Which city should hitler have gone for on the russian front?

[julian]

They may or may not have but they were hardly the only units involved were they? And what did they carry 3days worth of supply? Even if more they may not have known what thier log strcucture would look like in a week or two.

You seriously underestimate what a chief of staff of a unit knows about all aspects of being ready for an offensive.
And you ignore that PGR 2 executed a succesful deep penetration to the south in september over terrain in which it was difficult to supply. PGR 2 could therefore certainly have atacked east at the same time.
Reamining on the defensive does not mean your opponent is going to do you the courtesy of leaving you in peace so you could even end up suffering more losses and consuming more ammo.

[julian]

You clearly don't know the OTL.... Timoshenko and Zhukhov's fresh armies in front of AGC counterattcked all through the end of July and into the early part of Sep which had a huge effect on AGC as well as themselve.

Just shows that not attacking oneself does not guarantee consuming less resources and losing less men and material as the enemy will not leave you in peace.
Given the way the germans executed their offensives, the offensive was not something which would be more costly.
If yo do not have the resources for an offensive, then you do not have them for a successful defense either.

[julian]

It looks like heavy offensive fighting and heavy defenceive fighting required the same amount of supplies but as I mentioned if you have a sustained successful offensive your log network won't be as developed and therefore supply will be more difficult.

A deep penetration will always face logistical problems as supply trucks will have to drive further which means you will have to make do longer with what is present. Eventually, this and other factors will cause an offensive to stop at least temporarily. But one is certainly not going to abstain from starting an offensive or doing it slowly because of this prospect.

[Osterhase]

Why don't you try a side by side comparison of hypothetical Taifun 1 Sep and Taifun from the OTL.
Look at the OOB of both sides, operational dispositions of both sides, where the German railheads were and tell me that these operations are the same just with different weather???

Not only the weather would be different but the disposition of mobile forces would be different too and they would be in much better shape because all the wear and tear caused by the operations in september would have been avoided.

Operational disposition means physical location. The operational readiness rate for Taifun in the OP for the tanks was 60% which is equal or better than it was for the proposed 1 Sep operation.

Perhaps you've missed that there were 3 Pz Gruppen for Taifun in the OP as opposed to 2 for the proposed 1 Sep operation? Did you also miss that Guderian's forces advanced relatively unopposed to effect the Bryansk encirclement as a result of the Kiev operation? Tell me where the Soviet 5th Army was on 1 Sep 1941 in relation to AGC?

[julian]

I have heard this simpleton assumption many times... Look at a map, see where the movements to the flanks took place, where they were supplied from and where those units ultimately were supplied from during Taifun. AGC did not have the requisite supply arteries on the central axis in August to facillitate an attack by the whole Army Group on 1 Sep. As I stated before, trying to supply the whole of AGC on this narrow axis would have been like trying to sail the Bismarck up a creek. Or, try to run breathing through a straw...

You are still subordinating operations to logistics which is wrong. Logistics support operations. If it is a good thing to attack on a shorter front for operational reasons, then that is what you do and any logistical issues will be a secondary consideration. You still ignore that there is no dogma for rate of ammo consumption to be successful. It does not have to be about lavish usage of firepower. Having to use less does not automatically imply failure.

[julian]

Operational disposition means physical location. The operational readiness rate for Taifun in the OP for the tanks was 60% which is equal or better than it was for the proposed 1 Sep operation.

Perhaps you've missed that there were 3 Pz Gruppen for Taifun in the OP as opposed to 2 for the proposed 1 Sep operation? Did you also miss that Guderian's forces advanced relatively unopposed to effect the Bryansk encirclement as a result of the Kiev operation? Tell me where the Soviet 5th Army was on 1 Sep 1941 in relation to AGC?

Stating that all the moving to and fro and fighting by mobile forces during september would leave them in better shape than without is not very credible.
And different decisions about the importance of a Moscow operation from even before the start of Barbarossa could have led to an earlier operation with more Panzergroups. Could even have been earlier than end august.

[lwd]

They could certainly attack with more prospect of success than in the more unfavorable period because of bad weather.

Could they? That very much would depend on the state of the unit(s) involved, the weather, the terrain etc. Overly general statments like the above are seldom correct.

[Osterhase]

You are still subordinating operations to logistics which is wrong. Logistics support operations. If it is a good thing to attack on a shorter front for operational reasons, then that is what you do and any logistical issues will be a secondary consideration. You still ignore that there is no dogma for rate of ammo consumption to be successful. It does not have to be about lavish usage of firepower. Having to use less does not automatically imply failure.

There is nothing dogmatic about understanding events in retrospect. AGC did not have enough offensive power or logistical support for a 1 Sep attack to successfully take Moscow and the facts support this. What does appear dogmatic is your insistence that the attack can be carried by sheer willpower in the face of all obstacles, shortages and requirements. Or perhaps that your ill-sourced argument will convince anyone if you continue to repeat the same unsourced opinions and assumptions while telling very well read and experienced people that they don't understand. Are you in your teens, early 20's or something? (certainly follows that pattern).

[Osterhase]

Operational disposition means physical location. The operational readiness rate for Taifun in the OP for the tanks was 60% which is equal or better than it was for the proposed 1 Sep operation.

Perhaps you've missed that there were 3 Pz Gruppen for Taifun in the OP as opposed to 2 for the proposed 1 Sep operation? Did you also miss that Guderian's forces advanced relatively unopposed to effect the Bryansk encirclement as a result of the Kiev operation? Tell me where the Soviet 5th Army was on 1 Sep 1941 in relation to AGC?

Stating that all the moving to and fro and fighting by mobile forces during september would leave them in better shape than without is not very credible.
And different decisions about the importance of a Moscow operation from even before the start of Barbarossa could have led to an earlier operation with more Panzergroups. Could even have been earlier than end august.

