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Two Years Ago in the West. Hours of Decision.
It was mid May . . . In the forenoon Maubeuge had been taken in a bold coup de main by the 2nd Battalion, and the 3rd Company of the "Red Devils" had repulsed a desperate counterthrust by the enemy. A short stubborn duel between two tanks at 80 meters ( about 87 yards ) brought the final decision. Fast and furiously the two adversaries hurled their AT shells at one another. Everything was at stake. A hundredth of a second's advantage won over the adversary had brought victory. Proudly, the Model IV tank had been able to report by radio : "The last enemy resistance broken ; the armored enemy crushed. "
But there is no halt for the armored arm. It is the same as in the case of an express train-a minute's stop, then it travels on. And that was the way matters stood on that hot day in early summer.
We were to go to the direction of Valencienne! Across the fields we - the 3d Company - went with our heavy tanks ahead. On the highway our columns came to a halt. I asked the reason and learned that our reconnaissance had run into the enemy just outside the village of Villereau.
My commander was at the moment in conference with some of the higher officers. Therefore I had to make my own decision. I did not have any reflections to make. All we had to do was "Drive ahead past our own columns : drive ahead for purposes of reconnaissance! "
We were not to be stopped by the great difficulties of the terrain and after just 40 minutes time the Company succeeded in making contact with the commander of the battalion 3 kilometers ( about 1,864 miles ) outside of Villereau. There was a brief discussion of the situation. I submitted a proposition. The commander agreed and immediately the orders were given to the platoon leaders.
Scarcely two minutes later the big, cleancut Model IV tanks of the 1st Platoon were on their way after the enemy. Where was he? Where was his devilish AT artillery concealed?
These thoughts were running through the mind of each of the tank men. Every- one knows that in close fighting between tanks and AT artillery, that side comes out the winner that has the best nerves, is quickest, and whose shots take effect first. My ears listened tensely to the clatter of the tank treads of the departing platoon.
Suddenly I was already beginning to get uneasy-I heard three reports from one of our Model IV tanks and immediately afterward received the radio message : "Enemy AT cannon put out of order ; enemy retreating by way of Villereau ; 1st Platoon is after them. " The moment had now come for the entire company. Quickly we caught up with our leading tank. In joint assaults the enemy was soon driven far back beyond the village.
In my role as commander I spent a little while orienting myself anew with respect both to terrain and situation. Up ahead I perceived clearly that the en- emy was retreating. But what was that over there on the left? I suddenly caught my breath ; scarcely 1200 meters ahead , I saw the enemy hurrying out of Le Quesnoy at a rapid pace with tanks, AT artillery, and infantry. All his move- ments came to an end in a woods so-he was intending to get at our flank!
Sources: Article of Hptm. von Vietinghoff translated from Die Panzertruppe September 1942. Military Review. May 1943.
Cheers. Raúl M .
Incidents from the battle of france 1940.
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Re: Incidents from the battle of france 1940.
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.
Re: Incidents from the battle of france 1940.
Hello to all ; more...............
Two Years Ago in the West. Hours of Decision.
A thousand thoughts and reflections coursed through my brain : would the enemy be able to annul our valuable victories ? He must never, never succeed in doing this. He would still get acquainted with the "Red Devils . "
I was seized with raging anger against them. All day long they had lain opposite us with their red fezzes. Today there would be a clear, unmistakable decision made ! They would get acquainted now with our concentrated "will to annihilate. "
It took just a few short words to get the company in the correct frame of mind. The code names for the platoons were already engraved on the brains of the radio men; they had no further use for radio code tables. "1st Platoon go around the woods to the right ; 2nd Platoon, on the left. Commander's tank with Company Headquarters Detachment in the center. March time ; after the enemy, " this was the order. From this point on, the company continued to operate almost automatically. The experiences gained in many a fight rendered it unnecessary to give many orders. Everyone already knew just what he was to do.
