Which city should hitler have gone for on the russian front?

[Mobius]

huh?
what was all that about?

[timobrienwells]

Hi Osterhase,in reply,I believe that I understand the subject matter quite well,as I believe you do.Because our opinions differ does not necessarily mean that you 'understand' things better than I do,does it?The directive issued by Hitler on july30 was his way of justifying the stop order issued to AGC.After this directive he forbade all discussion on the subject.If you read the directive you will see that it is not an order as such,but Hitler putting forth his amateurish military opinion. To a man[Except Keitel]his general staff did not agree with him.They all[field commanders included]argued for a resumption of the advance on moscow.There must have been a good reason for them doing that.Why do you think they felt it right to go to moscow,and wrong to go for the limited tactical victories that hitler wanted?Also I can not agree with your comments about the unreadiness of the mobile formations.If they were so unready,then how was Guderian able to go so far so fast.I must also repeat to you that an operational pause WAS planned for at Smolensk.The pincer WAS closed on the 15th.[where do you get your information from?]The fighting at smolensk was heavy,but AGC fought off every attack.You said yourself that guderians forces were clear by Aug 8th,and the only thing stopping them from offensive action was directive 33 issued on july19th.We will obviously disagree again over this,but please dont dimiss my opinion by saying I need to do more internet research-I really consider that to be a bit of a cheap shot. Yours respectfully Tim Wells

[Osterhase]

Tim no personal offense was intended toward you, on the contrary. You've been a model of respect and I apologize for any misgivings on my part. But, back to the war....

A word about sources; personal diaries and memoirs(German-Guderian, Manstein, etc.) are a poor choice in that they are self serving, politically motivated and completely lack the Soviet perspective which really hasn't been available until the last ten years or so. Stolfi's book rely's on memoirs and almost exclusively German sources, and that is more than enough to make his central thesis untenable (in light of the facts brought to light from Soviet/Stavka archive by Glantz).
To quote Wray:
"Second, the shallow knowledge of Western analysts is often based as much on myth as on fact. A major reason for this is that Western knowledge of the Russo-German War has been unduly influenced by the popular memoirs of several prominent German military leaders. While interesting and even instructive to a point, these memoirs suffer from the prejudices, lapses, and wishful remembering common to all memoirs and, therefore, form a precarious foundation on which to build a useful analysis. For example, even though Heinz Guderian's Panzer Leader and F. W. von Mellenthin's Panzer Battles regularly appear on U.S. Army professional reading lists and contain interesting insights into German military operations, each book paints a somewhat distorted picture of the German war against Russia. These distortions are the result of outright exaggeration and misrepresentation (as is common in Guderian's work) or the omission of important qualifying data and contextual background (as is more often the case in Mellenthin's book)."

"operational pause WAS planned for at Smolensk.The pincer WAS closed on the 15th.[where do you get your information from?)"

What is your source for the operational pause, certainly not Dir.21
The pincer was closed on someone's operations map in a book you may have read, but the reality is quite different. I refer you to Wray http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources ... .asp#recon
Specifically- The Defensive Aspects of Blitzkrieg
and also Glantz-"Barbarossa" pgs 78-84 including operational map, chain of events w/orders of battle and losses incurred with Glantz's "reflections".

"The directive issued by Hitler on july30 was his way of justifying the stop order issued to AGC.After this directive he forbade all discussion on the subject.If you read the directive you will see that it is not an order as such,but Hitler putting forth his amateurish military opinion."

Directive 34, 30 July 1941 is a fully written operationsbefehl (as per H.Dv. 300 Truppenfuhrung), you may have seen it paraphrased but despite that, it remains a fully written and formal OKH op-order (to include official addendum on 12 August (Glantz-Appendix I).

"To a man[Except Keitel]his general staff did not agree with him"
Source for this?

