Hello to all, a little more about the 2./ Pi 505.....
The Company Commander drove ahead in order to designate the points at which ferries were to be constructed and to check the reconnaissance reports. - Motorcycle messengers were posted at all forks in the road as guides for the pontoon vehicles.
Considering that the reconnaissance had to be conducted under the fire of hostile machine guns concealed in bunkers, it was extremely successful. There was a perfectly level meadow with firm, dry soil and a good river bank, the conditions were favorable for ferry construction. The only objection was the lack of cover. The danger remained that the enemy might discover the presence of the many large vehicles and cover them with artillery fire.
Nevertheless, the designated vehicles arrived as early as 5:30 PM. We could plainly see the infantry crossing the river on their pneumatic rafts near Sedan. Our vehicles sped up. No long orders were required. The engineers jumped off their vehicles, uncoupled the ponton trailer, and immediately set to constructing ferries. It was astonishing with what ease the heavy bridge was put in place. A diving attack by hostile aircraft drove everybody under what little cover there was. Our nine light machine guns, kept firing at the hostile planes as fast as the guns would permit. The bombs struck the ground far from us. The bridge construction went on without a letup. Now hostile artillery fire was added. Our antiaircraft defense, which had been reinforced in the meantime, drove off a hostile observation plane, apparently, the French were under the impression that we were building a bridge in a different location. Perhaps the hostile airplane got on the beam of our radio station which was operating some distance from us. The shells came within 50 yards of our location, striking the ground in our front and rear as well as on both flanks. We were completely boxed in by the barrage. Two hostile batteries, determined to wipe us out, were plainly visible. Fortunately, as subsequent investigation showed, the village of Glaire, with its gardens, on the other bank of the Meuse prohibited any observed fire. In the record time of 38 minutes, the first 17-ton ferry and its motor tug were ready for operation.
Source: Building a Bridge across the Meuse West of Sedan for the Crossing of an Armored Division.
[From an article by Lieutenant Grubnau, German. Army, in Military Wochemblatt, 3 January 1941. Translated from the German in the Translation Section, the Army War College, Washington, D. C.]
Condensed by COLONEL F. M. BARROWS, Field Artillery.
More follows. Regards. Tigre.
Pioniers im Kampf 1939 - 1940
Moderator: sniper1shot
2./ Pi Btl 505 - May 1940.
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.
2./ Pi Btl 505 - May 1940.
Hello gents, a bit more.....
Other vehicles with bridge equipage followed. The 2d Bridge Company, 505th Engineer Battalion, and the Bridge Company of the 37th Engineer Battalion were ordered up by radio. Another company each of the 505th and 37th Engineer Battalions moved up to help bridging the more than 230 feet of water.
Meanwhile the first ferry was in operation, carrying across the river a steady flow of guns, armored cars, tanks, antiaircraft machine guns, and trucks. About an hour later, the Company had completed its second ferry.
The two ferries were coupled together; this served greatly to speed the process of ferrying materiel across the river (every single minute lost in crossing the river being a loss of miles in the offensive and advance). Some distance upstream, troops were still engaged in crossing the river by pneumatic rafts.
The abutment sections, one span each, were now put into place. The steep bank on the near side of the river made it necessary to support the spans by rails placed on top of them. Trestle spans were not used, because of the experience gained at a nearby bridge where the trestles had lost their footing, and time-consuming repairs were required, which caused a delay in the transfer of the troops.
Source: Building a Bridge across the Meuse West of Sedan for the Crossing of an Armored Division.
[From an article by Lieutenant Grubnau, German. Army, in Military Wochemblatt, 3 January 1941. Translated from the German in the Translation Section, the Army War College, Washington, D. C.]
Condensed by COLONEL F. M. BARROWS, Field Artillery.
the last part follows ASAP. Regards. Tigre.
Other vehicles with bridge equipage followed. The 2d Bridge Company, 505th Engineer Battalion, and the Bridge Company of the 37th Engineer Battalion were ordered up by radio. Another company each of the 505th and 37th Engineer Battalions moved up to help bridging the more than 230 feet of water.
Meanwhile the first ferry was in operation, carrying across the river a steady flow of guns, armored cars, tanks, antiaircraft machine guns, and trucks. About an hour later, the Company had completed its second ferry.
The two ferries were coupled together; this served greatly to speed the process of ferrying materiel across the river (every single minute lost in crossing the river being a loss of miles in the offensive and advance). Some distance upstream, troops were still engaged in crossing the river by pneumatic rafts.
The abutment sections, one span each, were now put into place. The steep bank on the near side of the river made it necessary to support the spans by rails placed on top of them. Trestle spans were not used, because of the experience gained at a nearby bridge where the trestles had lost their footing, and time-consuming repairs were required, which caused a delay in the transfer of the troops.
Source: Building a Bridge across the Meuse West of Sedan for the Crossing of an Armored Division.
[From an article by Lieutenant Grubnau, German. Army, in Military Wochemblatt, 3 January 1941. Translated from the German in the Translation Section, the Army War College, Washington, D. C.]
Condensed by COLONEL F. M. BARROWS, Field Artillery.
the last part follows ASAP. Regards. Tigre.
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.
2./ Pi Btl 505 - May 1940.
Hello folks, the story's last part....
By 11:30 PM-it was quite dark by that tin-several coupled ferries were moved into place by means of tugs. The bridge was completed shortly after midnight, There was an immediate rush of traffic for the bridge. The road was so crowded that two-way traffic was impossible. Casualties from the front had to be taken to our battalion collecting station in the cloth factory near the bridge. In addition to the many German casualties, there were 200 wounded of the enemy who needed care. Removal of the wounded to the rear was out of the question for the time being.
Column upon column now moved across the river in close order. A pontoon foot bridge was erected farther upstream and used for the crossing of motorcycle elements. Every minute had to be exploited. For the time being, the Battalion Commander, himself, took charge of handling the traffic at the bridge, urging the stream of traffic to move on and taking drastic steps at any sign of delay. The bridge was used not only by our own division. Our bridge being completed much earlier than those of the adjoining divisions, some of the neighboring elements moved over and squeezed into the line passing over our bridge.
The Company remained at that place for several days, taking advantage of the time to move up auxiliary material and joining the other two companies of the Battalion in preparing for the construction of a 20-ton bridge. A bridge construction company took over the job of erecting the bridge. A platoon of our company placed a 6-ton ferry just below the bridge to take care of less important traffic moving in the opposite direction.
The 20.mm antiaircraft guns protecting the bridge were most successful and drove back nearly all hostile aircraft with losses. Not a single bomb scored a hit on the bridge or struck anywhere near it.
The 20-ton bridge was completed by May 18, 1940. The Battalion immediately proceeded to remove its 16.ton military bridge and moved on to new and difficult assignments.
Source: Building a Bridge across the Meuse West of Sedan for the Crossing of an Armored Division.
[From an article by Lieutenant Grubnau, German. Army, in Military Wochemblatt, 3 January 1941. Translated from the German in the Translation Section, the Army War College, Washington, D. C.]
Condensed by COLONEL F. M. BARROWS, Field Artillery.
