Maskirovka

[Rosselsprung]

As it is understood, if maybe incorrectly, by English speakers, Maskirovka is a deception. The uses of it that usually come to mind by the RKKA are simply deceiving the Werhmacht high command of where offensives will occur, or the movement of troops. However, it also seems that Maskirovka is used in the same way as "camouflage" or "false maps". There is little information on it.

[Paulus II]

I found this on the net, not sure how correct it really is tho!

The Soviet Military Encyclopaedia defines maskirovka thus: "The means of securing combat operations and the daily activities of forces; a complexity of measures, directed to mislead the enemy regarding the presence and disposition of forces, various military objectives, their condition, combat readiness and operations, and also the plans of the commander... maskirovka contributes to the achievement of surprise for the actions of forces, the preservation of combat readiness and the increased survivability of objectives." It permeates down to the lowest tactical level and includes all measures, active and passive, designed to deceive the enemy. Although the word is sometimes translated as 'camouflage', this belies its much broader meaning which includes: concealment (skrytie), imitation using decoys and dummies (imitasiia), manoeuvres intended to deceive (demonstratinvnye manevry) and disinformation (dezinformatsiia).

Hope that helps,

Paul

[Eclisse]

I think this link will be of great utility:
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airc ... smith.html
on the use of false maps:
http://www.ce-review.org/00/23/vaknin23.html

[tigre]

Hello to all ; taking advantage of this old post..............................

The Soviet radio deception in the Battle of Cherkassy.

Before and in reports of the battle west of Cherkassy in January 1944, which ended in February 1944 with the breakout of two corps of the German 8th Army of General of Infantry Wöhler from the Korsun pocket, a Russian radio deception was suspected, although the question was whether the fact that the Russians used this means of leadership was generally denied based on the experience of the three-year campaign in the East.

Even today it cannot be said with certainty whether there was an intention to deceive on the part of Russia. However, since the possibility could not be ruled out at the time, a follow-up check by our own radio reconnaissance could not be dispensed with. This ultimately came to the conclusion that the enemy was using radio deception measures, so as a result of our own tactical countermeasures it could be avoided. So if there was an intention to deceive on the part of the Russian leadership, it has failed in its purpose. A radio deception can only be considered successful if it triggers tactical measures on the other side.

The sequence of observations initiated in the Cherkassy battle against the suspected Russian radio deception cannot be understood without a more detailed explanation of the fundamental German views.

According to them, the purpose of radio deception is to use radio stations to give the enemy the impression that they have new command points and, through the radio network relationships of these radio stations, to mislead them into drawing incorrect conclusions about the use of additional forces that actually do not exist. It requires effective radio reconnaissance of the enemy.

The creation of a radio deception requires an order from the command as to which tactical image should be presented. The mission can only be fulfilled if the means for radio reconnaissance and radio surveillance are available, there is complete clarity about one's own and the enemy's radio picture, at least as many radio stations can be freed from tactical radio units as how many command posts should be represented within the framework, the simultaneous execution of tactical deception measures is guaranteed, the cooperation between radio reconnaissance, radio surveillance, deception radio control, tactical radio control and the person responsible for the tactical deception measures is regulated, if possible under a special staff, through personal and message communication.

Without knowledge of both your own and the enemy's radio image, it is not possible to create a radio deception. In the German Wehrmacht, knowledge of one's own radio picture was a secondary task of the radio (communication) units (radio companies); It was called radio surveillance and was ordered and managed by the communication commanders of the divisions, corps, armies and army groups. Detecting enemy radio signals was the main task of the intelligence units, which were subordinate to the intelligence commanders at the Army Group High Commands; it was called radio reconnaissance.

Source: Die sowjetrussische Funktäuschung in der Schlacht von Tscherkassy. Oberst aD Randewig (*). Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift. Band (Jahr): 119 (1953). Heft 6

(*) The author was a communications troop leader in the 8th German Army in 1944.

Cheers. Raúl M .

Feliz Navidad - Feliz Natal - Frohe Weihnachten - Joyeux Noël - Merry Christmas - Wesołych Świąt!

[tigre]

Hello to all ; more.............................

The Soviet radio deception in the Battle of Cherkassy.

Experience has shown that mixing radio surveillance and radio reconnaissance leads to failure, but carrying out radio deception requires the interaction of surveillance and reconnaissance.

First of all, radio surveillance has to prepare documents on the density of its own radio traffic, both operational (backward of the divisions) and tactical (forward of the divisions). Intentional deceptive radio traffic must be brought into line with its density in order to avoid it standing out unnaturally from the ongoing tactical radio traffic. Where radio restrictions or radio silence are required depending on the situation in order to prevent the enemy from seeing their own force distribution, radio deception is generally not possible.

