There's no topic about this campaign, it's surprising, as the Caucasian campaign seems to be the most irrational operation of the WW2...
Here is why:
Hitler (and the OKW) tried to invade something as big as FRANCE with only 14 divisions. (by the way if anyone have a complete OOB about this campaign, I'd like to see it )
Why don't the OKW choosed to take Stalingrad and rush south AFTER ?
What are the big battles of this campaign ? What are the others "minor axis power" in this theater ? How many casualties ? Does Manstein really faced the threaten of a "giant Kessel" when the soviet winter offensive started ?
Is that true that a german unit reached the Caspian see ?
A lot of questions, and I hope a lot of answers
PS: At least I want to apologize for my very bad english. Hope it will make sense to you.
I am not as read up in this campaign. But, my guess is their eyes were bigger than their stomach. Maybe they were flushed with their previous victories.
This is certainly a fascinating campaign to study. The whole point of Blau was to seize the Caucasus. Stalingrad was just a step along the road. It was Hitler's inversion of this original concept that distorted the whole campaign.
Throughout the drive towards Grozny, Von Kleist Divisions were constantly short of fuel and air support, as more and more was diverted to Stalingrad. By November, they simply didn't have the supplies to sweep down from the hills to destroy the southern prong of the Soviet encirclement. If you look at a contemporary map, you will see that the main railways run from the Rostov/Kerch area to the south and south-west that mean that the units in the Caucasus would find it far easier to withdraw northwest towards Rostov/Kerch than directly north towards Stalingrad...
Hello OG:
You might find a copy of Wilhelm Tieke's THE CAUCASUS AND THE OIL. It is available in English and German and gives a history of the campign. Best wishes.
MEN AND SPACE IN WAR
A German Problem in World War II
Colonel General Kurt Zeitzler, German Army, Retired.
Military history has s h o w n that there is a definitive relation between the size of the area of operations and the strength of tbe forces required to conduct operations successfully
in it. This ratio of men to space is subject to the change of times. It is affected by such factors as armament and the performance of men; the economic power behind those men;
new inventions, particularly a r e a weapons; air superiority; the nature of the terrain; and the ability cf the commander to exploit the available space in furtherance of his strategy.
The right ratio of men to space is important in a strategic sense as well as on the tactical scale. The strategic ratio is taken into consideration during the planning for operations. The
tactical ratio is reflected in doctrinal directives which prescribe the frontage a unit can successfully cover in the attack or on the defense. The men-to-space ratios are more
critical for countries that have limited manpower at their disposal than for those which can draw on plentiful resources. The problem grows more complex the longer a war lasts and the larger the space involved. This question became a very crucial problem for the German command, especially during the campaign against tbe Soviet Union.
Men,Space, and Strategy
When Hitler attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941, the German forces advanced from Poland on a line approximately 700 k i 1o m e t e rs long. Roughly 140 divisions, including reserves, were deployed. In view of the extensive targets, the frontage, and the distance of the objectives, this number was not too large, Thus a certain risk had been accepted at the beginning of the operation in the ratio of men to space. This risk was bound to increase as
the number of available men declined and the space increased. By the end of 1941 the attack forces had advanced more than 1,000 kilometers a f t e r months of heavy fighting. By this time they held a frontage of about 1,800 kilometers. (See Figure 1.) Concurrent with the expansion of the front, the strength of the attack units had been reduced substantially through battle casualties, sickness, and march failures. The enormous
depth of space had swallowed men. There had been no replacements of significance. Consequently, in the infantry divisions tbe infantry strength had fallen by one-third, and the artillery strength by one-fourth. Thus the average strength of these divisions was only 65 percent of the original. The infantry troops in the Panzer divisions were down to 50 percent and materiel losses amounted to 65 to 75 percent. Thus the Panzer divisions, were at only 35 percent strength. The motorized infantry divisions were only
60 percent effective. In summary, the approximately 140 divisions which had
assembled for the attack were now equivalent to only 83 divisions. The
ratio of men to space had changed for the worse. This was one of the reasons
for the reverses in December 1941.
