The use of the reconnaissance group.

[tigre]

Hello to all ; a French point of view.........................

The use of the reconnaissance group.

Before the war of 1939, during field service and major maneuvers, one fact struck us above all: the fluctuation of ideas in the use of the groupe de reconnaissance (GR). Some of our leaders, and even our great leaders, seemed to want to use the GR as a more or less distant security element, others as a recce detachment.

During the operations of 1939 and 1940, when the Kriegspiele became "the phoney war", this same hesitation was to manifest itself.

Taking advantage of the lessons of experience, we would like here, and very briefly, to draw out lessons for the current or future use of the GR.

Far be it from us to make predictions about the war of tomorrow. We remember too much, unfortunately those of our great masters published in magazines or dailies, before 1914 or after 1918. We still have them before our eyes and will not have the indiscretion to cite them, even anonymously... They make us smile.

Since then, new means have come to disrupt all strategic and tactical ideas. However, let us not hasten to conclude, as we did the day after the trench warfare, the uselessness or impossibility of movement, the uselessness or impossibility of the use of fluid and fast light land units. New weapons can, like old ones, find their solution.

All history is there to prove it to us and no one has the right to assert that the atomic bomb, the rockets, the discovered rays, or to be discovered, parachuting behind enemy lines will be possible tomorrow. Motor vehicles may be stopped on the roads, planes grounded, firearms themselves silenced. Let us also not repeat the fairly frequent error in France, of preparing "the next one", remaining hypnotized by the processes of "the last one". It is not a question of stagnating in a deceptive and criminal routine, but of evolving and progressing. However, it seems to us that we can, for the future, still foresee the rapid action of an element such as the GR, to recognize, provide information, provisionally hold a point or occupy it, and this, even assuming
the use of completely new devices brought to life by our imagination.

We therefore propose, in this short study, to first see what was done in 1939 in the static war, after May 10, 1940, in the Blitzkrieg and then to present what could have been achieved.

I. — The GR in action.

And first of all, we will recall for the record that the GRDI (the only one of interest in our opinion and the one that we will study *), included three combat squadrons: 1 horse squadron, 1 motorcycle squadron, 1 machine-gun and anti-tank gun squadron, plus staff, a total of 24 light machine guns, 10 machine guns and 4 cannons of 25 (2 mounted and 2 horse-drawn). This was the so-called “normal type” GRDI, an absolutely abnormal and illogical type in our opinion. The first quality of a unit is indeed homogeneity, especially when this unit must be flexible, maneuverable and fast. Proceed with an amalgamation of automobiles, motorcycles from 2 to 11 HP, coming from requisition 2 and horses of all ages, all sizes and all gaits (most of which cannot go beyond trotting), is nonsense... to put it mildly.

It would certainly not have occurred to anyone, to prepare for a race or a raid in peacetime, to proceed with a mixture of riders, trucks and motorcycles. And yet it was with such a mix of squadrons that we entered the campaign.

(*) Two reconnaissance groups existed in France in 1939: the GRDI, working for the benefit of the infantry division, and the GRCA, attached to the army corps.

Source: L'emploi du groupe de reconnaissance. Rolland, Henri de. Revue Militaire Suisse. Band (Jahr): 93 (1948). Heft 5

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

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The use of the reconnaissance group.

I. — The GR in action.

On February 6, 1940, after a long period of inertia in the Bitche sector and at rest in Alsace, our division (35th DI) was placed at the disposal of the 12th Corps and relieved the 70th in the Pechelbronn sector. Its mission was: on the one hand, to protect the oil wells, on the other hand, to prohibit access to the Alsace plain, and finally, to complete the organization of the land and create a new position in front of the Maginot line on the Haussauerbach.

The deployment of the division was as follows: two sub-sectors were formed on the left, in the foothills of the Vosges, by the 49th infantry regiment, whose lieutenant-colonel's headquarters was installed at the Marienbronn farm; on the right towards the Lauter, by the 123rd RI and the 29th GRDI (CP of the lieutenant-colonel in Ingolsheim).

Each sub-sector itself included two districts, each held by a battalion: to the west, Climbach district and Pigeonnier-Scherol district; to the east, district of Wissembourg, occupied by the infantry and district of Geisberg-Altenstatt, assigned to the GR. On the far right the Hardt and the Moulin de Saint-Remy held by a section of the 123rd.

