German operational mobility in WW II.
Posted: Sat Jul 05, 2008 5:36 am
Hello to all people ; here goes this article on that subject for those who may be interested....
German operational mobility in WW II.
World War II witnessed the armored spearheads of the German Wehrmacht slash through the numerically superior armies of Europe with r elative ease and speed. It was a new application of a classic military theory -- Napoleon's concept of marching separately and striking together. This rapid, elastic concentration of forces in time and space was the lightning ' warfare known as Blitzkrieg. [33] (See enclosure 1, the Blitz Transport Plan] The doctrine of Blitzkrieg emphasized the indirect approach, capitalizing on the ability of armored forces t o concentrate quickly and strike hard where least expected. [34] As an operational concept it gave the Wehrmacht the ability to fight outnumbered and win. [35].
Writing after the war, General von Senger und Etterlin considered that German corps and divisional size units fought at the operational level of war. He stated, "German operational mobility at divisional and corps level led not only t o the victories of the Blitzkrieg but likewise to the German Army's success in keeping the superior Soviet Army off German soil for nearly four years." [37].
At the operational level, the Wehrmacht was organized into army groups, armies, corps, and divisions. Divisions were the largest units in the German Army which had a prescribed organization. [38]. Considering the combat power demonstrated by these divisions, the assertion they were an operational level force may not be unreasonable. Colonel Trevor N. Dupuy found that throughout World War II, the German ground forces regularly inflicted casualties at a 50% higher rate than the opposing British and American units and at a 300% higher rate then the opposing Russian units. He determined that one German division was a match for at least three Russian divisions of comparable size and firepower. [39].
The German Army firmly established its doctrine for operational maneuver in World War II. This doctrine "avoided giving detailed directions and confined itself to conventional principles-which applied to all arms and services." [40] Command responsibilities were satisfied by issuing broad directives which gave freedom of action to subordinate commanders. Emphasis was placed on command-leadership and not control-management. [41] The movement directives issued by higher commanders were broad in scope and included order of march and traffic control measures.
Overall responsibility for the control of marches and the regulation of traffic rested with the commander. He generally marched near the head of the main body and organized the march column for security purposes by dividing it into an advance guard (Vorhut), main body (Gros), and rear guard (Nachut). On the march, each front-line division, whether motorized or armored, was given either an all-weather road or a designated sector of advance. When a German corps or division was engaged in combat, it was almost always reinforced by units from its General Headquarters. When a General Headquarters or other unit was to use the same route at the same time as a particular division, they were subordinated to the division which controlled the route for the duration of the move. [42] The only exception to this was when the terrain included forests or swamps. Then the senior command would not allow its non-divisional units to move forward until the last elements of the division had cleared a predesignated phase line. The units would then proceed i n close formation strictly observing road intervals between vehicles and their assigned rate of march. [43].
Source: THE COMBAT SUPPORT ROLE IN OPERATIONAL MOVEMENTS: ANOTHER STEP IN LEARNING THE ART OF OPERATIONAL MANEUVER. A Monograph by Major Daniel G. Karis Military Police. School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Second Term 88-89.
More follows. Cheers. Raúl M .
German operational mobility in WW II.
World War II witnessed the armored spearheads of the German Wehrmacht slash through the numerically superior armies of Europe with r elative ease and speed. It was a new application of a classic military theory -- Napoleon's concept of marching separately and striking together. This rapid, elastic concentration of forces in time and space was the lightning ' warfare known as Blitzkrieg. [33] (See enclosure 1, the Blitz Transport Plan] The doctrine of Blitzkrieg emphasized the indirect approach, capitalizing on the ability of armored forces t o concentrate quickly and strike hard where least expected. [34] As an operational concept it gave the Wehrmacht the ability to fight outnumbered and win. [35].
Writing after the war, General von Senger und Etterlin considered that German corps and divisional size units fought at the operational level of war. He stated, "German operational mobility at divisional and corps level led not only t o the victories of the Blitzkrieg but likewise to the German Army's success in keeping the superior Soviet Army off German soil for nearly four years." [37].
At the operational level, the Wehrmacht was organized into army groups, armies, corps, and divisions. Divisions were the largest units in the German Army which had a prescribed organization. [38]. Considering the combat power demonstrated by these divisions, the assertion they were an operational level force may not be unreasonable. Colonel Trevor N. Dupuy found that throughout World War II, the German ground forces regularly inflicted casualties at a 50% higher rate than the opposing British and American units and at a 300% higher rate then the opposing Russian units. He determined that one German division was a match for at least three Russian divisions of comparable size and firepower. [39].
The German Army firmly established its doctrine for operational maneuver in World War II. This doctrine "avoided giving detailed directions and confined itself to conventional principles-which applied to all arms and services." [40] Command responsibilities were satisfied by issuing broad directives which gave freedom of action to subordinate commanders. Emphasis was placed on command-leadership and not control-management. [41] The movement directives issued by higher commanders were broad in scope and included order of march and traffic control measures.
Overall responsibility for the control of marches and the regulation of traffic rested with the commander. He generally marched near the head of the main body and organized the march column for security purposes by dividing it into an advance guard (Vorhut), main body (Gros), and rear guard (Nachut). On the march, each front-line division, whether motorized or armored, was given either an all-weather road or a designated sector of advance. When a German corps or division was engaged in combat, it was almost always reinforced by units from its General Headquarters. When a General Headquarters or other unit was to use the same route at the same time as a particular division, they were subordinated to the division which controlled the route for the duration of the move. [42] The only exception to this was when the terrain included forests or swamps. Then the senior command would not allow its non-divisional units to move forward until the last elements of the division had cleared a predesignated phase line. The units would then proceed i n close formation strictly observing road intervals between vehicles and their assigned rate of march. [43].
Source: THE COMBAT SUPPORT ROLE IN OPERATIONAL MOVEMENTS: ANOTHER STEP IN LEARNING THE ART OF OPERATIONAL MANEUVER. A Monograph by Major Daniel G. Karis Military Police. School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Second Term 88-89.
More follows. Cheers. Raúl M .