Area and Frontages.
When, Hitler’s summer offensive of 1942 came to an end after the Caucasus and Stslingrad battles, a considerable bulge had developed on the southern flank of the Eastern Front.
From an initial, relatively straight, front of approximately 600 to 700 kilometers, the German forces now held positions about 2,000 kilometers in length. Moreover, the area of operation had increased in depth to the south and the east by as much as 600 kilometers. (See Figure 2.). The employment of a large number of divisions of Hitler’s allies—Italy,
Hungary, and Romania Aid not improve the situation. These divisions were ill-equipped, inexperienced, and unable to hold wide sectors of the front. T h e enormous disproportion between men and space which had developed was to doom German warfare. It was the real cause of the rapid success of the Soviet winter offensive of November 1942. Could the disproportion between men and space have been anticipated?. The general staff of the G e r m a n Army, particularly the operations section and most of the commanders of the army groups and the armies, saw it coming. The general staff realistically expressed their evaluation of the situation to Hitler, the Supreme Commander. The chief of the general staff
cautioned against the consequences of the disproportion and many commanders expressed their concern. Hitler reasoned that this was a risk he bad to take. In his opinion the German
soldier was much better than bis opponent: he could cope with a great superiority, and his armament was much more effective than that of the enemy. Furthermore, the G e r m a n
Panzer and antitank weapons were far superior to those of the enemy.
Operational Restrictions.
A new chief of the general staff of the army was appointed shortly before the German summer offensive of 1942 came to a standstill. After obtaining a thorough understanding of the situation on the Eastern Front, he presented a long, special report to
Hitler on the gravity of the situation.
He closed his report with these words:
Because of the summer offensive a sharp disproportion in the ratio of men to space was incurred. There are too few men in too wide a space. This is in need of change if a disaster is to be prevented. There are two solutions for u change, either bring more
men into this space or give up space. There will hardlv be more men available
for the army at home. Not even the great losses were properly replaced. Consequently, the space must be reduced. The salient corners at the Caucasus Mountains and near Stalingrad especially offer themselves for this purpose, also the large protrusion toward the east at the Army Groups Middle and North. In this manner the great disproportion between men and space in the east will at least be somewhat equalized. In addition, the reserves absolutely necessary for the Eastern Front will be produced.*
Hitler refused bluntly, flatly, and furiously. It was to no avail that the general staff persistently returned to this demand. Hitler likewise rejected a third solution to tbe problem suggested later by the commander in chief of the Army G r o u p Don, who demanded
authority to conduct a flexible defense with his army group and full operational freedom for himself.
The Bowstring of Defense
At the close of 1942 the Germans were dispersed over most of Europe and parts of northern Africa. The Eastern Front at its most distant point was more than 2,000 kilometers from the homeland. Its total frontage amounted to roughly 2,900 kilometers. Moreover, there was the prospect of a second defense front on the west From where an invasion could be expected at any time. The Atlantic WalI extending from tbe eastern tip of the Netherlands to the Pyrenees stretched roughly over 2,000 kilometers. For all practical purposes a frontline, nearly 5,000 kilometers in length, existed for the German forces. It was an impressive length, indeed. If the 2,000 -kilometer- Iong Norwegian coast and the 400 kilometers
of the north and west coasts of Denmark are considered, the frontage was fantastic. In addition, German troops were in Finland, Yugoslavia, Greece, and North Africa. Al-.
though these countries were not so heavily occupied, they, nevertheless, drained manpower.