I had a good view from my turret. Widely deployed, the tanks rushed at the enemy. Automatically the left pla- toon came to a halt ahead of the first stretch that we had to traverse in order to take up fire protection. The rest of us drove ahead. The enemy's shells were now striking to right and left of us. One could see the dry dirt spurting up all over the field where the shells from the AT cannon were striking. But what did we care about that! All we knew now was our objective ; we had to reach it.
The platoon under F had now deployed to the right. It had the difficult task of helping in the protection of our right flank. I heard the well-known roar of our good old AT cannon. More and more violent the firing became. Soon it was impossible to distinguish whether it was the sound of our own guns or the bursting of the enemy's shells .
In my tank the heat reached the boiling point. Fifty degrees ( about 112 degrees Fahrenheit ) and more, mixed with the powder smoke and the smell of burned oil, the poisonous- smelling gases coming from the steering apparatus turned the tank into a regular hell. The hands of the driver gripped tenaciously the softened rubber of the control stick. Covered with grime and with his face running with perspiration but with a clear calm voice the radio operator in his hot and narrow hell was sending message after message.
His gaze tense and his eyes already bulging from the hour's exertion, my unshaven gunner peered through the sights. Oh, he is wide awake ! Not a fly can escape him. What was that over there? Driver, halt ! Out with the field glasses. Those were four enemy tanks ! But I was yet too far away.
Like a fox, we slipped up on the tanks. We found a favorable hedge and worked our way forward along it . We had good observation over the course it followed. But it is always a wild trip along hedges ! That is always where the ac- cursed AT cannon are located. But we knew how to manage it.
We moved slowly past the corner but took the curve at highest speed . Finally we were within range of the enemy tank. "Cannon, 800 meters ; enemy tank; fire !" We fired salvo after salvo as if on the drill ground. The first of the tanks was now on fire. Now I also saw the crew of the second climbing out. It too must have been hit. Suddenly I heard a terrific explosion behind us. A cold flash passed over my body. I guessed what had happened. One of the tanks of F ...'s platoon had been shot through the gas tank. A quick prayer passed our lips : "Lord, save our brave crew. "
Our mission called us again to our task of watching ahead. Now the Company Headquarters Detachment was also firing as hard as its guns would fire into the woods occupied by the enemy.
The enemy was no longer able to hold out against us. Wounded men were lying everywhere. The despairing enemy came out of their rifle pits with hands raised. The victory was ours. A happy feeling took possession of all of us as we reported back our proud success. One- half of an enemy battery, four enemy tanks, several AT cannon put out of commission. Long, retreating columns of the enemy were entirely broken up and annihilated. A flank attack by the enemy was repulsed.
Sources: Article of Hptm. von Vietinghoff translated from Die Panzertruppe September 1942. Military Review. May 1943.
It's all. Cheers. Raúl M .
Two Years Ago in the West. Hours of Decision.
A thousand thoughts and reflections coursed through my brain : would the enemy be able to annul our valuable victories ? He must never, never succeed in doing this. He would still get acquainted with the "Red Devils . "
I was seized with raging anger against them. All day long they had lain opposite us with their red fezzes. Today there would be a clear, unmistakable decision made ! They would get acquainted now with our concentrated "will to annihilate. "
It took just a few short words to get the company in the correct frame of mind. The code names for the platoons were already engraved on the brains of the radio men; they had no further use for radio code tables. "1st Platoon go around the woods to the right ; 2nd Platoon, on the left. Commander's tank with Company Headquarters Detachment in the center. March time ; after the enemy, " this was the order. From this point on, the company continued to operate almost automatically. The experiences gained in many a fight rendered it unnecessary to give many orders. Everyone already knew just what he was to do.
I had a good view from my turret. Widely deployed, the tanks rushed at the enemy. Automatically the left pla- toon came to a halt ahead of the first stretch that we had to traverse in order to take up fire protection. The rest of us drove ahead. The enemy's shells were now striking to right and left of us. One could see the dry dirt spurting up all over the field where the shells from the AT cannon were striking. But what did we care about that! All we knew now was our objective ; we had to reach it.
