combat tactics on the eastern front

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julian
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combat tactics on the eastern front

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A large excerpt from WW2 Foreign military studies 1945-1954 manuscript P 82 by Carl Wagener which was originally a report submitted by general Hube to Hitler the day before he crashed.

Part 1:

"P 082

Against the incessant russian attacks along the entire front throughout the year , the field forces almost invariably were given the same order: tactical and strategical defense without taking into consideration the situation of the adjacent front. In that way we intended to bring about position warfare-although we lacked improved defensive positions- and tried to wear down the enemy with purely defensive tactics. However, in spite of all efforts, the front did not become stabilized, and although all orders called for defense , loss of ground continued to be unavoidable; the enemy forced us to make extensive withdrawals. In retrospect this procedure was called elastic defense. The fact that the withdrawals were effected under pressure and in most cases too late, and, not having been planned, resulted in a considerable loss of equipment, filled the troops with a feeling of bitterness, and all the more so, since each time they broke out of an encirclement. The lowered combat efficiency became apparent in the subsequent battles , and the execution of defensive operations became more and more difficult in view of the weakened units.

Even isolated counterattacks did not change the situation. To be sure, they were frequently successful , owing to the fact that after each penetration or breakthrough, the enemy found himself in open terrain and without artillery support, and was inferior to us, as usual. However, in view of our policy of rigid defense, the superior number of attacking forces dictated time and place of commitment of our available strategic reserves , with the result that we could not gain the initiative; our forces were constantly tied down in the frontlines and had no chance to disengage in time , in order to prepare counterattacks. If we had withdrawn in time from areas which subsequently were


lost anyhow, we might have been able to make available large forces in good condition to regain lost ground and at the same time destroy the enemy forces.

The overall result of defensive tactics were the following : considerable loss of ground, heavy casualties, large losses of equipment and overtaxing of the troops. On the other hand, we gained time , decimated the enemy , and maintained a continuous front. The Russians had not succeeded in achieving any strategic breakthrough in spite of gaining a large amount of territory; the final decision which they were obviously trying to bring about at any cost in 1943, had been postponed.

Thus, defensive tactics had not produced any better results than delaying tactics; the same results could have been attained at a lower cost if delaying tactics had been planned carefully.

2.Reason for the failure of defensive tactics

a. Superiority of Russian artillery and their heavy concentrations on our inadequate positions ;

b. Our numerical inferiority, lack of reserves, inability to echelon our forces in depth, and overtaxing of the troops because of lack of replacements;

c. In sufficient artillery and ammunition;

d. The fact that the rigid, dogmatic orders, issued to the entire eastern front , called for defensive tactics without taking into consideration local condition or the time element; frequently these orders could not be executed owing to insufficient combat strength , weapons and ammunition, and the inadequacy of fortified positions; such orders were rescinded too late or not at all, which finally

undermined not only the authority of the order but also the confidence which the troops placed in their commanders.

3. The enemy

The enemy attacked incessantly, without any marked main effort but with rapidly changing objectives along a wide front. It would seem to be the aim of the Russians to prevent development of position warfare, to interfere with any stabilization of our front through constant spoiling attacks, and to contain our forces to prevent a balance of strength. If instead they had endeavored to achieve a strategic breakthrough , they would have needed a large scale concentration of forces; no doubt they could have successfully achieved such a concentration.

Our defensive tactics and our tactics were of advantage to the enemy’s strongest and most effective weapon, his artillery.

Time and again, our forces , withdrawing for short distances only, had to organize their defenses hastily. That enabled the enemy to advance quickly , and to move his supplies and communications speedily. He did not have to operate in open terrain, hampered by inadequate communications, his greatest weakness. Despite his considerable advance , he had thus avoided the danger of stretching his lines too far from the base of operations, a danger which generally threatens the success of any offensive.

The enemy will keep on using the same tactics and continue his incessant attacks along the whole front. It remains to be seen whether he will in the future concentrate his forces to a greater extent than heretofore and perhaps develop marked strategic concentrations.

