Influence of technical communication.

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Influence of technical communication.

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Hello to all :D; a point of view about it...............................

Influence of technical communication on leadership and combat events.

In 1909, Schlieffen called the commander a "modern Alexander" who was further back in a house with spacious offices where there were wire and radio telegraphs, telephones and signaling devices. As a result, the connection schemes always presented the same picture: wire lines that ran radially forward from a command post in the rear to the subordinate units. The commanders at their command posts were also connected to their command posts by wire and were therefore restricted in their movements to a certain axis.

When radio was introduced into battle formations as a new means of communication, little changed for a long time. The radio links doubled the wire connection and thus acted as a safety measure in case the wire broke; they were often used alone temporarily until the wire came along.

The main means of connection was the wire, the radio the auxiliary means. At that time, this rating corresponded entirely to the operational safety of these means. These means of communication had little influence on the way of leading, except for the fact that orders could be transmitted more quickly.

Later both means, wire and radio, would receive a different role. The change came from the tank weapon and from there was transferred to the infantry. The armored troops had consistently developed and exploited the peculiarities of radio, thereby achieving something completely new.

In 1935, Oberst Guderian *, as commander of a tank division, demanded for the first time an uninterrupted connection within the movement for his leadership and between all of his weapons. Radio thus became the main means of leadership in the movement, a type of leadership that had not existed before. A radio station was assigned to each tactically important connection. When moving, these radio stations followed the staff vehicles and maintained the connection via their roof antennas while driving. The messages received were transmitted to the relevant staff vehicles by motorcyclists.

Through continued training of the transmission personnel and through constant improvement of equipment and methods, it was finally possible to move an entire armored division around the terrain, to drive under cover, to have deployments made, etc., without the orders being transmitted other than via radio. The conclusion of this development phase was the Wehrmacht maneuvers in 1937, in which, in the final phase, Generalmajor Guderian demonstrated the attack of several hundred tanks in battle, together with infantry, artillery and air force, exclusively with the help of tank radio.

Guderian's leadership ideas proved their validity through success in 1940. As general of the armored troops at the head of Group v. Kleist quickly forced the Meuse crossing at Sedan and the breakthrough of the extending Maginot Line, then fought his way through the enemy's rear to the Aisne and crossed it, finally appearing in front of the Swiss border. It was Guderian's habit to leave the command post early every day to go to the front, accompanied only by his general echelon, and not to return until evening.

The general's radio unit traveled directly in his vehicle, an armored personnel carrier, which ensured him constant communication with his chief of staff. Through his chief of staff he was in contact with the air forces, neighboring troops, the superior command and the rear services. He was able to get in touch with his subordinate units via his other radio squads. In this way it was possible for him to always be at the focal point of the battle and to observe the enemy as well as his own troops, which was probably the only way to recognize and exploit the chances of success early enough given the incredibly rapid course of combat operations. Through his own observation and with the help of radio communications, he continually brought the combat orders to his units and their movements in harmony with the overall situation.

* Guderian was clear about the concept since during the IWW he had served as a communications officer in various echelons of command. Leutnant Guderian joined Telegraphen-Bataillon Nr. 3 and commanded a “heavy radio station” of the 5. Cavalry Division, according to the mobilization order. There he lived through the eventful beginning of the war. In October he was transferred to the 4th Army Command with the same task. The radio industry was in its infancy back then. Here Guderian became acquainted with wireless transmission, by means of which twenty years later he made his armored weapon tactically mobile and superior to all others. Incoming and outgoing radio messages also brought him into close contact with the work of the General Staff. (Walde K. Guderian. Eine Biographie).

Source: Einfluss der technischen Nachrichtenübermittlung auf die Führung und das Kampfgeschehen: Beispiele aus dem Zweiten Weltkrieg. Brun, E. ASMZ: Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift. Band (Jahr): 119 (1953). Heft 4

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Re: Influence of technical communication.

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Influence of technical communication on leadership and combat events.

The connection to the rear of the operational wire network was secured by a long-distance cable trunk line. It was often the only connection backwards over distances of 200-300 km. The maximum communication limit of 150 kilometers of the Pupinized field long-distance cables intended in peacetime was increased to 200-300 km by field amplifiers. The line was followed daily by a panzer group signal regiment at least as far as the panzer group's CP, but usually beyond this to an army corps or even a division that happened to be in the direction of the attack. The other divisions were then attached to the side of this main line.