In addition to assessing the traffic density, it is essential to take operational characteristics into account, which emerge with every long-term radio operation - contrary to regulations. Refraining from intentionally incorporating such peculiarities into deceptive radio communications can easily reveal them and make them unbelievable to the enemy.

A first important consideration is the choice of waves on which the deceptive radio traffic should be initiated, because only an alert opponent will detect any new radio traffic that occurs. The greater the general traffic density, the less freedom one has in choosing the wave, and the more the deception frequencies have to approach the wave ranges determined by radio reconnaissance in which the enemy's operational radio traffic can be received.

Otherwise, the probability that the enemy will detect the deceptive radio traffic is reduced. Only in the course of the radio illusion should a gradual transition be made to other frequencies, if necessary with carefully veiled announcements of wave changes.

In principle, deceptive radio communications should be carried out by rapid networks formed specifically for this task, if only to maintain the necessary secrecy. The occasionally unavoidable involvement of tactical radio stations for the necessary cross traffic must be carefully regulated if no special deceptive radio stations can be switched off.

Because it must be checked by the enemy, possibly also through agents and air reconnaissance, the radio deception needs to be supplemented by some tactical deception measures, for example, regular staffing of individual command posts, the appearance of full troops, marches of supply units, full and empty transport, etc. Spreading rumors among the population in the deception space. The fewer tactical deception measures that can be initiated, the more radio deception must be limited in time and scope. Without tactical deception measures, any radio deception that is intended to last for a long time is doomed to failure.

Source: Die sowjetrussische Funktäuschung in der Schlacht von Tscherkassy. Oberst aD Randewig (*). Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift. Band (Jahr): 119 (1953). Heft 6

Cheers. Raúl M .

Feliz Navidad - Feliz Natal - Frohe Weihnachten - Joyeux Noël - Merry Christmas - Wesołych Świąt!

[tigre]

Hello to all ; more.............................

The Soviet radio deception in the Battle of Cherkassy.

The special staff responsible for the radio deception draws up the radio deception plan based on instructions from the command, which is initially based primarily on technical considerations. It must prescribe the transmission powers, which must be measured in such a way that the opponent can detect the deceptive radio traffic with certainty without being made suspicious by excessive transmission strengths. It must determine the time and place of each transmission as well as the form and content of each deceptive radio program to be sent; The external form of the encryption of the deceptive radio messages must not differ from tactical radio messages, but their content must be worded or specially marked so that no misunderstandings can arise if tactical radio stations listen in.

Traffic times and traffic relationships must be determined in detail, and any cross traffic to tactical radio stations must be explained in detail. The possibility of detecting the waves must be assessed in terms of their dependence on the propagation phenomena in ground and space radiation and taking into account times of day (day and night waves) as well as weather influences (“radio weather”), and their favorable direction finding capability should be considered if the enemy succeeds in determining the location should and hereafter regulate the use of waves according to the general principles already explained. This outlines the most important German views on radio deception, and the Russian views are likely to come close to their principles.

Since the reorganization carried out in 1942, German front-line intelligence reconnaissance has been divided into operational long-range and tactical close-range reconnaissance under the intelligence reconnaissance (regimental) commanders at the army group high command.

The long-range reconnaissance companies consisted of an evaluation platoon, a radio reception platoon for long-, medium-, short- and ultra-short-wave detection as well as a direction-finding platoon with a long-medium-wave direction finding base of 150 to 250 km. The company preferably recorded touch (telegraphic) traffic and reported its results to the intelligence reconnaissance regimental staff.

The short-range reconnaissance company was divided into four mixed platoons for medium-, short- and ultra-short-wave reception as well as short-wave (near-field) direction finding with an optimal bearing base of 30 km (three bearing base lines each with 3 direction finders of 10 each, a maximum of 15 km) and a wire -Reconnaissance platoon, which is not taken into account here; The company reported its results to the intelligence reconnaissance detachment staff to which it was subordinate, immediately interpretable, urgent results using every type of intelligence transmission directly to corps, divisions and combat units. - Independent of the companies, the divisions had their own close-in reconnaissance troops subordinate to them. - The close-up reconnaissance primarily covered voice (telephony) communications; its activity depended on experienced interpreters.

In terms of the structure of the war, there were no reconnaissance units subordinate to the army high commands, nor the corps commands, nor - apart from the close reconnaissance troops - to the divisions. The enemy area in front of an army should generally be covered by deploying one long-range reconnaissance company and two short-range reconnaissance companies. This rule could no longer be applied in 1944.

Source: Die sowjetrussische Funktäuschung in der Schlacht von Tscherkassy. Oberst aD Randewig (*). Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift. Band (Jahr): 119 (1953). Heft 6

Cheers. Raúl M .