The platoon under F had now deployed to the right. It had the difficult task of helping in the protection of our right flank. I heard the well-known roar of our good old AT cannon. More and more violent the firing became. Soon it was impossible to distinguish whether it was the sound of our own guns or the bursting of the enemy's shells .
In my tank the heat reached the boiling point. Fifty degrees ( about 112 degrees Fahrenheit ) and more, mixed with the powder smoke and the smell of burned oil, the poisonous- smelling gases coming from the steering apparatus turned the tank into a regular hell. The hands of the driver gripped tenaciously the softened rubber of the control stick. Covered with grime and with his face running with perspiration but with a clear calm voice the radio operator in his hot and narrow hell was sending message after message.
His gaze tense and his eyes already bulging from the hour's exertion, my unshaven gunner peered through the sights. Oh, he is wide awake ! Not a fly can escape him. What was that over there? Driver, halt ! Out with the field glasses. Those were four enemy tanks ! But I was yet too far away.
Like a fox, we slipped up on the tanks. We found a favorable hedge and worked our way forward along it . We had good observation over the course it followed. But it is always a wild trip along hedges ! That is always where the ac- cursed AT cannon are located. But we knew how to manage it.
We moved slowly past the corner but took the curve at highest speed . Finally we were within range of the enemy tank. "Cannon, 800 meters ; enemy tank; fire !" We fired salvo after salvo as if on the drill ground. The first of the tanks was now on fire. Now I also saw the crew of the second climbing out. It too must have been hit. Suddenly I heard a terrific explosion behind us. A cold flash passed over my body. I guessed what had happened. One of the tanks of F ...'s platoon had been shot through the gas tank. A quick prayer passed our lips : "Lord, save our brave crew. "
Our mission called us again to our task of watching ahead. Now the Company Headquarters Detachment was also firing as hard as its guns would fire into the woods occupied by the enemy.
The enemy was no longer able to hold out against us. Wounded men were lying everywhere. The despairing enemy came out of their rifle pits with hands raised. The victory was ours. A happy feeling took possession of all of us as we reported back our proud success. One- half of an enemy battery, four enemy tanks, several AT cannon put out of commission. Long, retreating columns of the enemy were entirely broken up and annihilated. A flank attack by the enemy was repulsed.
Sources: Article of Hptm. von Vietinghoff translated from Die Panzertruppe September 1942. Military Review. May 1943.
It's all. Cheers. Raúl M .
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.
Re: Incidents from the battle of france 1940.
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Crossings across the Saône 1940.
1. General situation: The division itself is preparing the defence in the Belfort sector. According to the reports received, the enemy motorised troops are acting from the north-west, from Neufchâteau.
On the night of 14 June 1940, the 2nd Battalion of the "z" Regiment, which is located in the Belfort section, is ordered to close the crossings over the Saône in the section whose limits can be seen in sketch 2. An allied detachment blocks the southern road crossing at Gray s. Saône; the river crossings in the north are closed by the division's own Reconnaissance Detachment.
The 2nd Battalion of Regiment "z" was transported to the Saône by trucks at 12:00 on 15 June 1940. The battalion section has 6 road and 1 railway bridge. The battalion positions are shown on the sketch.
From the early morning of 16 June 1940, the battalion commander had a tank company with “R 35” model combat vehicles at his disposal.
2. Development: Throughout the afternoon of 15 June 1940, large numbers of refugees and scattered Allied troops crossed all the bridges in the north-west section. They give fantastic information about the enemy, who is said to be directly behind them. Towards dawn on 16 June, the enemy came into contact with the defending troops at all river crossings, most violently on the left wing and in the middle of the sector.
Enemy scouts soon attempted to cross the river in several places. These attempts were supported by enemy air activity from about 30 bombers.