Its all. See you. All the best. Tigre.
By 11:30 PM-it was quite dark by that tin-several coupled ferries were moved into place by means of tugs. The bridge was completed shortly after midnight, There was an immediate rush of traffic for the bridge. The road was so crowded that two-way traffic was impossible. Casualties from the front had to be taken to our battalion collecting station in the cloth factory near the bridge. In addition to the many German casualties, there were 200 wounded of the enemy who needed care. Removal of the wounded to the rear was out of the question for the time being.
Column upon column now moved across the river in close order. A pontoon foot bridge was erected farther upstream and used for the crossing of motorcycle elements. Every minute had to be exploited. For the time being, the Battalion Commander, himself, took charge of handling the traffic at the bridge, urging the stream of traffic to move on and taking drastic steps at any sign of delay. The bridge was used not only by our own division. Our bridge being completed much earlier than those of the adjoining divisions, some of the neighboring elements moved over and squeezed into the line passing over our bridge.
The Company remained at that place for several days, taking advantage of the time to move up auxiliary material and joining the other two companies of the Battalion in preparing for the construction of a 20-ton bridge. A bridge construction company took over the job of erecting the bridge. A platoon of our company placed a 6-ton ferry just below the bridge to take care of less important traffic moving in the opposite direction.
The 20.mm antiaircraft guns protecting the bridge were most successful and drove back nearly all hostile aircraft with losses. Not a single bomb scored a hit on the bridge or struck anywhere near it.
The 20-ton bridge was completed by May 18, 1940. The Battalion immediately proceeded to remove its 16.ton military bridge and moved on to new and difficult assignments.
Source: Building a Bridge across the Meuse West of Sedan for the Crossing of an Armored Division.
[From an article by Lieutenant Grubnau, German. Army, in Military Wochemblatt, 3 January 1941. Translated from the German in the Translation Section, the Army War College, Washington, D. C.]
Condensed by COLONEL F. M. BARROWS, Field Artillery.
Its all. See you. All the best. Tigre.
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.
-
John Kilmartin
- Contributor
- Posts: 297
- Joined: Wed Oct 29, 2003 3:50 pm
- Location: Regina, Saskatchewan
Re: Pioniers im Kampf 1939 - 1940
Hello to all 
; after a while more about the sappers.............
Geb Pi Btl 54 Mittenwald. “Wir tragen stolz das Edelweiss”.
Carrying out field training excercises also.
Source: 24. Gebirgsjaeger Photo Album - 1 Gebirgs Div. Historical Media, LLC
Cheers. Raúl M
.
; after a while more about the sappers.............Geb Pi Btl 54 Mittenwald. “Wir tragen stolz das Edelweiss”.
Carrying out field training excercises also.
Source: 24. Gebirgsjaeger Photo Album - 1 Gebirgs Div. Historical Media, LLC
Cheers. Raúl M
.- Attachments
-
- "We proudly wear the Edelweiss"
- image002.jpg (16.58 KiB) Viewed 8610 times
-
- On the move to the training camp………………
- image004.jpg (40.61 KiB) Viewed 8610 times
-
- fighting with the mule………………..
- image006.jpg (27.94 KiB) Viewed 8610 times
Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.
Re: Pioniers im Kampf 1939 - 1940
Assault on Fort "Legionow":
Fort "Legionow" located in the southern part of Warsaw suburbs, until the war of 1939 was used by Poles as ammunition storage. Around the fort several lines of barbed wire obstacles were prepared.
The assault on the fort started at 12:00 on 25 September. German forces participating in it consisted of one infantry battalion and attached II. platoon of 2. company of 62. engineer battalion.
Platoon of engineers formed 3 squads with explosives which were ordered to, with use of explosives, create 3 passages through the barbed wire obstacle.
Platoon of engineers was attacking in the center, between the 1st and 2nd companies of the infantry battalion. Under cover of artillery barrage, paralyzing the garrison of the fort, engineers managed - but under casualties - to quickly approach to the distance of 200 m from the obstacle. After charges exploded, fire from the fort intensified - four heavy machine guns were firing.
Actions of squads with explosives were covered by light machine guns of engineers; only entering into action of heavy machine guns of the infantry battalion weakened the Polish fire. That moment of interruption in Polish fire was utilized by the engineers, who across passages created in the obstacle approached to the walls of the fort's barracks. With use of hand grenades and flamethrowers remnants of the defenders were liquidated.
Assault on Fort II:
To Fort II, which together with other Forts defended the approaches to Warsaw from the north and north-west, Germans approached on 25 September 1939.
German reconnaissance reported that in front of the Fort Poles made shooting trenches and two lines of barbed wire obstacles, about 7 meters distant from each other. Barracks of the fort were surrounded by a water moat, behind which was a ground rampart.
The assault on this fort was to be carried out by 2. and 10. companies of one of infantry regiments and II. platoon of 2. company of 48. engineer battalion.
At down on 26 September the Fort was surrounded by Germans from three sides: from the south, east and west. At 4:30, under cover of darkness, a platoon of engineers with ladders, flamethrowers and prepared explosive charges in dispersion came close to the barbed wire obstacle near the south-western part of the Fort. Engineers sent forward with shears made passages across both lines of the obstacle, across which the approaching platoon of the 2nd infantry company, after order of the engineer platoon's commander, started to come closer to the Fort. However, when the platoon was passing the second line of barbed wire obstacles, Polish defenders opened heavy fire from rifles and machine guns. The platoon started to suffer heavy losses and was forced to retreat to initial positions.
Commander of the platoon of engineers decided to resume the attack from the jugular part of the Fort, where, according to possesed information, there was a bridge passed across the moat. Under cover of rifle and machine gun fire of the 3rd squad, the remaining two squads of the platoon of engineers attacked across the barbed wire obstacle, coming close to the rear part of the Fort, but were halted by fire of the defenders. Engineers responded to the fire of Polish defenders by throwing hand grenades.
Taking advantage of the fact that defenders of the Fort were involved in fire fight against the engineers and 2. infantry company, 10. infantry company managed to imperceptibly break through to the barracks from the eastern side. Further resistance of the crew was broken.
From the 120 men of the garrison of the Fort, 80 were taken prisoner.
Assault on Fort "Dabrowski":
Fort "Dabrowski" was located in the southern sector of old Warsaw's fortifications, near the road from Wilanow to Warsaw.
On 25 September 1939 Infanterie-Regiment.10 of German forces attacking from the south along the road Wilanow - Warsaw, reached the line of Warsaw Forts and could not advance further because of Polish resistance.
Inf.Rgt.10 with attached Pioneer-Bataillon.88 was ordered to capture Fort "Dabrowski" in the morning on 26 September. As the result of engineering reconnaissance, carried out by the commander of 3. company of Pi.Btl.88, it became clear that the Fort was surrounded by water moat about 20 - 30 meters wide, banks of the moat - steep. From the south-eastern side there was a wooden bridge across the moat. In the northern, jugular part of the Fort, there was another, but very old, wooden bridge.