In second echelon, the 11th RI had 1 battalion in Kutzenhausen, 1 in Retschwïller-Memelshoffen and the third in Lobsann. The artillery was distributed as follows: 1 group of the 14th R.A.D. (guns of 75), at Birlnbach, 1 group at Schonenbourg, 1 group at Keffenach. The 214th R. A. D. (cannons of 155) on the other hand, had 1 group in Lobsann and another in Lampertsloch. The division, flanked on the left by the 28th Alpine Division and on the right by the 23rd Division, installed its headquarters at the
thermal recovery in Morsbronn.

What was, in this whole, the role of the 29th GR. Two very distinct phases must be examined:

1° On March 10, the motorcycle squadron and the mounted machine gun platoon went up alone from Gunstett to the Oberhoffen district: 1 platoon at height 276 towards Weiler, another in reserve at Oberhoffen, 2 in support at heights 216 and 149. All these units remain in place until March 26.

2° On the 27th, the regrouped GR relieved a battalion of the 123rd in the Altenstatt-Geisberg district, and held several support points: the signal box, hill 189, the level crossing, the passage above the Seltz road (*). On the right, an infantry section, which is attached to it, holds, as we have said, the Hardt, the Ciblerie, and the Moulin de Saint-Remy.

Until April 25, the GR will remain in its positions, with the mission of locking itself into a string of isolated islets and holding out at all costs, without any idea of ​​withdrawal.

(*) Note that all these points are essentially identifiable.

Source: L'emploi du groupe de reconnaissance. Rolland, Henri de. Revue Militaire Suisse. Band (Jahr): 93 (1948). Heft 5

Cheers. Raúl M .

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The use of the reconnaissance group.

I. — The GR in action.

In the first phase, the G. R. is dissociated. In the second, it is regrouped and relieves a battalion. In the first, as in the second, it is immobilized in “good positions” and surrounded by barbed wire. However, the G. R. is essentially indivisible, and its three squadrons, which constitute a whole in their diversity, cannot be separated without leading to the paralysis of the entire group.

The G. R., when it is regrouped, relieves a battalion, but neither its strength nor its means of fire are the same. The G. R., we said, has 24 light machine guns and 10 machine guns. The battalion has 56 light machine guns, 48 machine guns and a force double its own. How, in such conditions, could it hold the quarter of a battalion? How could it beat with its fire all the ground allocated to it, without leaving any infiltration corridors for the adversary.

The G. R. is above all a mobile, fast unit, whose speed must be exploited to the maximum. To reduce it, like an infantry unit, to clinging to the terrain, entangling itself in barbed wire and leaving behind trucks, vans, motorcycles and horses, is to take away all its means of action, it is to use it like those tanks (mobile and fast machines) which were transformed on the Somme, by their commanders, into armored turrets of fortress. (Even though they retained the possibility of resuming their movement without delay).

Finally, if in this immobilization the G. R. loses all its material resources, it abandons, which is more serious, the very idea of ​​its main mission: intelligence.

Also, during this stay in the sector as during the previous ones, his performance was zero. In this prolonged stagnation, the men, poorly dressed and poorly equipped, became physically and morally exhausted and the weak flame that still burned within them was finally extinguished. This is the only result obtained, the only preparation for the great battle, which would soon break out and crush them.

What could the role of the group be in this sector? A simple examination of the ground and the situation is enough to make us understand:
The land is divided into two very distinct parts: on the left a mountainous and wooded massif, with heights reaching 504 and even 535 meters; on the right, large undulations discovered, with the Geisberg, the valleys of the Lauter, the Haussauerbach and, further east, the forest of Mundat, where the connection is not established with the neighbor, scattered in small groups kilometers away, and where the Germans make frequent incursions, night and day, pushing their audacity to the point of coming and shearing our telephone wires, after having alerted us with fanciful or ironic calls.


The mission of the G. R. therefore seems perfectly indicated to us: to provide information by first establishing and maintaining a close, continuous connection with the scattered elements to our right; provide information by probing, day and night, in the Mundat forest; finally inform, by harassing the enemy with offensive patrols, daring coups de main, which force him to reveal himself, small operations which would have trained, hardened our men, gave rise in them to this offensive, aggressive spirit which they lacked and without which there is no cavalry. This would have been better, in our opinion, than calling on the Free Corps, who arrived in an unknown, mysterious sector and hastily carried out raids doomed in advance to failure.

