Marne 1914.

[tigre]

Hello to all ; an interesting article dealing with the the supply services and combat actions.................

The Supply Services of the German First Army during the Battle of the Marne.

The operations of the German First Army in the early phases of the World War have been the subject of much writing, but little attention has been given to what took place in the supply service. When it is considered that the supply services of the First Army included 10,000 vehicles and 25,000 horses, it is readily seen that the daily movements of such a mass require narration and comment by themselves.

Colonel Jochim, Quartermaster General of the German First Army, has thus written a useful work, in describing the supply accomplishments behind the corps of the German First Army during the decisive days from the 5th to the 13th of September 1914.

By regulation, the supply services of the German troops were the responsibility of the army corps; these had at their disposal to insure supply:

Combat trains; marching with the troops
Regimental trains, marching behind the divisions
Columns of munitions and trains, divided, for the march: in a first and second echelon; for combat: in an echelon of combat, a first echelon and a second echelon.

Munitions and supplies were brought by columns allotted to the depot services to the refilling points where the columns of the second echelon were supplied. By an exchange of columns between the different echelons, munitions and supplies arrived at the combat echelon, which organized a distributing point for the columns or vehicles from the front. All of these columns thus constituted mobile depots of munitions and food.

The length of the columns will give an idea of the importance of the supply services: while the troops of an active German army corps, marching on a single road, formed a column 19 miles in Iength, the regimental trams and the first and second echelons of the army corps had a length of 17 miles. It is obvious that in all of its movements, the First Army had to pay equal attention to its combatant troops and its supply columns.

On 4 September, the First Army which, in compliance with instructions from the high command, had obliqued towards the southeast to cut off the French from Paris, had reached and even passed the Marne with its cavalry and four of its corps, while the IV Reserve Corps followed, west of the Ourcq, assuring the security of the flank from the direction of Paris.

The supply head of the First Army, initially at Dusseldorf, had been advanced little by little, and was installed on 5 September at Chauny, about 61 miles from the front. The parks and the convoys had followed the rapid advance of the First Army as well as they were able and were on the lines of communication of their respective corps about 25 miles in their rear.

On 5 September, the commander of the First Army intended to continue the pursuit to the south, but an order from the supreme command directed it to wheel between the Marne and the Oise on Paris, while the Second Army was to make an analogous movement between the Marne and the Seine. The IV Reserve Corps received the order to halt and the army commander prepared the change of front of his four other corps for the morning of the 6th. To execute the order of the high command, the army commander had to reverse his front, until then facing south, to the rear around his right wing. During this maneuver the troops had to pass through the zone of the supply services and the grave problem of General von Kluck is to execute this movement after having the supply services evacuate this zone without provoking disorder or interfering with the normal supply of his troops. He decided to bring the four army corps which were south of the Marne to the new front by a flank march behind the IV Reserve Corps, the latter remaining in place; on the new front the four army corps would thus be in the same order from west to east as before. It was sufficient to oblique the parks and convoys to the right and then west, to clear the region through which the troops were to move. At the same time this would bring them behind their respective army corps on the new front. The orders were issued for this to be done on the morning of 6 September.

Source: UN EXEMPLE DE LIAISON ENTRE LES OPERATIONS ET LES SERVICES DE L'ARRIERE. [An example of liaison between combat operations and the supply services.] Lieut.Colonel Anderegg . Periodical Articles-Catalog. RML Nº 66 Sep 1937

Cheers. Raúl M .

Feliz Navidad - Feliz Natal - Frohe Weihnachten - Joyeux Noël - Merry Christmas - Wesołych Świąt!.

[tigre]

Hello to all ; something more.................

The Supply Services of the German First Army during the Battle of the Marne.

Late in the night, the IV Reserve Corps announced that it had been attacked by superior forces and was forced to give way. The army commander then ordered the II Corps, the nearest to the IV Reserve Corps, to go immediately to the assistance of the former. Instead of being on the right wing of the new front, as intended, the II Corps would thus be on the left wing-the first breach in the plan of the army commander. But he believed that after having reinforced the IV Reserve Corps he would be able methodically to complete the change of front as planned. The movement commenced with the supply services which were to clear to permit the passage of the army corps. The second supply echelons were then on the Marne. The army had directed that, until further orders, the movements of the parks and convoys would be regulated by the general staff of the army and that as soon as the army was unscrambled the corps lines of communication with the supply head at Chauny would be reestablished.