Feliz Año Nuevo - Happy New Year - feliz Ano Novo - gluckliches Neues Jahr - Bonne Année - Felice Anno Nuovo - Szczęśliwego nowego roku!

[tigre]

Hello to all ; more.............................

The Soviet radio deception in the Battle of Cherkassy.

In the area of Army Group South with its three subordinate armies (1st Panzer, 6th and 8th), only two long-range reconnaissance and three close-reconnaissance companies were deployed. There was therefore a noticeable disproportion between the army group's considerable front width and the number of reconnaissance units, which was bound to have a detrimental effect on the reconnaissance results. These results were transmitted to the High Command of the 8th Army by the intelligence reconnaissance department staff assigned to (not subordinate to) it.

For this reason, the communications troop leader of the 8th Army had, contrary to the rule, ordered, in addition to the natural radio monitoring of its own radio traffic, observation of the enemy radio image by the radio company of the army signal regiment. This observation was originally dictated by the need to be able to regulate the wave distribution of one's own radio traffic in such a way that interference from Russian radio traffic was avoided, although the concern played a role in not being constantly and completely informed about the operational enemy radio picture took place largely in the same frequency range.

This was not a planned radio reconnaissance because, firstly, the army lacked the means for positioning through direction finding and for a systematic evaluation and, secondly, because observation of the enemy radio image was possible only while its own radio service was available in case of emergency, i.e had to step in if the wire connections, which had previously worked perfectly, were temporarily disrupted. But after the wire connections fell into Russian hands when the corps were surrounded, communication with them had to be maintained exclusively by radio.

The attack of the 2nd Ukrainian Front with the 5th Guards Tank Army from the east against the northern wing corps (XI.) of the 8th Army, which was holding between Kapitanowka and Rotmistrovka, began on January 24, 1944; After the advance of the 6th Guards Tank Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front from the west, both the XI. Corps of the 8th Army as well as the XXXXII. Corps of the 1st Panzer Army located on their left were surrounded on January 28, 1944; After the siege it was subordinated to the 8th Army.

Up to this point, the operational enemy radio picture had not yet been fully clarified. Only the radio communications of the two broken-in Russian tank armies with their corps and divisions were detected.

On the other hand, the numerous radio communications between the two Russian fronts remained unclear - after three years, the Russians had learned considerably about the encryption of their radio messages! Especially failed towards the 2nd Ukrainian Front after the break-in, the timely location of the infantry armies subordinate to it and closing in behind it (53rd, 4th Guards, 52nd), as they maintained extreme restraint in radio communications, contrary to Russian practice. On the other hand, it was striking that it was possible to detect the 27th Army on the left wing of the 1st Ukrainian Front at an early stage and to locate it by radio in the area east of Byala-Tserkiew.

Source: Die sowjetrussische Funktäuschung in der Schlacht von Tscherkassy. Oberst aD Randewig (*). Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift. Band (Jahr): 119 (1953). Heft 6

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; more.............................

The Soviet radio deception in the Battle of Cherkassy.

On January 30th and 31st, 1944, the attention of the long-range reconnaissance, although it remained concerned with the interpretation and ongoing location of the traffic of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, was involuntarily diverted from this eastern attack group and the western attack group (1st Ukrainian Front). The close-range reconnaissance continued to observe troop radio communications in the Novij Mirgorod - Rotmistrowka - Morenzy - Zvenigorodka break-in area in order to gain a final picture of the distribution of Russian forces and their further intentions.

Surprisingly, new radio communications broke through during this phase, which were established by a few but reliable locations on the northern front of the pocket north of the approximate Kanev - Kagarlyk line and in front of the eastern front of the pocket approximately in the Cherkassy - Mosny - Staroselje area.

In the north, the traffic situation remained uncertain: it was neither clear whether the new radio traffic belonged to the command radio network of the 27th Army, nor could the radio connections be traced forward beyond the forward radio nodes, which were interpreted as divisional headquarters. However, it became clear that the radio traffic in the east was controlled by the 52nd Army.

During long-range reconnaissance, this new radio image had to give the impression that the enemy, although it had begun to turn with stronger forces from the break-in area to the south against the Novij-Mirgorod-Mal. Yekaterinopol line - apparently to shield its attack groups - would now try to split the pocket from the east, for example via Staroselje to Kwitki, with simultaneous pressure from the north. However, this impression contradicted the tactical assessment of the situation by the army high command, which expected the enemy forces to be concentrated solely against the southern front of the pocket.