The available manpower had not increased significantly. It is true that new age groups grew up and new divisions from tbe countries allied with Hitler, ethnic Germans, and volunteer
formations from other countries were added. However, these ,were only replacements
for the losses. The German defense bow was overstretched —a very thin string Which,
if struck sharply at any place, was bound to break. If broken, the ends could no longer be tied because of the tension. In this phase of the Second World War, enemy offensives had relatively quick and far-reaching success. The calamity was worsened by the refusal of Hitler to accept advice. The decisions to vacate sectors nearly always were made when it was too late. A real strategist would have been able to shape the situation differently by
initiative and flexible tactics, in spite of the unfavorable ratio of men to space.
Men, Space, and Tactics.
Before World War II the manuals of most armies stated force ratios. These were specific frontages that could be covered or defended successfully by divisions, regiments, battalions,
and companies. It was written, for example, that one division on the defensive could hold as much as seven kilometers of front and that a regiment in the offensive could cover a
combat sector 1,200 to 1,500 meters , wide. Here too on a small scale it was deemed necessary that the ratios of men to space be in the right proportion. Units were trained in accordance with these figures. Field exercises, maneuvers, war games, and emergency
pkma were based upon them. Wartime circumstances frequently upset these calculations and deviations became neceesary. Oddly enough, this often went well if it were a tem
porary situation. At times, new techniques of attack and defense were found by taking advantage of a situation. Thus during World War I, for instance, the mobile defense was de.
veloped. In the World War H offensive the Germkns, at first, did not deviate two much from the accepted standards. At tbe beginning of tbe eastern campaign, the ratio in attack was one division per six to 10 kilometers of front, At lees important sectors, the front.
age was wider. Later, lack of msnpower required that attacks be restricted to spearhead operations, bypassing positions w h i c h would fall after being cut off. Attacke which dispersed the available forces too widely were nearly always doomed to failure
unless factors such as massed tanks, maesed air support, or a fluid enemy
position entered the picture.
Inadequacy of Reserves
The reduced force of the German attacks became particularly apparent during their counterattacks in the second half of the war. There were numerous examples of attempts to free encircled troops or to cut off enemy elements which had penetrated deeply near Stalingrad and Cherkassy. These operations against heavy odds made good initial progress because there was adequate manpower for the spice involred; however, they soon came to
a halt or collapsed after the attack had spent itself. During the defensive operations of the 6th German Army on the Eastern Front in August 1943, the Soviets had succeeded in penetrating deeply, but on a narrow sector, tbe thinly manned German defense line. The Soviet leaders exploited this thrust with fresh units. In doing eo they risked the passing of fresh forces and supplies through a bottleneck three kilometers wide. The German commander in chief recognized t h e i r vulnerability and turned his countermoves accordingly let the enemy advance and ordered t German units at the shoulders of
E penetration to be reinforced and hold their positions. He then asembled all available fighting strength. this case five battalions, reinforced, thrust through the bottleneck.
The tactics were sound and approiate and required nerve and daring. Success depended upon surprise. At st, the attack promised success, but ? Soviet command recognized the 1n g e r and ordered a mechanized rps to attack the five battalions. ren though the German forces stuck ggedly to their objective and shot wn 40 enemy tanks in heavy figirt-
~, their attack collapsed. Whenever adequate forces were emlyed in these counterattacks, they Iuired the force of the initial atack. The recapture of Kharkov by ele-
:uts of the Army Group South in mch 1943 and the rescue of the ended
1st Armored Army during the st part of April 1944 in tbe southstern f rent are examples.,
it was neither command failure nor poor performance of the troops wich was responsible for the lack success by German counterattacks the Eastern Front during the second
half of the war. It was the Pronounced dism-ouortion between men and space during these counterattacks.
Defensive Innovations.
During the second part of the war, the German forces on the Eastern Front were incredibly thin. In July 1942, for example, some divisions of the Army Group Middle had frontsges
as great as 60 kilometers. In August 1943 the ratio fell below 100 men to a kilometer of front in one army on the southern sector. Another corps had only 86 men to a kilometer; that is, eight to nine men to a 100-meter front. Losses and sickness under these circumstances were critical. Statements of prisoners revealed that the Soviet forces had about 70 men per kilometer of front. In September 1943 an infantry division with a fighting strength of 500 men had to bold a defense sector which was wider than’ recommended f!m a war strength division with full combat power. The further the war progressed, the thinner
the defense became.