To avoid disorder and perturbation in supply during the change of front, they undertook the direction of all the services of the rear, which normally were a function of the corps. To insure that everything was executed in accordance with the plan, the general staff officers were charged with directing and controlling the movements of the troops and convoys, especially during the passage of defiles.

During the day of 6 September, the army commander became aware of the gravity of the situation of the II and IV Reserve Corps on the Ourcq; consequently, be accelerated the march of the IV Corps (active) to make it reach the Ourcq during the morning of 7 September. At the same time the last two corps remaining on the southern front were attacked strongly and had to cover the right flank of the Second Army, which was also attacked; they were unable to reach the battlefield of the Ourcq until the evening, and even -in part during the night, of the 8th, after forced marches of 36 to 43 miles. As soon as it was found that the original plan could not be applied as a consequence of the unforeseen changes in the situation, the army had ordered the regimental trains immediately to withdraw, the parks and convoys toward the north, well in the rear, so as to disengage the roads for the passage of the last two corps of the army.

On the front of the Ourcq the corps were mingled since divisions and even brigades had been forced to intervene at the most seriously menaced localities in the order of their arrival. It was thus physically impossible to assure the supply of the corps by their organic columns and convoys, which had been withdrawn far in the rear toward the north. The army therefore placed automobile columns from the depot services at the disposition of the corps and gave the necessary orders to advance the munitions columns from the depots.

The change of front between the Oise and the Marne, as prescribed, has thus been executed but not in accordance with the intentions of the army commander, for the intervention of the French Sixth Army had upset not only the plan for the change of front of the corps, but also that established for the displacement of the parks and convoys.

On the evening of the 8th, the First Army commander gave his orders for the attack for the next day. It was to commence by a turning movement of the right wing. The regimental trains and the supply echelons continued their march to the rear to reform and to take their places in the rear of their respective corps. This movement was executed in the midst of friction and confusion of every nature, for in spite of the orders of the army, the corps had not taken all the necessary measures and certain echelons acted contrary to the orders given.

It was in this situation and in the course of the attack of the right wing of his army, that toward noon the army commander learned from Lieutenant Colonel Rentsch that the Second Army was falling back. It had received orders to retreat. This order was urgent; it was necessary at the same time to break off combat and get the parks and convoys behind the newly prescribed front. By good fortune for the First Army, most of its supply echelons were in a region situated on the east flank of the zone which the troops would have to traverse in their retreat.

The parks and convoys received the order to withdraw behind the Aisne and one division of cavalry was assigned for the protection of the lines of communication of the army toward the north. Taking into consideration the disorder which would be caused in the rear by this unexpected retreat, the army again ordered that the automobile columns of the depot services be placed at the disposition of the corps; besides supplies for the 10th were arranged for by having munitions and supplies brought to Soissons and the motor columns of the depots were advanced.

Source: UN EXEMPLE DE LIAISON ENTRE LES OPERATIONS ET LES SERVICES DE L'ARRIERE. [An example of liaison between combat operations and the supply services.] Lieut.Colonel Anderegg . Periodical Articles-Catalog. RML Nº 66 Sep 1937

Cheers. Raúl M .

Feliz Navidad - Feliz Natal - Frohe Weihnachten - Joyeux Noël - Merry Christmas - Wesołych Świąt!.

[tigre]

Hello to all ; a little more.....................

The Supply Services of the German First Army during the Battle of the Marne.

During the evening of the 9th, the disorder and jamming in the services of the rear was complete and interfered considerably with the retreat of the troops. Since the retreat was to continue on the 10th, the commander of the army artillery was charged with regaining order in the parks and convoys and of replacing them on the lines of communication of their army corps. To accomplish this the parks and convoys were taken under control on their passage over the Aisne and after considerable movements to the north of the Aisne the echelons found themselves on their assigned routes by the evening of the 10th. Most of the echelons were pretty well emptied; until they were filled the army had to assure the supply of its corps by use of the convoys of the depots; it also arranged for the supply of munitions by having all the depot columns advance as far as Soissons.

By the evening of 10 September, the army was again in the hands of its commanders, and the day of the 11th served for the reconstitution of the army corps and for continuing the placement of the echelons and trams on the lines of communication of their respective corps. At this moment the front of the army was south of the Aisne; the supply head was still at Chauny, about 25 miles in the rear, and the supply echelons on the roads about half way between the front and the supply head.

During the day of the 11th, three divisions were to act as rear guards south of the Aisne while the rest of the army crossed the river. The supply echelons were withdrawn still further in the rear and the army again charged itself with the responsibility of supply.