This is, succinctly, how we see the use of the G. R. in this concrete and precise case of sectoral war.

Source: L'emploi du groupe de reconnaissance. Rolland, Henri de. Revue Militaire Suisse. Band (Jahr): 93 (1948). Heft 5

Cheers. Raúl M .

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The use of the reconnaissance group.

II. The GR during the withdrawal.

1. — North of the Argonne.

On May 10, Hitler, having liquidated heroic Poland, resumed the interrupted conversation with France. To our insane dreams of understanding at all costs, to our tenacious illusion of war without battle, where the field of operation would be a green carpet, with diplomats and ministers as great leaders, he now provides his answer. Suddenly turning around, with all his forces now available, he addresses France and says: "To the two of us." And suddenly, his squadrons fly over Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, cross our borders, and his Panzer divisions rush straight ahead, break through the weak Allied defenses, cross the Meuse, jostle, separate our armies and rush towards the Channel.

Our division, alerted in its rest cantonments in Alsace, embarked on the night of May 20 to 21 and went to occupy a defensive position north of the Argonne, marked out by the Ardennes canal, the woods of Sy and Oches . The three infantry regiments are in line, the reconnaissance group in reserve.

There, until June 10, the division held its ground and, despite the waves of bombers flying over it freely, despite the violent artillery fire and massive infantry attacks, it did not give up an inch of ground.

But suddenly, on the extreme left, the 14th division was buried, the Aisne crossed between Rethel and Attigny and our division, largely overwhelmed, received the order in the afternoon to withdraw to the south of the Aire, near Grandpré. Then began a fearful retreat across the rugged, covered and cut terrain of the Argonne. For 150 kilometers, the march will take place and continue beyond the Meuse, to the surroundings of Nancy.

Tragic retreat, where it is necessary with exhausted, poorly equipped, barely fed troops, to march at night, and to fight by day a fresh, biting enemy, equipped with numerous and powerful equipment.

What will be, during this hasty withdrawal, the mission of the GR? First, mission of collection of the division, then, mission of delaying action and finally, on June 16, mission of sacrifice, participating with all the regiments of the division at the Battle of the Meuse.

Source: L'emploi du groupe de reconnaissance. Rolland, Henri de. Revue Militaire Suisse. Band (Jahr): 93 (1948). Heft 6

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

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The use of the reconnaissance group.

II. The GR during the withdrawal.

2. — Retreat across the Argonne.

On June 10, at 8:00 p.m., the 29th Reconnaissance Group preceded the division at Grandpré and then on the 11th secured the defense of the Aire and the Aisne. It constituted a reception element for the infantry and prepared the protection of its left flank. Looking north, his squadrons occupied Grandpré, Chevières, Marcq, looking west Termes, Senuc, Mouron and Vaulx-les-Mouron. Our infantrymen, who knew how to break contact without attracting the attention of the adversary, withdrew without difficulty, concerned only by some bombing and machine gun attacks by the planes.

On the 12th, the general's CP settled at Vienne-le-Château, the infantry reached Marcq, Grandpré, Senuc, north of Autry Wood, flanked on the left by the 6th D.I.C. and to the right by the 6th D.I. The Reconnaissance Group regrouped in the Renarde region.

During the night the division continued its march towards Bois d'Auzy, Saint-Thomas, Vienne-le-Château, Four-de-Paris, Varennes, and then received, on the way, the order to establish a blocking position on this line and then continue to Sainte-Menehould, les Islettes, Clermont in Argonne.

During this long stage, the Reconnaissance Group must protect the withdrawal in three axes:
— Rinarville, Vienne, Moiremont, Sainte-Menehould.
—Le Four-de-Paris, le Claon, les Islettes.
—Varennes, Neuvilly, Clermont
— and establish the connection on the left with the 6th D.I.C. and on the right with the 6th D.I.

