personnel;

- 2nd Office: intelligence;

- 3rd Office: operations;

- 4th Office: transport, supplies.

The internal notes specify that the service operates in accordance with the requirements of the instruction of May 28, 1924 on the organization and operation of general staffs in the field. In particular, the general staff directly regulates, according to the orders of the general commanding the army, all questions relating to operations. The arms and services directly order the technical arrangements. The questions must be dealt with quickly, after agreement between the offices, arms or services concerned. It is specified that often, and in any case for simple questions, personal contacts of officers will suffice.

The chief of staff personally and directly directs the 2nd and 3rd offices, as well as the transmission service. The deputy chief of staff also directs, according to the instructions of the chief of staff, the 1st and 4th offices, as well as the commands of the general headquarters. He particularly monitors the coordination of supplies, evacuations and traffic issues with current or planned operations.

Studies to adapt the army headquarters to the new requirements will continue until the engagement in May 1940. A press service composed of two officers is created in October17.

These provisions will prove their effectiveness until May 10, 1940. It is even permissible to think that the strong responsiveness of the general staff of the 7th Army to the requests of its superiors will push them to ask for more and more studies. This version partly explains why the plans and hypotheses accumulated. Intellectually, the 7th Army staff never lost its footing.

The 3rd Bureau quickly clarified the division of the 1st group of the headquarters. It recalled that, normally, all the elements of the 1st group would be distributed in an area allowing close collaboration between its constituent elements. However, during certain active operations, a command post as small as possible would be detached forward. At the end of its movement, the headquarters would deploy in an area that would include seven to eight medium-sized villages.

During this period, the 4th Bureau planned the removal of the organic elements. The automobile units would reach their future operational deployment zones by road. The other units would have to move over 12 days, using 60 trains. The movement plan would, however, come into play without incident to move the 7th Army from the Reims region to Flanders in November 1939.

The 7th Army, concentrated to the South-West of Reims, was only a command body, without divisions or mission. It was kept at the disposal of the general commanding in chief. However, as a member of the High Council of War, General Giraud had knowledge of various plans and eventualities falling within the framework of cover operations.

The command took advantage of the calm period following the arrival of the army formations in the concentration zone to ensure their preparation by organizing specialized training courses.

Finally, on October 20, 1939, the general commanding in chief on the North-Eastern front entrusted the general commanding the 7th Army with the permanent mission of inspecting the large units and training battalions stationed in the staging area of ​​the Grand Quartier Général. He thus accumulates territorial and operational responsibilities, which can only disperse his efforts. This general role is short-lived. It will be shortened by the alert measures of November 1939.

Source: La préparation jusqu'au 10 mai 1940 du raid de la 7e Armée francaise vers Breda. Didier Tanguy. RIHM n° 81Commission Française d'Histoire Militaire.

Cheers. Raúl M .