In two days the army commander had not only regained order in his corps, but also in the regimental trains and the parks and convoys. He still had to establish order in the depot services where the confusion was great as a result of the direct supply established with the front. Beginning with the 12th, supplies were to be reestablished normally, that is to say by the intermediary of the supply echelons and the regimental trains.

On 12 September the First Army was to follow the withdrawal of the Second Army; to do this it obliqued to the northeast and withdrew its right to prevent any effort at envelopment. The rear guards were withdrawn north of the Aisne and the supply echelons toward the rear, almost to the supply head.

Source: UN EXEMPLE DE LIAISON ENTRE LES OPERATIONS ET LES SERVICES DE L'ARRIERE. [An example of liaison between combat operations and the supply services.] Lieut.Colonel Anderegg . Periodical Articles-Catalog. RML Nº 66 Sep 1937

Cheers. Raúl M .

Feliz Navidad - Feliz Natal - Frohe Weihnachten - Joyeux Noël - Merry Christmas - Wesołych Świąt!.

[tigre]

Hello to all ; a little more.....................

The Supply Services of the German First Army during the Battle of the Marne.

On the morning of the 13th, the First Army was ready to repulse the attacks of the adversary, then commencing. The withdrawal of the right wing had required the unwedging of the lines of communication toward the northeast. The railhead, which was to have been transferred to Laon, remained at Chauny, on account of the arrival of the Seventh Army which included Laon in its zone. Chauny was very much exposed and required protection. The convoys refilled directly at the depots of the railhead, in order to permit the reestablishment of the depot columns, in view of the battle which seemed imminent and for which the army commander was preparing all the necessary supplies.

During eight days we have seen that a carefully prepared plan of operations and supply was completely destroyed by the adversary when he, took the initiative. If the army commander nevertheless accomplished his task it was due to improvisations at every instant. With this example, one could easily conclude that carefully prepared plans are useless, because, most frequently, the adversary wiIl not permit their execution, and consequently there will always be improvisation. This conclusion would be totally false. The establishment by the army commander of a complete plan of supply for a difficult operation, as well as having taken as the basis of his operations the possibilities of his supply services, denotes, in a commander, a perfect comprehension of the importance of supply in a modern army and a deep knowledge of the services of the rear. Such qualities are not always, paradoxical as it may appear, those of commanders. To be able to improvise it is necessary to know to the bottom the domain in which one wishes to improvise. Likewise, the plan which is prepared and cannot be executed serves not only as the base of all improvisations, but as the coordinating thread of all improvisation, and permits arrival, albeit by different routes, to the object proposed or prescribed.

If, during the battle of the Marne, the supply of the First Army had assured, normally or by improvisation, and if the commander were able to repair the friction and disorganization in the rear and commence the battle of the Aisne with his services coordinated and ready to function, it was due, aside from the competence of the army commander; to the fact that the direction of all the supply services was centralized in the general staff of the army and in the hand of the army Quartermaster General, Colonel Jochim. Ordinarily the corps organized their own supply ervices, but in case of necessity, these services could be entirely centralize in the general staff of the army.

One of the main lessons to be derived is the necessity of a chief of all supply services in each large organization. Actually this function was supplied by the general staff, but the general staff is deficient in that they are not supply specialists and only serve on these duties for periods of a few years. It is equally as important to have central control of supply services as of command, and this should be obtained at any price.

Colonel Jochim concludes: "The movements accomplished on the Marne and the withdrawal to the Aisne constitute a perfect example of the close connection which exists between combat operations and the supply services and which cannot arbitrarily be thrown out. It is necessary, on the contrary, to proceed with profound studies, to prevision, to place the two in harmony, unless the combat operations are to suffer. Without assured supply the finest victories and all the devotion of the troops will serve nothing, for supply is the primary condition to conserve the combative attitude of the troops for the future operations of the army.

Source: UN EXEMPLE DE LIAISON ENTRE LES OPERATIONS ET LES SERVICES DE L'ARRIERE. [An example of liaison between combat operations and the supply services.] Lieut.Colonel Anderegg . Periodical Articles-Catalog. RML Nº 66 Sep 1937

It's all folks. Cheers. Raúl M .

Feliz Año Nuevo - Happy New Year - feliz Ano Novo - gluckliches Neues Jahr - Bonne Année - Felice Anno Nuovo - Szczęśliwego nowego roku!!

[tigre]

Hello to all ; a little more................................

First Battle of the Marne in September 1914. Prelude.