At 9:00 p.m., the Commander of the GR, which constitutes three groups, gives orders for the following day:
to the west: 2 platoons: I G. M. (machine gun group?) and 1 horse-drawn cannon of 25, 1 platoon of motorcyclists, I G. M.;
to the east, 2 motorcycle platoons, 2 mounted platoons, with I G. M., 1 25 cannon;
in the center: a reserve of 1 motorcycle platoon, 1 machine gun platoon and 1 25-pounder cannon.

The squadrons leader (*) recommends paying special attention to the flanks, ensuring the link and points out as the axis of movement of his CP, the Four-de-Paris (until 10 o'clock), the Chalade, the Islets.

(*) Please note that in France, the squadron commander is a captain and the chief (chef) of squadrons is a commander (major).

Source: L'emploi du groupe de reconnaissance. Rolland, Henri de. Revue Militaire Suisse. Band (Jahr): 93 (1948). Heft 6

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

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The use of the reconnaissance group.

II. The GR during the withdrawal.

2. — Retreat across the Argonne.

On this day, June 13, the situation will be difficult in the morning, critical at the end of the afternoon for multiple reasons:

1° The elements of the 6th D. I. C. on the left are dispersed and 30 kilometers behind us, towards Belay-Tilloy. Therefore, the left flank of the GR is completely exposed.
2° The 21st R. M. V. E. left the Saint-Thomas region at 03:00 hours, hastily retreated to Sainte-Menehould without stopping and settled there at 08:00 hours.
3° The Condé - Servon road is not controlled by the western group.
4° The last infantry elements cross the GR five hours late.
5° The group operates in a forested and mountainous region, and its front will vary from 10 to 14 kilometers.

At 08:00 in the morning, a first battalion of the division arrived at Four-de-Paris, but from 09:00 in the morning the enemy surprised us on the left towards Autry and on the right in front of Montblainville, where a heavy shooting began. Very quickly reinforced, the adversary reached Mare-aux-Rœufs and advanced further to the left on both banks of the Aisne, already establishing an overwhelming movement. It is necessary to withdraw the western group towards Vienne-le-Château and advance a platoon of motorcyclists towards this town to prevent them from being isolated.

The Germans then reached Servon, while a last infantry battalion from the north crossed the GR and advanced towards Claon.

The western group having arrived at Vienne-le-Château, the commander directs the eastern group towards Boureuilles.

Around 1:30 p.m., a third battalion of the division arrived at Four-de-Paris. The enemy threatens Vienne-le-Château, but is blocked by very intense machine gun fire from the 29th GR.

Suddenly, two very important pieces of information reached the squad leader:

1° the Germans are in the Renarde,
2° other of their units have just entered Moiremont.

Therefore, the western axis is cut off and the left flank clearly overwhelmed.

Now it is a matter of maintaining the Four-de-Paris corridor and preventing the adversary from leaving Moiremont towards Sainte-Menehould or Florent. In haste, the commander takes his Pto Cdo to Claon, throws the entire central group on Moiremont and orders the eastern one to go to Neuvilly and hold the town at all costs.

It is 3:00 p.m., the third battalion, having finished its halt in Claon, resumes its march towards the Islettes. The group has a group of bikers surrounded at Moiremont and must establish themselves west of Florent, unable to advance further.

Source: L'emploi du groupe de reconnaissance. Rolland, Henri de. Revue Militaire Suisse. Band (Jahr): 93 (1948). Heft 6

Greetings. Raúl M :carapoker:.
Source: L'emploi du groupe de reconnaissance. Rolland, Henri de. Revue Militaire Suisse. Band (Jahr): 93 (1948). Heft 6

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

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The use of the reconnaissance group.

II. The GR during the withdrawal.

2. — Retreat across the Argonne.

The western detachment was then called from Vienne towards le Claon, where it was established, followed by a platoon of motorcyclists in Neufour whose mission was to prevent any exit from the forest and, subsequently, to allow us to leave.

And the enemy's advance continues. On the left, it infiltrates the forest, pushing towards Florent. In the central axis, their vehicles reached the barricade at Claon, but were stopped and destroyed by our guns of 25.

The situation is getting worse every hour. Then the commander called the eastern detachment, where everything was calm, to get a group of machine guns which he threw at Florent. At the same time, he informed the division "that it will remain motionless and resist at all costs unless overwhelmed."