At 10:00 a.m., the commander of the left wing company reported that the enemy had succeeded in advancing across the river at the Quitteur bridge. Based on this report, the battalion commander decides to carry out a counterattack with three tanks, an infantry platoon and a heavy machine gun platoon to regain possession of the bridge near Quitteur.
At the moment (around 11:00 a.m.) when these combined troops are marching from La Vaivre in the direction of Motey, a motorized enemy column appears on the road near Motey and is heading towards La Vaivre. An immediate attack by the combined detachment itself, which destroys some enemy tanks, forces the entire enemy column to stop.
Our own reconnaissance services inform the battalion commander that the enemy tank column is positioned along the entire road from Motey to Beaujeu and that the left wing company is completely isolated from the battalion.
Sources: Der Kommandant im Kampf : von einem polnischen Kriegsteilnehmer. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitung = Journal militaire suisse = Gazetta militare svizzera. Band (Jahr): 87=107 (1941). Heft 4
Cheers. Raúl M .
Crossings across the Saône 1940.
1. General situation: The division itself is preparing the defence in the Belfort sector. According to the reports received, the enemy motorised troops are acting from the north-west, from Neufchâteau.
On the night of 14 June 1940, the 2nd Battalion of the "z" Regiment, which is located in the Belfort section, is ordered to close the crossings over the Saône in the section whose limits can be seen in sketch 2. An allied detachment blocks the southern road crossing at Gray s. Saône; the river crossings in the north are closed by the division's own Reconnaissance Detachment.
The 2nd Battalion of Regiment "z" was transported to the Saône by trucks at 12:00 on 15 June 1940. The battalion section has 6 road and 1 railway bridge. The battalion positions are shown on the sketch.
From the early morning of 16 June 1940, the battalion commander had a tank company with “R 35” model combat vehicles at his disposal.
2. Development: Throughout the afternoon of 15 June 1940, large numbers of refugees and scattered Allied troops crossed all the bridges in the north-west section. They give fantastic information about the enemy, who is said to be directly behind them. Towards dawn on 16 June, the enemy came into contact with the defending troops at all river crossings, most violently on the left wing and in the middle of the sector.
Enemy scouts soon attempted to cross the river in several places. These attempts were supported by enemy air activity from about 30 bombers.
At 10:00 a.m., the commander of the left wing company reported that the enemy had succeeded in advancing across the river at the Quitteur bridge. Based on this report, the battalion commander decides to carry out a counterattack with three tanks, an infantry platoon and a heavy machine gun platoon to regain possession of the bridge near Quitteur.
At the moment (around 11:00 a.m.) when these combined troops are marching from La Vaivre in the direction of Motey, a motorized enemy column appears on the road near Motey and is heading towards La Vaivre. An immediate attack by the combined detachment itself, which destroys some enemy tanks, forces the entire enemy column to stop.
Our own reconnaissance services inform the battalion commander that the enemy tank column is positioned along the entire road from Motey to Beaujeu and that the left wing company is completely isolated from the battalion.
Sources: Der Kommandant im Kampf : von einem polnischen Kriegsteilnehmer. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitung = Journal militaire suisse = Gazetta militare svizzera. Band (Jahr): 87=107 (1941). Heft 4
Cheers. Raúl M .
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- Sketch 2..........................................
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Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.
Re: Incidents from the battle of france 1940.
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Crossings across the Saône 1940.
2. Development: During the battle with the tank column, an officer from the French headquarters of the Saône defense reported to the battalion commander. He brought an order that was brief: "Withdraw immediately from the positions on the Saône. The neighbor on the left wing had already withdrawn during the night of June 15/16. The city of Besançon (about 40 km southeast) is in enemy hands. The situation in the city of Vesoul (about 15 km northeast) is uncertain." The officer shows northeast on the map as the general direction of retreat and takes his leave in a hurry.