During the month of August the French and British armies had achieved no tactical successes of importance against the surging sweep of the powerful German right wing through Belgium and northern France. However, at Mons on August 23d and again at Le Cateau on the 26th, courageous stands by the British had somewhat bewildered von Kluck, the commander of the German First Army. When the French Fifth Army stopped south of Guise to strike back at its pursuers. von Bulow was so upset that he began to close his German Second Army toward the German Third Army on his left and von Kluck's army was dragged so far to the southeast that Paris was no longer included in the envelopment.

On the night of September 4th-5th the German First Army was known by the Allies to have changed direction to the southeast and to have crossed its mass to the south of the Marne River, east of Meaux (See Sketch No.1), thus apparently exposing its right flank to an attack by the newly created French Sixth Army. The French commander in chief had decided to pass to the offensive. The French Sixth Army was to advance to the Ourcq River on September 5th and attack the exposed hostile flank on the 6th. The 5th Group of Reserve Divisions of the Sixth Army, disposed about Dammartin faced generally northeast, as shown on Sketch No. 2.

A brief survey of the terrain covered by Sketch No.1, shows that Dammartin is twenty miles northeast of Paris. To the north lie the Forests of Ermenonville and Chantilly and to the south the Marne River flows west to join the Seine. Nine miles east of Monthyon the Ourcq River empties into the Marne. The district is traversed in every direction by an adequate number of all-weather roads. The open, slightly rolling ground, on which the crops had been harvested, afforded extended fields of fire and easy routes of advance across country. Vision was obstructed only by the buildings and the rows of poplar trees which lined the roads. The hills of Penchard, Monthyon, and Tillieres provided excellent observation over the district all the way to Paris toward the west and as far as the Ourcq to the east.

The 55th Reserve Division with a Moroccan brigade and Gillet's Cavalry Brigade attached, was an element of the 5th Group of Reserve Divisions. The division was organized as follows:

109th Brigade-204th, 282d, and 289th Reserve Infantry Regiments.
110th Brigade-231s 246th, and 276th Reserve Infantry Regiments.
3 Battalions of 75 mm guns from the 13th, 30th and 45th Reserve Artillery Regiments.
2 Squadrons of the 3d Dragoons.

Each infantry regiment was organized with two battalions and included four machine guns. The artillery battalions had three batteries each.

On the night of September 4th-5th the division was disposed as shown on Sketch No 2. The 110th Brigade, with two battalions of artillery attached, occupied the division's defensive position. The 231st Reserve Infantry furnished the outpost. The 109th Brigade, the division cavalry and the remaining battalion of artillery were in division reserve.

General Operations Order No. 13, 5th Group of Reserve Divisions, was received without previous warning at the command post of the 55th Reserve Division at 4 :30 AM, September 5th. The pertinent contents of the order, as amended by subsequent fragmentary orders, were in substance as follows:

The main body of the German First Army had turned southeast and crossed the Marne. There are no enemy forces of importance in the forests north of the Sixth Army. Yesterday, columns which appear to constitute the German right flank were marching southeast from Nanteuil-Ie-Haudouin toward Meaux and Lizy-sur-Ourcq. (See Sketch No.1).

The Sixth Army wiII change direction toward the Ourcq, prepared to pass to the offensive. This group will deploy today in preparation for an offensive toward the east.
Main body: Echeloned between the lines: (see Sketch No 2) Villeroy-Iverny-Montge, and Compans-Villeneuve.
Advance guards: Penchard-Monthyon-St. Soupplets.
Outpost line: Cregy-Pringy-northeastern exits of St. Soupplets.

Gillet's Cavalry Brigade will cover the right of the group to the north bank of the Marne. The Moroccan brigade wiII advance via: Messy-Charny-Villeroy-Penchard. The 56th Reserve Division will march via: Dammartin-St. Mard-Montge-St Soupplets. The 55th Reserve Division, employing routes between those assigned to the Moroccan brigade and the 56th Reserve Division will advance its main body to the area: Iverny-Le Plessis-l'Eveque-Vinantes-Nantouillet-Thieux-Compans and its advance guard to Monthyon, with its outpost on the line: Automne-Pringy-Fescheux Farm.

All elements of the group will be south of the le Mesnil-Amelot-Dammartin road by 8:00 AM.

Source: A Meeting Engagement. Action of the French 55th Reserve Division at Monthyon, September 5, 1914. A Historical Illustration. Academic Notes. Military Review. Sep 1939.

Cheers. Raúl M .

Feliz Año Nuevo - Happy New Year - feliz Ano Novo - gluckliches Neues Jahr - Bonne Année - Felice Anno Nuovo - Szczęśliwego nowego roku!!

[tigre]

Hello to all ; a little more................................