Because of these great dispropurtion between men and space, improved techniques of defense were sought. One method was to post the front with double sentries who could see each other and control the intervening area with their fire. The interval was mined and was under the protective fire of machineguns, mortars, and other heavy weapons located
to the rear. However, if a sentry post was lost through a direct euemy hit, the finely contrived system collapsed. Another method was to defend the f r o n t frOm strongpoints. Such a strongpoint was comprised of machineguns and mortars. The space between
the strongpoints varied according to the features of the terrain. In these cases also it was necessary for each strongpoint to be in view of the next so the crews could control the
intervening area with their fire. The intervening terrain was mined or, when t h e r e was a lack of mines, d u m m y minefield were prepared. During the night, patrols were used between the individual strongpoints. This method proved successful at many places, but it also was at a disadvantage when losses were incurred and the crews of the strongpoints
dwindled. It required that ready re serves be locally available for immediate intervention in case a strongpoint collapsed or the enemy penetrated the area between two strongpoints. At best, each of these methods was only a risky solution born of necessity.
Conflicting Demands.
The depth of the area of operations is another significant factor in consideration of the ratio of men to space. In question here is not only the ratio of men to space but also the
ratio of fighting men to supporting personnel in the rear area. In World War 11 Germany had a theater of operations, an occupied area, and the zone of interior. All three zones needed manpower. The longer the war lasted and the more rigorous the action, the more manpower was required. To distribute the insufficient forces over the three zones in such a way that the front was not shorted and the other two areas could perform their diverse tasks was almost an unsolvable problem. Here Germany paid dearly for the over-all disproportion. The combat soldier was far out at the front. Directly behind him were the men of the supporting services.the proper ratio between the two was of foremost importance.. Here are a few examples: At the beginning of the campuign against the Soviet Union there were three noncombatants to 10 combat soldiers. By September 1941 the ratio had changed to six noncombatants to 10 fighters. In October 1942 the ratio in an armored or infantry division was one to one. If one a d ds the noncombatants with the corps and army, the factor increases. As the war continued the ratio of tighter to noncombatant becatne increasingly unfavorable as heavy losses occurred among the fighters while there were a relatively small number of casuzilties among the supporting personnel. By 1943 there were infantry divisions with a fighting strength of only two or three battalions which
had a supply and service system that could have accommodated a division of 15,000 men.
Compartmentalization and Overhead.
Action to remedy the situation was taken. The rear services were combed out, weak divisions were consolidated, and o t h e r emergency steps taken. However, these measures were only stopgaps and could not make up for the inadequacy in number. The fact that the army, air force, at times the navy, the SS, the Labor Organization, and the Organization Todt had their own supply systems and services increased the disproportion of the figures.
Many services could have been consolidated. Without a doubt that would have improved the ratio of fighter to non combatant. The enemy situation was quite different. In his primitive, simple, and rigorous manner he saw to it that there was one non combatant to 10
fighters. Upon suffering heavy losses in the front, he immediately restored this ratio by drawing manpower from the supply and rear services or the civilian population. He could afford a reduced supply organization, for his men were accustomed to standards which were inconceivable in the Western concept. The air force in contrast to the army was oversaturated with men. The ratio of aircraft crews to non combatants was particularly unfavorable. In 1942, for instance, in the west where there was not ground fighting
at the time, there were 30,000 signal communication troops to 100 combat ready aircraft; that is, 300 men to one aircraft. If ground personnel of the airfields, supply services, guard units, and staffs are considered, the figures are distressing.
Wasted Manpower.