The commanders and staff met each night via this connection for a few hours to discuss things with each other. In order to shorten the reporting channel even further, the highest staffs maintained their own radio monitoring centers that listened to and followed their own radio traffic at the front. In this way, the top leadership was able to keep abreast of the current situation from front-line radio communications without having to wait for reports from the front.

With such a transmission system, two leadership methods were now possible: tactical leadership from the front during the movement and simultaneous operational leadership “on the long rein” from behind. Such leadership methods set a precedent. In the spring of 1941, General Rommel and his German Afrika Korps brought the new type of leadership to the desert. He also led exclusively from the front and could only be found at his command post at night.

He was constantly at the front and was never without radio stations that connected him directly with his chief of staff and the subordinate divisions and combat groups. In the middle of the battle he received their reports and gave orders. Against a fully combat-capable opponent, this type of leadership was put to the test again with the help of the uninterrupted connection, which undoubtedly existed. It is not to blame for the outcome of the battle for Africa.

This was the first time that tactics were so largely based on the possibilities of technology, instead of, as before, technology always only trying to meet the needs of tactics. This development eventually spread to the infantry. By giving it light mobile radios, mainly with telephony, it now had in principle the same command options as with the armored weapon.

We see the visible expression of this in the signal network of the army units, which overlays the command network. Apart from this development, which made radio the prerequisite for a completely new type of leadership on a primarily tactical level, there was also a development that primarily favored the speed and range of operational movements.

If the Allied armies and army corps had not been followed by a powerful communication system that never lost contact with the highest command bodies and rear organizations, the pace at which the Allied advance from the coasts of France to the Rhine and beyond would have been never conceivable. The importance attached to securing these connections is shown by the fact that 16,000 men from the Signal Corps were deployed to the 6th Army Group (Devers) alone.

The directional beam connections corresponded to the desire to replace the cumbersome cable or wire trunk lines, which required a lot of personnel and time, with another means. Their connectivity is on par with cable. In addition, multi-channel operation allows multiple transmissions to take place simultaneously over one and the same connection. Its great advantage over wire rods is clearest from a few figures: According to American information, the material for building a 160 km long line with four wires weighs 94 tons, while the material for a directional beam connection over the same distance only weighs 25 tons. Creating such a trunk line would require 4 battalions or 1,820 men over 10 days. However, a directional beam connection over the same distance could be created by 44 men in two days.

Source: Einfluss der technischen Nachrichtenübermittlung auf die Führung und das Kampfgeschehen: Beispiele aus dem Zweiten Weltkrieg. Brun, E. ASMZ: Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift. Band (Jahr): 119 (1953). Heft 4

Cheers. Raúl M 8).

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Re: Influence of technical communication.

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Hello to all :D; more...............................

Influence of technical communication on leadership and combat events.

This agile and powerful operational communications system was countered by a German communications system that failed in many respects throughout the Allied advance through France. Difficulties arose within the cooperation of the transmission services because they had become too used to stable conditions during the occupation and were now no longer able to cope with the new tasks of mobile warfare. In addition, the allocation of transmission troops proved to be too weak and their motorization was insufficient for mobile warfare.

For example, the wire connections between the Wehrmacht command staff and the Commander-in-Chief West, on the one hand, and the latter and Army Group G, which returned through the Rhone Valley, on the other, were inadequate and only intermittent. The radio connections, which were also insufficient in number, did not offer an adequate replacement. At the front itself, the Allied fire and carpet bombing destroyed the wire connections and destroyed a lot of radio equipment.

These examples show that the degree of mobility of a force largely depends on the mobility of its communications services. What ultimately determines the range of an advance? Firstly, the range of the supporting weapons, then the performance of the ammunition supply and finally the range of action of the communications. If the transmission services are not sufficient or fail, all cooperation and therefore all attacks cease.

A completely different task, which is not always thought of, can be assigned to technical communication in the rear formations. If it is possible to significantly shorten the time that elapses from the moment that losses of combat equipment occur on a front until the moment that these losses are replaced by supplies, an indirect increase in the combat power of a troop can be achieved.