Most likely, the enemy will continue his tactic of launching spoiling attacks on a wide front because he will be aware of the fact that he is at a disadvantage in mobile warfare after a breakthrough.
The numerically supperior enemy can endure the wear and tear of combat longer than we can; no doubt that will make it possible for him to continue lauching numerous attacks simultaneously on a wide front.The russians are not pressed for time and need not mmake any daring decisions. if they are consistently victorious they will be able to calculate when the time for the final blow has arrived.
The russians will continue to rely on their artillery and will make their plans accordingly. In the future their air superiority will become an additional factor.
We will play into the enemy's hand if we continue to use defensive tactics and expose our forces to his numerical superiority and his artillery, without seeking an opportunity to engage him ijn mobile warfare, his greatest weakness. "
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Re: combat tactics on the eastern front

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P 82 continued

"4.Our alternatives

Annihilation of the enemy forces remains the objective. All other considerations are of secondary importance. Above all, defense, loss and gain of territory should only be secondary objectives nothing more than means to achieve the purpose of annihilation . When ground is given up voluntarily and in time, it is regained frequently after a successful battle.

The enemy cannot be annihilated by purely defensive tactics, mere endurance, and rigid holding of ground. Although this will wear him down, experience has shown that the defender’s strength is spent in equal measure. Consequently, the numerically superior Russians, who are also strong in other respects and whose political convictions are difficult to undermine, will be able to hold out longer than we can.

Defensive tactics without prepared positions , in the face of superior enemy artillery, are doomed to complete failure.

If it is absolutely essential to maintain temporary or isolated defensive positions-in other words, if position warfare is desired-it will be necessary to meet its requirements and make provisions accordingly. Whenever the top leaders ask for the impossible, when orders call for nothing but bravery, and reliance is placed exclusively on valor, usually an error of omission is involved. The top leaders are supposed to provide troops with the means for executing their mission, and to coordinate strength , weapons and combat methods. Otherwise, orders which cannot be carried out produce not only failure , but destroy the confidence of the troops. Confidence is an indispensable element of strength; lack of confidence leads to a feeling of resignation. Anyone who is too often directly affected by failures will begin to question his absolute devotion. Moreover, In view of the power of present-day offensive weapons, the value of a stationary front has become questionable.

Even in an “East Wall”, inferior forces will be hardly able to bring about the development of position warfare, such as existed during ww1 due to a balance of the opposing forces.

It might be possible for some time –particularly while we are still fighting on enemy territory –to employ delaying tactics which are usually applied by forces fighting under the handicap of terrain or time. During the last few months they have resulted in maximum success. However, delaying action is nothing but a fight to gain time, although admittedly it is the cheapest method. In addition, one can use it to retain the initiative but not to bring about a decision.

Consequently, we must again begin to employ offensive tactics. Any other hopes and expectation have no meaning for the soldier. Gaining time, holding ground , and wearing down the enemy have a meaning only as long as they are related to a subsequent attack , “the shining sword of retaliation”. It is advisable to check whether at this time sufficient forces are available either to attack the enemy’s most vulnerable point, or to assemble forces in the rear for the purpose of crushing the enemy by means of a counterattack , after he breaks through in open terrain.

Such a counterattack should not be launched in order to support our defense at any one point, but to defeat the enemy; consequently, it must be launched whenever the command believes the conditions to be most favorable. If such action exposes other sectors to danger, it will be necessary to fight at those points a delaying action, or if need be to fall back. If we continue to attack only at points dictated by enemy action, the reserves will be used up and will never be able to strike a decisive blow.

Should our strength and supplies be inadequate for an attack or a decisive counterattack, or if we have to consider the west as a second major area of operations, then we will be compelled to continue fighting delaying actions in order to preserve our fighting strength and the continuity of the front, and to gain the time required to prepare attacks or counterattacks. In view of the supply situation, the preservation of a continuous front has become a necessity, which unfortunately can hardly be disregarded.

Defensive and delaying tactics are the proper combat methods until we have the opportunity to launch attacks or counterattacks; when such attacks are carried out, delaying tactics may continue at secondary fronts.

Judging by the experience of the last few months , successful execution of such operations is based on the conditions outlined below. "
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Re: combat tactics on the eastern front

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p 082 end

"a) Defensive tactics

We should again make it an inflexible rule to employ defensive tactics( such as holding out to the last man, disregarding losses, making a suicide stand)only in exceptional cases, or where such tactics will be confined to certain locality or time period. Whenever defensive tactics become absolutely necessary, the troops must be provided with a chance for survival by being given improved positions, weapons and ammunition, and by echelonment in depth, as well as provision for local reserves. Each defensive operation must at least have a chance of success. At the same time, the troops must be told clearly what is at stake. The reasons must be stated in the order.

