While I have the KStN docs, I am having a hard time building up larger units from them. At the moment, I am looking into the theoretical structure of bondenstage (? static) infantry divisions in 1944.
Were the infantry battalions composed of 1 heavy and 3 shutzen companies ?
thanks,
Mad Dog
static infantry divisions
Moderator: Tom Houlihan
Re: static infantry divisions
Greetings "MadDog" !! 
Hope the following is of some help -
Between 1939 and 1943 the German standard infantry division contained three regiments with a total of nine rifle battalions. Each of the infantry regiments had, besides its twelve rifle and heavy weapons companies, a 13th (infantry howitzer) and 14th (antitank) company. The division had also an antitank and a reconnaissance battalion. Organic artillery consisted of one regiment of one medium (150-mm. howitzer) and three light (105-mm. howitzer or gun) battalions with a total armament of forty-eight pieces. German division artillery was thus roughly equal to that of an U.S. division. Chiefly because of the antitank and reconnaissance units, on the other hand, the division with 17,00 men was substantially larger than its U.S. counterpart.
It was also substantially larger than could be supported by the dwindling supply of manpower after four years of war. In October 1943 the division was drastically overhauled to reduce its size while maintaining its firepower. Organization charts of the new-style division (with 13,656 men) comprising three regiments of two battalions each had only just been published when further slashes were ordered. The problem (set in January 1944 by Hitler) was to trim the personnel to something like 11,000 without affecting the combat strength. Army planners rejected this sleight of hand as impossible and contented themselves with a further cut from 13,656 to 12,769. Reductions were made chiefly in supply and overhead, and the proportion of combat to service troops was thereby raised to 75-80 percent. The result was the so-called 1944-type infantry division.
The reduction from nine infantry battalions to six was partly alleviated by the substitution of a Füsilier battalion for the old reconnaissance unit. The Fusilier battalion, still charged with reconnaissance duties, was organized like a rifle battalion except that one company was equipped with bicycles and the unit had slightly more horse-drawn vehicles and some motor transport. In practice the Füsilier battalion came to be reckoned as a seventh rifle battalion.
Besides lopping off three battalions, the new division pruned out the rifle squad and company while at the same time increasing the proportion of automatic weapons. The basic unit, the Rifle Company, was cut to 140 enlisted men and 2 officers, as compared with the U.S. Company of 187 enlisted men and 6 officers. Rifle strength in the German division was about 1,200 less than in the American but the total division firepower was superior. About equal in artillery, the German division enjoyed a slight preponderance in infantry howitzers, and a heavy superiority in automatic weapons.
The 1944 infantry division was set up as the basic type for new divisions as well as for the reorganization of certain old formations, as for instance, the Luftwaffe field divisions. The division which included the bulk of Rundstedt's infantry, however, the static (bodenstaendige) division, was exempted from reorganization unless specifically so ordered. The static divisions were formed at the request of Rundstedt in 1942 in order that he would have a nucleus of divisions not subject to transfer to the east. Though triangular with nine rifle battalions, they were substantially weaker than the normal old-type infantry division. They lacked the reconnaissance battalion and had only three battalions of artillery.
Although the static divisions were expressly designed as permanent garrison troops for the west, they were by no means safe from the periodic troop collections for the east. Actually, by the end of 1943, most of the divisions had lost their third regiments. Attempts in 1943 and early 1944 to rehabilitate the units and fill their ranks chiefly with 0st battalions resulted in virtual abandonment of tables of organization in favour of improvisation that reflected both the particular nature of the coastal assignments and the vicissitudes of the long struggle for manpower and equipment. In total strength and number and variety of combat units the static divisions bore little resemblance to one another. While the 716th Division, for instance, had six battalions and only one regimental headquarters under its control on D Day, the 709th, occupying two and a half times as long a coast line, had eleven battalions under three regiments.
Even after the 1944-type division had been standardized, experimentation continued. Certain divisions (notably the 77th and 91st in Seventh Army area) organized their six rifle battalions in two regiments. They lacked the Füsilier battalion and had three instead of four artillery battalions. In the case of the 77th Division this organic lack was partly made up by the attachment of an 0st battery and a Volga-Tatar rifle battalion. The 91st Division went into combat with an attached parachute regiment. The two-regiment infantry division therefore did not operate in T/O form in the invasion area, and for the German Army as a whole it may be regarded as experimental and eccentric, designed further to conserve manpower but not accepted as a generally satisfactory solution.