And until 7:00 p.m., the GR fought tenaciously, facing both the north and the west. The enemy increases his pressure. The motorcyclists arrive on the Vienne road but are stopped by our machine guns and the infiltration continues through the thicket to the edge of the Florent forest.

At 7:00 p.m., information from the division reached the GR's CP: “The infantry has just arrived at the line Sainte-Menehould, Les Islettes, Clermont.” It is safe. Therefore, the mission of the Reconnaissance Group is accomplished and completed.

At 7:30 p.m. orders were given to Florent's group to retreat and to Claon's group to cover their retreat and then move towards Les Islettes.

The movement took place under fire, but the two detachments were able to reach Les Islettes, without major losses, under the protection of Neufour's motorcycle platoon. —The entire GR then moved to Neuvilly, where it regrouped.

Their mission was accomplished, but with significant losses:
In the mounted squadron, 1 officer and his platoon surrounded in the forest have disappeared (*). In the machine gun squadron, 1 officer died. At headquarters, 1 NCO and 6 men were killed or wounded.

(*) They will fight for four days, then exhausted, without food, without ammunition, they will be captured.

Source: L'emploi du groupe de reconnaissance. Rolland, Henri de. Revue Militaire Suisse. Band (Jahr): 93 (1948). Heft 6

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

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The use of the reconnaissance group.

II. The GR during the withdrawal.

3. Tragic day at Baudrémont.

After six days of continuous fighting and exhausting marches, the division was at the limit of its strength. The losses on the 13th, 14th and 15th were particularly heavy. However, the Army Corps required it to make a supreme effort to allow the units retreating west of the Meuse to reach the Marne-Rhine canal, "an effort after which the infantry division will be able to breathe behind a continuous front, formed by new troops."

On the 16th, at dawn, the division, threatened by enemy infiltration, was forced to retreat to Nicey, Bois de la Juré, Belrain and Villotte. Three infantry battalions were surrounded and could only partially escape. The Germans advanced southwards, towards Longchamps, Bois de la Juré, and pushed hard to the left.

In the afternoon, an infantry battalion and a company of the 18th B.I.L.A (Bataillon d'Infanterie Légère d'Afrique) were deployed between Gimécourt and Baudrémont. Enemy planes constantly flew over the battlefield and the rear, without finding a single prototype in the sky, Villotte, Gimécourt and Raudrémont were violently bombed, but held out until 17:30.

An hour later, the enemy reached Villotte but was again driven back 1,200 metres from the village. At 19:00 hours it appeared on the western ridges of Baudrémont and Villotte was on fire.

At 20:00 hours, its mission accomplished, the infantry division began its retreat towards the left bank of the Meuse. Let us see what role the GR played in this desperate fight.

In the morning, at 03:15, the commander was informed that he was part of a group composed of the 29th GRDI and the 14th GRCA sent as reinforcements. The 29th was immediately ordered to regroup at Belrain, while the chef d'escadrons went to Ville-devant-Belrain, to the Colonel's Headquarters of the 14th GRCA. The GRDI soon joined up but, as soon as it arrived, it was disbanded (*). In addition, during the day, certain squadrons will receive orders from four different sources:

1° from the colonel in command of the group; 2° from their squadron leader; 3° the heads of the detachments, with whom they meet; and finally, 4° other officers who did not have the qualification to even have a GR squadron.

At 17:45 hours, the mounted squadron was ordered to head for Erize-la-Brûlée and march in the direction of Rosîtes. It occupied the village of Erize with the group of mounted squadrons of the 14th GRCA and was placed under the orders of the commander of this unit.

(*) We have already seen that the GR constitutes an indivisible whole.

Source: L'emploi du groupe de reconnaissance. Rolland, Henri de. Revue Militaire Suisse. Band (Jahr): 93 (1948). Heft 6

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; more........................

The use of the reconnaissance group.

II. The GR during the withdrawal.

3. Tragic day at Baudrémont.

The Motorcycle Squadron was sent to signal 368 (east of Rumont), to reinforce the motorcycle elements of the 14th. Shortly afterwards, the machine gun squadron was also brought to the signal, where it allowed the units of the 14th to retreat to Petit-Rumont.

At 09:00 sharp, on the signal, enemy fire increased, the road and its surroundings were violently bombarded for two hours.