First Battle of the Marne in September 1914. Prelude.

The 5th Group of Reserve Divisions was to change direction and march into a region known to have been traversed recently by the enemy in strength. No army cavalry covered the front and no air service was available for reconnaissance missions. There was no hostile threat against the south flank of the group and the Marne River, flowing within two or three miles of the southern infantry column, created a naturally strong flank.

If the 55th Reserve Division was to clear the le-Mesnil-Amelot-Dammartin road by 8:00 AM, its advance guard must march not later than 6:00 AM. Pressed for time as he was, the division commander appears to have dismissed the enemy with the assumption that no hostile interference of importance would be encountered during the day. The division order, dispatched to the brigades at 5:00 AM and as later amended, read in substance:

The 110th Brigade, with the division cavalry and two battalions of artillery attached, will march at once via: Mouss-le-Neuf -Thieux-Nantouillet-Iverny (See Sketch No. 2). It will provide the advance guard for the entire division after passing Thieux and will establish the outpost. Dispositions at the end of the march:

Main body: Ie Plessis-l'Eveque-le Plessis·aux-Bois-Iverny.
Advance guard: Monthyon.
Outpost line: Automne-Pringy-Fescheux Farm.
The 109th Brigade, With one battalion of artillery attached, will march at once via: Mauregard-le-Mesnil-Amelot-Compans. After passing Compans the brigade will follow the 110th Brigade.
Bivouac area: Vinanter-Nantouillet -Thieux-Compans.

Orders did not reach the regiments of the 55th Reserve Division until 6:00 AM. Both brigades were two hours late in clearing the le-Mesnil-Amelot-Dammartin road. The Commanding General, 110th Brigade, employed the 246th Reserve Infantry, with one platoon of cavalry and one battalion of artillery attached, as the advance guard for the brigade and the division. Not knowing of the march of the 56th Reserve Division on his left flank, he dispatched the attached division cavalry, less one platoon, to the north of the Bois de Tillieres with orders to march on Rouvres and Marchemorte (See Sketch No. 2).

At 12:30 PM the division, less its advance guard, was disposed as follows: (see Sketch No. 3) the 282d Reserve Infantry and one battalion of artillery at Vinantes; the 289th Reserve Infantry at Nantouillet; the 204th Reserve Infantry near the southern exits of Thieux; the 276th Reserve Infantry between La Baste and La Trace; the 231st Reserve Infantry, less the 5th Battalion, at Le Plessis-aux-Bois; the 5th Battalion, 231st Reserve Infantry on the road east of Nantouillet; and one battalion of artillery just west of Iverny. The division commander and the commander of the 109th Brigade were at Nantouillet. At 12:00 noon the advance guard commander had closed up the advance guard in Iverny for lunch and thirty minutes rest. The entire 246th Reserve Infantry, with the attached battalion of artillery, was in the village. The commander of the 110th Brigade was with the advance guard commander in Iverny. The division cavalry had not reported since its departure. The cavalry platoon of the advance guard had not been heard from since it entered Le Plessis-aux-Bois at 11:00 AM.

Source: A Meeting Engagement. Action of the French 55th Reserve Division at Monthyon, September 5, 1914. A Historical Illustration. Academic Notes. Military Review. Sep 1939.

Cheers. Raúl M .

Feliz Año Nuevo - Happy New Year - feliz Ano Novo - gluckliches Neues Jahr - Bonne Année - Felice Anno Nuovo - Szczęśliwego nowego roku!!

[tigre]

Hello to all ; a little more................................

First Battle of the Marne in September 1914.

The point of the advance guard moved out from Iverny at 12 :30 PM. Suddenly shells began to fall about the village. German 77-mm guns were firing from the high ground southeast of Iverny. Numerous other pieces were going into position. German infantry opened fire from the slopes west of Monthyon and additional infantry was debouching from the town. Between Monthyon and the Tillieres the flashes of another artillery battery could be seen. The leading company of the advance guard was driven from the Monthyon road by machine-gun fire but managed to deploy south of the road after suffering heavy losses. The second company was pinned to the ground at the eastern exits of the village. The ground south, east, and immediately north of Iverny was absolutely dominated by the German position. The open fields provided neither concealment from observation nor cover from fire. To the south the Moroccans could be seen marching along the road east of Villeroy. Their advance guard was approaching Penchard. To the north, obscured from view by the Bois de Tillieres, the leading elements of the 56th Reserve Division were entering St Souplets. (See Sketch No.2).