Provisions must be made for relief of the holding forces. The Russians employ a sensible setup, whereby an unarmed relief unit takes over the sector together with the weapons and equipment of the unit on the line.

We must remember that defensive tactics play into the hands of the Russians, that they place us at the mercy of their artillery which is their forte and that the enemy probably will be able to endure the wear and tear of defensive combat for a longer period than we can.

Construction of field fortifications constitutes the most important prerequisite for a successful defense.

b) Delaying tactics

We will probably continue using delaying tactics for some time. A large concentration of forces for the purposes of attack or defense necessitates weakening of forces elsewhere.

Delaying action is the method employed by an inferior force because it requires les depth , necessitates less construction of positions, and permits economical utilization of manpower; finally it allows the defender to gain time, and to maintain the continuity of the front, which is so often jeopardized by orders calling for calling for rigid defense. By employing delaying tactics it is possible for the defender to thwart the enemy’s plans and to escape the effects of enemy artillery by making partial withdrawals as soon as it opens fire. By making additional withdrawals, the defender might succeed in luring the enemy in open terrain, where he is at a disadvantage and where he can be crushed by a counterattack with tactical reserves .Finally, under present conditions all mobile warfare sooner or later is hampered by the shortcomings of motorization and the expenditure of ammunition; therefore the defender, by rapidly effecting additional withdrawals, might induce the attacker to exert his maximum effort and then , exploiting his subsequent weakening, might annihilate him with tactical reserves.

During such a war of movement , the forces which are moving orderly along their lines of communication and their fuel and ammunition depots without being under pressure , have the advantage over the attacking and pursuing forces which have been moving away from their supply bases and consequently may practically become defenseless.

Flexibility, and if need be, decreased motorization, assume greater importance for delaying tactics.

Reserves( particularly small armored detachments), increase of artillery, and additional ammunition supply , are as vital for delaying tactics as they are for static defense.

Delaying tactics cannot be controlled by a central command. They require more responsibility on the part of the intermediate and lower commands, as well as special training of officers and men.

Concise written directives which outline the aims of the top echelon and specify what is at stake, yet allow for sufficient latitude in the execution of a mission , and for safety’s sake might denote the maximum extent of any withdrawal will again bring out the superiority of the lower command echelon and strengthen the confidence of the frontline soldiers in the higher echelon. If the hands of the lower echelon are no longer tied, they will again exercise real leadership ,in other words, bring about local superiority, develop points of main effort , and execute their mission by using appropriate tactics.

Delaying action and counter attack offer a chance of achieving decisive victories in the east. "
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Re: combat tactics on the eastern front

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Hello to all :D; a little more by Karl Thoholte, General der Artillerie...........

Field Artillery role in the defensive battles in the East (1942-44).

Beginning in 1943, in an ever increasing degree, the defensive operations in the war against Russia developed into battles of materiel. In view of the high degree of commitment of materiel, the costly large-scale battles (for example, on Lake Ladoga *) demanded that ways and means be found to reduce the loss of manpower to a bearable and replaceable amount. This question became more pressing for Germany than for Russia, for the former was not and the latter was in a position to make good indefinitely her personnel losses.

At the outset one must recognize that at the time under consideration the German air force was not strong enough to be a decisive factor in any battle. The Russian air force was still weaker, and therefore less capable of defensive action, than the German. Furthermore, German armored forces did not exist in sufficient strength to be able by their disposition to equalize the fire-power at all threatened points on the Eastern Front. This was true even though the Russians had not yet mastered tank tactics and failed to obtain the maximum efficiency from armored weapons.

While it is true that German air power was always superior to that of the Russians, the air arm alone—even in the strength in which it later appeared on the American side on the Western Front — was never in a position to influence the ground battle to such an extent that some other arm could be ignored or neglected. Meteorological conditions alone precluded daily commitment of the Luftwaffe. Similar conditions affected the armored forces. Armor plays a decisive role only if it comes into battle in a moving situation. Other arms have first to provide the basis for such a situation. In the main, the burden of defensive battle is borne by the infantry, and by the artillery which supports it.

Owing to the bloody losses and the uninterrupted, maximum psychological strain in the heavy defensive battles, each several weeks in duration, the German infantry continuously lost in combat power. More and more the defense depended upon the artillery. In many cases it decided the issue. It was estimated that the artillery bore from 60% to 80% of the combat burden. (The battles around Aachen in the winter of 1944 were of the same nature.)