In the meantime, the battle becomes more intense. The runners sent to the left wing company return with the report that they have not succeeded in breaking through the tank column that is lined up along the entire length of the street and reaching the company. A second report tell about enemy armored vehicles that suddenly appeared near la Chapelle.
The general situation at 1:00 p.m. is as follows:
1. The battalion is fighting the enemy across the entire sector (about 25 km); the reserve, except for a few tanks, is fighting near Motey;
2. the left wing company is cut off from the battalion and attempts to contact it have failed,
3. the enemy also appears in the rear near la Chapelle,
4. there is a complete lack of wire and radio communications,
5. there are no means of transport,
6. the enemy is already in the distant rear positions.
7. the direction of retreat is actually unknown.
In this situation, the battalion commander must decide. The decision is as follows:
a) to attack the enemy at Motey vigorously and then break away from him, starting with the left wing,
b) to assemble the battalion in the forest at Vaudey,
c) under cover of darkness and the forest, in connection with the situation, to move in a general direction northeast.
The corresponding orders were issued. The time at which the battalion is to break away from the enemy was set at 4:30-5:15 p.m.
At 2:00 p.m. the planned attack on the enemy tank column at Motey begins, with all of our own reserves going into battle. The enemy is thrown back and behaves passively.
According to orders, the individual companies begin to retreat under enemy fire and between 7:30-8:30 p.m. the battalion assembles at Vaudey. The battalion returned to its own division on June 18 at 5:00 p.m. near Maîche, near the Swiss border.
Sources: Der Kommandant im Kampf : von einem polnischen Kriegsteilnehmer. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitung = Journal militaire suisse = Gazetta militare svizzera. Band (Jahr): 87=107 (1941). Heft 4
Cheers. Raúl M .
Crossings across the Saône 1940.
2. Development: During the battle with the tank column, an officer from the French headquarters of the Saône defense reported to the battalion commander. He brought an order that was brief: "Withdraw immediately from the positions on the Saône. The neighbor on the left wing had already withdrawn during the night of June 15/16. The city of Besançon (about 40 km southeast) is in enemy hands. The situation in the city of Vesoul (about 15 km northeast) is uncertain." The officer shows northeast on the map as the general direction of retreat and takes his leave in a hurry.
In the meantime, the battle becomes more intense. The runners sent to the left wing company return with the report that they have not succeeded in breaking through the tank column that is lined up along the entire length of the street and reaching the company. A second report tell about enemy armored vehicles that suddenly appeared near la Chapelle.
The general situation at 1:00 p.m. is as follows:
1. The battalion is fighting the enemy across the entire sector (about 25 km); the reserve, except for a few tanks, is fighting near Motey;
2. the left wing company is cut off from the battalion and attempts to contact it have failed,
3. the enemy also appears in the rear near la Chapelle,
4. there is a complete lack of wire and radio communications,
5. there are no means of transport,
6. the enemy is already in the distant rear positions.
7. the direction of retreat is actually unknown.
In this situation, the battalion commander must decide. The decision is as follows:
a) to attack the enemy at Motey vigorously and then break away from him, starting with the left wing,
b) to assemble the battalion in the forest at Vaudey,
c) under cover of darkness and the forest, in connection with the situation, to move in a general direction northeast.
The corresponding orders were issued. The time at which the battalion is to break away from the enemy was set at 4:30-5:15 p.m.
At 2:00 p.m. the planned attack on the enemy tank column at Motey begins, with all of our own reserves going into battle. The enemy is thrown back and behaves passively.
According to orders, the individual companies begin to retreat under enemy fire and between 7:30-8:30 p.m. the battalion assembles at Vaudey. The battalion returned to its own division on June 18 at 5:00 p.m. near Maîche, near the Swiss border.
Sources: Der Kommandant im Kampf : von einem polnischen Kriegsteilnehmer. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitung = Journal militaire suisse = Gazetta militare svizzera. Band (Jahr): 87=107 (1941). Heft 4
Cheers. Raúl M .
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.