With the Eastern Front ablaze, the chief of the general staff of the army demanded action from Hitler. At this stage Reichsmarshal Goring suddenly provided 150,000 men; later, even more. Unfortunately, they were not used to replenish the established army divisions. Instead, air force field divisions were formed. They, in turn, organized another rear organization. Manpower was needed to secure and maintain the lines of communication
between the front and the homeland. It also was needed for the administration, control, and security of the occupied areas, and for the mobilization and supervision of agriculture and industry. Later, it was needed to combat partisans, underground movements, and possible airdrops. The number of men required for theee tasks depended upon the characteristics
of the area, but the number also had to be weighed against the number of combatants at the front. Space could not be permitted to swallow too many men. Even with utmost economy the demands were heavy, for tbe occupied area was more than four times as large as Germany herself. The homeland also had a large demand for manpower. The armament
industry, food production, supply, transportation, economy and public order, and home defense against air attacks, sabotage, and the training of replacements for the front all required men. Thus the ratio of manpower on the front to that of the homeland came into play. During the German mobilization in 1939 the number of men reserved for the homeland was very large. The strength of the mobilized army was only about 3.75 million men. That was a small portion of the total manpower available. At this time the home army
was about one-third of the strength soldier. If he was given too wide an area to defend, be felt depressed or lost in space. He felt forlorn and deserted. The extent to which this affected him varied with the individual, but the effect was there. With some men it turned into mental anxiety or fear and constituted a seedbed for panic. It required a great deal of personal courage, self-control, and good. When the situation became critical on the Eastern Front, 150,000 men were stripped from Goering’s plush Luftwaffe to form field divisions
of the field army. In 1942-43 it was numerically almost as large as the east army. However, it must be taken into consideration that the strength of the home army included all soldiers in the army hospitals at home, those on convalescent leave, replacement units, and newIy activated units. As the war continued the number of those classified as indispensable in civil employment grew out of proportion in comparison with the dwindling number of men at the front.
Psychological Considerations.
The unfavorable ratio of men to space had psychological efTects On the military training to conquer these feelings. Some did not succeed. The soldiers frequently sought and found support in their more robust comrades tind the example set by their superiors. But when they were on their own they were apt to fail. The feeling of isolation at the front was
more intensive when the area was desolate, dreary, and deserted or if the soldier was exposed to unaccustomed climatic conditions. The effect was intensified by the numerical superiority of the enemy. The forced marches had put immense distance between the soldier and home. The German infantryman had covered 1,000 to 2,000 kilometers in the eastern campaign in 1942. He was aware of the vastness and desolation of the area and the poor roads and traffic system of this remote land. Moreover, the g r e a t hardships involved
had exhausted him. The soldier, the good ones included, sometimes asked himself: How am I ever to go home again safely with distances like that? It took soldierly qualities and a great deal of toughness to endure. An old experienced German officer wrote in this regard:
From my long military life, rich in experiences, I can tell you--at leaat with a view to our soldiers-that the fighting power and value ofa soldier decreases as the distance from the
homeland increases.
Final Comments.
In summarizing one may eay that in World War II the-disproportion between men and space on the Ger man side had an extremely adverse effect on the conduct of war. It was
once again confirmed that men and space in war must be in a proper ratio. This problem also exerted itself in the Korean War and in other wars or warlike actions.
No one knows if the men and space factor wiIi be of euch significance in future wars because each war is different f r o m its predecessor. This holds especially true in an era such as ours. One important invention follows hot on the heels of the other. Airpower
is d e v e 10 p e d to near perfection. Rocket, nuclear, and outer space problems are approaching their solutions. The question cannot yet be answered satisfactorily because two contrary opinions are apparently still struggling for recognition. One holds that in a future war the specific men-to-space ratio can be ignored because technical developments negate their influence, The other opinion contends: Ultimately, men must be there to seize an area, to occupy and hold it Consequently, the significance of the ratio of men to space is as valid now as ever. At this time one cannot judge whit opinion will prevail or which opinion will prove to be correct in a future war. This presentation is only intended to present G e r m a n findings from World War II. It does not presume to give lessons for the future; how ever, it should provoke reflection on the problem of “men and space’” for the present and for an uncertain future.