If the discussion here concerns the defense for the most part, it is because Germany found herself on the defensive on almost all fronts. In the offensive situations (late 1942), conditions were much the same: artillery had also to lighten the burden of infantry and armor in the attack. Aside from a very few surprise actions, no Russian attack succeeded unless it was heavily prepared and supported.

(*) During and after the siege of Leningrad the Ladoga Campaign developed into a huge artillery duel. The Germans outnumbered the Russians 2:1 in total number of pieces, but the Russians had at least twice as many large caliber weapons (that is, larger than 220-mm). For the siege of Leningrad in early 1942 the Germans had accumulated approximately 220,000 tons (avoirdupois) of artillery ammunition; the Russians had anequal if not slightly larger amount. On the days of all-out German offensive their daily expenditure of ammunition in a corps sector 20 km in width was 3,300 to 3,800 tons. Even with these concentrations the Germans failed to gain superiority and their infantry could make no gains. Russian rocket-launched projectiles succeeded in interdicting almost every German infantry attack.

Source: A German Reflects Upon Artillery. Interrogation of Karl Thoholte, General der Artillerie. The Field Artillery Journal. December 1945

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.
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Re: combat tactics on the eastern front

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Hello to all :D; a little more...........

Field Artillery role in the defensive battles in the East (1942-44).

In general, it has been proved by practical experience on all fronts in this war (WWII) that the fire of the infantry of all armies of the world is no longer decisive, as it was in many battles in World War I. (In the present decade this statement applies to Poland, France, England, the United States, and Germany. At times Russia seems to be an exception, the reasons for which lie in other considerations.) One explanation for the lowered combat efficiency and ruggedness of the infantry is that the foot soldier, trying to keep pace with machines, sees in them an assistance which he desires to use to lighten his most onerous task, that of hand-to-hand combat.

Propaganda in word, picture, and film has fostered this attitude. The long duration of the war, especially in Germany, contributed to it. Regardless of this indisputable fact it must be said that the infantry still has the final word in a decision, and this will probably continue to be true in the future. Terrain is taken and held only if the infantryman stands on it, even if the enemy force is destroyed before that time.

On occasions when the enemy's artillery was the principal factor behind his power to attack, counterbattery fire became a primary mission of all artillery. (That these missions could no longer be carried out in the later battles in the West was a primary reason for the German failure. They called for enormous amounts of ammunition, which at that time were unavailable.) On the Eastern Front in three or four months one German army knocked out 4,000 enemy batteries during the course of continuous and heavy defensive fighting. Many times, by timely defeat of the enemy artillery, German artillery succeeded in preventing the execution of planned attacks. At other times, by intensive barrage, so much force was taken from an attack that it could later be easily repulsed by the infantry. In the course of the war the Russians drew some conclusions from this: they never attacked at any point where the Germans were strong in artillery.

German artillery was never mobile enough to be able to move as an artillery strongpoint with sufficient speed. One of the most important lessons of the eastern campaigns is that reinforcement artillery must be kept as mobile as possible. It is self-evident that only completely motorized artillery capable of cross-country mobility should be considered as reinforcement artillery. Units to be used for this purpose must be so organized and equipped that they dispense absolutely with all superfluous weight, regardless of its origin, so that they have maximum fire-power with the minimum weight and volume. (In this the Russians were exemplary). Preparation for action and march order, service of the piece, and road marches were always subjects of much thought for higher artillery commanders. In order to serve the four pieces of a battery an exceedingly great amount of apparatus is required. Amount of equipment and motions of personnel could be decreased here and there by appropriate measures without detracting from the combat power of the unit.

At this point one must distinguish between division artillery and reinforcement artillery. The former finds itself fighting in a small area, and often independently. The battalion (and for most purposes the battery as well) must be so armed and equipped that it has at its disposal everything which it needs for an independent mission. Reinforcement artillery, on the other hand, fights only as part of a larger unit, and several smaller units can be concentrated into one group.

In the defensive actions against Russia the missions, in order of importance, were:
(1) to engage the enemy artillery as the principal factor in his power to attack; and
(2) to break up concentrations of infantry and armor and prepared positions of the enemy before he could launch an attack;
(3) to beat back enemy infantry when it was in the assault.