As is well known, the supply of replacement material does not only consist of the transport alone, but also consists of reporting a need that has arisen at the front to the department responsible for distributing the material, and issuing the delivery order from this department to the corresponding depot or the corresponding supply formation and finally from the actual transport from the depot to the front.

Source: Einfluss der technischen Nachrichtenübermittlung auf die Führung und das Kampfgeschehen: Beispiele aus dem Zweiten Weltkrieg. Brun, E. ASMZ: Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift. Band (Jahr): 119 (1953). Heft 4

Cheers. Raúl M 8).

Feliz Navidad - Feliz Natal - Frohe Weihnachten - Joyeux Noël - Merry Christmas - Wesołych Świąt! :up:
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Re: Influence of technical communication.

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Hello to all :D; more...............................

Influence of technical communication on leadership and combat events.

Ensuring supplies are most clearly illustrated by the following example:
From the breakthrough at St-Lô (end of July 1944) to the stop in front of the Siegfried Line (beginning of September), the equipment service of the 1st US Army (Hodges) was so heavily diversified that the advanced battalions assigned to the rear army main equipment service were up to 200 miles ahead. During all this time, wire connection at such a distance was impossible. In addition, the traffic routes were so congested that transmission by reporting drivers was out of the question. Since the supply of combat material can only be carried out in a timely manner if the orders arrive with as little delay as possible, the army equipment service was forced to rely solely on radio communications.

The 52nd Equipment Group, which was responsible for the equipment maintenance and supplies of the three army corps of the 1st US Army, also had control over certain so-called critical material. To a certain extent, it was the rationalization mechanism for material that had become scarce and therefore required particularly strict control. The 52nd Group gave the advanced equipment battalions permission to make deliveries to the front units. The order to the group was sent over the radio, as were the delivery orders from the group to the advanced battalions. In this way, losses of hours or even days in supplying the combat troops with replacement material were avoided.

Even when the advanced battalions were on the move, delivery orders could be given to the battalions in such a way that it was possible to carry out the deliveries immediately. Much more time would have been required if this material had to be requested each time by couriers, apart from the fact that it would not always have been easy for them to locate the constantly shifting equipment battalions.

Wire connections with teleprinters could only be used when the conditions in front of the Siegfried Line had become somewhat more stable again. The civilian network, which would have been useful during the advance period, had suffered too much damage, and although the repositioning took place quickly, it was not possible to reach the advanced equipment battalions via it soon enough.

Finally, a form of combat must be mentioned in which radio had acquired increased importance in the last war and will become even more important in the future: the temporary cutting off of small or large units or even their temporary encirclement. The history of the last war knows many such examples and in future wars this form of fighting will occur even more frequently as the fronts are increasingly stretched and fast mechanized units are grouped together behind them, whereby the encirclement will increasingly lose the expression of a crisis situation. It is obvious that radio becomes more important as the only means of communication across the encirclement front.

Source: Einfluss der technischen Nachrichtenübermittlung auf die Führung und das Kampfgeschehen: Beispiele aus dem Zweiten Weltkrieg. Brun, E. ASMZ: Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift. Band (Jahr): 119 (1953). Heft 4

Cheers. Raúl M 8).

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Re: Influence of technical communication.

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Influence of technical communication on leadership and combat events.

A well-known example is the encirclement of two German army corps of the 8th Army near Cherkassy-Korsun in February 1944 and their breakout after 20 days of encirclement. The report by the Chief of Staff of this army, Generalleutnant Hans Speidel, states: “The decisive factor for leadership and supply (during the encirclement) was the secure connection of the encircled troops (around 50,000 men). There were radio connections in the encirclement: the command radio, the Supply radio, the reconnaissance aviation radio, the railway troop radio, and also the air supply and air traffic control radio from the air force.

It was possible to maintain a powerful radio connection to both corps. During the encirclement, the radio center of the Army High Command had an average of 99 radio messages per day with the encircled corps (a total of 2,161 radio messages during the encirclement)."

The radio, as it was partly used by the Germans in Italy, did not exactly change the leadership methods significantly, but did promote flexible adaptation and evasive tactics in defense. In Italy, the German radio interception service had lost much of its success for the first time. The Allies had recognized their sometimes serious mistakes in their radio discipline thanks to the capture of the interception material from the German interception company off El Alamein. Since then, the Allied radio systems had been improved and standardized. The 8th British and 5th American armies maintained strict nimble discipline in Italy.