Around 10:00 in the morning, Erize-la-Brûlée and Petit-Rumont were shelled in turn and Erize was attacked by enemy infantry, supported by numerous heavy machine guns.

Half an hour later, the captain in charge of the mounted squadron of the 29th received an order from the chef d'escadrons of the 14th GR to retreat to Belrain; but, on the way, the lieutenant colonel of the 11th RI ordered him to return to Erize. In this useless movement, the squadron lost 1 dead, 3 wounded and 3 horses, without being able to reach the village already in enemy hands.

At 11:00 in the morning, the motorcycle squadron of the 14th withdrew to Villotte and the two squadrons, machine gun and motorcycle, of the 29th established themselves on Hill 311. It was midday; the colonel in charge of the GR grouping then left Ville-devant-Belrain, towards Baudrémont.

Two hours later, a German motorised column appeared in front of the mounted squadron of the 29th, but was immediately stopped by its automatic weapons and, all along the front, the fighting continued fiercely.

At 4:00 p.m., the General commanding the infantry division and that of the I.D. arrived in turn at Baudrémont. The situation of the division, pressed from the front, overwhelmed on both flanks and supported on the Meuse, became tragic.

The commander of the GR then advanced his mounted squadron towards Levoncourt, to reinforce elements of the 14th GR, but the village was empty. On the other hand, the motorcyclist and machine-gun squadrons of the 29th were taken to Lignières, with orders to remain there at all costs.

The enemy made contact, immediately attempted its usual flanking manoeuvre and violently shelled Baudrémont. At Levoncourt, the mounted squadron, threatened with encirclement, withdrew. It broke contact under automatic weapons fire and "Minen" (sic) then, on reaching Baudrémont, secured the withdrawal of the division headquarters and the artillery with a platoon of motorcyclists.

The enemy had already resumed its advance towards Lignières. Its motorized elements were ahead of its infantry and reached the outskirts of the village, but were stopped by our 25mm cannons and machine guns. The fighting then intensified. It spread southwards and then northwards, accompanied by a very violent bombardment by the "Minen" (minenwerfer-mortars?) which killed or wounded several non-commissioned officers and soldiers.

At that moment, a withdrawal order was sent to the captain in charge of the machine gun-motorcycle detachment, but it could not be carried out, as the 14th unit to which it was attached was stuck and requesting support.

At 8:00 p.m., the GR elements that were in Baudrémont stopped the enemy flanking the village from the south and the motorcyclists advancing along the road, then they went to the Courcelles crossroads, where they were ordered to remain until 9:00 p.m. to allow the infantry to withdraw.

Source: L'emploi du groupe de reconnaissance. Rolland, Henri de. Revue Militaire Suisse. Band (Jahr): 93 (1948). Heft 6

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; more........................

The use of the reconnaissance group.

II. The GR during the withdrawal.

3. Tragic day at Baudrémont.

At the same time, in Lignières, the bombardment subsided. The enemy advanced on the village and tried to infiltrate through the ditches to the south and southwest. Shortly afterwards, they extended their movement to the northeast, but were able to be stopped on all sides by our machine guns and automatic guns.

The captain of the 14th GRCA then received the order from the division to withdraw. The machine gun-motorcycle detachment of the 29th was therefore released, but completely cut off from the rest of the GR.

At 9:30 p.m., the commander ordered the two captains who were with him to retreat to Sampigny, Commercy, Void, and he rejoined his staff on the main road on the left bank of the Meuse, wondering with concern whether it was not already in enemy hands.

The road was clear and Void could be reached on the morning of the 17th, after an incredible night-time movement, in the midst of a real human herd. Like the infantry, the GR had fought for thirteen hours on June 16 without a moment's rest, without a minute's calm. Like the infantry, it had fulfilled its mission to the end.

What lesson can we draw from the use of the reconnaissance group north of the Argonne, during the retreat and during the Baudrémont era?...

During the defensive battle on the Petites Armoises, Bois de Sy and Oches lines, the GR was in reserve. This, we believe, is the only mission we can entrust to it. To confront it as a battalion, to risk sacrificing it on the eve of the resumption of the war of movement, where it had regained all its value, would have been stupid... To keep it ready, on the contrary, to exploit its mobility and speed, to move quickly towards a threatened point on the front, was perfectly logical.