(NOTE: the term infantry assault is used here in the American sense). Secondary (but little less important), and in close collaboration with the air force, was the crippling of the enemy supply and transport system and the disturbance of his leadership and command by attack of headquarters and command posts.

Source: A German Reflects Upon Artillery. Interrogation of Karl Thoholte, General der Artillerie. The Field Artillery Journal. December 1945

Cheers. Raúl M 8).
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.
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Re: combat tactics on the eastern front

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Hello to all :D; a little more...........

Field Artillery role in the defensive battles in the East (1942-44).

Division artillery with three light and one medium battalions in each division could not fulfill its tasks when the infantry division had the very broad sector so common on the Eastern Front. When this situation obtained and when larger combat operations presented themselves, GHQ Pool Battalions* - 105-mm guns, 150-mm howitzers, 210-mm howitzers, or heavier calibers - were introduced and placed under the command of division, corps, or army artillery commanders. GHQ Pool Battalions were placed under division artillery where no Artillerie Kommandeur** was actually in a position of command. In other situations, where commitment was correctly handled, reinforcement artillery was placed without reservation under the artillery commander of a corps as a strongpoint weapon. In more extensive situations an unattached artillery regimental staff (Artillerie Regiments Stab z.b.V.) was introduced and committed to control directly the reinforcing battalions. These staffs, together with the units assigned to them, were always placed under the artillery commander.

The division of labor between division artillery and concentrated GHQ artillery was this: the former undertook without reservation the direct support of the infantry—e.g., preparation for attack, interdiction of enemy attack, and fire upon any suitable target coming under observation; the latter undertook all targets at great range, including counterbattery. Often in defensive situations there was no difference in the mission: both kinds of artillery under the same ARKO undertook the same task.

The terrain, the situation, and the possibilities of ammunition supply conditioned the extent of introduction and use of GHQ artillery. In the battles on Lake Ladoga, for example, so much of this arm was committed on the German side that space did not permit bringing in more even though it was available. In that swampy terrain every possible battery position was occupied, and in addition supply was so strained that no more ammunition-gobbling tubes could be allowed. It follows that an increase in the effect of the artillery could be accomplished only by a very flexible leadership; that is, the commanders had to strive for the maximum effect of each piece already in use. In a certain respect there existed for the artillery no boundaries of division, corps, and army sectors: regardless of boundaries, each tube had to shoot where its greatest effect could be obtained, so that fire superiority would be gained as often as possible and at as many points as ossible. This, incidentally, is the vital point in modern artillery leadership.

The multiplicity of artillery missions and the lack of manpower for them demanded not only a very flexible leadership but a flexible unit as well. Only if the unit can rapidly execute commands for fire and shifts of fire can the artillery leader bring his unit to its maximum fire effect. The unassigned regimental staffs which went from one front to another were always confronted with strange GHQ battalions under their control. And from the point of view of those battalions, after every change of higher command they had to learn the procedures and idiosyncrasies of the new staff. It is obvious that a closely-knit organization which has a standing operating procedure and whose components know each other's capabilities is better for certain tasks than is a loosely connected group of GHQ battalions. On the basis of these conclusions and of the knowledge that only massed artillery could cause a decisive effect, the first German artillery division was established as an experiment. (At this time the Russians already had a large number of artillery divisions, with various tables of organization.)

* The term "GHQ Pool Artillery" is the accepted translation of Heeres Artillerie.
** Artillerie Kommandeur (abbreviated ARKO) is the name applied to a defined group of artillery officers of the rank of Oberst of higher. It is not necessarily a generic term for "artillery commander." Each ARKO had a permanent serial number between 1 and 200, which be retained whether he was assigned with a divisional or a corps staff.
Hoherer Artillerie Kommandeur (abbreviated HARKO) is the name applied to a defined group of artillery officers of general grade. It should not be translated merely as "higher artillery commander." Each HARKO had a permanent serial number, usually in the 300 or 400 series. Both ARKOS and HARKOS were organic only with the Army High Command, and not with any unit.

Source: A German Reflects Upon Artillery. Interrogation of Karl Thoholte, General der Artillerie. The Field Artillery Journal. December 1945

It's all. Cheers. Raúl M 8).

FELICES PASCUAS - HAPPY EASTER - FROHE OSTERN - JOYEUSES PÂQUES - FELIZ PÁSCOA - BUONA PASQUA! :up:
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.
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