"guderians forces were clear by Aug 8th,and the only thing stopping them from offensive action was directive 33 issued on july19th"

When Guderian's mobile formations were withdrawn they were in need of rest and refit (internal reorganization and consolidation is what happened), the nearest railhead/supply depot was 200 miles to the rear of the Yelnya bridgehead over the Desna. The offensives to the North and South were facillitated by movement within "internal lines" (von Moltke principal) which eased the logistical situation somewhat and sped up the operational tempo. An offensive forward would have been into the teeth of prepared Soviet defenses along the expected axis of advance with 2 Pz Grps. (instead of 3 as per Taifun). My source for Soviet preparations on the Moscow/Smolensk axis? Glantz as a secondary source, his chapter on Smolensk numerically footnotes each use of archival source material in his description of AGC's operations in July/August. What is of interest is the Soviet source material that has only been recently available thus adding dynamic perspective lacking in previous work (especially memoirs of German Generals).

[Osterhase]

"please dont dimiss my opinion by saying I need to do more internet research"
Tim I said non-internet research. What sources are you using? Judging by the sound of your opinions, I see heavy influence of Stolfi, short internet articles and reinforcement of your opinion perhaps on other internet forums. I'm certainly not dismissing your opinion otherwise I wouldn't continue to debate, but what are your sources/influences?

[timobrienwells]

OK,we probably do get our information from sources that may have a political or personal bias;I grant you that.My opinion about Barbarossa[and it is only an opinion]is based on a reading of many different sources over a lot of years.Not that this in any way lends credibility to my opinion,but I also look at the simplicity of the facts that we know are facts.My internet research and Stolfi are of only recent origin.[1 year]I have not read glanz,though on your urging,I will obtain a copy.Regarding the credibility of source information,if your inference is that german based information is unreliable,then why would you be convinced that Soviet based information is?I am not suggesting that it is not reliable,but if german intel is suspect,then what excludes soviet intel from being suspect as well?I am overseas at the moment,so I can not give you a list of everything I have,and I certainly dont remember all the other books I have read,but my interest in this general subject spans over 25 years.Again that does not add any weight to my opinions,but I am simply trying to establish that I have done some homework.All of that said,I will in my next post address the issues you raised. Regards TimWells

[Osterhase]

Hi Tim, just to clarify my position; I respect and trust German sources, but they are only one side of the story so to speak. If the information from German sources was perfect, then why did Barbarossa fail? It is importatnt to remember that after the war when all of these consecrated German Generals wrote their memoirs, etc. that the Soviet information was still lacking and wasn't available until about 10-12 years ago. I refer specifically to the Red Army/STAVKA archival information, not Soviet Generals memoirs or battle accounts. It is vitally important to gain NEW information because the material written up until these past 10-12 years is based on partial fact(s) and singular perspective. The link to Major Wray's work I posted earlier in our conversation is excellent in understanding the encirclements of 1941, 1942.

[Qvist]

If I may interject, the point is not the reliability of German sources as such, rather the inherent limitations of memoirs as a haistorical source, even quite beyond any issues of self-serving bias (which IMo is a quite plain characteristic of Guderians, for instance). Memoir accounts quite simply is not an adequate basis for analysis of the war in the East, though they are certainly a legitimate part of it. That has sadly not prevented a great deal of influential histioriography from being written on such a basis, quite unneccessarily, given the general availability of huge masses of German documentation, which ought to be the fundamental basis for such analysis. And even that, of course, can only illuminate the German side of the table, and it is fundamentally not feasible, as Stolfi attempted to do, to address an issue such as what possibilities existed on the central sector in July and August without an adequate grasp of the situation on the Soviet side, which cannot be obtained from any German source, be it memoir or documentary.

cheers

[Osterhase]

Well said Qvist, is anyone here interested in a reading group of Glantz's "Barbarossa"? I would be happy to participate even though I've read it and refer to it often.