Re: Incidents from the battle of france 1940.
Hello to all ; more...............
Night retreat in a southern direction.
1. General situation: The 1st Polish Infantry Division, after a night retreat in a southern direction, remaining in constant contact with the enemy, organized a temporary defense of the general line Dieuze-Guermange-Fribourg Forests (east of Guermange *) from dawn on June 16, 1940.
The 2nd Battalion of the 2nd Infantry Regiment prepares the defense on the edge of the forest south of Dieuze. The town of Dieuze, as an advanced point to the north, is defended by a French detachment.
2. Task of the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd Infantry Regiment: At 6:00 p.m. on June 16, 1940, the Commander of the 2nd Battalion receives a verbal order from his Regimental Commander, which briefly states the following:
«During the night of June 16-17, 1940, our division, under the cover of two battalions, will withdraw to the south to prepare a defense on the general line Lagarde-Moussey on the Canal de la Marne and on the river itself. From 24:00 p.m. on 16 June 1940, the 2nd Battalion will assume responsibility for the entire sector of the 2nd Infantry Regiment and must contain the enemy on this line until 4:00 p.m. on 17 June 1940. To the east of the 2nd Battalion, a battalion of the 3rd Regiment is given a similar task, French troops to the west. Two batteries will provide artillery support until 11:00 a.m. on 17 June 1940, and later only one battery."
3. Development: From dawn on 17 June 1940, the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd Infantry Regiment is grouped as shown in sketch 3. A reserve (3 platoons plus machine guns) is ready to counterattack, mainly on the right wing of the western group.
In the morning, at 05:00 a,m., after 15 minutes of artillery preparation, the enemy begins to attack from the direction of Dieuze. This attack fails.
At 09:00 a.m. the heavy artillery bombardment was resumed which lasted about an hour. At about 10:00 a.m. the enemy begins to attack and penetrates the right wing of the western defence group. It is repulsed by a counterattack by the reserve.
*) Dieuze is located 40 km away northeast of Nancy.
Sources: Der Kommandant im Kampf : von einem polnischen Kriegsteilnehmer. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitung = Journal militaire suisse = Gazetta militare svizzera. Band (Jahr): 87=107 (1941). Heft 4
Cheers. Raúl M .
Night retreat in a southern direction.
1. General situation: The 1st Polish Infantry Division, after a night retreat in a southern direction, remaining in constant contact with the enemy, organized a temporary defense of the general line Dieuze-Guermange-Fribourg Forests (east of Guermange *) from dawn on June 16, 1940.
The 2nd Battalion of the 2nd Infantry Regiment prepares the defense on the edge of the forest south of Dieuze. The town of Dieuze, as an advanced point to the north, is defended by a French detachment.
2. Task of the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd Infantry Regiment: At 6:00 p.m. on June 16, 1940, the Commander of the 2nd Battalion receives a verbal order from his Regimental Commander, which briefly states the following:
«During the night of June 16-17, 1940, our division, under the cover of two battalions, will withdraw to the south to prepare a defense on the general line Lagarde-Moussey on the Canal de la Marne and on the river itself. From 24:00 p.m. on 16 June 1940, the 2nd Battalion will assume responsibility for the entire sector of the 2nd Infantry Regiment and must contain the enemy on this line until 4:00 p.m. on 17 June 1940. To the east of the 2nd Battalion, a battalion of the 3rd Regiment is given a similar task, French troops to the west. Two batteries will provide artillery support until 11:00 a.m. on 17 June 1940, and later only one battery."
3. Development: From dawn on 17 June 1940, the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd Infantry Regiment is grouped as shown in sketch 3. A reserve (3 platoons plus machine guns) is ready to counterattack, mainly on the right wing of the western group.
In the morning, at 05:00 a,m., after 15 minutes of artillery preparation, the enemy begins to attack from the direction of Dieuze. This attack fails.