The German plan assumed an attack on the Fort from three sides: I. battalion of IR.10 with 2. company of Pi.Btl.88 should attack from the south-west and from the north, II. battalion of this regiment with 3./Pi.Btl.88 from the south and south-east. 1. company of IR.10 should approach the Fort from the northern side and 3. company of this regiment from the south-western side of the old wooden bridge. The moat was planned to be crossed with use of pontoons. The start of the attack was established at 5:00 AM on 26 September.
At 2:00 in the night, from 25 to 26 September, 2. company of Pi.Btl.88 arrived at the road junction to the north-west from Wilanow. Commander of the 2. company divided his forces in the following way:
III. platoon of engineers was attached to 1. infantry company with task of joint attack on the Fort from the north across the wooden bridge.
I. platoon with 5 pontoons was attached to 3. infantry company. The platoon was ordered to secure the moat crossing for the 3. company and half of the platoon of heavy machine guns across the south-western section of the moat.
II. platoon was kept in reserve and was ordered to advance together with the HQ of the I. infantry battalion.
At down all three units occupied their starting positions to the attack.
An attempt, made by I. platoon, consisted of breaking through to the courtyard of the Fort across the bridge, under cover of heavy machine guns and light mortars fire. An assault group, which penetrated into the bridge, was almost completely wiped out by Polish fire. Also the second attempt did not succeed.
Along the section of 3. company situation was developing in a way more favorable for the Germans. Under cover of an orchard, the company managed to approach to the nearbyhood of the water moat and to pull pontoons with them. On the roofs of residential buildings, adjacent to the Fort, Germans placed machine guns. In the orchards Germans placed heavy and light mortars. After the first boat launched on the water was riddled by fire of Polish machine guns, wherein several engineers were wounded or killed, commander of the I. platoon of 2. infantry company decided to cross the moat along the south-western section, on the left wing of 3. infantry company. Movement under the cover of orchards was carried out without problems.
Along this sections engineers initially managed to pass three infantry squads across the moat, and later, very rapidly, entire 3. infantry company and part of the 4. company of heavy machine guns. During the further attack along the rampart of the Fort Germans suffered heavy losses: they were under fire not only from the barracks of the Fort, but also from houses adjacent to the Fort.
Until 7:30 AM Germans managed to seize the rampart of the Fort, but major part of the Polish garrison, which was in the barracks, continued to resist.
II. battalion of Inf.Rgt.10, occupying handy positions 700 meters from the bridge near the road to Powsinek, since the beginning of the assault encountered heavy resistance of the Poles: a machine gun nest, prepared by them in front of the bridge across Vistula, was covering with fire the road to Wilanow. Attacking in front of the II. battalion, II. and III. platoons of 3. company of engineers, using grenades, were supporting the infantry. Only at 9:00 AM when the Polish machine gun nest on the bridge was destroyed, assault groups from the III. platoon of engineers crossed the bridge and joined to the 2. company of engineers, which was overcoming the resistance of Poles defending the barracks.
So until 9:00 AM Germans cleaned from the defenders the southern part of Fort's rampart. The seizure of the entire Fort was impossible due to fire carried out from casemates of the central barracks and from nearby houses.
Concluding that attacking the barracks from the north would cost the Germans lots of casualties, commander of Pioneer-Bataillon 88. ordered the commander of II. platoon to blow up the barracks, starting the preparations to blow them up from the exposed wall and the outer part of the brick ceiling.
Blowing up the coverage of the barracks was judged as pointless because the high layer of ground and thick layer of stone cover were a good protection from the impact of explosion.
The attempt of blowing up the western facade of the barracks with use of 30 kg of explosives failed. The wall cracked, but was not pierced. With another explosion of 100 kg charge Germans managed to make a breach of about 1 meter diameter in the wall. Further two similar charges were planted, 50 meters from each other, but Poles continued to resist, trying to prevent further German explosive works with use of hand grenades.
Germans were throwing hand grenades, using flamethrowers against wells of ventilation and breaches appearing after explosions of charges, they were also throwing smoke candles into them.
At 11:00 AM commander of Inf.Rgt.10 ordered to withdraw all infantry units from the area of the Fort, leaving only one company of heavy machine guns and one platoon of infantry support weapons to provide cover for the engineers. At the same time he ordered the commander of Pioneer-Bataillon 88. to blow up the Fort.
At 12:00 garrison of the Fort capitulated. 475 men, including 15 officers, were captured.
============================================================
So as can be seen while attacking forts, apart from huge superiority in military technology, Germans had also fourfold superiority in manpower and in case of Fort "Dabrowski" no smaller than sixfold.
Descriptions of combats for these three forts in Warsaw can be found in:
1) "Vierteljahreshefte fur Pioniere" No 1/1940 (Fort "Dabrowski")
2) "Pioniere im Kampf" by Obstl. Liere (Fort "Legionow" and Fort II)
3) "Deutscher Siegzug in Polen" by gen. Ernst Kabisch (Fort "Legionow" and Fort II)
Fort "Legionow" located in the southern part of Warsaw suburbs, until the war of 1939 was used by Poles as ammunition storage. Around the fort several lines of barbed wire obstacles were prepared.
The assault on the fort started at 12:00 on 25 September. German forces participating in it consisted of one infantry battalion and attached II. platoon of 2. company of 62. engineer battalion.
Platoon of engineers formed 3 squads with explosives which were ordered to, with use of explosives, create 3 passages through the barbed wire obstacle.
Platoon of engineers was attacking in the center, between the 1st and 2nd companies of the infantry battalion. Under cover of artillery barrage, paralyzing the garrison of the fort, engineers managed - but under casualties - to quickly approach to the distance of 200 m from the obstacle. After charges exploded, fire from the fort intensified - four heavy machine guns were firing.
Actions of squads with explosives were covered by light machine guns of engineers; only entering into action of heavy machine guns of the infantry battalion weakened the Polish fire. That moment of interruption in Polish fire was utilized by the engineers, who across passages created in the obstacle approached to the walls of the fort's barracks. With use of hand grenades and flamethrowers remnants of the defenders were liquidated.
Assault on Fort II:
To Fort II, which together with other Forts defended the approaches to Warsaw from the north and north-west, Germans approached on 25 September 1939.
German reconnaissance reported that in front of the Fort Poles made shooting trenches and two lines of barbed wire obstacles, about 7 meters distant from each other. Barracks of the fort were surrounded by a water moat, behind which was a ground rampart.
The assault on this fort was to be carried out by 2. and 10. companies of one of infantry regiments and II. platoon of 2. company of 48. engineer battalion.
At down on 26 September the Fort was surrounded by Germans from three sides: from the south, east and west. At 4:30, under cover of darkness, a platoon of engineers with ladders, flamethrowers and prepared explosive charges in dispersion came close to the barbed wire obstacle near the south-western part of the Fort. Engineers sent forward with shears made passages across both lines of the obstacle, across which the approaching platoon of the 2nd infantry company, after order of the engineer platoon's commander, started to come closer to the Fort. However, when the platoon was passing the second line of barbed wire obstacles, Polish defenders opened heavy fire from rifles and machine guns. The platoon started to suffer heavy losses and was forced to retreat to initial positions.