The advance guard commander had lost his freedom of maneuver by permitting his command to be surprised in so unfavorable a situation. He could not move detachments to reconnoiter the hostile situation or to seize the favorable terrain to the north. He must protect the main body against the enemy's advance even though it necessitated the sacrifice of his command. The only satisfactory plan open to him was to organize and defend the village of Iverny in order to protect the division.

The division commander was not only without timely information but was also out of communication with the brigade. These facts appear to have justified some independent action by the Commanding General, 110th Brigade. That officer was ignorant of the hostile strength and dispositions but the enemy's position and his aggressive attitude should have indicated that action by the entire division would be required to capture Monthyon.

Immediately following his initial contact with the enemy, the advance guard commander deployed his regiment on a north-south line through the eastern exits of lverny in order to check the hostile advance. At 12 :45 PM the Commanding General, 110th Brigade, decided to attack at once. His orders were in substance as follows: (See Sketch No.2).

The 246th Reserve Infantry will attack Monthyon. The attack will be supported by the two battalions of artillery. It will be covered on the south by a battalion of the 276th Reserve Infantry, moving in the direction: Villeroy-Penchard and on the north by the 276th Reserve Infantry, less one battalion, in the direction: Le Plessis-I'Eveque-St Soupplets.

The 231st Reserve Infantry will await orders in reserve at Le Plessis-aux-Bois.

Repeated attempts by the 246th Reserve Infantry to advance were repulsed. The 5th Battalion, 276th Reserve Infantry, committed in the direction of Villeroy, became involved in the action of the Moroccans and was thereafter lost to its brigade. The 276th Reserve Infantry, less its 5th Battalion, deployed about Le Plessis-I'Eveque with a detachment on the eastern spur of the Tillieres, which was found to be unoccupied. Contact was established with elements of the 56th Reserve Division advancing on St Soupplets and a slight advance was made in the direction of Monthyon. The Moroccans contacted the enemy at Penchard at 1 :30 PM. After an initial success, the French colonials were checked by a vigorous counterattack. Between 3:00 PM and 4:00 PM the Germans launched a strong attack from the cover of the Monthyon ridge in the direction of the Bois de Tillieres.

Although the heavy firing to the front was distinctly heard at his command post, the Commanding General, 55th Reserve Division, remained at Nantouillet until near 5:00 PM, ignorant of the situation and out of communication with the 110th Brigade. At 4:00 PM he dispatched the battalion of artillery at Vinants toward Villeroy. Fifteen minutes later the 109th Brigade was directed to move the 289th and 204th Reserve Infantries to Le Plessis-aux-Bois.

Source: A Meeting Engagement. Action of the French 55th Reserve Division at Monthyon, September 5, 1914. A Historical Illustration. Academic Notes. Military Review. Sep 1939.

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; a little more................................

First Battle of the Marne in September 1914.

At 5:00 PM the 246th Reserve Infantry was still holding its line through Iverny, hard pressed by the Germans. The 276th Reserve Infantry, less one of its two battalions, was still in possession of Le Plessis-l'Eveque but its left had been pushed back almost to Cuisy. (See Sketch No.4.) The regimental commander had reported that his battalion could not hold much longer. The 231st Reserve Infantry, ordered forward to support the defense of Iverny at 2:00 PM and again at 3:40 PM, had not been heard from. The Moroccans were in retreat through Villeroy and Charily. To the north the 56th Reserve Division was being steadily driven back through the Bois de Tillieres. Three battalions of the 110th Brigade had been fighting desperately for four and one-half hours, with no word from the division commander. The brigade commander, feeling that he had been abandoned and fearing that he would be enveloped, ordered the 246th Reserve Infantry to withdraw from Iverny to the line: La Baste-La Trace. The movement was completed in good order by 5:30 PM.

As the 246th Reserve Infantry reached its new line it was joined by the 231st Reserve Infantry. At about the same time a messenger reported that the 109th Brigade was beginning to arrive at Le Plessis-aux-Bois. Encouraged by the appearance of his own reserves and the approach of other elements of the division, the commander of the 110th Brigade decided to renew the attack at once. The 246th Reserve Infantry was ordered to capture the southern portion of Monthyon, the 231st Reserve Infantry the northern section.

The division commander arrived from Nantouillet at his new command post one-half mile west of Le Plessis-aux-Bois at approximately 5:20 PM. By 5:45 PM he had been informed of the situation, including the offensive ordered by the Commanding General, 110th Brigade. He knew that the 289th Reserve Infantry had arrived in Le Plessis-aux-Bois and that the German, had not occupied Iverny. No instructions had been received from the group commander, who was at Thieux. Darkness would commence at 7 :30 PM.

