Rommel's booty in North Africa
Moderator: Tom Houlihan
Rommel's booty in North Africa
History always told me Rommel troop depended on captured British supplies to prolong his war in North Africa. Anyone have some info about this. According to my info, When Rommel captured Bengzhai in Jan 1942, he took 1300 lorries and when he captured Tobruk, he took 3 million rations and 500000 gallon oil and 2000 motor vehicles Anyone have additional info on these : like except these above, what he captured from Bengzhai, Tobruk, Berhemd, or other battlefield ? I know he also captured POL , rations and ammunition in these area, How much of these ? anyone have these detailed info ?
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Nacht
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Hype...
Kelvin,
As a general 'spot' overview type of answer... there is quite a bit of information available about material shipped and captured but this forum might not be the best method of sharing the answers... it would need be in some type of tabular monthly form and also by port or city... I would guess from your statement of your requirements or personal quest.
The detemination from history and source record materials is that Rommel probably did not initially live off of captured supplies... but this is a general statement and not one as specified by a week to week synopsis of the determinants of attrition, mechanical failure or loss in the term of the campaign from February of 1941 to May of 1943.
If a straight line comparison is made of comparable German Army Divisions in 1941... his (Rommel's) were as well supplied or better a delivered army into the field... initially at least, as compared to others in the German Army. A lot of the 'hype' about Rommel and the mystique surrounding him are just that... 'hype'... if you read his own words and those of his commanders... the timing of the battles and a myriad of effecting events set the true course of the battles in the campaign. As the NA Campaign timeframe continued, the simple logistics and economics or the overwhelming superiority in production abilitites with their delivery to the field of battle by the Commonwealth/Allies was the deciding factor.
My example thought process is that when near equal numeric forces were engaged, the DAK seemed to prove its equipment took the field by a slightly larger degree than the Allies could manage but as soon as far greater numeric superiority came into play for the Allies... then the only hope of salvation and survival in the field came from the capturing of anything the DAK could obtain (from the opposition) to supplement their own stored stocks. The impression gained of the desert campaign in most reader's minds from initially reading about the desert war or from stories of the battles is basically wrong or incorrect as the number of tanks in combat remained relatively small and the total numbers of troops engaged is similarly low but most authors in the past did not go into the details of numerics or combatant strengths... at least when compared to that of the descriptions of the campaigns in the East into Russia and Western Europe.
The reading of ENIGMA messages in bothe the German Naval communication, the Luftwaffe reports and the German Army elements contributed at different times to the store house of knowledge collected by the Allies and the subsequent total onslaught on all maritime traffic or shipments to Rommel's forces in late 1942 (in advance of the invasion of Morocco) of course changed the scenario in the late NA Campaign. Many commanders in the Allied camp had great hesitation in the attacking of every thing that was being sent directly before November 1942 for the fear of the Germans realizing that several elements of their various ENIGMA messages were being read at different times dependant on some field changes to the German equipment and coding systems implemented.
The DAK army was forced to depend more on air transport to an even greater degree or being supplemented for basic needs to a greater extent. We additionally know of the decimation of the Me-323 transport force sent to releive and bring supplies... plus also the various glider attempts to bring in specific goods... & even critical spare parts. Plus, the loss of large numbers of Ju-52 in their various roles of support.
Rommel's reports show his staff equipment requests to Kesselring were often drastically inflated. The timing of shipments to his army and the successful arrival in the early campaign was to keep the Commonwealth off balance in the early segments. The 'beute' or 'booty' goods did well supplement their initial stores in the major harbors or towns captured... but if you look at the consumed fuel requirements per month or just basic items like paper goods... many might be surprised as to the quantities required to run an army! I have joked to my AANA colleagues about Rommel's forces having only 15-20% of the paint required to run his army in 1941 and by 1943 his troop had only 4-5% of the toilet paper that was requested or needed in the field... and a severe shortage of shovels to bury the waste!