Commander of the platoon of engineers decided to resume the attack from the jugular part of the Fort, where, according to possesed information, there was a bridge passed across the moat. Under cover of rifle and machine gun fire of the 3rd squad, the remaining two squads of the platoon of engineers attacked across the barbed wire obstacle, coming close to the rear part of the Fort, but were halted by fire of the defenders. Engineers responded to the fire of Polish defenders by throwing hand grenades.
Taking advantage of the fact that defenders of the Fort were involved in fire fight against the engineers and 2. infantry company, 10. infantry company managed to imperceptibly break through to the barracks from the eastern side. Further resistance of the crew was broken.
From the 120 men of the garrison of the Fort, 80 were taken prisoner.
Assault on Fort "Dabrowski":
Fort "Dabrowski" was located in the southern sector of old Warsaw's fortifications, near the road from Wilanow to Warsaw.
On 25 September 1939 Infanterie-Regiment.10 of German forces attacking from the south along the road Wilanow - Warsaw, reached the line of Warsaw Forts and could not advance further because of Polish resistance.
Inf.Rgt.10 with attached Pioneer-Bataillon.88 was ordered to capture Fort "Dabrowski" in the morning on 26 September. As the result of engineering reconnaissance, carried out by the commander of 3. company of Pi.Btl.88, it became clear that the Fort was surrounded by water moat about 20 - 30 meters wide, banks of the moat - steep. From the south-eastern side there was a wooden bridge across the moat. In the northern, jugular part of the Fort, there was another, but very old, wooden bridge.
The German plan assumed an attack on the Fort from three sides: I. battalion of IR.10 with 2. company of Pi.Btl.88 should attack from the south-west and from the north, II. battalion of this regiment with 3./Pi.Btl.88 from the south and south-east. 1. company of IR.10 should approach the Fort from the northern side and 3. company of this regiment from the south-western side of the old wooden bridge. The moat was planned to be crossed with use of pontoons. The start of the attack was established at 5:00 AM on 26 September.
At 2:00 in the night, from 25 to 26 September, 2. company of Pi.Btl.88 arrived at the road junction to the north-west from Wilanow. Commander of the 2. company divided his forces in the following way:
III. platoon of engineers was attached to 1. infantry company with task of joint attack on the Fort from the north across the wooden bridge.
I. platoon with 5 pontoons was attached to 3. infantry company. The platoon was ordered to secure the moat crossing for the 3. company and half of the platoon of heavy machine guns across the south-western section of the moat.
II. platoon was kept in reserve and was ordered to advance together with the HQ of the I. infantry battalion.
At down all three units occupied their starting positions to the attack.
An attempt, made by I. platoon, consisted of breaking through to the courtyard of the Fort across the bridge, under cover of heavy machine guns and light mortars fire. An assault group, which penetrated into the bridge, was almost completely wiped out by Polish fire. Also the second attempt did not succeed.
Along the section of 3. company situation was developing in a way more favorable for the Germans. Under cover of an orchard, the company managed to approach to the nearbyhood of the water moat and to pull pontoons with them. On the roofs of residential buildings, adjacent to the Fort, Germans placed machine guns. In the orchards Germans placed heavy and light mortars. After the first boat launched on the water was riddled by fire of Polish machine guns, wherein several engineers were wounded or killed, commander of the I. platoon of 2. infantry company decided to cross the moat along the south-western section, on the left wing of 3. infantry company. Movement under the cover of orchards was carried out without problems.
Along this sections engineers initially managed to pass three infantry squads across the moat, and later, very rapidly, entire 3. infantry company and part of the 4. company of heavy machine guns. During the further attack along the rampart of the Fort Germans suffered heavy losses: they were under fire not only from the barracks of the Fort, but also from houses adjacent to the Fort.
Until 7:30 AM Germans managed to seize the rampart of the Fort, but major part of the Polish garrison, which was in the barracks, continued to resist.
II. battalion of Inf.Rgt.10, occupying handy positions 700 meters from the bridge near the road to Powsinek, since the beginning of the assault encountered heavy resistance of the Poles: a machine gun nest, prepared by them in front of the bridge across Vistula, was covering with fire the road to Wilanow. Attacking in front of the II. battalion, II. and III. platoons of 3. company of engineers, using grenades, were supporting the infantry. Only at 9:00 AM when the Polish machine gun nest on the bridge was destroyed, assault groups from the III. platoon of engineers crossed the bridge and joined to the 2. company of engineers, which was overcoming the resistance of Poles defending the barracks.
So until 9:00 AM Germans cleaned from the defenders the southern part of Fort's rampart. The seizure of the entire Fort was impossible due to fire carried out from casemates of the central barracks and from nearby houses.
Concluding that attacking the barracks from the north would cost the Germans lots of casualties, commander of Pioneer-Bataillon 88. ordered the commander of II. platoon to blow up the barracks, starting the preparations to blow them up from the exposed wall and the outer part of the brick ceiling.
Blowing up the coverage of the barracks was judged as pointless because the high layer of ground and thick layer of stone cover were a good protection from the impact of explosion.
The attempt of blowing up the western facade of the barracks with use of 30 kg of explosives failed. The wall cracked, but was not pierced. With another explosion of 100 kg charge Germans managed to make a breach of about 1 meter diameter in the wall. Further two similar charges were planted, 50 meters from each other, but Poles continued to resist, trying to prevent further German explosive works with use of hand grenades.
Germans were throwing hand grenades, using flamethrowers against wells of ventilation and breaches appearing after explosions of charges, they were also throwing smoke candles into them.
At 11:00 AM commander of Inf.Rgt.10 ordered to withdraw all infantry units from the area of the Fort, leaving only one company of heavy machine guns and one platoon of infantry support weapons to provide cover for the engineers. At the same time he ordered the commander of Pioneer-Bataillon 88. to blow up the Fort.
At 12:00 garrison of the Fort capitulated. 475 men, including 15 officers, were captured.
============================================================
So as can be seen while attacking forts, apart from huge superiority in military technology, Germans had also fourfold superiority in manpower and in case of Fort "Dabrowski" no smaller than sixfold.
Descriptions of combats for these three forts in Warsaw can be found in:
1) "Vierteljahreshefte fur Pioniere" No 1/1940 (Fort "Dabrowski")
2) "Pioniere im Kampf" by Obstl. Liere (Fort "Legionow" and Fort II)
3) "Deutscher Siegzug in Polen" by gen. Ernst Kabisch (Fort "Legionow" and Fort II)
Re: Pioniers im Kampf 1939 - 1940
Just for clarification: Fort "Dabrowski" = Fort IX. 
And when it comes to this episode from combats for Fort "Dabrowski" / Fort IX:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Janusz_Kusoci%C5%84ski
"Kusociński volunteered for the Polish army after Poland was attacked by the Germans and was wounded twice."
Capitulation of Fort "Dabrowski" was not the end of Kusociński's struggle against the German invader:
"During the German occupation he worked as a waiter, but was secretly a member of the Polish resistance.[1] Janusz Kusociński was arrested by the Gestapo on March 26, 1940 during the AB Action and imprisoned in Mokotów prison. He was executed three months later in Palmiry, near Warsaw."