They avoided all the mistakes that had previously given the Germans valuable clues. What the German radio interceptors were still able to record and read were at most short-term radio messages such as requests to fire or orders to be carried out immediately to smaller front units. In order to communicate all radio reconnaissance results that were important to the troops as quickly as possible due to their short validity, the German high command in Italy had them sent out via a powerful transmitter as “broadcast warning messages” with special encryption. Under certain circumstances, the troops could pick up these broadcasts using ordinary commandeered home receivers and immediately take advantage of them. This radio warning system was of particular service to the German artillerymen, who could often be warned of impending fire from Allied counter batteries.

Source: Einfluss der technischen Nachrichtenübermittlung auf die Führung und das Kampfgeschehen: Beispiele aus dem Zweiten Weltkrieg. Brun, E. ASMZ: Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift. Band (Jahr): 119 (1953). Heft 4

Cheers. Raúl M 8).
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Re: Influence of technical communication.

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Hello to all :D; more...............................

Influence of technical communication on leadership and combat events.

Transmission by technical means is, in a sense, similar to the use of items in everyday life. At some point, these items have created a market and use for themselves through their practicality and we only notice their usefulness when they are no longer available for some reason. In war literature (and here too) we usually only talk about the transmission service when it is not working.

In such cases, however, its influence on combat becomes especially evident, although in a negative sense. - The vital role of communications is often best demonstrated in the disruptions that caused its failure! An example of the impact of deficiencies on an operational communications system is the air raid on Rotterdam. At that time there was no direct means of communication between airmen in the air and ground troops, but there was radio communication from the command at the front to the airfields of the support forces in Germany.

The time from when air support was requested until the arrival of the air units was a few hours at German airfields. By the time the planes arrived, the situation could have changed significantly, while the ground troops were unable to reach the planes in the air to redirect them. This meant on several occasions that rapidly advancing German units felt their own bombs.

«The air attack on Rotterdam (after the surrender) was due to the same reason. It was programmed into the attack plan. Despite all efforts, the General Commander of XXXIX. Corps (Mot), General Schmidt, to whom the Dutch commander had capitulated, found no way to inform the approaching wing of the change in the situation.

The Ardennes 1944.

The American 8th Corps in the Ardennes experienced the consequences that a failure of a technical connection system can have on front-line units during the German offensive of 1944.

Before December 16, 1944, the 106th Infantry Division of the US 8th Army Corps was located in the Schnee Eifel. On its left wing, the 14th Cavalry Group covered the corps' northern flank, while on the right was the 28th Infantry Division. The 106th Infantry Division had to maintain a front of about 45 km with three regiments in the front, of which the 424th occupied the village of Großlangenfeld with the 106th Reconnaissance Squadron assigned to it. The 106th Reconnaissance Squadron was connected to its right by cable with the heavy weapons company of the 424th Infantry Regiment and to its left by patrols with Group B of the 18th Cavalry Squadron near the 423rd Infantry Regiment in the Schnee Eifel.

The 106th Infantry Division had replaced the 2nd Infantry Division and took over a rather dense and confusing cable network, which also had many local accumulations of wiring harnesses from all weapons. This field cable network was supplemented according to their own needs. Radio silence was ordered.

Early in the morning on December 16, the first blow of the German offensive was dealt against the positions of the American 8th Army Corps. The 14th Cavalry Group on the corps' northern flank was swept away by the forward elements of the 1. SS Panzer Division. The German 18. Infantry Division (18. Volks-Grenadier-Division) surrounded the northern shoulder of the Schnee Eifel and isolated it along with the 22. Infantry Division (actually 62. Volksgrenadier-Division) of the LXVI. Corps. - Further south, the German LVIII. Panzer Corps launched itself against the 424th Infantry Regiment, which, supported by armored elements, was able to offer resistance for some time. But then the LVIII. German Panzer Corps turned south towards Houffalize. On December 18, the connection with the 28th Infantry Division was cut and the route to Bastogne was opened to the enemy. On the northern wing, the German attack had broken through the front of the 106th Infantry Division in the Schnee Eifel and had driven back the 14th Cavalry Group.