The 231st and 246th Reserve Infantries advanced at 6:00 PM. Both regiments lost direction and arrived in Iverny simultaneously. (See Sketch No.2) Neither regiment left the village. The division commander decided at 5:45 PM to attack with the 109th Brigade. The 289th Reserve Infantry was to pass through the 110th Brigade with the southern portion of Monthyon as its objective. The 282d Reserve Infantry, moving from Vinantes, was to attack on the right of the 289th. The leading battalion of the 109th Reserve Infantry crossed the line of departure at 6:30 PM.

Committed to the fire swept fields about Iverny without time for preliminary reconnaissance both regiments gravitated toward the cover of Iverny. By 7:00 PM two battalions of the 231st, two of the 246th, one of the 282d, and one of the 289th-six of the eight battalions committed-were huddled together in Iverny. The hopeless confusion in the village broke up the attack. Darkness was at hand and firing gradually ceased on both sides.

Source: A Meeting Engagement. Action of the French 55th Reserve Division at Monthyon, September 5, 1914. A Historical Illustration. Academic Notes. Military Review. Sep 1939.

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; las part................................

First Battle of the Marne in September 1914.

To complete the story of Monthyon a brief account of the German actions west of the Ourcq on September 4, 1914.

The IV Reserve Corps of the German First Army, with the 4th Cavalry Division attached, had remained north of the Marne in the vicinity of NanteuI-le-Haudouin; undiscovered by the Allied reconnaissance (See Sketch No. 1). The corps, commanded by General von Gronau, consisted of the 7th Reserve Division and the 22d Reserve Division, less one brigade. It included two regiments of 77-mm, guns but had no medium or heavy artillery and no aviation was available to its commander.

With orders to cover the right flank and rear of the German First Army from the vicinity of Marcilly and Chambry, General von Gronau marched his corps south at daylight, September 5th. The troops were in their new bivouac areas by 10:00 AM-the 7th Reserve Division in the area: Marcilly-Barcy and the 22de Reserve Division at Chambry.

By 10:45 AM it was apparent from reconnaissance reports that a French movement of serious proportions was in progress toward the east. The corps commander had to have information. His cavalry had reported that it was unable to penetrate the hostile screen. There was no air service. Turning to his chief of staff, von Gronau said, "Colonel, there is no help for it. We must attack." Orders were issued promptly. The IV Reserve Corps was directed to attack in order to determine the hostile strength, dispositions, and intentions. The 7th Reserve Division was ordered to advance to the attack via Cuisy and Montge on St Mard (See Sketch No. 2). The 4th Cavalry Division was to advance through Marchemorte in the direction of Dammartin.

The 7th Reserve Division marched at 11:45 AM from Marcilly and Barcy (See Sketch No.1). Recognizing the tactical importance of Monthyon, the division commander directed both of his columns to march on the heights about the town. As the advance guards debouched on Monthyon, the French were discovered resting in Iverny. How the French were surprised and pinned to the ground about Iverny has been presented. Von Gronau had followed his advance guard into Monthyon. From the commanding heights of the village he observed the terrain to his front and flanks. To the south the Moroccans were in plain view. To his front the situation was well in hand. To the north French troops were seen entering the Bois de Tillieres at Montge. Their strength and movement had to be discovered. Again von Gronau's decision was prompt. Two battalions of the 7th Reserve Division, posted about Monthyon, would contain the French at Iverny. The remainder of the division would attack at once in the direction of the eastern spur of the Tillieres. The success of the attack is already known.

The 22d Reserve Division had moved from Chambry to a position between Barcy and Monthyon. Its commander had joined the corps commander at Monthyon. As the Moroccans entered Penchard the division was ordered to attack and capture the high ground in that vicinity. The French colonials, struck in front and flank, were soon in retreat toward Villeroy and Charny.

By 5:00 PM von Gronau knew that his infantry had engaged two and one-half French divisions. His cavalry had discovered the advance of the French VII Corps from the direction of Dammartin. Not caring to expose his command to the dangers of an envelopment, he ordered his divisions to withdraw under cover of darkness. The French were as unprepared for the withdrawal as they had been for the attack and the German IV Reserve Corps occupied its new position east of the Therouanne River without interierence (See Sketch No.1).

Source: A Meeting Engagement. Action of the French 55th Reserve Division at Monthyon, September 5, 1914. A Historical Illustration. Academic Notes. Military Review. Sep 1939.
http://www.delcampe.net/page/item/id,28 ... age,S.html

It's all folks. Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; just a little complement........................