===============================================
BTW - anybody knows how the hell Infanterie-Regiment 10. (from 4. Inf.Div.) found itself near Warsaw?!
Maybe sources confused the number of regiment?
And when it comes to this episode from combats for Fort "Dabrowski" / Fort IX:
J. Kusociński (who was among the defenders) and soldiers from his unit were responsible for this German failure:(...) An attempt, made by I. platoon, consisted of breaking through to the courtyard of the Fort across the bridge, under cover of heavy machine guns and light mortars fire. An assault group, which penetrated into the bridge, was almost completely wiped out by Polish fire. Also the second attempt did not succeed. (...)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Janusz_Kusoci%C5%84ski
"Kusociński volunteered for the Polish army after Poland was attacked by the Germans and was wounded twice."
Capitulation of Fort "Dabrowski" was not the end of Kusociński's struggle against the German invader:
"During the German occupation he worked as a waiter, but was secretly a member of the Polish resistance.[1] Janusz Kusociński was arrested by the Gestapo on March 26, 1940 during the AB Action and imprisoned in Mokotów prison. He was executed three months later in Palmiry, near Warsaw."
===============================================
BTW - anybody knows how the hell Infanterie-Regiment 10. (from 4. Inf.Div.) found itself near Warsaw?!
Maybe sources confused the number of regiment?
Re: Pioniers im Kampf 1939 - 1940
Fort "Legionow" (= Fort VIII = Fort "Słuzew"):
http://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fort_VIII_ ... y_Warszawa
Was defended by 3rd squadron of 9th uhlan regiment and a small infantry unit (probably some platoon).
http://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fort_IX_Twierdzy_Warszawa
http://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fort_VIII_ ... y_Warszawa
Was defended by 3rd squadron of 9th uhlan regiment and a small infantry unit (probably some platoon).
Fort "Dabrowski" = Fort "Czerniakow" = Fort IX:Just for clarification: Fort "Dabrowski" = Fort IX.
http://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fort_IX_Twierdzy_Warszawa
Re: Pioniers im Kampf 1939 - 1940
Everything above was based on German sources.
I've got also sources on combats for Fort "Czerniakow" (Fort IX) from the Polish POV this time.
NOW TIME FOR POLISH SOURCES on combats for Fort IX:
Polish sources say that Fort IX was occupied by Polish units (in the night from 25 to 26 September) as follows:
- platoon of ppor. rez. Jan Borowski from 3rd company of volunteer battalion "Ordona" of por. rez. J. Pietrzyk occupied the ridge of the Fort.
- platoon of this company under ppor. rez. Stanisław Domin and part of 1st company of II. battalion of 360. infantry regiment occupied the Fort and the three-storey apartment house protecting the entrance to the Fort.
- the remaining platoon from this 3rd company occupied the bridge leading to the Fort.
This shows that Germans overestimated the garrison of the Fort. It was by no mean a battalion. In fact garrison of the Fort consisted of 3. company of "Ordona" battalion and part of 1. company from 360 pp (infantry regiment).
So at best the garrison could number some 250 - 350 men. Certainly not 500 - 600 men.
In the locality Czerniaków itself, kpt. art. Konstanty Zbijewski with part of his 2nd volunteer battalion "Obrony Warszawy" decided to organize an independent resistance nest.
In the area of Siekierki was an infantry company of por. Zbigniew Hołyszewski from 15. Infantry Division.
And proper combats from the Polish point of view:
At 5:00 AM on 26 September Germans started an attack against the bridge (the one defended by Kusociński and attacked twice by German assault groups from I. platoon of enginners). There are two accounts:
Ppor. M. Gazicki described this as follows:
"I prohibited to open fire, in order to let the Germans cross the bridge. Only when they were on our side of the bridge, we opened fire from the distance of 50 meters. It cost the Germans a few dozens killed and wounded.
After some time Germans showered the Fort with fire of heavy mortars. The barrage lasted quite long, garrison of the Fort suffered heavy losses. At the same time the enemy attacked the bridge and the apartment house. The last one several times passed from hands to hands. After we finally lost the house, holding the bridge any longer was impossible. My counterattack failed. Germans penetrated into the top of the Fort. Scarcity of hand grenades was our weakest side while conducting close combat.
Finally Germans seized the top of the Fort. We quickly realized this neighborhood. Germans were throwing through wells of ventilation hand grenades, smoke candles and tear gas, causing unbearable conditions. Counterattacking against Germans at the top of the Fort didn't help, because we were not able to hold the recaptured ground because we were excellent targets for sharpshooters firing from windows of neighbouring houses there. Finally we resigned from recapturing the top of the Fort. Soldiers slowly accustomed to smoke candles and tear gas, helping each other by throwing smoking bullets through windows, etc. (...)"
Second account (repulsing the attack of assault groups across the bridge by Kusociński):
"From the direction of WIlanow, towards the bridge near Powsińska street enemy pressure is increasing. Another assault starts. Our outposts in the foreground are captured. Profiles of German soldiers can be seen yet around 30 - 40 meters from our positions. We currently have two heavy machine guns along this section. They constantly fire. Crews of machine guns have to change heated barrels during this assault. Suddenly the heavy machine gun of Janusz Kusociński stammers / jams. While other members of the crew of this HMG is pulling down and cleaning from sand jammed parts, trying to launch it again, Kusociński half-tilted from his post fires from his Vis pistol towards the crawling Germans. One moment later the heavy machine gun can fire again. Almost at the same moment Kusociński is wounded. Despite the yet second wound, he refuses to leave his post. But he has both of his thighs streaked through. He is not able to move on his own. Edward Fitan was in the garage near the Morszczynska street when some soldier came to ask him to help with carrying the wounded Kusociński. They put him on a blanket and carried to the garage. In the meantime Polish machine guns open cross fire towards the attackers. Germans suffer heavy losses and have to withdraw."
In this situation Germans started to fire at the Fort with their light and heavy mortars (from the orchards) and at the same time attacked the Polish three-storeyed apartment house. Close combats took place, often with use of bayonets and hand grenades. Soon the defenders ran out of grenades and Germans took the upper hand. They seized the apartment house, the second wooden bridge and penetrated into the top of the Fort:
Ppor. Gazicki writes about this: "Finally Germans seized the top of the Fort... " (see above).
Despite hopeless situation, the defenders continued to resist and waited for relief. At some point the defenders could hear hammering in the western part of the Fort - German engineers were planting charges.
Around 11:00 charges exploded. 2/3 of the Fort's casemates fell down, burying 3 officers and ca. 20 soldiers. Officers buried under the ruins were: pppor. rez. Jan Borowski, ppor. rez. Stanisław Domin and - from 1st company - ppor. rez. Mieczysław Cichowski.
Ppor. rez. M. Gazicki was lucky - he was unearthed from under the ruins. Wounded ppor. rez. J. Pietrzyk ordered ppor. Gazicki to break through through the German lines to the city with the remaining part of defenders, while at the same time taking the task of covering this withdrawal with heavy machine guns.
During the attempt of opening the gate of the Fort, 3 Polish soldiers were killed and Corporal Lewandowski was wounded. It was heard that Germans were again hammering something above the remaining part of the casemates.