[timobrienwells]

Hi Osterhase.In reply to the points you raised.1]Operational pause.This was part of the plan submitted to Hitler on Dec 5 1940.In the initial planning,the Lossberg study conducted by warlimont for OKW,recognised the need to re-evaluate the strategic picture, after the Smolensk line had been taken.Rest and refit were also cited.Paulus's completion of general Marcks's work[OKH]called for the same strategic pause.As you know Paulus's work constituted the basis for the halder plan of Dec 5 1940.Finally general Wagner's quatermaters report stated that logistics would have to be stockpiled at Smolensk until the german gauge rail reached the city.Paulus stated that Smolensk should fall on day 20 of the offensive,and given that it fell on july 16,he was pretty close.Ofcourse the op pause was not in DIR 21,because Hitler's directives were of a general nature,it was then up to staffs and commanders to work out plans and operations. 2]Directive 34.Yes,directive 34 was an operationsbefehl,everything that Hitler issued was,but that does not lend any credibility to the military logic of it.Hitler did not issue Dir 34 because of the operational situation,as I stated before.He used his interpreptation of the situation to justify it!! The proof?Firstly his generals did not acccept his reasons as valid,but they still struggled for 3 weeks to change what they saw as an obviously disastrous mistake.Secondly,and more conclusively,Hitler had already stated that he was going to do exactly this back on 18 dec 1940,when he changed the strategic emphasis of the halder plan from Moscow to Leningrad and the Ukraine.Halder and the general staff proceeded on the basis that they would ultimately change Hitler's mind about such absurd non-military ideas,to no avail. 3]'Source for this'[about the generals disagreeing with him about AGC]Why are you asking me for a source about something that is accepted as historical fact??I mean,we can go down that road if you want to,but it is going to make things awfully slow.Is it because you want to know where I got my information from,or is it because you want to dismiss that information as memoirs?Halder's 'Diaries' is one,but there are others.If you insist I will get them,but the list of generals who disagreed with hitler about the Moscow things includes Halder,Brauschtitch,Warlimont,Bock,Guderian,Kluge and Hoth.I dont know about Strauss and Von Weichs,but I cant imagine that they would have agreed with Hitler.If on the other hand you can provide the name of one general involved who DID agree with Hitler on this issue,then I would be very appreciative[and surprised].Keital[and maybe Jodl]dont count ofcourse. regards TimWells

[timobrienwells]

Hi Osterhase,thank you for all of the articles you have sent me,they are interesting and informative.However,I must confess that they really have only confirmed my views,as I have not found in them any factual basis to support the popular idea that AGC could not have taken moscow in AUG 41.Infact,most of the things I have read point the other way.Now to the other points you raised.4]You were correct about the Yartsevo corridor,but my point was that the mobile elements of both panzer groups 2 and 3 were east of the city by the time it fell on july16. 5] ' Panzer groups...attrited to 50% AFTER the refit' ] The danger of statistics! The actual figures submitted on Aug 4 by guderian and hoth were 50% and 60% respectively.That was their SERVICABLE numbers for the offensive to Moscow.Can we therefore assume from these numbers that Guderain for example had 'permanently lost' 50% of his armour?Ofcourse not!Tank numbers were always in 3 groups, 1-servicable; 2 repair/maintenance; 3 permanently lost.After an advance of 650 kilometres in 3-4 weeks,is it any surprise that a large % of the armour was in repair?These would be returned to the fighting wedge in a short period.In any case,arguments about numbers is not the best way to determine the offensive capabilities of Panzer groups 2 and 3.The best way is to examine what they achieved AFTER this period.So looking at Panzer group Guderian first,it attacked Roslavl on Aug 1 captured it,and destroyed a russian army in the process.Next, it attacked south into the ukraine,going 450 kilometres,and helping to destroy Budenny's armies in the Kiev Encirclement.Finally,it attacked north as part of the Typhoon effort on Sep 30,surrrounding large soviet forces in the Bryansk pocket,and pushing on to Rhez etc.The total distance that the '50% attrited' PG2 covered was more than twice the distance required to get to moscow from its postions of late July.That is the evidence I prefer to use when trying to evaluate the offensive capability of PG2.What about Hoth?Well he also went all the way to the outskirts of Leningrad,and then all the way back to his jump off positions for Typhoon on Oct 2.After this he took part in the destruction of nine soviet armies during Typhoon,and ended up in the outer suburbs of moscow.Not bad for a panzer army that apparently only had 60% of its tanks available.It also must be emphasised that both groups had to contend with adverse weather condtions for the latter half of their operations. 5] 'into the teeth of prepared soviet defences along the axis of advaance' Well that sounds very scary,but just how sharp were those teeth in october when Hoth and Hoepner totally destroyed them in less than 2 weeks of fighting,taking 670,000 prisoners,and advance half the required distance to moscow?Were the forces opposite AGC stronger in Mid-Aug or early October?Were they more prepared in october? We know the answers to those questions,so the idea that PG2 and PG3[with their motorized formations]did not possess the offensive capability to strike at moscow is not supported by facts or historical events. 6] 'kiev forces to attack north' This has to be one the longest running mythes around.budeeny's forces were fully engaged against AGC,there was no chance of them marching north in strength and posing any sort of threat to AGc's flanks.To dis-engage from AGS would have meant losing Kiev,and Stalin was determined to hold it.The only force that could have possibly intervened in a miid-aug Typhoon was the armies near Gomel,and Bock had already taken this into account by assigning infantry divisions for flank protection in this area. I have read a lot on this forum about the recent soviet archival data that shows that the germans had no hope in Barbarossa,but I am yet to see any convincing numbers to show how badly wrong the germans were. Yours repectfully Tim Wells