This article was translated and
digested from the original, published
in WEHRKUNDE (Federal
Republic of Germany) November
1961, under the title, “Mensch
und Raum im Kriege. ”
Kurt Zeit.zler s e r v e d in the
German Army in World Wars I
and II. In 1941 he was chief of
staff of the Ist Panzer Army in
Russia and in 1942 was appointed
chief of the German General Staff
---a position which he held until
1944. He is the author of “Withdrawals
of the German Army on
the Eastern Front in the August
1960 issue of the MILITARY REVIEW.
Regards.
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.
On Jul 27 1942, after some rest the 125 ID moved on through the “Caucasus Gate” Rostow-Bataisk. This very day the unit grasped the towns of Ogpu and Lenina, then marched through the burning and dusty steppe in the North Caucasus. The 125 ID was within the Army Group “A”’s framework (Generaloberst List) with the 17 AOK (General Ruoff) in the V AK (General Wetzel) with the 198 ID on its left and the 73 ID on its right.
On Jul 28 1942 by nightfall, Krasnaja Slobodka was reached and seized. From Aug 02 1942, onwards the new neighbour on the right was the 9 ID.
On Aug 12 a meeting was held between all the units’ Ia (Ops Offrs) in order to co-ordinate the advance of the four divisions belonging to the V AK to the Caucasus. According to the order issued on Aug 13 the divisions should attack across the Kuban as follows:
73 ID from the west of Jelisawetinskaja to Sewerskaja.
9 ID from the east of the rail bridge of Krasnodar to Tochtamukaj.
125 ID from the north of Tljustenchablij to Schendskij.
198 ID from the south of Lenina to Wotschepschij.
On Aug 14, at dawn the men of the I./ IR 421 took up their readiness positions and by 04:30 hours, after a softening barrage the assault boats carried the first wave of 36 men to the opposite bank, which in that place was located 250 meters away. At the Division’s CP, the Corps Commander and the CoS of the 17 AOK followed the IR 421’s assault. Around 19:30 hours, Oberst Reinhard reported that the bridgehead was secured; it costed 18 KIA and 44 WIA. The other Corps’s divisions also got across the Kuban river with success so the V AK’s crossing stretched out over 40 kilometers.
On Aug 20 a Corps’ order reached the 125 ID: stop the advance at once. At mid morning the V AK’s CoS informed the 125 ID’s Commanding Officer that the division had a new task so the O1, Oberleutnant Prinz was detached to the Corps’ CP; the task was the following: march to the west and attack on Noworossisk.
Sources: Del Caucaso a Leningrado. Coronel Marini. Círculo Militar
"Das Wiesel - Geschichte der 125. Inf.Div". Breymeyer.
Cheers. Raúl M .
Attachments
rostovjul1942773ps8bg7.jpg (97.36 KiB) Viewed 12351 times
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.
Hello to all ; more follows............................
Towards the City.
At that time the 125 ID's strengh was as follows: 299 Officers; 87 Officials; 2048 NCOs and 12192 Enlisted men; also 5270 horses and 1800 horse drawn vehicles. During its advance from the Mius, the division had had the following casualties: 99 Officers, 336 NCOs and 1862 Enlisted men.
On Aug 29 1942, fighting against one strong resistence the regiments went on reaching a security line within the wooded land before Natuchajewskaja; from there the German could see for the first time the Black Sea coast. According to the legend Oberst Friebe radioed the words “Thalatta, Thalatta” (the sea, the sea).