Hope the following is of some help -
Between 1939 and 1943 the German standard infantry division contained three regiments with a total of nine rifle battalions. Each of the infantry regiments had, besides its twelve rifle and heavy weapons companies, a 13th (infantry howitzer) and 14th (antitank) company. The division had also an antitank and a reconnaissance battalion. Organic artillery consisted of one regiment of one medium (150-mm. howitzer) and three light (105-mm. howitzer or gun) battalions with a total armament of forty-eight pieces. German division artillery was thus roughly equal to that of an U.S. division. Chiefly because of the antitank and reconnaissance units, on the other hand, the division with 17,00 men was substantially larger than its U.S. counterpart.
It was also substantially larger than could be supported by the dwindling supply of manpower after four years of war. In October 1943 the division was drastically overhauled to reduce its size while maintaining its firepower. Organization charts of the new-style division (with 13,656 men) comprising three regiments of two battalions each had only just been published when further slashes were ordered. The problem (set in January 1944 by Hitler) was to trim the personnel to something like 11,000 without affecting the combat strength. Army planners rejected this sleight of hand as impossible and contented themselves with a further cut from 13,656 to 12,769. Reductions were made chiefly in supply and overhead, and the proportion of combat to service troops was thereby raised to 75-80 percent. The result was the so-called 1944-type infantry division.
The reduction from nine infantry battalions to six was partly alleviated by the substitution of a Füsilier battalion for the old reconnaissance unit. The Fusilier battalion, still charged with reconnaissance duties, was organized like a rifle battalion except that one company was equipped with bicycles and the unit had slightly more horse-drawn vehicles and some motor transport. In practice the Füsilier battalion came to be reckoned as a seventh rifle battalion.
Besides lopping off three battalions, the new division pruned out the rifle squad and company while at the same time increasing the proportion of automatic weapons. The basic unit, the Rifle Company, was cut to 140 enlisted men and 2 officers, as compared with the U.S. Company of 187 enlisted men and 6 officers. Rifle strength in the German division was about 1,200 less than in the American but the total division firepower was superior. About equal in artillery, the German division enjoyed a slight preponderance in infantry howitzers, and a heavy superiority in automatic weapons.
The 1944 infantry division was set up as the basic type for new divisions as well as for the reorganization of certain old formations, as for instance, the Luftwaffe field divisions. The division which included the bulk of Rundstedt's infantry, however, the static (bodenstaendige) division, was exempted from reorganization unless specifically so ordered. The static divisions were formed at the request of Rundstedt in 1942 in order that he would have a nucleus of divisions not subject to transfer to the east. Though triangular with nine rifle battalions, they were substantially weaker than the normal old-type infantry division. They lacked the reconnaissance battalion and had only three battalions of artillery.
Although the static divisions were expressly designed as permanent garrison troops for the west, they were by no means safe from the periodic troop collections for the east. Actually, by the end of 1943, most of the divisions had lost their third regiments. Attempts in 1943 and early 1944 to rehabilitate the units and fill their ranks chiefly with 0st battalions resulted in virtual abandonment of tables of organization in favour of improvisation that reflected both the particular nature of the coastal assignments and the vicissitudes of the long struggle for manpower and equipment. In total strength and number and variety of combat units the static divisions bore little resemblance to one another. While the 716th Division, for instance, had six battalions and only one regimental headquarters under its control on D Day, the 709th, occupying two and a half times as long a coast line, had eleven battalions under three regiments.
Even after the 1944-type division had been standardized, experimentation continued. Certain divisions (notably the 77th and 91st in Seventh Army area) organized their six rifle battalions in two regiments. They lacked the Füsilier battalion and had three instead of four artillery battalions. In the case of the 77th Division this organic lack was partly made up by the attachment of an 0st battery and a Volga-Tatar rifle battalion. The 91st Division went into combat with an attached parachute regiment. The two-regiment infantry division therefore did not operate in T/O form in the invasion area, and for the German Army as a whole it may be regarded as experimental and eccentric, designed further to conserve manpower but not accepted as a generally satisfactory solution.
Signed: "The Shadow"
Re: static infantry divisions
I have a feeling that "it depends". Looking at some gliederung, for various static divisions, some appear to have battalions composed of 4 of the same type of company, while some seem to have the more typical 3xCo.+1 hvy.Co.
The latest KStN I have for static shutzen Co. is April 7, 1943. I dont _think_ there is is a later one....
thanks,
Mad Dog
The latest KStN I have for static shutzen Co. is April 7, 1943. I dont _think_ there is is a later one....
thanks,
Mad Dog