![Very Happy :D](./images/smilies/icon_biggrin.gif)
The air defense of the German Reich in the World War 1939-1945 and its lessons.
The beginnings of the German air defense 1939-1941.
In pursuit of the guiding political ideas, the German Supreme Command was guided by the strategic idea of destroying the various opponents in short campaigns and separately. A war of attrition, as well as campaigns seeking a decision in two or even more theaters of war at the same time, should be avoided as far as possible.
The Luftwaffe also thought offensively. Their striking power was intended to break enemy resistance on the battlefield. It was hoped that air strikes on the enemy's rear facilities would deprive the enemy of their freedom of action for strategic defense or for possible new offensives.
At the same time, however, the training and combat principles of the German Air Force were aimed at strategic air warfare independent of the other branchs of the Wehrmacht. These operations were intended to hit the enemy's power sources. However, such an air war was not envisaged in connection with the planned “blitzkriegs”, at least in the early stages of a possible war.
The Germans did not have a distinct defensive air strategy. It was argued that the sooner and more effectively the enemy was thrown out of the airfields used by his bombers, the fewer the forces required for the actual air defense of the Reich. Under no circumstances should the attack force be weakened. German military doctrine still saw attack as the best defense. In addition, the German air warfare potential did not seem to be sufficient to build up a strong offensive force and a correspondingly powerful air defense at the same time. The effectiveness of the German Luftwaffe was not suitable for a long war.
The organization and operational objectives of the German air defense forces in 1939 were based on the view that the well-fortified “Western Air Defense Zone” (flak and fighters) was able to repel even stronger air attacks than was expected from the British and French at the time. However, anti-aircraft units were still spread across the whole of Germany from the western borders to the Elbe. They were supposed to provide localized defense to protect the most important objectives that were behind the West Wall and east of Germany's western borders. Day fighters were grouped around a few very specific objectives for the same purpose. Berlin initially received more “symbolic” protection.
The overestimation of the own air offensive was also reflected in the insufficient expansion of night fighters. There had already been some experimental units before the war. But back then it was not believed that night air combat would acquire the same importance as it actually did later. The correctness of this opinion seemed to be confirmed when the Anglo-French air raids did not reach any major proportions until the spring of 1940. Night raids were limited to occasional disruptive operations, with enemy bombers primarily dropping propaganda material. These flights mostly extended to the western part of the empire, and in individual cases also to areas further east.
On December 18, 1939, the RAF launched a strong daytime bombing attack on naval installations in the northwestern coastal area. The losses inflicted on the British bombers by the German fighters showed that daylight attacks into the interior of the Reich without fighters protection would initially have little success. There were no further attacks for the time being, so the Germans believed that air supremacy over German space was assured. Radar devices were used experimentally for the first time on the German side during this operation.
However, from this success the necessary conclusions for the liberal use of these devices in air defense were not immediately drawn. The anti-aircraft artillery had been using it since 1940 to detect approaching bombers and to achieve more effective defensive fire. However, the German hunters only used them on a larger scale from 1941/42. Previous use of these devices was also hampered by production difficulties. In addition, the German Supreme Command probably did not realize the great importance that radar would have for both air tactics and the overall strategy of the future air war.
Source: Die Luftverteidigung des Deutschen Reiches im Weltkrieg 1939-1945 und ihre Lehren: ein strategischer Überblick. Herhudt von Rohden. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift. Band (Jahr): 117 (1951). Heft 10
Cheers. Raúl M
![Cool 8)](./images/smilies/icon_cool.gif)