Source: Einfluss der technischen Nachrichtenübermittlung auf die Führung und das Kampfgeschehen: Beispiele aus dem Zweiten Weltkrieg. Brun, E. ASMZ: Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift. Band (Jahr): 119 (1953). Heft 4

Cheers. Raúl M 8).
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Re: Influence of technical communication.

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Hello to all :D; more...............................

Influence of technical communication on leadership and combat events.

The Ardennes 1944.

The reason for this setback seemed at first to lie exclusively in the enemy's overwhelming superiority; However, the cause was largely due to the failure of the connections. The artillery strikes that initiated the offensive severely damaged the cable network. During construction, the wire and cable lines were laid along a few axes and were therefore particularly vulnerable. The repair was not successful quickly enough because untangling the wires, which were laid very close together, took a lot of time under enemy fire and caused heavy losses. In addition, the interference removal team did not build the network themselves, but had to work in a network they had taken over, some of which was foreign to them.

The 106 Reconnaissance Squadron had 13 radio sets, which ensured secure communication over a distance of 30 km in the terrain there. But no radio connection could be established because radio silence had been ordered before December 16th and they had obviously failed to keep individual stations permanently connected. They did not expect such a surprise attack by the Germans and apparently believed that the reception of radio traffic could be controlled via the wire. However, once the wire connections were destroyed and the use of runners had become impossible as a result of enemy activity, the radio documents could no longer be transmitted. In this situation, the only means that would have allowed the higher command to inform the situation at the front, to request and direct artillery fire, and to bring reserves into proper use failed, partly as a result of poor organization and partly as a result of technical inadequacy.

The Infantry Regiments were equipped with the same or in some cases weaker stations, but were less well endowed. The infantry therefore did not have the necessary resources to meet the requirements of mobile defense in such a wide area. Especially with such stretched fronts, guided artillery fire would have been the most effective means of defense.

The urgent demand to send situation reports to the rear, which would have enabled the commander to assess the strength of the enemy and his intentions and then make his decisions, could not be fulfilled. In this confused situation, the higher commands were literally hungry for news because they felt compelled to make decisions based on mere assumptions.

The 8th Corps therefore lost track of the situation soon after the offensive began. Vanguard battalions and even regiments were out of touch with their divisional commands. The connections between the two main defense divisions were also severed. The 8th Army Corps, which had operated successfully throughout the invasion, was thus eliminated as a leadership organism.

The more the Germans were able to deepen their incursion, the more critical the situation became in terms of communications. After the army headquarters had been relocated twice, the distance to the headquarters of Army Group Bradley became too great for a directional beam connection, so that it ultimately resulted in the well-known subordination of the 1st Army came under Montgomery's 21st Army Group.

Source: Einfluss der technischen Nachrichtenübermittlung auf die Führung und das Kampfgeschehen: Beispiele aus dem Zweiten Weltkrieg. Brun, E. ASMZ: Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift. Band (Jahr): 119 (1953). Heft 4

Cheers. Raúl M 8).
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Re: Influence of technical communication.

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Hello to all :D; more...............................

Influence of technical communication on leadership and combat events.

The Ardennes 1944.

Also interesting is the report of an eyewitness who observed that smaller units, including the 106th Reconnaissance Squadron, quickly lost their will to fight when they found themselves deprived of all upward and lateral connections. This also shows the psychological effect that the loss of all connections can have in hard-pressed or almost surrounded units.

Only the connection of the 14th Cav Group, which was assigned to the 106th Inf Div, did not fail. For them, radio was a much more organic component than for other branches of the armed forces, since it was a light, mobile force that could never be managed by any other means of transmission. The 14th Kav Group was able to transmit messages early on in the German attack. The radio connection continued despite the barrage of German artillery and the invading tanks. The intelligence officer of the 14th Cavalry Group, who made his estimates based on reports from advanced Cavalry units, correctly calculated the enemy's strength and precisely located the position of the 1st SS Panzer Division on the morning of December 16th.

In summary, this example shows the importance of reliable connections for leadership in crisis situations. Due to the failure of communications, intelligence gathering at the front was almost completely lost and the situation quickly became unclear and confused for the leadership. The artillery could not support the infantry in their defensive battle. The reserves had to be deployed on the basis of unclear and insufficient intelligence and were therefore not deployed at the crucial moment or in the right place.