Movements of the IV Reserve Corps of the German First Army.

Source: http://1914ancien.free.fr/lt_juin2.htm

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; a little more...................................

ADAPTATION OF THE PRECONCEIVED MANEUVER.

One of the most spectacular instances of the lightning-like adaptation of a preconceived maneuver to a changed tactical situation is found in the operations of the German First Army, in the period of 4-7 September, 1914.

The relative positions held by the opposing forces on the eve of the Battle of the Marne appear on Plate 44. The German First Army, with corps abreast, was sharply oriented to the south, in roughly parallel columns and had crossed the Grand Morin; its IV Reserve Corps, echeloned to the right rear, was observing against Paris. Early on September, this corps became heavily engaged with the newly formed French Sixth Army, which had debouched from Paris in a serious surprise attack against the German right flank. It became necessary during the night of 5-6 September to rush the II Corps to the support of the hard-pressed IV Reserve Corps. During the following day, the remaining corps were conducted, by forced marches, to the Ourcq; it was impossible to preserve the original order in line; each corps was directed by the shortest route to the most threatening portion of the new front; units became mixed; temporary groupings were resorted to, named after the corps commander on the spot.

The march performances in this situation were extraordinary; the IX Corps and the rear elements of the III Corps were shifted from the left wing of the army to the right, passing in rear of the entire new front; the IX Corps started from Esternay, at dawn of the 7th, and by midnight had covered a distance of 38 miles; on the next day, the 8th, the two corps were started again at 2:00 AM and except for a brief halt at noon covered again a distance of approximately 40 miles; on the morning of 9 September, this corps entered the battle, in a decisive manner, by enveloping Manoury's left wing and forcing it back.

The German army commander, von Kluck, fell a victim to the disillusionment following the first Battle of the Marne, but the maneuver of the Ourcq has the unmistakable touch of genius, the Napoleonic manner: a gigantic stream of supply and troop columns was pouring in a fixed direction; a strategic crisis of the first order stopped this movement and then reversed it; by a remarkable exertion of every intellectual, moral and physical force on the part of staffs and troops, the stream was made to flow again in an orderly fashion; in the midst of a highly complicated logistic problem, a new maneuver was conceived and initiated: a new front was created with the II, IV and III Corps along the Ourcq, to stop the French Sixth Army in conjunction with an enveloping attack against the French left by the IX Corps, which was progressing satisfactorily when G.H.Q. suspended the operations.

There must be the fullest realization that any adaptation of means cannot be immediate or instantaneous: the change in plan of the First German Army was formulated as early as the evening of 5 September; it was not until three days later that the tactical dispositions of the IX Corps could become really effective. In this precarious situation, the German First Army was confronted with the difficult task of executing a retrograde turning movement, from the old front facing south to a new front facing southwest. Such a movement can be executed in several ways.

The entire army may be faced to the rear and then execute a left turn in a difficult maneuver due to the effect on the stream of trains, ammunition and supply columns, which ordinarily follow the corps routes from depots in the communications zone, will bring on endless logistic complications.
If a new front were established by means of a flank march, the movement of troops and trains would be simplified, though slower. This solution is objectionable because it is time consuming and involves a flank march along the enemy front.
Instead a movement, by echelon, pivoting on the initial left unit, represented a compromise solution and was adopted.





Source: FMFRP 12-13. Maneuver in War.

More follows. Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; a little more...................................

ADAPTATION OF THE PRECONCEIVED MANEUVER.

It was the intention of the army commander on 6 September to conduct the II Corps as far as the region northeast of Meaux, the IV Corps as far as Bout, the III Corps to La Ferte Gaudier, while the IX Corps remained in place, until the echelonment was completed. It was hoped to continue the maneuver on the following day, 7 September, have all corps change direction to the west and thus change the echelonment to a new front; as regards trains, it was only necessary to withdraw their columns a sufficient distance to the north, along their original routes, to clear them for the northward movements of the combat troops and then conform to the westerly movement of their corps.

This maneuver was never executed; events moved too fast. The flank attack from the direction of Paris seriously endangered the IV Reserve Corps; the II Corps was rushed to its assistance during the night 5-6 September; during the following days the remaining corps advanced on the Ourcq by forced marches; it was impossible to preserve the original order in line. The operation of ammunition and supply trains became exceedingly difficult. Army Headquarters was compelled to intervene in corps administrative arrangements and undertook to regulate all movements in daily orders.



Source: FMFRP 12-13. Maneuver in War.

It's all folks. Cheers. Raúl M .