On such an occasion, the intelligence commander responsible for the final analysis of the results finds himself in an extremely delicate position. He is obliged to attach importance to every new radio traffic that occurs, contrary to the judgment of the command, and to follow it up as long as there is no evidence that it is fake traffic. He can make it easy for himself and report his findings to the management with reservations.

In this way he releases himself from responsibility, but by addressing a radio process that was initially only recorded technically as a tactical measure, he puts an undue burden on the leadership and troops, especially in a tense situation, and shakes their trust in radio reconnaissance when his report is not confirmed later. If he decides not to report a newly occurring radio image until he has examined and verified it using all the means at his disposal, his report may come too late. Because this verification takes time, and during its implementation, the observation that was initially treated as a deception may turn out to be fact.

In this case, failure to report can have serious consequences. The decision as to whether newly detected traffic is a tactical radio image or a technical deception radio image is just as difficult as the alternative, whether radio silence from the enemy entitles the enemy to interpret the reconnaissance area as enemy-free or, on the contrary, to assume one excellently disguised assembly behind it. There are no exact methods of knowledge here. Long experiences can often, but emotional considerations will rarely lead to an accurate decision.

Source: Die sowjetrussische Funktäuschung in der Schlacht von Tscherkassy. Oberst aD Randewig. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift. Band (Jahr): 119 (1953). Heft 6

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; more.............................

The Soviet radio deception in the Battle of Cherkassy.

The intelligence detachment commander assigned to the army found himself in this ambiguous situation as to whether he should immediately report the new radio images that had appeared in the north and east, as time was of the essence, or whether he should initially refrain from reporting them in order not to alarm the leadership and troops prematurely. In view of the obvious massification in the south, he was also reluctant to point out that further attacks might be imminent against the eastern and northern fronts of the pocket, especially since the new radio images had not yet been completely clarified; On the other hand, he could not ignore their appearance, and the radio picture in the east, which was clearly controlled by the 52nd Army, gave him particular concern.

There was a discussion between him, the general staff officer who was handling the enemy situation (Ic), and the intelligence troop leader of the army high command, who himself had been the intelligence reconnaissance commander of an army group for many years. Different views emerged from this debate. Although the reconnaissance commander admitted that he might have made an overly pessimistic judgment, he ultimately considered the new radio traffic to be tactically genuine and therefore threatening. The general staff officer described an intention to attack from the north as unlikely, but from the east as at least possible.

The intelligence troop leader was inclined to the view that it was an enemy radio deception because the new radio images stood out too conspicuously from the other tactical radio traffic and because the enemy, in contrast to the earlier observations, neglected the concealment; His strongest objection was the fact that no traffic had been detected ahead of the radio nodes that were interpreted as divisions. He recommended that these connections be checked, despite the urgency of time, because it was necessary to avoid alarming the troops.

The platoon of the intelligence close-in reconnaissance company in the pocket then received radio instructions to search for troop radio communications from the suspected Russian divisions. Within a short time the report was perfectly negative. This meant that the incoherence of the newly emerged radio networks could be considered proven. Almost at the same time, the bulk of the company deployed outside the pocket gained a clear picture of the enemy's distribution of forces in the Vyasowok - Olshana - Kazatsky area after solving a Russian radio cipher, from which the Russian command's intention also emerged, to separate the encircled German corps by attacking from south to north and destroy them individually.

Source: Die sowjetrussische Funktäuschung in der Schlacht von Tscherkassy. Oberst aD Randewig. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift. Band (Jahr): 119 (1953). Heft 6

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; more.............................

The Soviet radio deception in the Battle of Cherkassy.

In this context, it should be noted that the orders of the army high command to reduce the pocket were not based on intelligence reports about intentions to attack in the north and east of the encirclement. The Commander in Chief and Chief of Staff were not informed of the alleged Russian radio hoax until it was recognized as such.

Only rarely will it be possible to decide whether radio deception took place and whether it was a success or a failure, because even the most objective scientific war reports are likely to avoid admitting that you were deceived or that you deceived in vain. From the point of view of radio deception adversary communications intelligence, proof of the success of a deception is only obtained if during radio deception enemy radio messages referring to the deceptive radio image are detected.

This happened in October 1917, when, before the advance of the German and Austrian armies in the battle between Flitsch and Tolmein, the radio service in South Tyrol simulated the formation of a German attack group and the German radio reconnaissance services intercepted the Italian radio message. "Do not disturb" radio communications provide valuable information about enemy intentions.

In the absence of such conclusive evidence, one can only proceed with extreme caution and moderation. This was the objective of the previous statements.

Source: Die sowjetrussische Funktäuschung in der Schlacht von Tscherkassy. Oberst aD Randewig. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift. Band (Jahr): 119 (1953). Heft 6

It´s all. Cheers. Raúl M .