At 09:00 a.m. the heavy artillery bombardment was resumed which lasted about an hour. At about 10:00 a.m. the enemy begins to attack and penetrates the right wing of the western defence group. It is repulsed by a counterattack by the reserve.
*) Dieuze is located 40 km away northeast of Nancy.
Sources: Der Kommandant im Kampf : von einem polnischen Kriegsteilnehmer. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitung = Journal militaire suisse = Gazetta militare svizzera. Band (Jahr): 87=107 (1941). Heft 4
Cheers. Raúl M .
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- Sketch 3.........................................
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Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.
Re: Incidents from the battle of france 1940.
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Night retreat in a southern direction.
Almost at the same time:
a) Enemy troops appear behind the left wing of the defence (the French defensive troops on the left wing had withdrawn without warning the 2nd Battalion, leaving the left wing open); Sketch 3.
b) The battalion commander receives a message that the enemy is already at the southern edge of the forest.
e) The artillery itself falls silent.
The battalion commander assesses the situation as follows: the battalion is flanked on the left and pushed towards the lake. Faced with this situation he decides to head south. This decision is carried out and the individual groups take up positions again north of Géloucodet, in constant contact with the enemy.
Between 2:00 and 4:00 p.m. the battalion held these positions in constant combat. Due to the enemy's evasion, the battalion commander at 4:00 p.m. decided to withdraw towards Bourdonnay, where, still fighting, he arrived at 6:00 p.m. and took up positions north of Bourdonnay, on the hills, to resist the enemy coming from the north. At 6:30 p.m. he also received unexpected fire from the south, with enemy tanks entering into action. The enemy took advantage of the withdrawal of the French troops on the left wing and advanced to Lagarde, where he came into contact with the defenses of the Marne Canal.
In this situation the battalion commander was forced to break through with the battalion in groups behind the Marne Canal. Four officers and about 100 men, all that remained of the battalion, reached the south bank of the canal. The rest fell on the battlefield, were wounded or captured.
The 2nd Battalion performed its task well and held off the enemy until the ordered moment.
Sources: Der Kommandant im Kampf : von einem polnischen Kriegsteilnehmer. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitung = Journal militaire suisse = Gazetta militare svizzera. Band (Jahr): 87=107 (1941). Heft 4
It's all. Cheers. Raúl M .
Night retreat in a southern direction.
Almost at the same time:
a) Enemy troops appear behind the left wing of the defence (the French defensive troops on the left wing had withdrawn without warning the 2nd Battalion, leaving the left wing open); Sketch 3.
b) The battalion commander receives a message that the enemy is already at the southern edge of the forest.
e) The artillery itself falls silent.
The battalion commander assesses the situation as follows: the battalion is flanked on the left and pushed towards the lake. Faced with this situation he decides to head south. This decision is carried out and the individual groups take up positions again north of Géloucodet, in constant contact with the enemy.
Between 2:00 and 4:00 p.m. the battalion held these positions in constant combat. Due to the enemy's evasion, the battalion commander at 4:00 p.m. decided to withdraw towards Bourdonnay, where, still fighting, he arrived at 6:00 p.m. and took up positions north of Bourdonnay, on the hills, to resist the enemy coming from the north. At 6:30 p.m. he also received unexpected fire from the south, with enemy tanks entering into action. The enemy took advantage of the withdrawal of the French troops on the left wing and advanced to Lagarde, where he came into contact with the defenses of the Marne Canal.
In this situation the battalion commander was forced to break through with the battalion in groups behind the Marne Canal. Four officers and about 100 men, all that remained of the battalion, reached the south bank of the canal. The rest fell on the battlefield, were wounded or captured.
The 2nd Battalion performed its task well and held off the enemy until the ordered moment.
Sources: Der Kommandant im Kampf : von einem polnischen Kriegsteilnehmer. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitung = Journal militaire suisse = Gazetta militare svizzera. Band (Jahr): 87=107 (1941). Heft 4
It's all. Cheers. Raúl M .
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.