But in the late campaign... we had DAK assigned troops arriving with no transport and had to hitch rides to the battlefield with their Italian allies (example: some of the Ramcke elements trucks and a piece of the 10./PD lost their trucks as well in convoy). If not for an audacious maneuver of capturing a load of British equipment in late November of 1942, many of Ramcke's forces would have been captured...
As a general 'spot' overview type of answer... there is quite a bit of information available about material shipped and captured but this forum might not be the best method of sharing the answers... it would need be in some type of tabular monthly form and also by port or city... I would guess from your statement of your requirements or personal quest.
The detemination from history and source record materials is that Rommel probably did not initially live off of captured supplies... but this is a general statement and not one as specified by a week to week synopsis of the determinants of attrition, mechanical failure or loss in the term of the campaign from February of 1941 to May of 1943.
If a straight line comparison is made of comparable German Army Divisions in 1941... his (Rommel's) were as well supplied or better a delivered army into the field... initially at least, as compared to others in the German Army. A lot of the 'hype' about Rommel and the mystique surrounding him are just that... 'hype'... if you read his own words and those of his commanders... the timing of the battles and a myriad of effecting events set the true course of the battles in the campaign. As the NA Campaign timeframe continued, the simple logistics and economics or the overwhelming superiority in production abilitites with their delivery to the field of battle by the Commonwealth/Allies was the deciding factor.
My example thought process is that when near equal numeric forces were engaged, the DAK seemed to prove its equipment took the field by a slightly larger degree than the Allies could manage but as soon as far greater numeric superiority came into play for the Allies... then the only hope of salvation and survival in the field came from the capturing of anything the DAK could obtain (from the opposition) to supplement their own stored stocks. The impression gained of the desert campaign in most reader's minds from initially reading about the desert war or from stories of the battles is basically wrong or incorrect as the number of tanks in combat remained relatively small and the total numbers of troops engaged is similarly low but most authors in the past did not go into the details of numerics or combatant strengths... at least when compared to that of the descriptions of the campaigns in the East into Russia and Western Europe.
The reading of ENIGMA messages in bothe the German Naval communication, the Luftwaffe reports and the German Army elements contributed at different times to the store house of knowledge collected by the Allies and the subsequent total onslaught on all maritime traffic or shipments to Rommel's forces in late 1942 (in advance of the invasion of Morocco) of course changed the scenario in the late NA Campaign. Many commanders in the Allied camp had great hesitation in the attacking of every thing that was being sent directly before November 1942 for the fear of the Germans realizing that several elements of their various ENIGMA messages were being read at different times dependant on some field changes to the German equipment and coding systems implemented.
The DAK army was forced to depend more on air transport to an even greater degree or being supplemented for basic needs to a greater extent. We additionally know of the decimation of the Me-323 transport force sent to releive and bring supplies... plus also the various glider attempts to bring in specific goods... & even critical spare parts. Plus, the loss of large numbers of Ju-52 in their various roles of support.
Rommel's reports show his staff equipment requests to Kesselring were often drastically inflated. The timing of shipments to his army and the successful arrival in the early campaign was to keep the Commonwealth off balance in the early segments. The 'beute' or 'booty' goods did well supplement their initial stores in the major harbors or towns captured... but if you look at the consumed fuel requirements per month or just basic items like paper goods... many might be surprised as to the quantities required to run an army! I have joked to my AANA colleagues about Rommel's forces having only 15-20% of the paint required to run his army in 1941 and by 1943 his troop had only 4-5% of the toilet paper that was requested or needed in the field... and a severe shortage of shovels to bury the waste!
But in the late campaign... we had DAK assigned troops arriving with no transport and had to hitch rides to the battlefield with their Italian allies (example: some of the Ramcke elements trucks and a piece of the 10./PD lost their trucks as well in convoy). If not for an audacious maneuver of capturing a load of British equipment in late November of 1942, many of Ramcke's forces would have been captured...