[The Red Baron]

Hitler was a fool to attack Russia in the first place. Yes, I know, he and Stalin had very little trust for each other, but Russia was HUGE! 1st reason) The 1939 Non-Aggressive Pact between Germany and the Soviet Union was still in effect, and Hitler knew Stalin wouldn't break the treaty if he didn't. 2nd reason) More land wasn't needed, and if more land was obtained, his Huge Fortress Europe would become Huge Fortress Europe and Huge Fortress Part of Asia. Just another area for the Alies to attack if ya ask me...!3rd reason) Didn't you pay attention in History class Hitler? Napleon, who led one of the most powerful armies ever, was driven out of Europe for the same reason you were: THE BLISTERING COLD! Russians have their own fortress just by letting the wind and ice take it's part. Did you know that during Hitler's attack, Russia faced one of the harshest winters in 100s of years? Believe it, its a fact. A fact that I logistically made up.

-For the Motherland!

-For Taxes on the Rich and not the Middle Class!

-For the People!

-Communism was a good philosophy, it's just how it was aplied by Stalin, so stop saying the Communists are bad people, because they're not!

[timobrienwells]

Hi to The Red Baron,welcome.As regards Hitler and Russia,there is little doubt that he was a fool.The winter in 1941?I think the the Russkies probably had the better of it,because of their intact infrastructure and shorter lines of communication.Concerning commumists,who said they were bad people?Their philosophy?Wasn't it abandoned by most of the world last century? Respectfully Tim Wells

[The Red Baron]

You're right, nobody said it was a bad philosophy, I wrongfully assumed that someone would.

Sorry.

[CaptainSensible]

Concerning commumists,who said they were bad people?Their philosophy?Wasn't it abandoned by most of the world last century?

When was most of the world communist?

[CaptainSensible]

Hitler was a fool to attack Russia in the first place. Yes, I know, he and Stalin had very little trust for each other, but Russia was HUGE! 1st reason) The 1939 Non-Aggressive Pact between Germany and the Soviet Union was still in effect, and Hitler knew Stalin wouldn't break the treaty if he didn't. 2nd reason) More land wasn't needed, and if more land was obtained, his Huge Fortress Europe would become Huge Fortress Europe and Huge Fortress Part of Asia. Just another area for the Alies to attack if ya ask me...!3rd reason) Didn't you pay attention in History class Hitler? Napleon, who led one of the most powerful armies ever, was driven out of Europe for the same reason you were: THE BLISTERING COLD! Russians have their own fortress just by letting the wind and ice take it's part.

Annihilation of the Soviet union was the sole purpose of Hitler.

The Soviets were rebuilding their army in 1940-41 after the harsh lessons of the winter war against Finland. They had already made threatening moves against Romania to test their new methods, tactics and weapons. Romania was a supplier of oil to Nazi Germany, and I'm sure Stalin was keen on another crack at Finland, a major German source of Zinc and Iron ores.

So attacking the Red army in 1941 makes sense.