Poles realized that Germans wanted to bury the defenders alive.
In such situation remnants of the 3rd company capitulated.
Ppor. rez. Gazicki managed to escape the Fort and break through to Warsaw with 35 soldiers.
Those who capitulated went to captivity:
Stefan Jaguścik's account:
"The moment of capitulation was tragic. To surrender? Or not to surrender? Some shout: Polish soldier is not surrendering, we fight to the last! Some stood near one wall, some near the other one. Those standing near the other wall shout: We are not surrendering. We are breaking through to Warsaw! They put on bayonets on their rifles, put hand grenades behind their belts and to their hands. One of officers observed the foreground with his binoculars - there were Germans hidden in the bushes there, and they had machine guns. The gate was opened. We saw the Germans and they saw us. Officer could see, that passing there was impossible. Nothing could pass there alive. We closed the gate. The situation was hopeless. Everybody took his rifle and tried to destroy the butt by hitting the ground. Soldiers were taking off cartridge belts, belts and throwing on the ground. Lieutenant Pietrzak, who was wounded, then fainted. Everybody was crying. I never heard and saw such cry before."
I've got also sources on combats for Fort "Czerniakow" (Fort IX) from the Polish POV this time.
NOW TIME FOR POLISH SOURCES on combats for Fort IX:
Polish sources say that Fort IX was occupied by Polish units (in the night from 25 to 26 September) as follows:
- platoon of ppor. rez. Jan Borowski from 3rd company of volunteer battalion "Ordona" of por. rez. J. Pietrzyk occupied the ridge of the Fort.
- platoon of this company under ppor. rez. Stanisław Domin and part of 1st company of II. battalion of 360. infantry regiment occupied the Fort and the three-storey apartment house protecting the entrance to the Fort.
- the remaining platoon from this 3rd company occupied the bridge leading to the Fort.
This shows that Germans overestimated the garrison of the Fort. It was by no mean a battalion. In fact garrison of the Fort consisted of 3. company of "Ordona" battalion and part of 1. company from 360 pp (infantry regiment).
So at best the garrison could number some 250 - 350 men. Certainly not 500 - 600 men.
In the locality Czerniaków itself, kpt. art. Konstanty Zbijewski with part of his 2nd volunteer battalion "Obrony Warszawy" decided to organize an independent resistance nest.
In the area of Siekierki was an infantry company of por. Zbigniew Hołyszewski from 15. Infantry Division.
And proper combats from the Polish point of view:
At 5:00 AM on 26 September Germans started an attack against the bridge (the one defended by Kusociński and attacked twice by German assault groups from I. platoon of enginners). There are two accounts:
Ppor. M. Gazicki described this as follows:
"I prohibited to open fire, in order to let the Germans cross the bridge. Only when they were on our side of the bridge, we opened fire from the distance of 50 meters. It cost the Germans a few dozens killed and wounded.
After some time Germans showered the Fort with fire of heavy mortars. The barrage lasted quite long, garrison of the Fort suffered heavy losses. At the same time the enemy attacked the bridge and the apartment house. The last one several times passed from hands to hands. After we finally lost the house, holding the bridge any longer was impossible. My counterattack failed. Germans penetrated into the top of the Fort. Scarcity of hand grenades was our weakest side while conducting close combat.
Finally Germans seized the top of the Fort. We quickly realized this neighborhood. Germans were throwing through wells of ventilation hand grenades, smoke candles and tear gas, causing unbearable conditions. Counterattacking against Germans at the top of the Fort didn't help, because we were not able to hold the recaptured ground because we were excellent targets for sharpshooters firing from windows of neighbouring houses there. Finally we resigned from recapturing the top of the Fort. Soldiers slowly accustomed to smoke candles and tear gas, helping each other by throwing smoking bullets through windows, etc. (...)"
Second account (repulsing the attack of assault groups across the bridge by Kusociński):
"From the direction of WIlanow, towards the bridge near Powsińska street enemy pressure is increasing. Another assault starts. Our outposts in the foreground are captured. Profiles of German soldiers can be seen yet around 30 - 40 meters from our positions. We currently have two heavy machine guns along this section. They constantly fire. Crews of machine guns have to change heated barrels during this assault. Suddenly the heavy machine gun of Janusz Kusociński stammers / jams. While other members of the crew of this HMG is pulling down and cleaning from sand jammed parts, trying to launch it again, Kusociński half-tilted from his post fires from his Vis pistol towards the crawling Germans. One moment later the heavy machine gun can fire again. Almost at the same moment Kusociński is wounded. Despite the yet second wound, he refuses to leave his post. But he has both of his thighs streaked through. He is not able to move on his own. Edward Fitan was in the garage near the Morszczynska street when some soldier came to ask him to help with carrying the wounded Kusociński. They put him on a blanket and carried to the garage. In the meantime Polish machine guns open cross fire towards the attackers. Germans suffer heavy losses and have to withdraw."
In this situation Germans started to fire at the Fort with their light and heavy mortars (from the orchards) and at the same time attacked the Polish three-storeyed apartment house. Close combats took place, often with use of bayonets and hand grenades. Soon the defenders ran out of grenades and Germans took the upper hand. They seized the apartment house, the second wooden bridge and penetrated into the top of the Fort:
Ppor. Gazicki writes about this: "Finally Germans seized the top of the Fort... " (see above).
Despite hopeless situation, the defenders continued to resist and waited for relief. At some point the defenders could hear hammering in the western part of the Fort - German engineers were planting charges.
Around 11:00 charges exploded. 2/3 of the Fort's casemates fell down, burying 3 officers and ca. 20 soldiers. Officers buried under the ruins were: pppor. rez. Jan Borowski, ppor. rez. Stanisław Domin and - from 1st company - ppor. rez. Mieczysław Cichowski.
Ppor. rez. M. Gazicki was lucky - he was unearthed from under the ruins. Wounded ppor. rez. J. Pietrzyk ordered ppor. Gazicki to break through through the German lines to the city with the remaining part of defenders, while at the same time taking the task of covering this withdrawal with heavy machine guns.
During the attempt of opening the gate of the Fort, 3 Polish soldiers were killed and Corporal Lewandowski was wounded. It was heard that Germans were again hammering something above the remaining part of the casemates.
Poles realized that Germans wanted to bury the defenders alive.
In such situation remnants of the 3rd company capitulated.
Ppor. rez. Gazicki managed to escape the Fort and break through to Warsaw with 35 soldiers.
Those who capitulated went to captivity:
Stefan Jaguścik's account:
"The moment of capitulation was tragic. To surrender? Or not to surrender? Some shout: Polish soldier is not surrendering, we fight to the last! Some stood near one wall, some near the other one. Those standing near the other wall shout: We are not surrendering. We are breaking through to Warsaw! They put on bayonets on their rifles, put hand grenades behind their belts and to their hands. One of officers observed the foreground with his binoculars - there were Germans hidden in the bushes there, and they had machine guns. The gate was opened. We saw the Germans and they saw us. Officer could see, that passing there was impossible. Nothing could pass there alive. We closed the gate. The situation was hopeless. Everybody took his rifle and tried to destroy the butt by hitting the ground. Soldiers were taking off cartridge belts, belts and throwing on the ground. Lieutenant Pietrzak, who was wounded, then fainted. Everybody was crying. I never heard and saw such cry before."