Details are known where, for example, artillery groups could no longer be informed in time about the enemy's presence in their rear and were therefore ambushed when they were deployed at the last moment. In this way, the cooperation between the various weapons was increasingly lost and ultimately a coordinated defensive battle became impossible.

It is also interesting to know that, on the other hand, the previously mentioned supply formations of the equipment service of the 1st Army completely succeeded in evading the German attack thanks to their well-functioning transmission service and in keeping all their depots and all material out of German reach. Their wire connections were also destroyed, but the withdrawal orders could still be transmitted via radio at the right time.

Two battalion headquarters with two depots containing approximately 1000 tons of equipment and twelve equipment companies with all their own workshops and their own material depots were in the direction of the German attack. All of these units, with the exception of one equipment maintenance company, were able to be withdrawn without loss of men or material. The order to withdraw was given by wire to a battalion staff and some of its companies located around Malmédy on December 17th. This was also the last wire connection that was still usable.

All other units were given the order to withdraw by radio. Thanks to this timely withdrawal, replacement of the material lost during the fighting could begin immediately afterwards.

Source: Einfluss der technischen Nachrichtenübermittlung auf die Führung und das Kampfgeschehen: Beispiele aus dem Zweiten Weltkrieg. Brun, E. ASMZ: Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift. Band (Jahr): 119 (1953). Heft 4

Cheers. Raúl M 8).
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Re: Influence of technical communication.

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Influence of technical communication on leadership and combat events.

Arnhem 1944.

Another example of the consequences of an inadequate transmission service is the Battle of Arnhem. The British 1st Parachute Brigade, which landed on the first day, had taken possession of the city center and the northern end of the bridge, while the German counterattack was able to stop the bulk of the British 1st Airborne Division, which had landed on the Second day, west of Arnhem, in Osterbeek. During the first combat operations the few radio devices of the 1st Parachute Brigade were lost. The result was that at the division command post the situation of the surrounded brigade in Arnhem remained almost unknown until its desperate resistance ceased after four days: contact with the division command via the civilian telephone network It was only temporarily possible when Dutch partisans took possession of the telephone exchange and established connections through the civilian network.

But there was also no radio communication with the command of the airborne army. The location of the 1st Airborne Division was not known until the sixth day of fighting, after a liaison officer managed to reach it. By now, however, the loss of the British division at Arnhem had already become inevitable. The lack of connection, according to the higher command, had other consequences: on the 3rd and 5th days, the Polish parachute brigade had to descend as planned, but until these days their predetermined landing zones could not be kept clear, so the Poles were in the middle of enemy territory and had to fall under withering fire and unload their material with heavy losses: of 75 gliders, 44 were lost on the third day and 110 of the 167 transport planes were lost on the fifth day during the approach and landing.

A large portion of the dropped supplies were lost due to the ever-changing situation on the ground. On the fifth and sixth days of the battle, due to bad weather, no supplies could be transported by plane. On days 8 and 9 the situation remained unchanged. Of the supplies that British and American airmen dropped at great sacrifice during days 4 and 7 of the fighting, 87% ended up in the hands of the Germans.

In these and many other examples, it is not reported how much responsibility for the failure lies with the delivery. It is simply stated that there were no connections because the few radios were lost in the battle. However, it should not be difficult to see that much of the losses can be attributed to this circumstance. Technical transmission has had an additional influence in achieving the objectives of offensive actions.

Two things crucially determine the “extent” of an offensive action: links and supplies. It is evident that the entire machine stops when the links are no longer maintained. On the other hand, a timely supply of ammunition and, especially, spare material represents an indirect increase in the combat power of the troops. It is not only about rapid transportation of spare materials, but also about shortening the time between losses that occur and the arrival of spare parts as much as possible. The transmission service can significantly contribute to shortening this time.

Finally, the psychological influence of a reliable transmission system should not be ignored. If there is a reliable connection between a separated or surrounded unit and the other troops, this can greatly reduce the impression that those trapped are isolated. Then you know that your own troops outside the field know your situation. Therefore, the actions of those trapped can be coordinated with those of the outside.

Source: Einfluss der technischen Nachrichtenübermittlung auf die Führung und das Kampfgeschehen: Beispiele aus dem Zweiten Weltkrieg. Brun, E. ASMZ: Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift. Band (Jahr): 119 (1953). Heft 4

That's all. Cheers. Raúl M 8).
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.
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