This is one of the issues Dieppe suffered from. The Royal Navy was unprepared to risk capital ships in the channel. That is sometimes seen in the literature as an "inter-service rivalry" issue and intransigence on the RN's part. That is unfair -- I come back to my remarks in an earlier post about the need to remember the strategic situation in 1942.Where was the naval gunfire support?
Germany was still triumphant, and the British Isles weak. The invasion threat of late 1940 was certainly over, and while the Battle of Britain was also won, the air situation overall could best be described as "air parity." Most of the combat effective British Army had been sent to North Africa (a gutsy move on Churchill's part). In other words, the only thing keeping the Third Reich out of the British Isles was the German inability to get across the channel. Thus, the RN's command of the sea COULD NOT BE RISKED.
Yes -- unstintingly. This is probably the most fogotten aspect of the battle. In fact, the air fighting over Dieppe that day was the largest air battle in the West after the Battle of Britain.Did the RAF give cover and close support to the beachhead?
This has been widely believed for years. The most recent scholarship has established that in fact this was not the case. While there was skirmishing in the channel this did not tip off the local German Army commanders. For an excellent examination of this, see a recent article in the Autumn 2003 edition of the Canadian Military Journal by noted Canadian military historian Ben Greenhous:Also, from what I gather, the raid was a botch before the force had even landed, since German ships had spotted the raiders at sea.
http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/engraph ... tory_e.pdf