Re: Pioniers im Kampf 1939 - 1940
Thank you very much for those great complements Domen . Cheers. Raúl M .
. Cheers. Raúl M .Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.
Re: Pioniers im Kampf 1939 - 1940
Hello to all ; after a while here goes another interesting history dealing with the actions carried out by the Germans sappers........this time against the bridges along the Meuse River..................
The failed blow against the bridge over the river Maas in Venlo - May 10, 1940.
The 56 ID (Generalmajor Karl Kriebel) was part of the IX AK (General d. Inf. Geyer) subordinated to the 6 AOK of General d. Art v. Reichenau, when on May 9, 1940 at 13:45 hours received codeword for the alarm. To the left of the division it was to attack the Generalleutnant v. Briesen's 30. ID, while to the right opened a gap of about 30 kilometers to the area of Gennep, where was to attack the 256 ID, located on the south wing of the 18 AOK.
On May 10, 1940 the 56 ID crossed the Dutch border in a front of 25 kilometers, organized into three battle groups: On the right the IR 171 (Oberst Gottfried von Erdmannsdorff) advancing on Arcen, with support from the II. / AR 156, to the left the IR 192 (Oberst Ludwig Wolff) with main effort on Velden, with support from the I. / AR 156 (Hauptmann Theodor Friedmann). While the III. / IR 234 (Oberstlt. Gonell) was to lead a surprise attack on Venlo in order to seize the bridge over the River Meuse. The rest of the IR 234 (Oberstleutnant Adalbert Kratz) would continue as division reserve.
Sources: Geschichte der 56. Infanterie-Division 1938 – 1945.
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... n/56ID.htm
http://www.lobberich.de/aktuell/gn/2004/04-15.htm.
Cheers. Raúl M.
; after a while here goes another interesting history dealing with the actions carried out by the Germans sappers........this time against the bridges along the Meuse River..................The failed blow against the bridge over the river Maas in Venlo - May 10, 1940.
The 56 ID (Generalmajor Karl Kriebel) was part of the IX AK (General d. Inf. Geyer) subordinated to the 6 AOK of General d. Art v. Reichenau, when on May 9, 1940 at 13:45 hours received codeword for the alarm. To the left of the division it was to attack the Generalleutnant v. Briesen's 30. ID, while to the right opened a gap of about 30 kilometers to the area of Gennep, where was to attack the 256 ID, located on the south wing of the 18 AOK.
On May 10, 1940 the 56 ID crossed the Dutch border in a front of 25 kilometers, organized into three battle groups: On the right the IR 171 (Oberst Gottfried von Erdmannsdorff) advancing on Arcen, with support from the II. / AR 156, to the left the IR 192 (Oberst Ludwig Wolff) with main effort on Velden, with support from the I. / AR 156 (Hauptmann Theodor Friedmann). While the III. / IR 234 (Oberstlt. Gonell) was to lead a surprise attack on Venlo in order to seize the bridge over the River Meuse. The rest of the IR 234 (Oberstleutnant Adalbert Kratz) would continue as division reserve.
Sources: Geschichte der 56. Infanterie-Division 1938 – 1945.
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... n/56ID.htm
http://www.lobberich.de/aktuell/gn/2004/04-15.htm.
Cheers. Raúl M
.Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.
Re: Pioniers im Kampf 1939 - 1940
Hello to all ; more follows.........................
The failed blow against the bridge over the river Maas in Venlo - May 10, 1940.
As of November 17, 1939 the General Staff of the 56th ID began planning the attack on the bridge of Venlo. In late December 1939 the mission was assigned to the III. / IR 234. The mission was planned in the utmost secrecy and the Battalion Commander (Maj. Gonell) should memorize and destroy their orders. There were three assault groups as follows: one carried by train, another motorized and a third on bicycles, the latter two should take and secure the access to the bridge. Once over the bridge the train was to attack the positions of the Deurne Canal and the Peel from the rear.
At the end of January 1940 the III. / IR 234 was moved to Kaldenkirchen and its CP was established at the Kriekenbeck Castle. The code word for launching the attack would be 'Sofortiger Umzug'. On May 9, 1940 at 21.30 hours the locomotive of the special train departed from Kempen towards Krefeld where it hooked several wagons and continued to Lobberich where it arrived at 21:50 hours. In that station the company of Hauptmann Hildesheim took the train. At this time the total control of the operation was assumed by Oberstleutnant Meyer.
http://www.obras-del-alma.com/blog/?p=12346
Sources: Geschichte der 56. Infanterie-Division 1938 – 1945.
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... n/56ID.htm
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... n/56ID.htm
http://manfred-albersmann.de/pages/home ... irchen.php
http://www.lobberich.de/aktuell/gn/2004/04-15.htm
http://www.herdenking.nl/index.php?opti ... Itemid=657
Cheers. Raúl M.
; more follows.........................The failed blow against the bridge over the river Maas in Venlo - May 10, 1940.
As of November 17, 1939 the General Staff of the 56th ID began planning the attack on the bridge of Venlo. In late December 1939 the mission was assigned to the III. / IR 234. The mission was planned in the utmost secrecy and the Battalion Commander (Maj. Gonell) should memorize and destroy their orders. There were three assault groups as follows: one carried by train, another motorized and a third on bicycles, the latter two should take and secure the access to the bridge. Once over the bridge the train was to attack the positions of the Deurne Canal and the Peel from the rear.
At the end of January 1940 the III. / IR 234 was moved to Kaldenkirchen and its CP was established at the Kriekenbeck Castle. The code word for launching the attack would be 'Sofortiger Umzug'. On May 9, 1940 at 21.30 hours the locomotive of the special train departed from Kempen towards Krefeld where it hooked several wagons and continued to Lobberich where it arrived at 21:50 hours. In that station the company of Hauptmann Hildesheim took the train. At this time the total control of the operation was assumed by Oberstleutnant Meyer.
http://www.obras-del-alma.com/blog/?p=12346
Sources: Geschichte der 56. Infanterie-Division 1938 – 1945.
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... n/56ID.htm
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... n/56ID.htm
http://manfred-albersmann.de/pages/home ... irchen.php
http://www.lobberich.de/aktuell/gn/2004/04-15.htm
http://www.herdenking.nl/index.php?opti ... Itemid=657
Cheers. Raúl M
.Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.
Re: Pioniers im Kampf 1939 - 1940
Hello to all ; more follows.........................
The failed raid against the bridge over the river Maas in Venlo - May 10, 1940.
Die "motorisierte Abteilung' (The motorized detachment).