On Augh 30 1942, both regiments had reached the last heights before the town of Natuchajewskaja, after that the ground rolled down towards the city and port of Anapa some 20 kilometers away. The II./ AR 125 reinforced with one heavy battery took up positions and one recce patrol (I./ IR 419) was detached to the village but found it free of enemy, at 17:00 hours the town was seized without fight; the IR 421 occupied the north part and the IR 419 the south part. At once more recce patrols were sent towards Krasn. Medwedowskaja located 6 kilometers away to south which was found strongly occupied by the enemy.
On Aug 31 1942, at 15:00 hours the IR 419 attacked towards Krasn. Medwedowskaja coming from the wooded land located some 3 kilometers to the north of the town with its III. Battalion to the right and the I. Battalion to the left the riflemen was escorted by three assault guns belongng to the 249 Stug Abt. At 15:45 hours the battalions broke into the town and by 18:00 hours it was in german hands. With this attack the division had turned 90º towards the south, proceeding to its new objective: Noworossisk.
This very day, the 3º Army (Romanian) took Anapa thus surrounding part of the Soviet 47 Army within the Taman's Peninsula and on Sep 01 1942, German and Romanian troops got across the Kertsch strait moving ahead along the Peninsula of Taman coming from the west.
Sources: Del Caucaso a Leningrado. Coronel Marini. Círculo Militar
"Das Wiesel - Geschichte der 125. Inf.Div". Breymeyer.
Cheers. Raúl M .
Attachments
The 17 AOK's adance to the Caucasus mountains range
wikingcaucasoky6em0.jpg (164.5 KiB) Viewed 12243 times
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.
If you can read in Russian, on caucasus (in area Novorossisk) you can receive some information on military actions from here. Defence of Novorossisk (major Kunikov and 2nd separate battalion of marines)
In the course of searches of materials for the requirements I having found out in TsAMO (in fund 500 - fund of trophy documents) reports of German antiaircraft battalions, regiments and korps from June, 1st on November, 25th, 1942 (a huge pack of documents) Among them are daily reports antiaircraft units about position of land formations (infantry, tank and a cavalry) divisions, battle groups, regiments and battalions (German, Romanian, Italian, Slovak and, so-called, east trops).
Very much and very interesting documents, a part of the information from which I used at the situation description in area Novorossisk on the beginnings of September, 1942.
I hope it to you will help.
Hello to all ; more follows............................
Towards the City - Last obstacles.
On Sep 01 1942 at 08:45 hours, the I./IR 419 (Hauptmann Wildschütz) seized the height 116 while the III./ IR 419 did the same with height 106; ahead and 2,5 kilometers away stood out the Point 198,9 known as Heigh of “Gudsewo”. That hill should be taken this very day and the battalion went on with its 2. Company in the lead reinforced with three assault guns and the support furnished by three heavy batteries; the enemy position was rolled in spite of two assault guns were lost. From there the German had got an amazing view of the Zemeskaja Bay, the city and the port.
On Sep 02 1942, the enemy counterattacked twice at 08:30 hours and at 09:15 hours but without success. Shortly afterwards the german artillery was hit by heavy shells, the fire being directed from hill “Seregaj”. That height was finally seized by the III./ IR 419 on Sep 03 1942; by noon the II./ IR 419 had relieved the III./ IR 419 at “Seregaj” so it could proceed towards south.
On Sep 04 1942, the villages of Wassilijewka and Glebowka were conquered hence that day the II. and III. Battalions took up an all-round position at Glebowka.
On Sep 05 1942, the IR 421 with the support furnished by the assault guns seized the last bulwark before the city, the wooded land outside of Borissowka and then the Radfahr Abteilung pressed on against the road leading to Wladimirowka.
Sources: Del Caucaso a Leningrado. Coronel Marini. Círculo Militar
"Das Wiesel - Geschichte der 125. Inf.Div". Breymeyer.
Cheers. Raúl M .
Attachments
img1516ql0ck4.jpg (80.46 KiB) Viewed 11967 times
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.
)