Not very credible??? Its the facts! The railheads moved forward in August/Sep along with the Soviet attacks easing up in Sep which allowed AGC to replenish, recieve replacements of men and equipment. ugh....

[lwd]

They may or may not have but they were hardly the only units involved were they? And what did they carry 3days worth of supply? Even if more they may not have known what thier log strcucture would look like in a week or two.

You seriously underestimate what a chief of staff of a unit knows about all aspects of being ready for an offensive.

Am I? Care to support your position with fact and logic rather than opinion.

And you ignore that PGR 2 executed a succesful deep penetration to the south in september over terrain in which it was difficult to supply.

Did I? I don't think so. Care to show where I did?

PGR 2 could therefore certainly have atacked east at the same time.

Really? I guess they could have but it would have been rather insane to do so. Now attacking East instead of South might have had some merit but it's not just the supplly sitiuation of those two units at that point intime that determines their abiltiy to reach Moscow is it? Or maybe you think it si.

Reamining on the defensive does not mean your opponent is going to do you the courtesy of leaving you in peace so you could even end up suffering more losses and consuming more ammo.

Scucessful defenisve operatoins usually sustain fewer casualties and there ease the log situation as the network is usually well established including the vairuos levels of supply dumps. If your oppositoin has the force to make a heavy attack then they have the force to make an offense difficult as well.

I have heard this simpleton assumption many times... Look at a map, see where the movements to the flanks took place, where they were supplied from and where those units ultimately were supplied from during Taifun. AGC did not have the requisite supply arteries on the central axis in August to facillitate an attack by the whole Army Group on 1 Sep. As I stated before, trying to supply the whole of AGC on this narrow axis would have been like trying to sail the Bismarck up a creek. Or, try to run breathing through a straw...

You are still subordinating operations to logistics which is wrong. Logistics support operations.

If you don't have an adequate logistics system then logistics should impact operations. The failure to realize this resulted in a number of serious defeats for the German army.

If it is a good thing to attack on a shorter front for operational reasons, then that is what you do and any logistical issues will be a secondary consideration.

??? It has determined the length of the front you are attacking on but it is a secondary issue? Do you realize just how inane this sounds?

You still ignore that there is no dogma for rate of ammo consumption to be successful. It does not have to be about lavish usage of firepower. Having to use less does not automatically imply failure.

This is what is known as a straw man argument. In general haveing an adequate supply of ammo means you have a better chance of being successful, as the adequacy of your supply system decreases (not just ammo by the way) your probability of success also decreases. It will reach a point where success is so unlikly that the operation is not worth conducting. You apparently fail to realize this.

So far your posts have been long on opinions and short on both fact and logic. It would be nice to see less of the former and more of the latter.

[Osterhase]

If it is a good thing to attack on a shorter front for operational reasons, then that is what you do and any logistical issues will be a secondary consideration.

??? It has determined the length of the front you are attacking on but it is a secondary issue? Do you realize just how inane this sounds?
.

[/quote]

That one cracks me up... In spite of the Wehrmacht's preferred offensive method was envelopmet to effect the 'battle of annihilation' concept and destroy the enemy's field armies asap, we are led to believe here that a more narrow front was better for 'operational reasons'.

I guess the (duh) rhetorical question of the day is whether or not it's better to attempt envelopment of the enemy from a concentrated narrow base and drive further around them through prepared defenses, or start out already on their flank(s) and advance along lightly defended axis (Guderian's path in Taifun) to effect an enveloping movement???

[julian]

That one cracks me up... In spite of the Wehrmacht's preferred offensive method was envelopmet to effect the 'battle of annihilation' concept and destroy the enemy's field armies asap, we are led to believe here that a more narrow front was better for 'operational reasons'.

I guess the (duh) rhetorical question of the day is whether or not it's better to attempt envelopment of the enemy from a concentrated narrow base and drive further around them through prepared defenses, or start out already on their flank(s) and advance along lightly defended axis (Guderian's path in Taifun) to effect an enveloping movement???

Funny that you would say this as this extemely long enveloptment would be very difficult for reasons of fuel consumption.
Guderian certainly did not choose to attack from where he did. It was simply the consequence of the operation to the south.
And the socalled narrow base is obviously not really a narrow base.

[julian]

This is what is known as a straw man argument. In general haveing an adequate supply of ammo means you have a better chance of being successful, as the adequacy of your supply system decreases (not just ammo by the way) your probability of success also decreases. It will reach a point where success is so unlikly that the operation is not worth conducting. You apparently fail to realize this.

So far your posts have been long on opinions and short on both fact and logic. It would be nice to see less of the former and more of the latter.

Incorrect. You would never be able to quantify what an adequate supply is. There are only averages from real operations and these also sometimes more reflect what was available, if only because you cannot consume more than is produced. Not being able to squander ammo has the one advantage of being forced to be very efficient.
And you would be found even more wanting if you tried to prove that AGC did not have this socalled adequate supply level in august 1941.

[julian]

Scucessful defenisve operatoins usually sustain fewer casualties and there ease the log situation as the network is usually well established including the vairuos levels of supply dumps. If your oppositoin has the force to make a heavy attack then they have the force to make an offense difficult as well.

If the railways cannot bring up enough supplies to sustain the average rate of consumption in the defensive then you will have a problem there too as you will use up your reserve and will end up in a situation where you will consume the ammo as it arrives.
So, here too you will be forced to use your ammo as efficiently as possible.
The type of offensive operations the germans conducted makes life much easier for the infantry armies.

[julian]

??? It has determined the length of the front you are attacking on but it is a secondary issue? Do you realize just how inane this sounds?

Operational reasons determine it and any alleged logistical limitations that result from it are indeed a secondary issue.