The Saxons sappers had planned an operation quasi adventurous in order to carry out the foreseen raid. On May 9, 1940, in the afternoon, they had captured, on the road, three Dutch trucks which brought vegetables from Venlo to the large market of Duisburg. The cargo consisted mainly of lettuce and asparagus, which was unloaded in the Klaashof at Hinsbeck and then sold in the local market in Krefeld. With those empty trucks the detachment were motorized for fulfilling the assault. On May 10, 1940 at 04:00 hours, 60 Germans sappers of the Pi Btl 156 left the Klaashof led by Leutnant Hertel and less than two hours afterwards ten of them had fallen in action, including the leader of the detachment.
Sources: Geschichte der 56. Infanterie-Division 1938 – 1945.
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... n/56ID.htm
http://manfred-albersmann.de/pages/home ... irchen.php
http://www.lobberich.de/aktuell/gn/2004/04-15.htm
http://www.herdenking.nl/index.php?opti ... Itemid=657
Cheers. Raúl M.
; more follows.........................The failed raid against the bridge over the river Maas in Venlo - May 10, 1940.
Die "motorisierte Abteilung' (The motorized detachment).
The Saxons sappers had planned an operation quasi adventurous in order to carry out the foreseen raid. On May 9, 1940, in the afternoon, they had captured, on the road, three Dutch trucks which brought vegetables from Venlo to the large market of Duisburg. The cargo consisted mainly of lettuce and asparagus, which was unloaded in the Klaashof at Hinsbeck and then sold in the local market in Krefeld. With those empty trucks the detachment were motorized for fulfilling the assault. On May 10, 1940 at 04:00 hours, 60 Germans sappers of the Pi Btl 156 left the Klaashof led by Leutnant Hertel and less than two hours afterwards ten of them had fallen in action, including the leader of the detachment.
Sources: Geschichte der 56. Infanterie-Division 1938 – 1945.
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... n/56ID.htm
http://manfred-albersmann.de/pages/home ... irchen.php
http://www.lobberich.de/aktuell/gn/2004/04-15.htm
http://www.herdenking.nl/index.php?opti ... Itemid=657
Cheers. Raúl M
.Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.
Re: Pioniers im Kampf 1939 - 1940
Hello to all ; more follows.........................
The failed raid against the bridge over the river Maas in Venlo - May 10, 1940.
Die Sonderzug "Gruppe Hildesheim" (The special train - Group Hildesheim).
Shortly after 05:30 hours special train rolled by the station of Kaldenkirchen coming from Lobberich. It was carrying an assault detachment of about 100 men of the III. / IR 234, belonging to the 56. ID and some soldiers of the 3. Platoon, 6. Grenzwachtkompanie acting as guides. At 05:35 hours the train crossed the border, crossed the station of Venlo and headed for the bridge located behind it. Once there the detachment was to capture the bridge intact and hold him until the arrival of the bulk of the III. / IR 234, but the operation failed. Overnight the tracks coming from Kaldenkirchen were blocked by means of the track's changes, therefore the road to the bridge was blocked.
South Casamata at Blerick
Sources: Geschichte der 56. Infanterie-Division 1938 – 1945.
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... n/56ID.htm
http://manfred-albersmann.de/pages/home ... irchen.php
http://www.lobberich.de/aktuell/gn/2004/04-15.htm
http://www.herdenking.nl/index.php?opti ... Itemid=657
Cheers. Raúl M.
; more follows.........................The failed raid against the bridge over the river Maas in Venlo - May 10, 1940.
Die Sonderzug "Gruppe Hildesheim" (The special train - Group Hildesheim).
Shortly after 05:30 hours special train rolled by the station of Kaldenkirchen coming from Lobberich. It was carrying an assault detachment of about 100 men of the III. / IR 234, belonging to the 56. ID and some soldiers of the 3. Platoon, 6. Grenzwachtkompanie acting as guides. At 05:35 hours the train crossed the border, crossed the station of Venlo and headed for the bridge located behind it. Once there the detachment was to capture the bridge intact and hold him until the arrival of the bulk of the III. / IR 234, but the operation failed. Overnight the tracks coming from Kaldenkirchen were blocked by means of the track's changes, therefore the road to the bridge was blocked.
South Casamata at Blerick
Sources: Geschichte der 56. Infanterie-Division 1938 – 1945.
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... n/56ID.htm
http://manfred-albersmann.de/pages/home ... irchen.php
http://www.lobberich.de/aktuell/gn/2004/04-15.htm
http://www.herdenking.nl/index.php?opti ... Itemid=657
Cheers. Raúl M
.Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.
Re: Pioniers im Kampf 1939 - 1940
Hello to all ; the end.........................
The failed raid against the bridge over the river Maas in Venlo - May 10, 1940.
Assault on the bridge.
While the German railroad personnel dealt to open the tracks, the detachment of Leutnant Hertel continued its march. At 05:00 hours the motorized detachment (Hertel) crossed the border smoothly by the post at Niederdorf. Changing direction several times the three trucks arrived at Venlo Bridge at 05:52 hours. Once in place and seeing that the raid of Group Hildesheim had failed Leutnant Hertel launched the assault with 9 of his sappers.
As he moved received heavy fire from the defenders but still managed to reach the middle of the bridge and once there tried to cut the ignition wire. But Corporal Bieser (Dutch) observed the maneuver and activated the mechanism of destruction so the bridge flew through the air killing the Germans who were on it. Another five sappers who tried to reinforce the first group were seriously injured and two others flew and fell into the river, but swam to the west bank and remained hidden until the arrival of the German forces.
http://historie.venlo.nl/gebeurtenisinf ... enisID=210
German troops marching through Blerick............
Sources: Geschichte der 56. Infanterie-Division 1938 – 1945.
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... n/56ID.htm
http://manfred-albersmann.de/pages/home ... irchen.php
http://www.lobberich.de/aktuell/gn/2004/04-15.htm
http://www.herdenking.nl/index.php?opti ... Itemid=657
It's all folks. Cheers. Raúl M.
; the end.........................The failed raid against the bridge over the river Maas in Venlo - May 10, 1940.
Assault on the bridge.
While the German railroad personnel dealt to open the tracks, the detachment of Leutnant Hertel continued its march. At 05:00 hours the motorized detachment (Hertel) crossed the border smoothly by the post at Niederdorf. Changing direction several times the three trucks arrived at Venlo Bridge at 05:52 hours. Once in place and seeing that the raid of Group Hildesheim had failed Leutnant Hertel launched the assault with 9 of his sappers.
As he moved received heavy fire from the defenders but still managed to reach the middle of the bridge and once there tried to cut the ignition wire. But Corporal Bieser (Dutch) observed the maneuver and activated the mechanism of destruction so the bridge flew through the air killing the Germans who were on it. Another five sappers who tried to reinforce the first group were seriously injured and two others flew and fell into the river, but swam to the west bank and remained hidden until the arrival of the German forces.
http://historie.venlo.nl/gebeurtenisinf ... enisID=210
German troops marching through Blerick............
Sources: Geschichte der 56. Infanterie-Division 1938 – 1945.
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... n/56ID.htm
http://manfred-albersmann.de/pages/home ... irchen.php
http://www.lobberich.de/aktuell/gn/2004/04-15.htm
http://www.herdenking.nl/index.php?opti ... Itemid=657
It's all folks. Cheers. Raúl M
.Serás lo que debas ser o no serás nada. General José de San Martín.