In this brief period of defensive combat, the group not having had the opportunity to be used, we obviously cannot draw any interesting lessons from it. During the retreat across the Argonne, things were very different, especially during this very characteristic day of June 13.

There we saw and understood, to our cost, the absurdity of composing a GR from such disparate elements as horses, motorcycles and vehicles. Although commanded by officers full of enthusiasm, the mounted platoons were a dead weight, a burden and, to avoid their capture, it was necessary to constantly resort to groups of motorcyclists, which were lacking elsewhere. The horses retreated painfully at 12 per hour, compared to the motorized units at 50 or 70. Thus, an entire platoon disappeared during this eventful day.

On the other hand, the absence of armored vehicles in a group called to advance bravely, on the offensive, and to face the enemy armored vehicles, both defensively and offensively, was a cruel feeling. On this 13th day, the auto-machine guns would have rendered invaluable services and would have allowed to fight against the flanking movements and counterattack the adversary on his flank. In addition, the insufficient number of personnel of the GR operating on the front of a division was strikingly manifested.

Finally, the normative and logical constitution of mixed groups (horses - motorcycle and vehicles)* has revealed, on many occasions, the inexperience of the leaders in command of units other than their own. It also highlighted the disadvantage of taking men who know them from the hands of their leader who knows them to place them under new leadership.

* Logical given the hybrid organization of the time.

Source: L'emploi du groupe de reconnaissance. Rolland, Henri de. Revue Militaire Suisse. Band (Jahr): 93 (1948). Heft 6

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; more........................

The use of the reconnaissance group.

II. The GR during the withdrawal.

3. Tragic day at Baudrémont.

The theory of "spare parts" is, in our opinion, the biggest mistake made before and during the war. The army was then considered as a vast machine, whose various units are spare parts and interchangeable at will. To admit such a principle is to ignore and neglect the moral factor, which is essential in the campaign. Which will not prevent our censors or our masters from reminding us, after the debacle, that the troop is the reflection of the leader (*).

There would therefore be, in our opinion, the greatest interest in forming, from peacetime, these groups, even if it means reinforcing them in combat with a reserve at the disposal of the commanding officer.

And, if we had to finally draw out a final lesson from this day of the 16th, we would say that the G. R. having to be called upon, from the start of operations, to boldly push forward, there could be no question of perfecting or redoing its training in concentration. The G. R. must be a unit trained before the war, an elite unit, an active unit. In summary, we see the organization of the reconnaissance group as follows:

2 platoons of armored cars;
2 motorcycle squadrons,
1 motorized squadron,
with in addition a reserve (machine guns and 25 mm mounted cannons and motorcycles) at the headquarters and in the hands of the leader.

Finally, let us examine the mission of the G. R. during the day of Baudrémont. There, the situation is clear. The division must sacrifice itself for the benefit of the army corps. There is no doubt, the group must, with the infantry, the artillery and the engineers, be thrown into the battle. The fight is decisive. The leader cannot keep a single asset in hand unused.

And if, to conclude, we now examine the results obtained during these days of June, we can say:

On June 13, the G. R. saved the division by collecting its infantry and protecting its withdrawal. On the 16th, the G. R. did what it had to, since it did what it could. The rallying sound was sounded, it rushed and took on in the mission of sacrifice the part that was due to it, and which should have been, in our opinion, the first.

On the morning of June 23, the division general himself recognized the services rendered by his G. R., during these days of hopeless struggle, when, in the Bois du Fey (**), he addressed these last words to it:
"If everyone had done what you have done, we would not be where we are. »

(*) Let us recall that between 1918 and 1939, the barracks had become a school. For training, the lieutenants no longer had their platoons, the captains no longer had their squadron, the commanders no longer had their squadron group and for maneuvers each commanded a marching unit. This is to remove all knowledge and consequently all mutual trust essential to combat.

(**) Let us note that there are two woods of the same name: Bois du Fays, NE of Bar-le-Duc, Bois du Fey, SE of Toul.

Source: L'emploi du groupe de reconnaissance. Rolland, Henri de. Revue Militaire Suisse. Band (Jahr): 93 (1948). Heft 6

It´s all. Cheers. Raúl M .